US Dollar Carry Fuels ASEAN Stock Market Boom

Now my themes on the current market actions in the ASEAN markets appear to be gradually gaining acceptance among a few perceptive observers.

While I call it arbitrages from policy divergences, they call it US dollar Carry Trade. Point is policy divergences of developed economies and emerging markets have incentivized cross-border capital flows that has helped pumped up asset prices (asset inflation).

Here is a terse excerpt from Howard Simons... (bold highlights mine/charts Minyanville.com)

``If it seems like the cheap dollar is propelling Thai stocks higher relative to US stocks, it is. Now let’s duplicate the exercise with another one of 1997’s chalk outlines on the pavement, the Philippines.

``The song remains the same: Filipino stocks have been feasting on cheap dollars; just borrow the USD, lend the PHP, rinse and repeat. The Philippines actually get a twofer for our policies as the stimulus increases demand for Filipino expatriate workers throughout the region; their remittances are one of the top sources of export earnings for the nation.”

Carry trade is seen from the perspective of foreign money flows INTO the ASEAN markets. Of course, NOT all trades are foreign based. In fact, foreign money account for less than half of the overall trade. This implies that the other important half is the domestic business cycle at play.

What this points to is that those who insist that this run up is about economic success or political endorsement or positive micro fundamental developments will one day get a RUDE awakening.

For now enjoy the party!

How Myths As Market Guide Can Lead To Catastrophe

``This is how humans are: we question all our beliefs, except for the ones we really believe, and those we never think to question.” -Orson Scott Card

If I told you that the global financial markets have been simply looking for reasons to correct from its overbought position, would you buy this argument?

For many the answer is no. People look for news to fill this vacuum or what is known as a “last illusion bias” or “the belief that someone must know what is going on[1]”.

Because it is the proclivity of man to seek more complicated explanations, the Occam Razor’s rule[2]-the simplest solution is usually the correct one- is usually perceived as inadequate. Yet even if profit taking is a real phenomenon on the individual level, outside of the realm of statistics or news linkages, this is usually deemed as inconceivable by an information starved mind.

I would surmise that such a human dynamic could be a function of esteem based reputational incentives, or the need to seek self-comfort in being seen as “sophisticated”.

And stumbling from one cognitive bias to another, this camp usually associates cause and effects to “availability heuristic” or what we simplistically call “available bias” or the practice of “estimating the frequency of an event according to the ease with which the instances of the event can be recalled”[3]. And this is so prevalent in newspaper based accounts of how the markets performed over a given period.

Though we can’t discount some influences from news on a day-to-day basis, they may contribute to what we call as “noise”, since they represent tangential forces that are distant to the genuine “signals” that truly undergirds market actions.

In other words, people frequently mistake noise for signals.

And worst, for financial market practitioners scourged by an innate “dogma” bias, a characteristic seen among the extremes, particularly in the Pollyanna and Perma Bear camps, the attempt to connect the cause and effects of market actions and the political economy is largely predicated on spotty reasoning; specifically what I call as “Cart Before the Horse” reasoning - where X is the desired conclusion, therefore event A results to X.

This can actually be read as combining both logical fallacies (Begging the Question and Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc) and cognitive biases, particularly Belief bias or the “evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by their belief in the truth or falsity of the conclusion[4]”, from which they apply behavioral decision making errors by selective perception or choosing data that fits into their desired conclusion (while omitting the rest), by the focusing effect or placing too much emphasis on one or two aspects of an event (at the expense of the aspects) and by the Blind Spot bias or reasoning that fails to account of their personal prejudices.

In short, the deliberate misperception of reality is a representation of distorted beliefs on how the world ought to be.

Clearing Cobwebs Of Cognitive Biases and Logical Fallacies

Let apply this into today’s market actions.

In the US equity markets, the bulls have fallen short of SEVEN CONSECUTIVE[5] weeks of broad market gains following Friday’s SEC-Goldman Sachs related sell-off as the week closed mixed for key US bellwethers.

The S&P 500 was the sole spoiler among the big three benchmark, where the Dow Jones Industrials and the technology rich Nasdaq still managed to tally seven straight weeks of advances (despite Google’s 7.59% loss prior to the Goldman Sach’s news).

Yet in spite of Friday’s selloffs, the week-on-week performance by the different sectors constituting the S&P had been also been mixed (see figure 1).

Figure 1 US Global Investor: Weekly Sectoral Performance and stockcharts.com: S&P 500 Financial Sector

This means that while Friday’s market selloff had been broad based, it wasn’t enough to reverse the general trend over the broader market, even considering the largely overheated pace of the ascent for the overall markets. Yes, we have been expecting a correction[6] and perhaps this could be the start of the natural phase of any market cycle.

Moreover, while the SEC-Goldman Sachs (explanation in the below article) news may have triggered the selloff on Friday, the largest loss over the week had been in the materials and telecom sectors with the Financial, where Goldman Sachs belongs, took up the fourth position.

Considering that the S&P Financial Index took a severe drubbing on Friday (down 3.81%-see left window), this only exhibits that the sector’s muted loss on a weekly basis had been an outcome of an earlier steep climb or an upside spike!

In short, in whatever technical indicator (MACD, moving averages, or Relative Strength Index) one would look at, the US financial sector has been severely in overstretched and overbought conditions which have been looking for the right opportunity for a snapback. Apparently, the SEC-Goldman event merely provided the window for this to happen.

Perma Bears: Broken Clock Is Right Twice A Day

Now for the Perma bear camp, whom have been nearly entirely wrong since the crash of 2008, seems to have nestled on the current hoopla over the SEC-Goldman Sachs as the next issue to bring the house down.

And like a broken clock that is right only twice a day, never has it occurred to them that since markets don’t move in a straight line, they can be coincidentally ‘right’ for misplaced causal reasons.

Their horrible track record in projecting a market crash early this year predicated on the US dollar carry trade bubble and the Greek Debt Crisis has only manifested events to the contrary of their expectation in terms of both the markets and the political economy. Instead, what seem to be happening are the scenarios which we have had pointed out[7].

Here is Oxford Analytica on the US dollar carry trade[8], ``As financial markets possess a demonstrable tendency to overshoot expectations, the carry trade probably is stoking market euphoria in certain places. However, this may only be partially significant, as underlying fundamentals still inform a large cross-section of investment activities.” (bold emphasis mine).

As you can see the deepening lack of correlation, which highlights on the glaring lapses in causality linkages, from which the 2008 crash became a paradigm for the mainstream, is now being accepted as “reality”. The rear-view mirror syndrome or the anchoring bias is becoming exposed as what it is: A fundamental heuristical flaw, which cosmetically had been supported by misleading reasoning.

And as for the Greek Tragedy, the resolution is increasingly becoming a bailout option. Writes the Businessweek-Bloomberg, ``The euro may receive a temporary boost to $1.38 when Greece accesses a 45 billion euro ($61 billion) bailout plan before traders reestablish bets that the shared currency will decline, according to UBS AG.[9]”

And Morgan Stanley’s Joachim Fels, who among the mainstream analysts we respect, decries the prospective action, ``The bail-out and the ECB's softer collateral stance set a bad precedent for other euro area member states and make it more likely that the euro area degenerates into a zone of fiscal profligacy, currency weakness and higher inflationary pressures over time.[10]” (bold highlights mine)

The difference between us and Mr. Fels is that we look at the political incentives that impels the decision making process of policymakers-where the default option or the path dependency by any government, in a world of central banking, has been towards inflationism as recourse to any critical economic problem.

And Mr. Fels appears to be reading the market along our lines.

Price inflation, which Mr. Fels warns of, is starting to creep higher and becoming more manifest even in economies that have been expected to have lesser impact from inflation due to more monetary constraints, such as the Eurozone (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Danske Bank: Will Nasty Inflation Challenge the ECB?

The Danske team, led by Allan von Mehren, expects an inflation surprise[11] to challenge the European Central Bank (ECB) based on 3 factors, rising oil prices, rising food prices and depreciating Euro.

For us, these factors are merely symptoms of the political actions and not the source of inflation.

And for those plagued by the said dogmatic biases, they keep repeatedly asking the wrong question-“where is inflation?”-even when (corporate and sovereign) bonds, commodities, stocks, derivatives and most market signals have been pointing to inflation, across the world.

The fact that inflation is in positive territory for most economies, already dismisses such a highly flawed argument.

Yet, the narrowed focus or the ‘focusing effect’ or excessive tunneling on business or industrial credit take-up or unemployment rates or on rangebound sovereign yields (particularly in the US) purposely disregards the fact that inflation is a political process.

Government which resorts to the printing press as the ultimate means to resolve economic predicaments can only reduce the purchasing value of every existing currency from the introduction of new ones.

Tea Parties As Signs Of The Reemergence Of The Bond Vigilantes

In addition, such outlook neglects the fact that

-inflation has existed even during high period of unemployment rates as in the 70s,

-consumer credit isn’t the principal cause of inflation but intractable government spending and

-as argued last week, governments will opt to sustain low interest rates (even if it means manipulating them-e.g. quantitative easing) as a policy because ``governments through central banks always find low interest rates as an attractive way to finance their spending through borrowing instead of taxation, thereby favor (or would be biased for) extended period of low interest rates.[12]”

Moreover, for a population with a deepening culture of dependency on government welfare programs, the inclination is to accelerate government spending[13] in order to keep up with public demands for more welfarism. And this can only be funded by borrowing, inflation, and taxes in that pecking order.

Why taxes as the lowest priority? Because to quote Professor Gary North[14], ``Politicians fear a taxpayer revolt. Such a revolt is unlikely until investors cease buying Treasury debt. For as long as the government can run deficits at low interest rates, that is how long they will continue.”

The ballooning Tea Party in the US, for instance, which reportedly accounts for 15-25% of the population is relatively a new spontaneously organized political movement that has apparently emerged in response to the prospects of significantly higher taxes.

For the politically and economically blinded progressives to demean this as “superficial” accounts for as utter myopia. How superficial is it to resist a runaway government spending spree, which should translate to prospective higher taxes and or lower standards of living via inflation?

As author and Professor Steven Landsburg rightly argues[15], ``Once the money is spent, the bill must eventually come due—and there’s nobody around to foot that bill except the taxpayers. We are locked into higher current spending and therefore locked into higher future taxes. The president hasn’t lowered taxes; he’s raised and then deferred them. To say otherwise is—let’s be blunt—a flat-out lie.” (bold highlights mine)

Instead, the superficiality should be applied to the fabled belief that government spending and inflationism will account for society’s prosperity. Name a country over human history that has prospered from the printing press or inflationism?!

Hence, the emergence of the Tea party movement appears to sow the seeds of a taxpayer revolt, or as seen in the market, the soft resurfacing of the long absence in the bond vigilantes, who could be simply waiting at the corner to pounce on the policy mistakes based on the delusions of grandeur by charlatan governing socialists and their followers, at the opportune moment.

Until the tea partiers gain a political upperhand, the deflation story is nothing but a justification to undertake more inflationism.

The Siren Song Of Inflation

Going back to the naïve outlook for deflation, the lack of borrowing from both domestic and overseas savings doesn’t close the inflation window, in fact it enhances it. This will entirely depend on manifold forces as culture, habit (or addiction)[16], time constancy of political sentiment and political tolerance and etc...and importantly, the attendant policies in response to the political demands.

Nevertheless, Morgan Stanley’s Spyros Andreopoulos enumerates why inflation is seemingly a siren song[17] for policymakers in dealing with a gargantuan and burgeoning debt problem.

From Mr. Andreopoulos (bold emphasis his, italics mine):

``Public debt overhang: The higher the outstanding amount of government debt, the greater the burden of servicing it. Hence, the temptation to inflate increases with the debt.

``Maturity of the debt: The longer the maturity of the debt, the easier it is for a government to reduce the real costs of debt service. To take an extreme example, if the maturity of the debt is zero - i.e., the entire stock of debt rolls every period - then it would be impossible to reduce the debt burden if yields respond immediately and fully to higher inflation. Hence, the longer the maturity of the debt, the greater the temptation to inflate.

``Currency denomination of the debt: Own currency debt can be inflated away easily. Foreign currency-denominated debt on the other hand cannot be inflated away. Worse, the currency depreciation that will be the likely consequence of higher inflation would make it more difficult to repay foreign currency debt: government tax revenues are in domestic currency, and the domestic currency would be worth less in foreign currency. So, the temptation to inflate increases with the share of debt denominated in domestic currency.

``Foreign versus domestic ownership of debt: The ownership of debt determines who will be affected by higher inflation. The higher the foreign ownership, the less will the fall in the real value of government debt affect domestic residents. This matters not least because only domestic residents vote in elections. Note that unlike domestic owners, foreign owners may not necessarily be interested in the real value of government debt since they consume goods in their own country. But they will nonetheless be affected by the inflation-induced depreciation. So, the temptation to inflate increases with the share of foreign ownership of the debt.

``Proportion of debt indexed to inflation: By construction, indexed debt cannot be inflated away. Hence, the higher the proportion of debt that is indexed to inflation, the lower the temptation to inflate.

``To these purely fiscal arguments we add another dimension, private sector indebtedness:

``Private sector debt overhang: An overlevered private sector may generate macroeconomic fragility and pose a threat to public balance sheets. Hence, high private debt also increases the incentive to inflate.

As per Mr. Andreopoulos perspective, there are many alluring technical reasons on why the political option is to inflate rather than adapt market based austerity or to allow market forces to clear up previous imbalances so as to move to the direction of equilibrium.

And combined with today’s prevailing economic dogma and direction of political leadership, the path dependency will most likely be in this direction.

Real Economic Progress And Deflation

None the less, real progress is characterized by increasing efficiency and technological advances that decreases costs of production and increases in output.

The result of which is a rising value of purchasing power of money or “deflation” (see figure 3) and not higher inflation which is the result of excessive government intervention.

Figure 3: AIER: Purchasing Power of the US dollar

This was mostly the case in the United States until the introduction of the US Federal Reserve in 1913, from which the US dollar has been on a steady decline or where the only thing constant today is to see the US dollar collapse in terms of purchasing power.

Going to the US government’s Bureau of Labor Statistics’ inflation calculator, $100 US dollars in 1913 is now only worth $4.55. That’s a loss of over 95%!

So aside from death and taxes, another thing certain in this world is that the value of paper money is headed to its intrinsic value-Zero[18]!

Yet it is funny how protectionists, who stubbornly argue about the “overvalued” currency of the US as the main source of her problem, have been only been asking for more of the same nostrums, instead of looking at WHY these has emerged on the first place.

Like in reading markets, belief in myths can be the greatest error that could lead to tremendous losses that investors can get entangled with.

As former US President John F. Kennedy once said, ``The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest, but the myth, persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic. Belief in myths allows the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought.”

---

[1] Wikipedia.org, List of cognitive biases

[2] Wikipedia.org, Occam Razor

[3] Taleb, Nassim Nicolas; Fooled By Randomness, p. 195, Random House

[4] Wikipedia.org, Belief Bias

[5] The emphasis on seven is meant to highlight the degree of overextension or overheating

[6] See US Stock Markets: Rising Tide Lifts Most Boats And Is Overbought

[7] For my earlier treatise on the US dollar carry bubble see What Has Pavlov’s Dogs And Posttraumatic Stress Got To Do With The Current Market Weakness?, and Why The Greece Episode Means More Inflationism for my discourse on the Greece crisis.

[8] Oxford Analytica; Dollar Carry Trade No Longer a Sure Bet, Researchrecap.com

[9] Businessweek, Greek Bailout in ‘Matter of Days” to Boost Euro, UBS Says, Bloomberg

[10] Fels, Joachim, Euro Wreckage Reloaded April 16, 2010, Morgan Stanley Global Economic Forum

[11] Mehren, Allan von; Euroland: Nasty inflation surprise will challenge ECB, Danske Bank

[12] See How Moralism Impacts The Markets

[13] See Where Is Deflation?

[14] North, Gary The Economics Of The Free Ride

[15] Landsburg, Steven; Tax Relief, Obama Style, thebigquestions.com

[16] See Influences Of The Yield Curve On The Equity And Commodity Markets

[17] Andreopoulos, Spyros; Debtflation Temptation

[18] See Paper Money On Path To Return To Intrinsic Value - ZERO

Why The Greece Episode Means More Inflationism

``The European capital market institutions would not be able (or even willing) to step up to the plate and negotiate a restructuring. The ECB is not allowed to. And the EC is not up to it. There is an alternative -- the IMF has specific experience in this regard. But, allowing the IMF in would be an admission that the Euro area has not quite made it as currency union. The IMF, given its historical origin with exchange rate mechanisms, would convey a message that the big Euro players would not like to see. It would tar the reputation of the Euro even if there are no contagion effects on other PIIGS. Moreover, allowing Greece out of the Euro (or kicking) it out would be even worse. That is why, I think, the Germans will pay up. They will pay to maintain the reputation of the Euro. Americans underestimate the commitment to the Euro.” –Paul Wachtel Thoughts on Greece's debt problems

Prior to last week’s intermission, we noted that like the Dubai debt crisis, the Greek dilemma would seem like a political issue more than an economic one and therefore, as we suggested, would be resolved politically.

And by politically, we meant that arguments for sound policies or by imposing harsh or rigorous discipline against a wayward member of the EU would be subordinate to the practice of inflationism.

And as per the mainstream, the most recent volatility in the global markets had been mostly attributed to either the prospects of a contagion from the risks of a Greece default or from the attempts of China to wring out inflation out of its system.

Nevertheless, we have not been convinced by verity of the alleged cause.

While key benchmarks across asset markets have indeed broadly deteriorated then, which somewhat did raise some worries on my part, the correlation and the supposed causation did not seem to square [see Global Market Rout: One Market, Two Tales].

If indeed there had been a generalized anxiety over a contagion of rising default risks from sovereign debts, then sovereign CDS AND sovereign YIELDS, aside from corporate and bank lending rates would have spiked altogether!

In addition, considering the scenario of a run from sovereign securities, the contagion should have been largely a regional dynamic and paper currencies would not have been seen as the safe shelter, since the major currencies of the world have all similarly afflicted by the same disease!

What happened instead was a palpable shift to the currency (US dollar) of the lesser affected nation (the US) which somewhat resembled a “flight to safety” paradigm of 2008. With the trauma from the recent crisis along with automatic stimulus response [as discussed in What Has Pavlov’s Dogs And Posttraumatic Stress Got To Do With The Current Market Weakness?] some have mistakenly labeled the recent events as the unwinding US dollar carry trade.

Yet, as CDS and yields went on the opposite course, Baltic stock markets soared and gold plummeted validating our observation that the precious metal, which has served as man’s money throughout the ages, has been exhibiting a tight correlation with the Euro or a proxy thereof, instead of deflation or inflation signs [see When Politics Ruled The Market: A Week Of Market Jitters]. This tight correlation appears to have been broken last week! (see figure 3)

Figure 3: stockcharts.com: Gold-Euro Break, US 10 Year Yield, JP Morgan Emerging Debt Fund

The contour of the Euro and Gold trendlines has been the same over the 6 months up until last week!

Since gold has served as lead indicator of asset markets since the depths of 2008, including the recent selloffs, any resumption of an upward trend by gold is likely to be signs that asset markets will be headed higher soon.

Ergo, Gold above 1,120 should likely serve as my trigger for a buy on equity markets.

Moreover the major US sovereign benchmark, the 10 year Treasury yield (TNX), in spite of the recent stock market setback has remained stubbornly high. Also the JP Emerging Market Debt Fund (JEMDX), in spite of the recent China and Greek jitters, remains buoyant.

In other words, those expecting a repeat of 2008 or of a deflation scenario appear to be in a wrongheaded direction.

What seems to be in place is that the markets seem to be looking for a reason to retrench or has been reacting to the discordant tones from the mixed messages transmitted by the political and bureaucratic authorities. In short, if markets had been recently buoyant out of a flood of global liquidity then qualms over a liquidity rollback appear to be the major concern.

Inherent Defects In The Euro

Any major liquidity rollback for developed economies would most likely be deferred, with the Greek and the PIIGS issues signifying as one of the principal reasons.

Remember since the PIIGS is a political issue then any attempt to resolve the Greek crisis will be political.

Professor Paul Wachtel in a New York University forum captures it best, ``It is not Greece, it is the Euro. A troubled small country can be shrugged off but a currency area is either whole or not. The Germans will pay up to keep the Euro area in tact.”

True. A united Europe has been a longstanding project since the close of World War II. Monetary integration has been in the works through the European Monetary System since March of 1979.

So the Euro isn’t just a symbolical currency that can easily be jettisoned, instead it is a sense of pride for the major European economies that make up the core of the European Union. Hence it won’t be easy to dismantle a pet project for Europe’s social democrats.

However since the Euro is another monetary experiment it comes with inherent flaws in it.

For instance, the inclusion of Greece to the European Union has effectively bestowed subsidy privileges to her by the European Central Bank (ECB) even prior to this crisis via an intraregion carry trade.

Where the interest rate spread of Greek sovereign instruments had been wide relative to core Euro members, European banks bought Greek bonds and used them as collateral to extract additional loans from the ECB. Spendthrift socialist Greece, in turn, took advantage of this easy access to money to fund lavish public expenditures.

As Philip Bagus explains, ``The banks buy the Greek bonds because they know that the ECB will accept these bonds as collateral for new loans. As the interest rate paid to the ECB is lower than the interest received from Greece, there is a demand for these Greek bonds. Without the acceptance of Greek bonds by the ECB as collateral for its loans, Greece would have to pay much higher interest rates than it does now. Greece is, therefore, already being bailed out.

``The other countries of the eurozone pay the bill. New euros are, effectively, created by the ECB accepting Greek government bonds as collateral. Greek debts are monetized, and the Greek government spends the money it receives from the bonds to secure support among its population.”

The latest US centered bubble exacerbated the carry trade and the intraregion subsidies of the PIIGS which eventually rendered European banks as highly sensitive to a PIIGS default (see figure 4).

Figure 4: Bloomberg: Shot Gun Wedding

According to Bloomberg’s Chart of the Day, ``Banks in Germany and France alone have a combined exposure of $119 billion to Greece and $909 billion to the four countries, according to data from the Bank for International Settlements. Overall, European banks have $253 billion in Greece and $2.1 trillion in the so-called PIGS.”

So not unlike the US, the European Union will most likely persist in subsidizing subprime PIIGS and the European banking system at the expense of the rest of its society.

And also not different from the US, the risks of unsustainable welfare states will likely be a part of the currency and asset equation.

NYU’s Mario Rizzo bluntly writes, ``People like to deny reality when it is unpleasant. This is not just a problem of bad leadership. It is a problem that goes to the heart of the fantasy world the typical voter lives in. Buy reality bites. Let’s see how it does so in the next few years.” (bold highlight mine)

Moreover, the underlying systemic subsidies incent European member state beneficiaries to expand spending. Obviously such feedback loop mechanism of incremental subsidies and deficit spending will ultimately be untenable.

Again from Philip Bagus, ``For the member states in the eurozone, the costs of reckless fiscal behavior can also, to some extent, be externalized. Any government whose bonds are accepted as collateral by the ECB can use this printing press to finance its expenditures. The costs of this strategy are partly externalized to other countries when the newly created money bids up prices throughout the monetary union.

``Each government has an incentive to accumulate higher deficits than the rest of the eurozone, because its costs can be externalized. Consequently, in the Eurosystem there is an inbuilt tendency toward continual losses in purchasing power. This overexploitation may finally result in the collapse of the euro.” (bold emphasis mine)

So perhaps it wouldn’t be systemic rigidities that could undo the Euro, as preeminent monetarist Milton Friedman warned about [or the tradeoff between ``greater discipline and lower transaction costs outweigh the loss from dispensing with an effective adjustment mechanism”] but the untenable cross subsidies and systemic inflationism inherent within the system.

Easy Monetary Policies To Continue

And the political response has been as what we had expected.

An article from Bloomberg says Europe will use former US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s “Bazooka” approach to deal with Greece, ``European leaders closed ranks to defend Greece from the punishment of investors in a pledge of support that may soon be tested. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her counterparts yesterday pledged “determined and coordinated action” to support Greece’s efforts to regain control of its finances. They stopped short of providing taxpayers’ money or diluting their own demands for the country to cut the European Union’s biggest budget deficit.”

Like short selling, the blame has always been pinned on the markets. However, as discussed above, the woes of the PIIGS exhibits a structurally flawed monetary system.

The fact that Greece fudged its numbers to get into the Euro membership serves as damning evidence of EU’s incompetence. Investors don’t just punish nations without any basis. Investors get burned for making the wrong decisions.

On the other hand, bilking taxpayers, misrepresentation and mismanagement are enough justifications for punishment, not only from investors but from the resident political constituency. True, international sanctions won’t likely work as policymakers are too tied up rescuing each other.

Of course, tightening of monetary policies today won’t help the cause of the EU or the US from executing bailouts and rescues of their political patrons. Hence we can expect deferred “exit strategies” and even extended quantitative easing programs.

Oh, did I just mention the US as possibly help fund a Greece bailout? Yes, apparently. This according to Financial Times, `` European governments are expected to turn increasingly to US investors to help them meet their funding requirements as record levels of bond issuance make it harder to attract buyers.” (bold highlight mine)

So whether it be the IMF (where the US has the largest exposure representing 17% of voting rights) or direct participation from US investors we can expect somewhat the US to be a tacit part of the rescue team. Sssssssshhhhh.

Perhaps, some Asian nations as China may take part in it too.

What do you expect, it’s a paper money system! Government central banks can simply print money and channel them into sectors or economies in dire straits, in the hope that the money printing has neutral effects.

All the imbalances we’ve just spelled out here is a medium to long term perspective, which means they aren’t likely to unravel anytime soon.

But it is one of the risks that should be reckoned with overtime.

For the meantime, the triumphalism of the Philosopher’s Stone or the alchemy of turning lead into gold will likely still work its interim or immediate wonder. That’s why it has been the preferred du jour priority option by policymakers.

And importantly, that’s why it gives confidence to the global political authorities to do all their redistributive programs.

Meanwhile, expansionary policies from the EU and the US are likely to continue. And this should help support the asset markets.

Does This Look Like A US Dollar Carry Bubble?

In 2008, the reason why the US dollar skyrocketed during the post Lehman incident was because of the gridlock in the US banking system which practically siphoned off global liquidity in the system.

The ensuing demand for cash unleashed a massive wave of demand for the US dollar. This scramble for cash led to a tsunami of selloff that resulted to a meltdown in the asset markets. The panic selling was specially sensitive on leveraged position such as the carry trade.

Today we have officials and experts who continually warn about carry trade bubbles.



This is the latest figures from the Bank of International Settlements which shows of external claims of BIS reporting banks.

This from BIS, (all bold highlights mine)

``Banks’ external claims continued to decline in the third quarter of 2009, falling by 1% ($235 billion) to $30.6 trillion. $36 billion of new claims on non-banks in emerging markets (up 3%) were balanced by $32 billion (down 0.4%) in reductions to non-banks in developed countries. Cross-border claims on banks in developed countries dropped by a further 1% ($181 billion) after a 2% decrease in the second quarter of 2009, and total interbank claims continued to decrease, although at a reduced pace, for the fourth consecutive quarter, by $224 billion or 1%

"Location of counterparties: Claims on non-banks in Latin America and Asia increased by $18 billion (7%) and $16 billion (6%), respectively.

"Instruments: Loans declined across all regions, while holdings of securities picked up everywhere except in offshore centres.

"Currencies: Banks’ cross-border claims denominated in US dollars increased for the first time since the third quarter of 2008, by $154 billion or 1%. This was more than accounted for by a $240 billion increase in US and Caribbean interbank claims on other Caribbean centres, the United States and the United Kingdom.

"Foreign currency claims on residents of reporting countries: Claims in US dollars, sterling, euros, Swiss francs and yen declined further, by $88 billion or 2% (after $65 billion in the previous quarter), while claims in other foreign currencies went up by $32 billion (14%)."

Given the figures and the charts above does this look anywhere like a carry trade?

Next we don't have another banking gridlock. What's being touted as the reason for the rally in the US dollar has been "tightening".

We think this is nothing but a hooey, see [What Has Pavlov’s Dogs And Posttraumatic Stress Got To Do With The Current Market Weakness?]

Beware of propaganda masquerading as analysis.

East Asia And The ASEAN Yield Curve

This is a sequel to our earlier post What’s The Yield Curve Saying About Asia And The Bubble Cycle?, but this time in graphs.

The idea is that steep yield curves emanating from central bank policies incentivize the market to engage in various interest rates arbitrages like carry trades, stock market speculations and other borrow-short-invest-long transactions which essentially fuels bubble cycles.

A reminder is that interest rate policies and the shape of the yield curves impact the asset markets with a time lag. Said differently, asset markets respond to rate curves belatedly.

As earlier shown, in the US yield curve has been extraordinarily steep which most likely implies strong support to her asset markets. Importantly, because the US government has reflating its banking system, the arbitrages are likely to support global markets more as investors seek to optimize returns at the long end.

This means that the US dollar carry trade is likely to inflate further. And carry trades aren't likely to be confined to the US dollar but diffused to major currencies which have all engaged in competitive devaluation via a combination of suppressed interest rates, fiscal spending and most importantly, quantitative easing programs.

In addition, because asset market reflect a time lag on the curve, credit systems hobbled by deleveraging (such as in the US, UK and parts of Europe) could probably see belated marginal positive responses or improvements but would not likely reach the level it had during the last boom.

It is in Asia and emerging markets where a credit fueled bubble cycle is likely to take place.

In Asia where low interest rates have generated more policy traction than in crisis affected Western developed economies, the yield spreads also remain elevated.

And as earlier pointed out, combined with the other policies all these have been manifested in asset outperformance.

Again the steepness of the yield curve in the region should lend support to the asset markets for the meantime. As local investors and speculators and the domestic financial institutions will be incentivized to take advantage of the wide chasm in interest rates.

The following charts are all from Asian Development Bank's Asianbondsonline.com.

China

Japan

South Korea

Singapore

IndonesiaMalaysia

Philippines

Thailand

Finally, it would be foolish for anyone to think that stock markets move in a straight line, because in reality they don't.

Nevertheless, any attendant weaknesses should be construed as countercyclical or temporary events because aside from many other factors, steep yield curves are likely to support credit activities that should work favorably for asset markets.

Emerging Market guru and Franklin Templeton's chief honcho Mark Mobius nails it when he recently wrote, ``what I said was that in a bull market as we are now experiencing, there will be corrections as the market continues to march upwards, and such corrections could be anywhere from 15 to 20%, or even 30%. We have to be ready for such short-term volatility. The markets in China, Asia, and Dubai have seen corrections of 20% or more during the recent crisis, so these kinds of corrections should not be surprising.I want to emphasize that I am not predicting any specific correction but I am just saying that we have to prepare for such corrections and that we not be alarmed by them given current market conditions. Overall, I believe we will continue to see markets rise in the long run." (bold emphasis mine)

In short, market operates in cycles.