``There are no facts, only interpretations”-Friedrich Nietzche
However, the bulls equally dismiss on the subsequent 2001 tech bust as an “outlier” event for having the infamous 9/11 to “unjustifiably” weigh on the circumstances. Such argument we believe is selective perception or ``how we view our world to create or justify our own reality (Sherif & Cantril, 1945)”.
In essence, the bulls argue that in the realm of probability distributions, given the high success ratio of monetary policy actions as reflected by the market gains in the aftermath, the probability is thus weighted to favor market gains under the present circumstances.
Figure 3: Economagic: Reprise of 2001 “Outlier”?
Effectively, based on the dimensions of technical readings alone, the
But given such developments, should we then join bandwagon? Not so fast, I believe.
The tech bust in 2001 appears to have manifested a parallel repertoire when the FED initiated its policy changes then.
In January 3, 2001 the FED “surprised” the market as it lowered its FED FUND rates by 50 basis points to begin its “preemptive” campaign to fight deflationary forces.
The US equity markets went into fabulous hyperdrive: the Dow sprung by 300 points or 2.8%, the S & P 500 zoomed by 5% (!!) or 64.9 points and even astonishingly the Nasdaq whizzed skywards by 14.17% (!!!) or 324.83 points. Again, notice of scale of gains by the
Unfortunately such burst of adrenalin wavered as the one-day gains were wiped out in the coming sessions see figure 3.
In addition, the same chart tells us that the 9/11 outlier event argument occurred when the
Thus, since the 9/11’s relationship was COINCIDENTAL rather than CAUSAL, writing off the 2001 equation from the probability list was unwarranted.
Nonetheless, the basic difference between 2001 and today is that the
In figure 4, ALL policy changes (inflection points shown by the red line) SUBSEQUENT to or DURING recessions, marked by the red shadows, saw the
In other words, the defining contrast of the probability distribution, following the FED rate cuts, SHOULD BE IF A
One should be reminded that each of the said periods had distinct or dissimilar dynamics which influenced the financial markets then. And should NOT be lumped and generalized as similar with that of today.
Whether the markets will do a rhythmical reprise of 1998 as discussed in our August 13 to 17 edition (see US Markets: Unlikely A Reprise of 1998) or that of a 2001 appears to be a 50-50 odds given the above facts.
Assigning greater odds to a positive outcome is similar to a gambler’s fallacy (wikipedia.org), ``where the random event is the throw of a die or the spin of a roulette wheel, gamblers will risk money on their belief in "a run of luck" or a mistaken understanding of "the law of averages". It often arises because a similarity between random processes is mistakenly interpreted as a predictive relationship between them.”
A gambler’s fallacy can be exemplified by coin tosses. If a coin has been flipped five times and comes up with a series of “heads”, then the usual bet for the next toss would that of a “tail” since people would be inclined to think that the “law of averages” could deliver a “tail” outcome. But this ignores the fact that coin flipping is a 50-50 odds where each “flip” is INDEPENDENT of the results of the previous tosses, hence the fallacy.
So in the present environment where the recession prospects is a RISK concern, it would appear that as the chart shows, if the US falls into a recession the market goes down while if it escapes recession it could go up. In short, a 50-50 odds.
Now when bullish commentaries tells us that the previous streaks of rate cuts ended with a positive return, we understand these as prognosis shaded with a confirmation bias. And when they introduce probabilities using the same data in support of such claims, we also understand these as forecasting based on a gambler’s fallacy.
The bullish or bearish outcome will depend on a myriad of interacting factors such as the resolution of the bottlenecks in the global credit system, the reappearance of risk taking appetite, a return of confidence to the global financial markets, the strength of the global economy, the resiliency of the heavily levered US economy, the fate of the US dollar, political risks as growing protectionist sentiment and many, many more…