April 7: The Day Global Risk Assets Bottomed: A Synchronized Reversal Across Stocks, Crypto, and Commodities

 

The conventional view serves to protect us from the painful job of thinking—John Kenneth Galbraith 

April 7: The Day Global Risk Assets Bottomed: A Synchronized Reversal Across Stocks, Crypto, and Commodities 

Following the April 7-8 lows, a synchronized rally swept across US, Asian or global stocks, commodities, and Bitcoin. Forget domestic interventions—this was a liquidity-driven comeback, sparked by global catalysts and market dynamics. 

I. Introduction 

On April 7-8, 2025, global markets teetered on the edge: Hong Kong’s Hang Seng cratered 13%, U.S. stocks wobbled, copper plunged 8%, and Bitcoin hit a yearly low. Fear ruled, with the VIX spiking to 46.98. 

Then, everything reversed course and headed higher through the next few weeks. 

From Tokyo to New York, stocks soared. Gold, oil, copper, and even Bitcoin joined the party. 

What sparked this global comeback? 

It wasn’t Chinese state buying or local policies. It was a liquidity tsunami, fueled by a massive global short-covering and capital rushing back to oversold assets. 

II. The Panic and the Spark

Figure 1

Concerns over the festering trade war, all-time high uncertainties, mounting geopolitical tensions in the face of a weakening global economy, and high systemic leverage put pressure on risk assets.   

In charts, US-China bilateral tariffs soared in April.  (Figure 1)

Figure 2

The world’s government debt-to-GDP ratio remains high and is expected to rise further. (Figure 2, upper diagram) 

The IMF slashed its global GDP forecast from 3.3% to 2.8% in 2025 (Figure 2, lower image) 

Deflating prices, deleveraging, and liquidity tightening led to a risk aversion in global stocks, which culminated in April 7’s brutal selloffs. 

The Chinese yuan fell, or the US dollar-yuan USDCNY spiked, driven by China’s retaliatory tariffs. 

But late on April 7, rumors of a 90-day U.S. tariff pause (excluding China) surfaced, sparking a wild U.S. market swing (S&P 500 from -4.7% to +3.4%). 

Though denied, these rumors set the stage for April 8. 

III. April 8 Onwards: A Liquidity-Fueled Macro Short-Covering Rally 

On April 8, the selloff in some of the global markets had eased, and some had started a sharp recovery. 

Liquidity—fueled by institutional buying, short covering, and algorithmic trading—revived risk-ON sentiment.

Figure 3 

From the April 7-8 lows, the S&P Global Equity Index rebounded 11.2%, the US S&P 11.02%, and the Euro Stoxx 600 10.8% as of April 25th. (Figure 3, topmost pane) 

In Asia, China’s Shanghai Composite rallied 6.6%, while Hong Kong’s Hang Seng 50 surged 9.9%. (Figure 3, middle graph) 

Meanwhile, Southeast Asian bourses staged a massive recoil. Indonesia’s JCI surged 12.7%, Thailand’s SET 9.33%, and the Philippine PSEi 30 8.74%, over the same period. (Figure 3, lowest chart)

Figure 4

Strikingly, USD gold prices soared 12.1%, copper 20.2%, WTI crude 6.9%, and Brent crude 7.5% (Figure 4, upper window) 

The CRB Commodity Index advanced by 7.2%, while Bitcoin roared 28%. (Figure 4, lower visual) 

Risk-ON was suddenly back! 

The USDCNY spike U-turned and plunged, with China’s central bank selling dollars to slow the yuan’s fall, but this was secondary. (Figure 4, lower graph) 

I called this on my X.com post, "A macro short-covering rally." 

IV. Extreme Oversold Conditions 

Figure 5

The VIX nearly hitting 50 was a sign of extreme oversold conditions. Historically, this has proved to be a turning point. (Figure 5, upper chart) 

While past performance doesn’t guarantee future results, one thing is clear: liquidity re-emerged following oversold conditions, and the VIX metric may have been somehow validated. 

V. Why Liquidity, Not Local Policies 

Chinese state buying, PBOC intervention, and the BOJ’s yen-defense rhetoric were possibly too small to reinvigorate the world’s risk appetite. 

Yet, the rally’s timing, scale, and breadth—spanning stocks, commodities, crypto, and the yuan—points to a global liquidity flood, driven by tariff relief hopes, the Fed’s dovish narrative, and oversold conditions. 

VI. Takeaways: A Fragile Rally in a Fractured World 

Trump’s arbitrary and capricious policies (Tariffs or not) should sustain an ambiance of "regime uncertainty," which clouds economic calculation for the global economy. 

This is aside from geopolitical (e.g., latest India-Pakistan clash over Kashmir, the ongoing Israel-Palestine War, Russia-Ukraine War, US/Israel-Houthi War, frictions at South China Sea and Taiwan, et al.) and geoeconomic (US-China trade war) tensions. 

Trump’s backsliding against China has prompted Chinese media to make a mockery of his policies, which in the coming days could test his mercurial temperament. Rising markets may reanimate his belligerent trade and foreign policy stance. 

With Return on Investment (RoI) and "hurdle rates" indeterminate, investments will likely stall.  The financial world will likely chase short-term gains via the financial markets, which likely implies heightened volatility in the days to come. 

Easily, this ties to bear market rallies in stocks, which are often sharp and swift but fleeting. 

Furthermore, for a financial world increasingly dependent on central bank easy-money bailouts, mounting de-globalization dynamics, rising geopolitical and geoeconomic uncertainties, increasing risks of economic discoordination and disruptions, increasing leverage, volatile liquidity conditions, and escalating risks of stagflation will likely inhibit central banks from their traditional approach—all of which may reduce the likelihood of fuel for a financial market "blowoff." 

Lastly, aside from gold, central banks and governments have lately been amassing Treasury Bills—a sign of a stampede for liquidity. The last time they hit this high was during the Great Recession (2007-2009). They surpassed the highs during the 2020 pandemic recession. (Figure 5, lower chart) 

All told, all-time high gold prices plus the second-highest official inflows to Treasury bills are likely signs of a coming global recession or a financial crisis.

 

 

PSEi 30: Has BBM’s SONA Cycle Climaxed? Rising Contagion Risks from the Unwinding of the Yen-Yuan Carry Trade

Bulls of 1929 like their 1990s counterparts had their eyes glued on improving profits and stock valuations. Not a thought was given to the fact that the rising tide of money deluging the stock market came from financial leverage and not from savings—Dr. Kurt Richebächer 

In this issue 

PSEi 30: Has BBM’s SONA Cycle Climaxed? Rising Contagion Risks from the Unwinding of the Yen-Yuan Carry Trade

I. PSEi 30: Has BBM’s SONA Cycle Climaxed? 

II. The Health of the Pre-SONA Pump: July’s Index Spike on Sluggish Volume 

III. The Impact of the "National Team:" Rising Concentration Risks in the Financial Spectrum 

IV. The Impact of the "National Team:" Rising Concentration Risks in the Economy 

V. How Media Shapes the Overton Window: Focus on "Ghost Month" while Ignoring Geopolitical Risks from South China Sea 

VI. How the Unwinding Carry Trade from the Japanese Yen’s Massive Rally May Aggravate the PSEi 30’s post SONA Dump 

PSEi 30: Has BBM’s SONA Cycle Climaxed? Rising Contagion Risks from the Unwinding of the Yen-Yuan Carry Trade 

Has BBM’s SONA Cycle Peaked? While the headline index has shown resilience in July, market internals reveal structural weaknesses. The unraveling of the Yen-Yuan carry-trade increases global contagion risks. 

I. PSEi 30: Has BBM’s SONA Cycle Climaxed? 

The following post is a follow-up on my July 21st, “The 2024 Pre-SONA Pump: Philippine PSEi 30 Soars to 6,800 - History, Details, and Effects” 

Since its interim peak on July 19th, the PSEi 30 has dropped 2.97%—as of the week ending August 2nd—supported by this week’s decrease of 1.79%, marking its second consecutive decline. 

The major Philippine benchmark fell in 5 of the last 9 trading days. 

Interestingly, this week’s larger decrease came as the Philippine government is expected to announce the Q2 GDP—which has been widely projected to outperform—and June’s labor force survey. 

The authorities are also set to release July's CPI print, which the BSP expects to show a bounce from last month.

And it's also earnings season, where the consensus expects Q2 earnings to exceed expectations. 

Meanwhile, the establishment and media have been peddling the idea of the “ghost” month affecting the stock market’s performance, earnings, and the economy. 

II. The Health of the Pre-SONA Pump: July’s Index Spike on Sluggish Volume 

First, let's examine the performance of the Philippine Stock Exchange last July*. 

*Nota Bene:

-The base reference matters. In my perspective, the 2013 starting point represents the real peak of the PSEi 30 based on volume and market internals.

*Annual returns of the PSEi 30 partially represent an apples-to-oranges comparison due to marginal changes in its membership.

*The data indicated reflects nominal returns and not CPI-adjusted or real returns.

Figure 1

Thanks to the pre-SONA pump, the PSEi 30 jumped 3.23%—representing its second-best monthly performance in 2024 and the biggest July returns since 2018. (Figure 1, topmost image)

It was also the largest of the BBM's pre-SONA pumps over the last three years.

On a year-to-date basis, the PSEi 30's meager 2.62% returns signified its best showing since 2019, which highlights the ongoing bear market.  (Figure 1, middle graph)

Despite this, diminishing returns continue to be a scourge on the PSEi 30.

But how about the volume?

Though July's gross turnover was up 11.3% from a year ago, in peso terms, its depressed level, which was almost equal to 2021, reinforced the downtrend since 2015. (Figure 1, lowest chart)

Figure 2 

Gross volume includes the published special block sales and the undeclared substantial share of cross-trades.

In the first 7 months of 2024, gross volume fell by 8.4% year-over-year (YoY) to Php 865.5 billion, marking a third consecutive annual decline. (Figure 2, highest window)

This means that the paltry improvement last July has not been significant enough to cover this year's volume deficit.

The 7-month main board volume likewise dropped 3.69% to Php 702.7 billion, which signified levels below 2018. (Figure 2, middle visual)

Resonating with the gross volume levels in peso, it has been a downhill for the main board volume since peaking likely in 2013.

Amazing.

The more than a decade-long depression in the PSE's gross and main board volume represents the decadent conditions of capital or savings.

It must be emphasized that these volumes have been inflated by foreign trade, pumps by the "national team," and intra-day dealer trades.

In the first 7 months of 2024, the share of foreign participation has risen from 45.44% in 2023 to 48.8% this year. (Figure 2, lowest diagram)

Foreign investors remained marginal sellers, posting Php 27 billion in outflows, their fifth consecutive year of net selling.

III. The Impact of the "National Team:" Rising Concentration Risks in the Financial Spectrum 

As for the "national team," the Other Financial Corporations (OFC) could be part of this cabal engaged by authorities to prop up the index.

Clue?

The BSP on the OFC’s activities in Q1 2024: The BSP on the OFC’s activities in Q1 2024: “The QoQ growth in the other financial corporations’ domestic claims was attributable to the increase in its claims on the other sectors, the central government, and the depository corporations. The other financial corporations’ claims on the other sectors grew as its investments in equity shares issued by other nonfinancial corporations and loans extended to households increased. Likewise, the sector’s claims on the central government rose as its holdings of government-issued debt securities expanded. Moreover, the sector’s claims on the depository corporations rose amid the increase in its deposits with the banks and holdings of bank-issued equity shares. (bold added) [BSP 2024]

Figure 3

The growth of OFC’s claims on the private sector slipped from 9.5% in Q4 2023 to 8.5% in Q1 2024, which was also reflected in the claims on depository institutions, whose growth rate decreased from 20% to 13.9%. 

Nevertheless, both claims surged to record highs in nominal peso levels, reflecting the returns of the PSEi 30 amounting to 7% and the Financial Index to 17% in Q1 2024. (Figure 3, upper and middle charts) 

OFCs have not just been funding the government; they have also been propping up the PSE! 

To emphasize, the percentage share of the free float capitalization of the top three banks reached an unprecedented 22.7% of the PSEi 30 last May! (Figure 3, lowest image) 

Though it has slipped, it has remained within a stone's throw of 21.85% as of the week of August 2nd. 

The same banking heavyweights command a whopping 89% of the overall Financial Index pie, which is stunningly higher than the 79% share in the week of July 16, 2023.  

This outgrowth partially reflects the decrease in the number of members from 9 to 7, due to the exclusion of Rizal Commercial Bank and Union Bank. 

The only non-bank member of the index is the Philippine Stock Exchange [PSE:PSE].

Figure 4

The Financial Index has not only starkly outperformed, alongside ICT, electrifying the gains of the PSEi 30, but it has also been absorbing a greater share of the depressed volume of the PSE. (Figure 4, topmost graph)

That is, the uptrend in the Financial Index has climbed along with its estimated volume share of the PSEi 30, comprising 18.15% last June. (Figure 4, middle image)

As such, the concentration of gains in the index has also resonated in the context of gross volume.

To wit, the rising concentration risk comes amidst a declining trend in profit growth of the banking system, where a bulk of it represents accounting profits. For instance, mark-to-market losses are concealed via record Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets, and BSP relief measures that understate NPLs, etc.

IV. The Impact of the "National Team:" Rising Concentration Risks in the Economy

And it is not just banks.

While year-to-date (YTD) gains of the PSEi 30 members have been evenly distributed (as of August 2), the returns of the top five issues have defined the index's performance rather than the overall breadth. (Figure 4, lowest pane)

For instance, the traded volume of the top 20 most active issues increased by 40% this July compared to a year ago and was up by 2.17% YTD 2024 from the previous year.

In the same vein, the volume of the Sy Group soared 46.6% last July from the same month in 2023 and was up 7.3% YTD 2024 compared to a year ago. 

This indicates that the heavy index pumping last July by the Philippine version of the “National Team” amplified the percentage share of the top 20 issues and the Sy Group in the context of volume. 

Meanwhile, the average share of the top 10 brokers increased from 56.98% in July 2023 to 57.6% last month. 

Aside from the sluggish volume, the PSEi 30’s SONA gains have barely been reflected in the PSE’s constellation. 

The advance-decline spread last July 2024 was -150 compared to -166 in the same month a year ago. Again, the PSEi was up 3.23%.

Figure 5

This divergence reverberated in the YTD performance: although negative breadth has become less negative—or price declines have been less intense—a positive sign, they are still declining.  Again, the PSEi was up 2.62% YTD. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

Lethargic volume (a symptom of capital consumption), rising risks from the concentration of activities in trading volume (reflecting maladjustment in balance sheet exposure), select stock prices (inflation of mini-price bubbles), broker exposure (increased balance sheet leveraging?), as well as low levels of retail trades (low savings), and rising dependence on foreign trade (increasing reliance on global capital flows) translate to magnified risks of significant downside volatility or simply—a meltdown. 

A stock market meltdown leads to a decrease in collateral values that underpin bank lending, which magnifies balance sheet mismatches, increases illiquidity, and heightens the risk of insolvency within the industry and among its borrowers. It also weakens the balance sheets of investment, pension, and insurance funds (such as the government’s SSS and GSIS), potentially leading to increased capital deficits and further heightening the risk of illiquidity and insolvencies. 

The BSP would likely bail some of these out at the expense of the peso. 

During the stock market meltdown in March 2020, the Finance Chief called on the SSS and GSIS to boost or "rescue" the stock market. The BSP followed this up with record cuts in official rates, historic liquidity injections, and the implementation of various relief measures. The rest is history. 

The BSP implemented ex-Fed chairman Ben Bernanke advise, 

History proves, however, that a smart central bank can protect the economy and the financial sector from the nastier side effects of a stock market collapse (Bernanke, 2009) 

The Philippine version of the national team likely exists for these reasons. 

V. How Media Shapes the Overton Window: Focus on "Ghost Month" while Ignoring Geopolitical Risks from South China Sea 

Incredibly, the establishment and media continue to entertain and mislead the public with the alleged influence of the so-called "Ghost Month" on stocks or the economy.

Because "Ghost Month" is a superstition rooted in Chinese tradition (religion), the media and establishment's embrace of it assumes that the markets and the economy are driven by Chinese culture, even when the Philippines is predominantly a Catholic population. (Figure 5 middle window)

For example, some BSP literatures cite the "Ghost Month" to rationalize the unexplainable. The BSP should address accusations of their having 'ghost employees' instead. 

The repetitive references to the so-called "Ghost Month" also assume that foreign participation in the financial markets and the economy is influenced by Chinese tradition.

Or, are investors or market participants in the PSE and the economy predominantly of Chinese descent or a practitioner of Chinese traditions?

Some PSE facts regarding the alleged misfortunes of the Ghost Month:

Since the PSEi uptrend from 2003 through 2023, August has closed lower in 14 of the 21 years, or 67% of the time, with an average change of -0.72%. Yet, August 2021 delivered a majestic 9.33% return, the highest since 2000. August 2022 also produced a 4.24% return, the highest since 2008. (Figure 5, lowest graph)

So, what happened to the "Ghosts" of 2021 and 2022? Did the PSEi call upon the movie comedians known as the "Ghostbusters" to foil the rut? Or, have these rallies been a product of the BSP's easy money campaign?

Ironically, the same media and establishment experts have been unanimously silent about the June 17th Ayungin Shoal incident, which involved a standoff between the Philippine and Chinese Coast Guard.

The incident could have triggered World War III—had the US agreed with the Philippines' interpretation, activating the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. Unfortunately, the US implicitly gave a cold shoulder to the Philippines, forcing the latter to negotiate and deal with Chinese authorities over the South China Sea. Naturally, the US is opposed to this.

The same echo chamber has been observed ignoring the ongoing shift to a war economy through its embrace of war socialism.

Superstitions are given precedence over facts that matter, translating to the brazen hoodwinking of the public that fomenting war is good for the economy while Ghosts will scare the wits out of investments. 

Won't a war lead to a partial transformation of the living population into ghosts? 

Yet, who would invest in a country on the brink of war? Who would like to see their investment ownership evaporate when enemy drones start wreaking havoc on crucial social, economic, and political edifices, exacting a heavy toll on life and disrupting the division of labor?

But don't worry, stocks and real estate will boom! 

Sorry, but that’s an absolutely stunning imbecilic logic. 

VI. How the Unwinding Carry Trade from the Japanese Yen’s Massive Rally May Aggravate the PSEi 30’s post SONA Dump

The scarcity of local volume translates to amplified vulnerability to volatile foreign sentiment, mercurial fund positioning, and flows. 

Proof?

The massive +4.7% rally by the Japanese yen $USDJPY stole this week’s thunder.

It smashed what the consensus called the “unstoppable” force, a speculative mania. 

To amplify its policy, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) reportedly timed its $36 billion intervention in July to coincide with softening signs in the US economy.

Furthermore, the Chinese yuan $CNY also rebounded by 1.1% week-over-week (WoW). The US dollar index fell by 1.1%. 

The unraveling of the yen and yuan carry trades unleashed a wave of de-risking and deleveraging that rippled across the globe.

Figure 6 

Asian currencies posted substantial gains. (Figure 6, topmost graph) 

The Philippine peso rallied by 0.46%, with the $USDPHP closing at 58.08 and looking poised to fall below the 58 levels and retest the 57.5 area this coming week.

The Philippines led the rally in ASEAN bonds. (Figure 6, middle window) The sharp fall in the 10-year Philippine bond yields strengthens the view that the BSP is about to cut rates.

Furthermore, as signs of mounting strains in the economy emerge, the "belly" of the Philippine treasury curve has also inverted—meaning yields of 2-to-7 year notes have dropped below the 1-year note and partly below the 6-month T-bills. (Figure 6, lowest chart)

Philippine treasuries appear to be defying the BSP’s projected increase in inflation.

Figure 7

The unwinding of the carry trades sent the Japanese stocks crashing.  The yen’s massive rally coincided with the Nikkei 225’s 5.81% nosedive last Friday, to register its 2nd largest one-day decline after the Black Monday crash of October 1987.  The Nikkei was down 4.6% WoW. (Figure 7, topmost and middle charts)

Asian stock markets closed mostly lower. Eleven of the nineteen bellwethers posted deficits, with an average decline of 0.47%. Aside from Japan, the most significant weekly declines were led by Taiwan and the Philippines.(Figure 7, lowest graph)

All of this indicates the magnified contagion risks associated with asset booms driven by financial leverage.

Figure 8 

Risks in the ‘periphery’ have reached the ‘core.’ 

The race to a series of record highs by the S&P 500 $SPX has echoed the PSEi 30’s muted rally in 2024. With the SPX down, the PSEi 30's SONA pump has started to wobble. (Figure 8, highest image)

Foreign outflows of Php 1.6 billion this week have partly resulted in the PSEi 30’s 1.79% decline.

In the backdrop of lethargic volume, concentrated activities, and a rising share of foreign participation, a continuation of global de-risking and deleveraging translates to more liquidations here and abroad, which could expose many skeletons in the closet of the Philippine financial system.

The SONA pumps of 2022 and 2023 not only surrendered all their gains; more importantly, the PSEi 30 closed lower than its base at the start of the pumps. (Figure 8, middle graph)

If history rhymes, the PSEi 30 could fall below its June 21st low of 6,158 during this SONA cycle (post-SONA dump).

Further, when the Philippine peso rallied in 2018 (USD PHP trended lower), it marked the onset of the PSE’s bear market. Will history repeat? (Figure 8, lowest chart)

Importantly, weren't we repeatedly told that easy money would fuel the embers for the rocketing of asset gains?

___

References

Prudent Investor, The 2024 Pre-SONA Pump: Philippine PSEi 30 Soars to 6,800 - History, Details, and Effects, July, 21, 2024

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Q1 2024 Domestic Claims of Other Financial Corporations Rise by 2.8 Percent QoQ and 12.9 Percent YoY, July 31, 2024

Ben S. Bernanke, A Crash Course for Central Bankers, ForeignPolicy.com, November 20, 2009

  

PSEi 30 Plummets on Foreign Selling Amidst Low Volume; Intensifying Global Liquidity, Collateral, and Counterparty issues

 

Most investors are primarily oriented toward return, how much they can make, and pay little attention to risk, how much they can lose—Seth Klarman 

 

In this brief issue: 

 

PSEi 30 Plummets on Foreign Selling Amidst Low Volume; Intensifying Global Liquidity, Collateral, and Counterparty issues  

 

I. PSEi 30 Plummets on Foreign Selling Amidst Low Volume  

II. Intensifying Global Liquidity, Collateral, Counterparty issues have Magnified Liquidations and Volatility  

 

PSEi 30 Plummets on Foreign Selling Amidst Low Volume, Intensifying Global Liquidity, Collateral, Counterparty issues 

 

I. PSEi 30 Plummets on Foreign Selling Amidst Low Volume  

 

From our outlook a week ago…(bold original) 

 

Thus, the sustained deterioration of market liquidity magnifies the risks of downside volatilities. 

 

Stagflation Ahoy! How "Limited" is the Impact of the Ukraine War on the Domestic Economy? 

April 24, 2022 

 

Despite the heroics of pre-closing interventions, the PSEi 30 plunged 3.82% this week, the worst in 2022, pulling down its YTD performance to -5.5%.  

 

And down by 6.56%, the April 2022 loss represented the largest since 2008. 

 

Figure 1 

 Weekly foreign outflows accounted for Php 1.46 billion. Meanwhile, the share of foreign transactions was little change week on week at 46.54%. Nevertheless, foreign participation has been on an uptrend since July 2021. But they remain net sellers.  

 

Figure 2 

Simply put, foreign dumping of domestic equities in the face of low volume resulted in the biggest weekly deficit of the year. 

 

This week’s selloff slightly boosted trading turnover. 

 

Foreign selling accelerated in March. While the PSE recorded an outflow of Php 10.693 billion, the BSP reported an outflow of USD 305 million.  

 

In the BSP report, the primary channel of the exit of hot money was the PSE, while a less significant portion came from the treasury markets. 

 

Nonetheless, the PSEi 30 slid to August 2021 levels, confirming the double break in the uptrend from March 2020 when the BSP mounted a rescue of the financial system.  

  

Further, bearish patterns could compound selling pressures. First, a rounding top seems to plague the index. Next, the week's selloff cements the drift to a death cross (200-day moving average rise above the 50-day moving average). 

 

Yes, an oversold bounce is due, but one may use such opportunities to generate liquidity. 

 

II. Intensifying Global Liquidity, Collateral, Counterparty issues have Magnified Liquidations and Volatility  

 

Liquidity, collateral, and counterparty issues have magnified liquidations and volatility worldwide.  

 

Market strains are emerging in the nook and crannies of the global financial markets, particularly in credit markets, credit spreads, currencies to the stock markets.  

 

The pain appears to be spreading.  

 

Figure 3 

In the currency market, the USD continues to firm up. (Figure 3 topmost pane) 

 

And it is not just against the euro, but the yen and the yuan (as noted below) are likewise under severe pressure.  

 

The Chinese yuan registered its sharpest monthly drop. (Figure 3, middle window) 

 

Surging US repo fails have accompanied the plunge of the Japanese yen. (Figure 3, lowest pane) 

 

Pressure on collateral and counterparties has become apparent.  

 

 

Figure 4 

 

The ongoing liquidity drain has been pushing up the yield spread of US junk bonds while high-grade corporate yields in Europe have surged to the pandemic highs of 2020. (Figure 4, upper and middle windows) 

 

 

Figure 5 

 

Surging yields or plummeting global bond markets have amplified volatility. (Figure 5, upper window)  

The MOVE index continues to climb, signaling further strains on the bond markets. (Figure 4, lowest pane) 

 

Soaring Credit Default Swaps (CDS) continues to hound the US S&P. (Figure 5, lower window) 

 

From Credit Bubble Bulletin’s Doug Noland, April 30: "Asia Credit default swap (CDS) prices increased notably this week and during April. For the month, the Philippines CDS rose 32 bps (to 111bps), Vietnam 25 bps (137bps), Malaysia 25 bps (92 bps), India 22 bps (127bps), Indonesia 21 bps (106bps), and South Korea 12 bps (41bps)". 

 

Default risks are rising globally. 

 

Unlike in the recent past, global central banks can’t print the scarcities and shortages brought about by the supply shock.  

 

 

Figure 6 

 

Fertilizer shortages have spread to the US, which means lower output ahead. The risks of a global food crisis mount.  

 

The CEO of Goya Foods affirms our view. Real Clear Politics, April 26: "Bob Unanue, the CEO of Goya foods, told FNC's Maria Bartiromo on Tuesday that inflation price increases and actual shortages of food are likely around the world this year." 

 

The Indonesian government confirmed its export ban on palm oil, which translates to the diffusion of shortages of many items globally. 

 

Inquirer, April 25: Indonesia’s plan to ban palm oil exports will deal a blow to the world’s top food and consumer products companies including Unilever, Procter & Gamble, and Nestle. Indonesia counts for more than half of the global supply of the edible oil, which is used in everything from cakes, chocolate, margarine and frying fats to cosmetics, soap, shampoo and cleaning products. 

 

Deepening protectionism will only intensify supply disruptions.  

 

Because of power shortages, Pakistan and India imposed rolling brownouts amidst sweltering heat waves. 

 

The feedback loop between the 'real' developments and the financial markets can only escalate.  

  

Batten down the hatches. 

 

Yours in liberty, 

 

The Prudent Investor Newsletters 

 

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Nota Bene: The newsletter intends to apprise readers of the market conditions based on the information available at the time of the items’ writing, whose accuracy and timeliness of the issues concerned are subject to change without prior notice.   Solicitation to trade is neither intended by the contents. In the meantime, the discussion of occasional positioning on particular issues are opinions of this author.