Last weekend I wrote,
The administration seems to be applying a tacit blackmail stratagem at the US: “if you push hard on my war on drugs, then we will shift allegiance to China!”
It’s not tacit anymore.
From today’s headlines (Inquirer):
PRESIDENT Duterte said on Monday he wanted U.S. forces out of his country’s south and blamed America for the restiveness of Muslim militants in the region, marking the first time he publicly opposed the presence of American troops in the country.
Duterte has had an uneasy relationship with the U.S. since becoming president in June and has been openly critical of American security policies. As a candidate, he declared he would chart a foreign policy that would not depend on America, his country’s treaty ally.
The U.S. military in 2002 deployed troops to train, advise and provide intelligence and weapons to Filipino troops battling the al-Qaida-linked Abu Sayyaf militants in the southern Philippines. When the American forces withdrew in February last year, U.S. officials said a smaller contingent of U.S. military advisers would stay. Details of the current U.S. military presence in the south were not immediately available.
Duterte did not mention any deadline or say how he intends to pursue his wishes. The U.S. Embassy did not immediately issue any reaction.
(bold mine)
I’m all for “independent foreign policy” and “non intervention”, but then again that’s not the real issue. It’s a smokescreen. The main issue has been the ochlocratic ad hominem (path to dictatorship) politics that has now been reinforced through “geopolitical blackmail”.
Actions have consequences.
In the same weekend note I observed: “much will now depend on the feedback mechanism between the parties involved as with those associated with them.”
If the Philippine government makes real of the threat to undermine the interests of the shadow but powerful and highly influential political forces behind Washington—the neo-conservative and military industrial complex—then potential responses or repercussions may have already been set in motion. To repeat:
-This would eventually prompt US rating agencies credit downgrades—especially if US military interests are compromised.
-This would reduce investment and portfolio flows from US and allied nations.
-Credit flows will likely ebb too, thereby putting pressure on access to international credit markets and thereby tightening financing conditions. This will be baneful to a leftist government with a penchant for political spending profligacy: social spending (welfare state), bureaucracy, infrastructure, and most importantly, the military institution.
The reduced access to credit and fund flows will likely accelerate on the unraveling of the mounting economic and financial imbalances inherited by this government from the previous two regimes.
-The Philippine government will be alone to deal with territorial disputes. (This should be a good thing if only the Philippines government’s response would be to increase trade rather than through brinkmanship politics)
-Finally, it would be a lot cheaper or cost effective for the US government to engage in covert operations to influence the domestic political environment than to pullout from the country. The US government may surreptitiously work to offset whatever leverage the administration has been building to countermand the US government’s influences in the country. The US government has been no stranger to the financing, influencing and orchestrating destabilization to regimes it perceives as hostile to its interests. Operation Gladio should be stark reminder.
Unpredictable behavior?
Leftist governments virtually operate on the same set of actions
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