A crunch is developing in international funding markets.The cost to convert local currency payments in the euro area, U.K. and Japan into dollars has jumped amid speculation the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates in December. With other major central banks set to hold, or even loosen, monetary policy, the projected policy divergence is supercharging the usual year-end uptick in demand for dollar funding….
The one-year cross-currency basis swap rate between euros and dollars reached negative 39 basis points Wednesday, the largest effective premium for dollar borrowing since September 2012, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The rate was at negative 37 basis points as of 11:31 a.m. London time.The measure, which was closely watched by investors during the financial crisis as an indicator of stresses in the banking system, reached negative 138 basis points in 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. While the increase this month is driven more by monetary-policy divergence it still has implications for global banks. It also means U.S. companies, which have been borrowing in euros to take advantage of historically low interest rates, must pay more to swap those proceeds back into dollars….This rush for dollar fundraising across the globe this month pushed up the one-year cost for Japanese banks to the highest level since 2011. Meanwhile, the cost for U.K. banks has more than doubled in November. That’s unusual because the surge was mostly focused in the euro area and Japan the last two occasions that funding costs rose, according to George Saravelos, global co-head of foreign exchange research at Deutsche Bank AG in London.
This seems really more about those balance sheets overstuffed by debt as evidenced by the $9.6 trillion credit in US dollars to non-bank borrowers outside the United States at the end of Q1 2015 (BIS)
First, evidence from 22 countries over the past 15 years shows that offshore dollar credit grows faster where local interest rates are higher than dollar yields, and this relationship has tightened since the global financial crisis. And the wider the gap between local 10-year yields and those on US Treasury bonds, the faster the next quarter growth in outstanding US dollar bonds issued by non-US resident borrowers. This finding is consistent with the observation that, since 2009, dollar credit has flowed to an unusual extent to emerging markets and to advanced economies that were not hit by the crisis, while it has grown at a slower pace in the euro area and the United Kingdom (UK). In sum, dollar credit has grown fastest outside the US where it has been relatively cheap.
Second, before the global financial crisis, banks extended the bulk of dollar credit to borrowers outside the US. Low volatility and easy wholesale financing enabled banks to leverage up to funnel dollar credit offshore. These findings are consistent with Bruno and Shin (2014b) and Rey (2013).Third, since the crisis, non-bank investors have extended an unusual share of dollar credit to borrowers outside the US. Firms and governments outside the US have issued dollar bonds, and banks have stepped back as holders of such bonds. The compression of bond term premia associated with the Federal Reserve’s bond buying has induced investors to bid for bonds of borrowers outside the US, many rated BBB and thus offering a welcome spread over low-yielding US Treasury bonds. We also find that inflows into bond mutual funds offering a spread over US Treasuries played a significant role in spurring offshore dollar bond issuance. We interpret this as evidence of the portfolio rebalancing channel of the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases.A key observation is that, following a brief spike in spreads in Q4 2008, spreads declined in the subsequent quarters even as the stock of offshore dollar bonds grew rapidly. Thus, while we cannot reject the “spare tire” argument of Erel et al (2012) and Adrian et al (2013) at the height of the crisis (ie firms substituting from supply-constrained bank financing to bonds, despite widening spreads), any such effect seems to have been short-lived. Instead, heavy bond issuance amid falling yields and narrowing spreads points to the importance of a largely policy-induced favourable supply of funds from bond investors beginning in early 2009.We end with a discussion of the implications for policy. First, dollar debt outside the US serves to transmit US monetary easing into immediately easier financial conditions for borrowers around the world. Second, while policy in economies outside the US can raise the cost of dollar debt at home, the effect of such policy is limited by multinational firms’ ability to borrow dollars abroad through offshore affiliates. Third, the recent prominence of bond markets in supplying dollar credit introduces new risks to financial stability, and thus changes the way that we need to think about the policy challenges posed by offshore dollar credit growth.