Showing posts with label shadow banking system. Show all posts
Showing posts with label shadow banking system. Show all posts

Thursday, March 06, 2014

China’s Bear Stearns Moment? First Bond Default Looms

Following the bailout of a delinquent trust company late January, China’s credit markets seem to have returned to a placid state, thereby signaling a possible easing of credit woes. 

Well it turns out that such credit tranquility has only shifted the financial pressures to the currency market, the yuan.

Now even as the agitations in the currency markets remain unsettled, reports say that a debt delinquent solar company may spark a “Bear Stearns moment” with China’s first possible bond default.

From Bloomberg: (bold mine)
The growing risk of default by Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science & Technology Co. may become China’s “Bear Stearns moment,” prompting investors to reassess credit risks as they did after the U.S. securities firm was rescued in 2008, according to Bank of America Corp.

“We doubt that the financial system in China will experience a liquidity crunch immediately because of this default but we think the chain reaction will probably start,” Hong Kong-based strategists David Cui, Tracy Tian and Katherine Tai wrote in a note yesterday. During the U.S. financial crisis, it took a year “to reach the Lehman stage” when investors began to panic and shadow banking froze, the strategists added.

The maker of solar cells said March 4 it may not be able to make an 89.8 million yuan ($14.7 million) interest payment in full by the deadline tomorrow. As sub-prime mortgages fell amid the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, banks began hoarding cash, causing two Bear Stearns Co. hedge funds to seek bankruptcy protection. The troubled bank was sold to JPMorgan Chase & Co. in March of that year in a deal facilitated by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Six months later, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed in the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history.

Chaori’s potential failure to pay investors would mark the first bond default in Asia’s largest economy, highlighting the strain in China’s $4.2 trillion bond market after a trust product issued by China Credit Trust Co. was bailed out in January. There haven’t been any defaults in China’s publicly traded domestic debt market since the central bank started regulating it in 1997, according to Moody’s Investors Service.
Will this lead to another bailout within the week?

Let me add that China’s troubles have not been entirely captured by Western media. For instance, a report just surfaced that in late January, there has been a reported “run” on three cooperatives

From the Chicago Tribune
In the run-up to the holiday in late January, word had spread that at least three rural cooperatives were running short on funds. In what the local government described as a "panic", depositors rushed to withdraw cash. Local officials say several co-op bosses fled after committing fraud…

Depositors would normally be protected by China's banking regulator, which requires lenders to keep a certain amount of cash on reserve to meet depositor demand.

But as participants in a pilot program, the depositors quickly woke up to an unpleasant reality: so-called "Farmers' Mutual Help Funding Cooperatives" aren't technically banks. Not only did they not have sufficient reserves on hand, they weren't legally required to.
Farmer’s cooperatives reportedly emerged in 2006 and ballooned fast over the years. According to the  same report
By the middle of last year, 137 such co-ops had been established in Yancheng, with total membership reaching 170,000, deposits of 2.3 billion yuan, and total loans outstanding of 1.9 billion yuan, according to figures cited by official media.

But in practice, many co-ops shifted into riskier forms of lending. Jiangsu, along with neighboring Fujian province, is known for its vibrant grey-market lending networks, serving small factory owners and real estate developers who often cannot obtain bank loans.

Informal lending generally occurs through family and friends, but the rise of farmers' co-ops created a platform for informal lenders to scale up their operations by collecting funds in a bank-like setting.
If you might notice China’s financial markets seem to have been faced with increasing frequencies of financial tremors. This may lead to a financial Pompeii.

I am not sure if Bear Stearns should even be the right parallel. That’s because all it takes is for China’s fragmented highly indebted financial system to become unglued, as the Chinese government to lose control that results to the crumbling of the castle built on the proverbial sand. 

Remember financial strains will always function as the initial symptoms. Then a liquidity squeeze follows (this is where the PBoC has been actively intervening in the hope to kick the can). After, the contagion spreads to the real economy via a financial crisis that leads to a economic crisis or vice versa.

Interesting times indeed.

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

Will a Mises Moment Occur in China?

Here is a bizarro comment/report of the day.

From Bloomberg: (original)
Record new credit in China in January may help Asia’s largest economy maintain momentum amid government efforts to rein in risky lending
From same article but updated to look complete
China’s aggregate financing, the broadest measure of credit, climbed to 2.58 trillion yuan ($425 billion), the central bank said Feb. 15, spurring optimism the economy will maintain momentum amid government efforts to rein in risky lending.
Push credit to NEW record levels will “rein in risky lending”? Give more alcohol to alcoholics will remove alcoholism?  

A more sensible report from Reuters

First the stock market rally…
China's stock market began January heading in the same direction it went in 2013, when it posted one of the world's worst performances, but on Monday it ended with a year-to-date gain for the first time in 2014.

The turnaround comes as investors see signs of support from the central bank and take advantage of a lighter month of new listings. Other emerging markets have recovered as well, though some continue to lag behind.
Next inundating the system with steroids…
Banks are finding it easier to obtain the short-term loans that are critical to their operations, a shift that has improved sentiment among investors over the past month. A benchmark for the cost of short-term loans among banks, the weighted average of the seven-day repurchase agreement rate, stands at 3.86%, down from 4.36% Friday and 6.59% on Jan. 20, the height of a brief wave of panic that swept China's banking system at the start of the year.

The lower rates came after the Chinese central bank channelled a large amount of cash into the financial system to prevent a repeat of a severe crunch seen in June.

Further evidence of looser monetary conditions emerged on Saturday, when official data showed Chinese financial institutions lent far more than expected in January. Banks issued 1.32 trillion yuan ($217.6 billion) of new loans, compared with 482.5 billion yuan in December, according to the People's Bank of China. The country's banks typically lend more aggressively at the start of the year than at the end, so increases are common, but the January total was also well above the 1.07 trillion yuan in new loans recorded a year earlier.

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Chinese stock markets has been celebrating the RECORD steroids as shown by the recent spike in the Shanghai Composite. Will more steroids be coming so as to fuel the SSEC higher?

We learn too that Chinese resident investors have become more discriminate, picky or selective and cautious with regards to fixed income placements as bond spreads between investment grade and lower grade issues widen

From another Reuters report: (bold mine)
Unlike in mature markets, where a AA rating is considered strong, investors deem anything below AAA in China to be weak.

The spread between high- and low-risk borrowers , according to Thomson Reuters benchmark curves, has widened to a 21-month high of 105 basis points now, from around 70 bps in mid-2013, when China's money markets suffered a short lived liquidity squeeze that sent tremors well beyond its borders.
"Short lived" in the face of growing credit tremors? "Short lived" when government uses bigger and bigger intensity of liquidity injections? I doubt it.

So prior to the New Year, the Chinese government conducted a bailout. After the New Year, the Chinese government extends a subsidy (another bailout?) to a politically privileged sector.

Yet will the two interventions be enough to stabilize China’s markets? Or will the Chinese government have to employ serial bailouts in increasing frequency in order to keep the China’s highly fragile financial markets and economic system from falling apart?
Reports indicate that the second delinquent shadow bank trust, the Jilin Province Trust, is in the process of also being bailed out. The said Trust have financed the same beleaguered company that prompted for the first “trust” or shadow bank bail out of 2014.
Negotiations are ongoing over the return of funds to investors in the product created by Jilin Province Trust Co Ltd and backed by a loan to a coal company, Shanxi Liansheng Energy Co Ltd.
Interesting no? Will bailouts become a weekly affair?

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Record credit infusion has substantially brought down rates of 7 day repo. Yet how long will the effects of the steroids last? A month or a week or two before new credit issues emerge? 

You see the problem isn't liquidity, the problem is the sustainability of the heavy debt yoke which has not only brought about rising rates that increases the burden of debt servicing but also credit quality issues. Liquidity signifies only a symptom of the disease. So in effect, the actions by the Chinese government to inject liquidity has been meant to buy time.

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Record cash injection seem hardly to impact yields of China’s 10 year sovereign.

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Curiously even the Chinese currency (against the USD) the yuan has been weakening from the start of the year. Are these signs of capital flight?


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And record cash injections seem to have only INCREASED the probability of default as measured by 5 year CDS.

So will the Chinese government continue to inject RECORD after RECORD of credit to produce short term “stability” in the hope the debt nightmare might go away? Or has the Chinese government been playing a financial Russian Roulette?

The Chinese government should heed the wisdom of the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises whose warnings have become resonantly valid in the case of China. (bold mine)
Because the effects which the inflationists seek by inflation are of a temporary nature only, there can never be enough inflation from the inflationist point of view. Once the quantity of money ceases to increase, the groups who were reaping gains during the inflation lose their privileged position. They may keep the gains they realized during the inflation but they cannot make any further gains. The gradual rise of the prices of goods which they previously were buying at comparatively low prices now impairs their position because as sellers they cannot expect prices to rise further. The clamor for inflation will therefore persist.
But if the Chinese government will continue gamble with with sustained record injections of credit and liquidity then we might see a “Mises moment” in China.

Again the great Mises.
But on the other hand inflation cannot continue indefinitely. As soon as the public realizes that the government does not intend to stop inflation, that the quantity of money will continue to increase with no end in sight, and that consequently the money prices of all goods and services will continue to soar with no possibility of stopping them, everybody will tend to buy as much as possible and to keep his ready cash at a minimum. The keeping of cash under such conditions involves not only the costs usually called interest, but also considerable losses due to the decrease in the money’s purchasing power. The advantages of holding cash must be bought at sacrifices which appear so high that everybody restricts more and more his ready cash. During the great inflations of World War I, this development was termed “a flight to commodities” and the “crack-up boom.” The monetary system is then bound to collapse; a panic ensues; it ends in a complete devaluation of money Barter is substituted or a new kind of money is resorted to. Examples are the Continental Currency in 1781, the French Assignats in 1796, and the German Mark in 1923.
If the Chinese government continues to inject record after record liquidity this may prompt for a "crack up boom" as described above, yet if they decide to withhold liquidity then there will be a massive deflationary (property and stock market and eventually economic) bust. The Mises Moment. The effect from the current trend of political actions, of trying to buy time from markets to clear, looks headed in such direction

Has the falling yuan been a sign? Have recovering gold prices been indicative of such buildup of stress behind the scenes in China?

Oh by the way, ASEAN currencies staged a very remarkable rally yesterday in the face of severely oversold conditions. The question will the rally be sustained?  Or how long with this last?

We live in very interesting times.

Monday, February 17, 2014

Global Markets: How Sustainable is the Recent Risk ON?

From Risk OFF suddenly to Risk ON. 

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Most of global stock markets led by the US went into hyperdrive mode.

Some bulls have come out of their hibernation to aver “you see I told you, forex reserves, floating currency, low NPLs neatly did the trick. And this has been all about ‘irrationality’”. Of course, I will keep pointing out—the so-called financial market ‘irrationality’ represents a two way street, because such involves the base human impulses of both greed and fear. Bluntly put, fear can be irrational as much as greed. However, any idea of a one directional bias for irrationality signifies in and on itself “irrational” logic

A mainstream foreign report even implied that the “short-lived” emerging market woes have passed. I can’t agree to the notion that 7 ½ months of Emerging Market volatility represents a “short” time frame period. Neither can I reconcile how the repeated ON and OFF volatilities over the same period equals the conclusion that EM troubles have passed.

EM guru Franklin Templeton’s Mark Mobius, for instance, flip flopped for the second time in 2 weeks, earlier by noting how EM selloff will “deepen” to this week’s “probably nearing the end of this big rush out of emerging markets.”[1]

Such seeming state of confusion from the mainstream signifies desperation to resurrect the boom days underpinned by cheap money.

Yet has the current rally been really indicative of the end of the EM selloff? Or has this been the proverbial calm before the storm or the maxim “no trend goes in a straight line”? Or a stock market lingo—a dead cat’s bounce?

Nonetheless as I keep pounding on the table, we should expect “sharp volatility in the global financial markets (stocks, bonds, commodities and currencies) in the coming sessions. The volatility may likely be in both directions but with a downside bias”[2]

Acute market volatilities represent a normative character of major inflection points whether bottom or top. Incidentally since the present volatilities has been occurring at record or post-record highs of asset prices particularly for the stock market, then current volatility logically points to a ‘topping’ formation rather than to a ‘bottoming’ formation.

Severe gyrations tend to highlight the terminal phase of a bull market cycle. Again in whether in 1994-1997 or in 2007-2008, denial rallies can be ferocious to the point of expunging all early bear market losses but eventually capitulate to the full bear market cycle[3].

The bottom line is that stock markets operate in cycles and that the best way to play safe is to first understand the cycle and ride on the cyclical tide.

China: Stocks Soar as Default Risks Escalates

Let us examine why global stock markets resumed a risk ON scenario this week. 

Take China, the Shanghai Composite celebrated the first week of the year of the wooden horse with a blistering 3.5% run.

Monday’s ramp was allegedly prompted by the extension of subsidies by the Chinese government to automakers[4]. Incidentally one of the beneficiaries of the extended subsidies to automakers has been BYD Co., an automaker with investments from Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. More signs that Mr. Buffett once a value investor has transformed into a political entrepreneur.

Moreover, this one week stock market blitzkrieg has partly been an offshoot to the Chinese government’s rescue of a troubled shadow banking wealth management ‘trust’ product worth 3 billion-yuan ($496 million) at the near eve of the New Year’s celebrations[5].

So prior to the New Year, the Chinese government conducted a bailout. After the New Year, the Chinese government extends a subsidy (another bailout?) to a politically privileged sector.

Yet will the two interventions be enough to stabilize China’s markets? Or will the Chinese government have to employ serial bailouts in increasing frequency in order to keep the China’s highly fragile financial markets and economic system from falling apart?

How about reports where six trust firms which has 5 billion ($826.6 million) loan portfolio to a delinquent coal company have been in danger of default[6]? The debt exposure by the six trust firms account for 67% more than the size of the one recently bailed out by the world’s largest China’s state owned bank, the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd (ICBC).

The Reuters’ report adds that another trust, Jilin Province Trust Co Ltd, with exposure to struggling coal company Shanxi Liansheng Energy Co Ltd have failed to pay off “763 million yuan in maturing high-yield investments it sold to wealthy clients of CCB (China Construction Bank)”.

Ironically this is the same coal company with which the ‘first’ bailed out trust firm has exposure to. Has Jilin Province Trust’s debt payment delinquency been in the hope for a bailout? Will other creditors with exposure to the same coal company follow suit?

So has the pre-New Year bailout of the ICBC sponsored Trust firm exposed to Shanxi Liansheng Energy, opened the Pandora’s box of the moral hazard of dependency on government life support system? Will shadow banks resort to defaults or threats of defaults in order to be bailed out? Should we expect a wave of bailouts? How will the Chinese government pay for all these?

Yes while foreign currency reserves of the Chinese government tabulates to a record high of $3.82 trillion at the close of December 2013, as proportion to shadow banking debt this represents only half of $7.5 trillion based on JP Morgan estimates[7] and one fourth if based on the estimates of the controversial former Fitch’s analyst Charlene Chu[8]

And this is just the shadow banks. Of course not every shadow banks will fail, but the point is how deep will a potential contagion be? This is some dynamic which I think no one has a clue.

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Aside from tremors from the shadow banks, private Chinese companies who lack implicit guarantees from the government have either postponed or canceled debt issuance. The Zero hedge reports[9] 9 companies who recently backed down from raising $1 billion worth of debt.

Moreover, Chinese non-performing loans (NPL) have been racing higher for the 9th consecutive quarter to the highest level since the 2008 crisis.

As you can see, the Chinese NPL experience demolishes the false notion that falling NPLs are free passes to bubbles. Credit bubbles implode from their own weight or from rising interest rates or from a reversal of confidence by lenders. In China’s case, rising NPLs are symptoms of the hissing overstretched credit bubble which has been transmitted via higher consumer price inflation and rising interest rates.

The growing risk of debt default, shrinking access to credit and rising NPLs are troubling signs of rapidly deteriorating China’s credit conditions. Yet these are signs of stability?

Even the China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has been cognizant of the growing risks of debt defaults. As quoted by Bloomberg[10]:
China’s central bank signaled that volatility in money-market interest rates will persist and borrowing costs will rise, underscoring the risk of defaults that could weigh on confidence and drag down growth.

“When the valve of liquidity starts to tame and curb excessive credit expansion, money-market rates, or the cost of liquidity, will reflect that,” the People’s Bank of China said in a Feb. 8 report. “The market needs to tolerate reasonable rate changes so that rates can be effective in allocating resources and modifying the behavior of market players.”
Meanwhile China’s banking regulator, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, in the face of rising concerns of defaults has ordered some small financial institutions to “set aside more funds to avoid a cash shortfall” according to another Bloomberg report[11].

As you can clearly see, the Chinese government has been preparing for their financial Yolanda.

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Moreover, the Chinese government dramatically infused money into the financial system last January based on the latest PBOC data where the Zero Hedge observed, “this month's broad liquidity creation was the largest monthly amount in China's history!”[12]

China’s infusion of a tsunami of liquidity, where China’s loan creation (left window) totalled $218 billion in January while total social financing (right window) spiked by $425 billion has essentially dwarfed the $75 billion by the US Federal Reserve and the $74 billion by the Bank of Japan.

Why the gush of government sponsored loan creation-total social financing in the face of rising risks of defaults? Has the Chinese government been forced to play the debt musical chairs in the recognition that a stoppage in credit inflation would extrapolate to a Black Swan event[13]

All these represents newfound stability and a conclusion to the EM sell off? All these are bullish reasons to bid up on stocks? Will ASEAN or the Philippines be immune to a potential debt implosion?

Or have the recent spurt in China’s stocks been signs of communications (public relations/ signalling channel in central bank gobbledygook) management by Chinese government aimed at creating a financial Potenkim Village in order to assuage creditors?

As risk analyst, I’d say good luck to all those who believe that “this time is different”.

US Stocks: Fed’s Janet Yellen Gives Go Signal for More Stock Market Bubble

How about US stocks?

US stocks sprinted for the two successive weeks expunging most if not all of the earlier losses. As of Friday, the S&P 500 knocks at the door of new record highs.

The melt up in US stocks began the previous week when the ECB made a “teaser” to further ease by suspending sterilization in March.

As a side note, this week the enticement for more easing came with a report the ECB has been “seriously considering” negative overnight bank deposit rates[14]. This may have also compounded on the frenzied charge by US-European stock market bulls.

Europe’s stocks have been on a blitz. But ECB’s overture for more easing reveals of the stagnation of Europe’s real economy. 

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Europe’s economic stagnation has been reflected on corporate earnings. Forward revenues of European stocks have been in a steady decline since 2012.

Ironically, European stock markets seem to see heavenly bliss from such negative streak of earnings.

Such parallel universe exhibits why this has hardly been your granddaddy’s stock markets.

Central bank policies have transformed financial markets into a loaded casino (backed by central bank PUT or implicit guarantees) where people mindlessly chase yields with the singular aim of jumping on the stock market bandwagon financed with a deluge of credit money and rationalizing such actions by shouting statistics, regardless of their relevance.

Moreover, the unimpressive US job data whetted on the speculative appetite of the Pavlovian momentum chasing crowd. 

Bad news in the real economy has been good news for Wall Street. Why? Because Wall Street expects subsidies provided by the US Federal Reserve to them, via zero bound rates and asset purchases charged to the real economy, to continue.

In terms of present policies, this implies that the Fed’s “tapering” may be truncated.

Bad news in the real economy is good news for Wall Street has been one of this week’s main theme.

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Retail sales fell most since June 2012 blamed mostly on the “bad weather”. Revised data showed that retail sales slumped also even in December but at a lesser degree[15]. So this has hardly been about bad weather or that bad weather represents a convenient rationalization for the stock market meltup.

The chart from Businessinsider reveals that core retail sales has been in a downtrend even as retail employment has been rising[16]. Yet how will a sustained fall in retail sales continue to finance retail employment?

Most importantly factory production dropped most since 2009[17] again blamed on the bad weather.

So the unexpected declines in factory output, jobs and retail sales, which not only translates to sluggish economic growth but may even reinforce on each other, have been seen as bullish for stocks by Wall Street.

This reveals how central banking policies have been driving a wedge or a gulf between the Main Street and Wall Street as evidenced by such seeming economic and social schadenfreude, where Wall Street benefit from the sufferings of the real economy. This also means more polarization or partisanship in the political sphere.

Another very significant catalyst for US stock market melt UP has been the debut testimony given by Fed Chairwoman, Ms. Janet Yellen, at the House Financial Services Committee hearing[18].

While Ms. Yellen admits that low interest rate can fuel asset bubbles, she denies that US stocks have been a bubble, where her personal sentiment sent a flurry of bid orders that powered stocks to a frenetic melt up mode.

Ms. Yellen’s admission that low interest rates serves fuel to bubbles…(bold mine)
We recognize that in an environment of low interest rates like we've had in the Unites States now for quite some time, there may be an incentive to reach for yield. We do have the potential to develop asset bubbles or a build up in leverage or rapid credit growth or other threats to financial stability. Especially given that our monetary policy is so accommodative, we are highly focused on trying to identify those threats.
Ms. Yellen’s grants a license to the US stock market bubble…
I think it's fair to say our monetary policy has had an effect of boosting asset prices. We have tried to look carefully at whether or not broad classes of asset prices suggest bubble-like activity. I have not seen that in stocks, generally speaking. Land prices, I would say, suggest a greater degree of overvaluation.
First, admit it and then deny it. Except for land prices, for Ms. Yellen “threats to financial stability” has been anything but relevant to the US. Does Ms. Yellen own a lot of stocks?

As another side note: Contra other central bankers like those from the Philippines, at least Ms Yellen acknowledges that low interest rates “may be an incentive to reach for yield” and thus “have the potential to develop asset bubbles”.

I don’t know which metrics Ms Yellen uses in valuing stocks or measuring credit growth. But the Russell 2000 at 81 price earnings ratio (!!!) as of Friday February 14th close, certainly looks like a bubble from whatever angle.

And that “potential to develop asset bubbles or a build up in leverage or rapid credit growth or other threats to financial stability” has already been present via record net margin debt, and record issuance of various types of bonds e.g. junk bonds, corporate bonds that has been used to finance equity buybacks.

Perhaps the FED may be looking at solely the credit from the banking sector. If so, then such blinders will come at a great cost. Are bonds not financial assets held by US banks?

Yet systemic build up in leverage or rapid credit has been relentless.

The latest financial engineering has been to increasingly use shadow banks via “synthetic” derivatives based on corporate bonds in the face of shrinking liquidity in the bond markets. This novel approach has been meant to hedge on assets or to bet on their performance which according to the Financial Times represents a “dramatic shift in the nature of the corporate bond market”[19].

Moreover equities have increasingly played an important role as collateral for repo trades. From a Bloomberg report[20] “Repurchase agreements, known as repos, backed by equities rose 40 percent during the year ended Jan. 10, according to Federal Reserve data. Rising equity-collateral usage combined with a slide in repos backed by government securities pushed equities share to 9.6 percent of the $1.55 trillion tri-party repo market in January, up from 5.7 percent a year earlier, Fitch said in a report published yesterday.”

This growing moneyness or liquidity yield of equities seem to play right into Mr. George Soros’ reflexivity theory[21] in that “when people are eager to borrow and the banks are willing to lend, the value of the collateral rises in a self-reinforcing manner and vice versa.”

Hence soaring stocks, which leads to increasing values of equity based collateral, feeds on the borrowing appetite of stock market participants. The latter are likely to use proceeds from such borrowing to finance even more equity purchases that would be used to obtain more credit for speculation. Such collateral-lending-price feedback loop mechanism only serves as fodder to a deeper stock market Wile E. Coyote mania.

Manias may persist for as long as return on assets outpaces the cost of servicing debt or upon the sustained confidence of creditors on the capability and willingness of borrowers to fulfil their financial obligations.

If the cost of servicing debt is measured by the actions of the US treasury markets, then we should see how the latter has recently behaved.

Yet the dramatic melt UP in stocks have translated into wild swings in the yields of 10 year UST notes.

Why? Because rising stocks based on intensifying demand for credit tends to push up on yields, while adverse main stream economic data tend to push down yields as economic uncertainty spurs concern over asset selloffs or asset “deflation”.

Yet over the week, yields of 10 year notes climbed 7 bps to 2.75%. This means that the stock market melt UP seem to have bigger influence on the UST markets than the sluggish growth data.

This also means that regardless of what the Fed does (whether they persist on tapering or Untapers) for as long as, or in the condition that the stock market (and real estate) mania persists, yields of USTs are most likely to edge up.

This seems as signs that the US inflationary boom has reached a maturation phase where available resources have not been adequate to finance bubble projects on the pipeline. The entrepreneurial cluster of errors has been based on the misplaced belief of the abundance of savings from artificially lowered interest rates. Such errors are being reflected on rising interest rates and or an up creep of inflation.

Bernanke’s QE 3.0 in September 2012 had only a 3 month impact in the suppression of yields. Since July 2012, yields of USTs trekked higher, but the upside momentum accelerated when Abenomics and the Bernanke’s “taper” was announced in the second quarter of 2013.

This also is one reason why past data can hardly be relied on. That’s because central policies have so vastly distorted the pricing mechanism that has altered the traditional functional relationship of firms, markets and the economy.

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What has driven yields of USTs down of late has been a pseudo meltdown in US stocks. While “bad news is good news” may hinder rising yields, strength in economic data will expedite the advance.

As one would note from the above overlapped charts of the yields of 10 year notes (TNX) and the S&P, over the last 9 months, there seems to be new correlation where yields of 10 year USTs decline ahead of the S&P (green rectangle). And the S&P rallies ahead of the bottoming TNX.

And rising UST yields (higher interest rates) amidst rising asset prices fuelled by massive debt expansion only exacerbates on the Wile E. Coyote momentum which eventually will lead to the Wile E. Coyote moment or what Ms. Yellen calls as “threats to financial stability”.

And all the RECORD credit inflation seems to escape the eyes of an econometric technician like Ms. Yellen who seems to think that all these operates in a vacuum.

Unfortunately blindness leads to Black Swans.














[12] Zero Hedge Spot The Real Liquidity Bubble February 15, 2014


[14] Wall Street Real Time Economic Blog ECB Considers Negative Deposit Rate February 12 2014,


[16] Businessinsider.com Something Has To Give Here February 13, 2014



[19] Financial Times Investors turn to ‘shadow’ bond market February 10, 2014


[21] George Soros The Alchemy of Finance John Wiley & Sons p 23

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

China Rescues Troubled Trust Product

Like her Western contemporaries, the Chinese government has decided to delay the day of reckoning by bailing out a troubled trust product.

Reports the Bloomberg:
China’s eleventh-hour rescue of wealthy investors in a high-yield trust threatens to drive more money into the nation’s $6 trillion shadow-banking industry, undermining regulators’ efforts to deter excessive risk-taking.

Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd., the nation’s largest lender, yesterday told customers who had invested in the 3 billion-yuan ($496 million) trust product that they can sell their rights to unidentified buyers to recoup the principal. Some clients plan to visit ICBC branches to demand more interest ahead of tomorrow’s 5 p.m. deadline for accepting the offer, according to Du Ronghai, a Guangzhou-based investor.

Averting the nation’s biggest trust default may reinforce investors’ belief in implicit guarantees and the government’s backing of such risky products, stoking their appetite for products in the $1.67 trillion trust market. The bailout underscores the pressure on authorities to maintain financial and social stability even as they aim to prune the government’s role in the world’s second-largest economy and curtail debt.
This shows how government’s today fervidly dreads short term pain by undertaking measures that will even be more agonizing in the future.

Yet the article rightly puts into spotlight the risks of moral hazard from the bailout. Local governments, whom has used shadow banks as a main conduit for financing, along with other private sector borrowers will likely pile into the shadow banking sector since the government has placed an implicit guarantee via today’s actions.

China’s shadow banks—which includes wealth management products (WMPs) or a pool of securities like trust products, bonds and stock funds that offer higher yields than the bank deposits—have grown significantly.

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And according to a report from Businessinsider, WMPs soared by 47.4% in the third quarter of 2013 from a year ago. Trust products, which are part of WMPs, jumped by 60.3% over the same period while LGFV loans rose sharply by 59.7% as interest rates for these products rise. The diagram above shows of the WMPs issued in 2013.

Moreover, according to the same Bloomberg report above, there are about 5.3 trillion yuan of trust products that will be due this year compared with 3.5 trillion yuan in 2013. However shareholder equity backing these has been estimated only at 236 billion yuan. This extrapolates to a higher likelihood of a wave of defaults.

Will the Chinese government bailout all problematic WMPs?  At what costs will any succeeding bailout/s bring about? How long before the next debt problem surfaces?

It’s odd that today’s rescue efforts has not spurred a celebration in China’s financial markets. 

Yields of Chinese 10 year and 5 year treasuries while down from recent highs remains elevated at 4.52% and 4.44%. Recent highs were 4.71% for the 10 year and 4.6% for the 5 year.

Chinese equities via the Shanghai Index, rose modestly by .26%.

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And what’s more peculiar has been that Shibor (interbank) rates seem to have surged (green ellipse), particularly from overnight to 1 month maturities. This seem to indicate signs of a squeeze. Although it's not clear whether the above rates reflected before or after the bailout.

As I previously asked will China be a trigger to 2014’s possible Black Swan event?

2014 is certainly proving to be interesting times.

Monday, January 20, 2014

Will China Trigger the Black Swan Event in 2014?

The ongoing financial tremors in China appears to be absent in the eyes of the mainstream

Instability in China’s Credit Markets
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Yields of China’s 10 year local currency bond remains at 2008 levels.

As of Friday, China’s money market rates leapt to the highest level in a month as banks have reportedly been hoarding funds in order to meet withdrawals before the Spring Festival (New Year) holidays and concerns over “first trust-product default”.

The seven-day repurchase rate, reports the Bloomberg[1], surged 81 basis points, the most since Dec. 20, to 5.17 percent in Shanghai, according to a weighted average from the National Interbank Funding Center. That was the highest level since Dec. 31. It climbed 114 basis points this week.

The Chinese government attempted to ferret out her shadow banking system by withdrawing liquidity last June only to discover that the vehemence of market reactions[2].

For the Chinese government market instability would run the risk of upsetting political goals of generating statistical economic target which may have political repercussions. This forced the People’s Bank of China to inject funds and abort the mission. 

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But artificial treatments have led China’s debt disease to rear her ugly head. Not only has interest rates soared, but the credit pressures have become apparent anew as China’s annual probability of default based on 5 year credit default swaps have risen.

Ballooning Debt Levels

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Runaway credit growth underpinning China’s property bubble plus growing complexity from deepening politicization of the banking sector via credit allocation has prompted for a dramatic evolution of credit activities in China over the past few years.

Local government debt has reportedly reached 17.89 trillion yuan or about US $ 3 trillion. Lending restrictions by the central government on the local government has forced the latter to migrate and tap shadow banks consisting of trust securities, insurance and leasing companies, and other non-bank financial institutions, which accounted for 27.8% of new debt. Aside from shadow banks the local government has resorted to other financial engineering instruments too, they have used IOUs and shifted the use of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) into using State Owned Enterprises (SOE) who acquired loans in their behalf (backed by illicit guarantees by the borrowing local government).[3]
Mainstream media wants to put the blame financial liberalization on the explosive growth of lending, but as one would note from the above, credit growth has largely been from the local governments camouflaged through the private sector, via LGFVs, or through the Shadow banks. All these avalanche of debt financed spending on mostly property projects has spurred a massive property bubble. Although  these has mostly been contrived to produce statistical growth which has been meant to get the blessings of the higher ups in order to ensure the political tenure and to fulfil the political ambitions of the officials of local governments.

A lot of the supposed private sector entities appear to be either wards or crony arms of local and state governments. And all these collective attempts to generate statistical “growth” have led to China’s dire pollution problems where smog has reached dangerous levels[4].

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Meanwhile Chinese credit expansion has also been in a product of the PBoC’s printing of yuan in exchange for foreign currency. Although much of the proceeds of foreign exchange transactions end up with the banking system and subsequently converted into loans. China’s money supply growth has soared past the US[5]

China’s foreign exchange reserves have now reached new records at $3.82 trillion at the end of December. Importantly, China’s vendor financing scheme with the US has led to record holdings of US treasuries. China now has $ 1.317 trillion worth of USTs[6]. This record holding of US contradicts the PBoC’s earlier claim where they will not increase acquiring of USTs last November[7]. This also shows how China continues to implicitly finance the US military via UST purchases, which for me, represents a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde or an inconsistency in terms of the brinkmanship geopolitics of territorial disputes.

Emergent Signs of Credit Stress

Yet despite the huge reserves, the Chinese government appears to be a bind. They would like to put a curb on the shadow banks, but they fret that doing so might impair the credit channels via the banks, which may harm credit conditions, undermine the economy and imperil the already fragile political conditions.

An example can be seen in a reported infighting between banking regulators: the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), whom has been finding ways to “move loans off their books” and China’s banking regulator, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), whom has supposedly “watered down” regulations to accommodate the requests of the banking system[8].

A proposed new rule by the CBRC known as Regulation 9 has been designed to restrict off banking sheet lending activities that would limit backdoor activities, but lobbying from the banking industry allegedly pushed the CBRC to dilute the essence of the regulation.

Nonetheless a record 2.6 trillion yuan ($427 billion) of interest and principal on securities issued by non-financial companies have reportedly been due this year[9]. This has brought about growing concerns over credit risks.

There have already been signs of emerging credit stress. 74 of about 800 Peer-to-peer online lending companies which came online in 2013[10] with outstanding loans of 26.8 billion yuan ($4.4 billion) have either shut down or have been unable to facilitate cash withdrawals to its users.

Importantly at the start of the article I noted that rising money market rates have reportedly been due to banks hoarding funds in anticipation of the “first trust-product default”.

The world’s largest bank (in terms of assets[11]), the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd., which is state owned bank, has reportedly rejected calls to bailout a 3 billion-yuan ($495 million) shadow banking trust product which it had distributed[12]. The company reportedly invested in a coal mine venture, Shanxi Zhenfu Energy Group, which recently collapsed. 

A default on the investment product, according to a report from Bloomberg, which comes due Jan. 31, may shake investors’ faith in the implicit guarantees offered by trust companies to lure funds from wealthy people. Assets managed by China’s 67 trusts soared 60 percent to $1.67 trillion in the 12 months ended September even as policy makers sought to curb money flow outside the formal banking system.

A China Triggered Global Black Swan Event?

This is interesting because the Chinese government embarked on a massive stimulus program in 2008 to the tune of 4 Trillion RMB US$ 586 billion[13] to shield her from the global crisis. Apparently the Chinese government got hooked on such political measures from which stimulus spending have now become a standard and stealthily implemented via state and local governments.

And yet the government may have already drained the people’s savings and has thus used debt to attain statistical growth. And as noted above, most of today’s economic growth model comes with heavy reliance on leveraging which results to the loss of productivity making them vulnerable to bursting bubbles.

Applied to China, billionaire, market guru and crony capitalist George Soros appears to share the same insight. In a recent article, Mr Soros writes[14] that China’s “model depended on financial repression of the household sector, in order to drive the growth of exports and investments. As a result, the household sector has now shrunk to 35% of GDP, and its forced savings are no longer sufficient to finance the current growth model. This has led to an exponential rise in the use of various forms of debt financing.”

Mr. Soros continues “There are some eerie resemblances with the financial conditions that prevailed in the US in the years preceding the crash of 2008. But there is a significant difference, too. In the US, financial markets tend to dominate politics; in China, the state owns the banks and the bulk of the economy, and the Communist Party controls the state-owned enterprises.”

And while many including Mr. Soros points to China’s Third Plenum as being an optimistic factor, as I recently noted[15],
implementation will mark the difference from rhetoric
Yet the Chinese political economy and her financial markets will have to face vast immediate or short term challenges first. And the ultimate  challenge is how to deal with her overleveraged economy.
I recall that in late November, as companies borrowing costs spiked, China’s state newspapers warned about a “limited debt crisis”[16]

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China’s Shanghai Index seems to share the same worries and has been down 5.25% year to date as of Friday’s close

2014 will probably answer the following questions:

Will the year of the horse usher in a series of defaults for the China’s overleveraged system? Will such defaults be contained (perhaps by her record reserves)? Will the Chinese government resort to bailouts? Or will it cause a domino effect that may spread through the financial system? Will there be a global contagion?

Has the proverbial chicken come home to roost for China’s credit and property bubbles?

Will economic and financial troubles prompt China into a military showdown with her neighbors over territorial disputes?

Will China trigger the Black Swan Event in 2014?










[8] Wall Street Journal Regulators at Odds on Reining In China's Shadow Lending January 14, 2014



[11] Global Finance Magazine World’s Biggest Banks 2013 October 2013



[14] George Soros The World Economy’s Shifting Challenges Project Syndicate January 2, 2014