In the war on drugs, the dividing line between prosecuting criminals and becoming part of the crime becomes indistinct
From the New York Times (bold emphasis mine)
Undercover American narcotics agents have laundered or smuggled millions of dollars in drug proceeds as part of Washington’s expanding role in Mexico’s fight against drug cartels, according to current and former federal law enforcement officials.
The agents, primarily with the Drug Enforcement Administration, have handled shipments of hundreds of thousands of dollars in illegal cash across borders, those officials said, to identify how criminal organizations move their money, where they keep their assets and, most important, who their leaders are.
They said agents had deposited the drug proceeds in accounts designated by traffickers, or in shell accounts set up by agents.
The officials said that while the D.E.A. conducted such operations in other countries, it began doing so in Mexico only in the past few years. The high-risk activities raise delicate questions about the agency’s effectiveness in bringing down drug kingpins, underscore diplomatic concerns about Mexican sovereignty, and blur the line between surveillance and facilitating crime. As it launders drug money, the agency often allows cartels to continue their operations over months or even years before making seizures or arrests…
It is not clear whether such operations are worth the risks. So far there are few signs that following the money has disrupted the cartels’ operations, and little evidence that Mexican drug traffickers are feeling any serious financial pain. Last year, the D.E.A. seized about $1 billion in cash and drug assets, while Mexico seized an estimated $26 million in money laundering investigations, a tiny fraction of the estimated $18 billion to $39 billion in drug money that flows between the countries each year.
And in the pretext to trap the criminals for evidence, officials themselves induce or encourage the engagement of such ‘criminal’ activities.
Yet the article does not only skim over any potential conflict of interests and the increased possibility of corruption that emerges from the aforementioned police operations, but also ignores the skewed priorities undertaken by officials in following the drug money which leads to more crimes.
Nevertheless what has been obvious is that the war on drugs has been a massive failure. Instead, the war on drugs has resulted to the swelling of the drug trade and surging number of drug related deaths.
Chart from Professor Mark Perry
Drug money laundering by US authorities has corrupted many officials. This can be deduced from the enormous difference between seizures and drug money flows, considering that US narcotics agents have functioned as significant operatives for drug laundering operations.
Corruption is the innate socio-economic response to any prohibition laws, be it drug, alcohol or anti-mining laws or etc…
As Professor Mark Thornton writes, (The Economics of Prohibition, p.131)
Corruption is a function of the price of the prohibited product. As enforcement increases, the price of a prohibited product and the costs of avoiding detection rise relative to the basic costs of production. We should expect that suppliers would be willing to pay to reduce their risk. A higher price involves both a greater risk of apprehension and a greater incentive to provide monetary payments to public officials.
As enforcement increases, the risk of apprehension rises and the quantity of output decreases. The divergence between price and the basic costs of production increases. Increased enforcement therefore increases the ratio of costs of risk to the cost of production. The result is an increased profit opportunity for entrepreneurship in avoiding detection. Many avenues exist by which entrepreneurs can reduce detection risks. They can use faster boats and planes, smaller and easier-to-conceal products, or deceptive packaging. One way to shift the burden of risk is to corrupt the public officials charged with the enforcement of prohibition. As enforcement efforts increase, corruption (like potency) will gain a comparative advantage in avoiding detection over transportation, technology, and deception.
We therefore expect corruption to increase with increased enforcement efforts, whether or not total revenues in the industry increase. This assumes that the underlying demand for the product, penalties for both prohibition and corruption, and the efforts to reduce corruption are held constant.
So the unstated motto of US drug officials seem to be “if you can’t beat them, join them”, just camouflage them with entrapment operations.
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