Showing posts with label gold prices. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gold prices. Show all posts

Sunday, November 22, 2026

Three Markets, One Signal: The PSEi Unravels, the Peso Weakens, and T-Bills Surge

 

Psychologist James Reason’s ‘Swiss cheese model’ holds that major disasters in complex systems are the result of the accumulation and alignment of multiple failures—the ‘eyes’ or holes in some kinds of cheese. Today, several risks—overvaluation, high debt, cash flow shortfalls, volatility, rising interest rates, interconnections, financial games, poor safeguards—are creating the perfect conditions for a financial crash—Satyajit Das 

In this issue

Three Markets, One Signal: The PSEi Unravels, the Peso Weakens, and T-Bills Surge

I. Whac-a-Mole 1: The Floor Gives Way

II. The Global Mallet: Equity De-Risking and Deleveraging Reaches the Core

III. Whac-a-Mole 2: The Peso Borrows from the Reserves

IV. Whac-a-Mole 3: The Mallet Hits the T-Bills

V. Three Markets, One Signal: The Mallet Moves the Pressure, Not the Problem 


Three Markets, One Signal: The PSEi Unravels, the Peso Weakens, and T-Bills Surge 

Financial stress keeps migrating. The PSEi's support stock cracks, the peso borrows from the reserves, and T-bills price a liquidity squeeze while the AI unwind reaches Asia. 

I. Whac-a-Mole 1: The Floor Gives Way 

This week, the mallet found the floor.


Figure 1 

The PSEi 30 lost 286.51 points (-5.12%) to 5,306.98, its biggest weekly drop since the week of January 31, 2025 and a 2020 low. The 5,600 "Maginot line" is gone. The March 19, 2020 closing low of 4,623.42 now sits 12.9% below. (Figure 1, topmost pane) 

"ICTSI selloff drags PSEi to 6-year low," ran the headline. Wow. This is a rarity. The Overton window has almost always treated the PSEi as synonymous with the Philippine stock market.

For once, it was accurate. Partly though. 

Friday. ICTSI's 7.22% crash delivered 89.52 gross points, or 52.37% of the index's 170.93-point loss (-3.12%). SM (-4.38%, 23.31 points) lifted the pair's contribution to 66%. The remaining 34% was reflected in negative PSEi breadth: just 5 advancers against 23 decliners. The broader PSE market was equally negative, with 41 advancers against 131 decliners. 

Yet ICTSI alone was 49.5% of the Php 9.11B main board volume (MBV)!  (Figure 1, middle graph) Foreigners sold Php 993.6M of its roughly Php 4.51B turnover (22%), so nothing bid underneath it. The top 10 brokers handled 66% of MBV. 

The week. ICTSI was 136.01 gross points, or 47.5% of the 286.51-point plunge. With SM, BDO, BPI and SMPH, the share was 64.54%. Breadth was 283-593. That -310 spread is the widest since September 30, 2022's -326, and it is the eleventh straight negative week (Figure 1, lowest image)


Figure 2 

The average PSEi member fell 4.45%, and only two held up. ICTSI fell 10.58%, while PLUS (-16.92%) and SCC (-19.8%) kept collapsing. (Figure 2, topmost pane) 

ICTSI's index weight slid to about 21.7%, yet the top 5 still carry 53.84%. (Figure 2, middle diagram) 

The three big banks (BDO, BPI, MBT) rose from 20.34% to 21.12% simply by falling less. 

Foreigners were net sellers for a second week (-1.128B). ICTSI's own net foreign selling (-1.271B) exceeded the entire market's net outflow. Daily main board volume rose 14.8% to Php 6.771B, with cross trades at 25.84% and ICTSI at 38.73%. 

Why does one stock carry half the tape? Because a managed index changes who participates. 

When the benchmark is defended, with floors under the heavyweights, rescue bids post-recess  (afternoon delight), into the close (pre-closing pumps) and/or 'rotation’ from one name to the next, prices stop telling participants where the risk is. A measure managed as a target stops measuring. Those who need true prices leave, and a thin ring of brokers and cross trades works a few names. The PSE posted its lowest retail and institutional participation in 2025, and a thinner market attracts more managing, which thins it further. 

What I call benchmarkism is the whole exercise: managing market outcomes through an unofficial "national team," and statistical output to project a panorama of “macro stability.” ICTSI was its primary instrument. Its rising price, valuation and volume share from July to September were engineered to put a floor under the PSEi and power a rotation-led bull market, as our three-part series laid out. 

The index was made to look stronger than the market underneath it. Concentration isn't an oversight. It is what benchmarkism leaves behind, and the establishment has been as silent on WHY it happens as on how concentrated trading has become. 

Each rescue must also be bigger than the last to buy the same calm. ICTSI peaked at Php 1,027 on July 20 and was celebrated for its Php 2T market cap in early September. Then its decline accelerated. The stock engineered to be the floor was holding the index up, and when it broke, the index went with it. 

Benchmarkism backfired. Price controls buy time but deepen the maladjustment, and the consequences run opposite to what was intended. In a savings-starved capital market, the floor had to be built from one stock's price, and that is the unforeseen consequence. 

This week’s collapse essentially validates the arguments advanced in our three-part series. 

ICTSI is now technically oversold, making a rebound possible at any time. But an oversold condition is not a reversal signal. A bounce may provide temporary relief without changing the underlying trend, restoring market breadth or repairing the concentration that benchmarkism left behind. A recovery in price should not be mistaken for a recovery in market structure.

II. The Global Mallet: Equity De-Risking and Deleveraging Reaches the Core 

Of 19 national bourses, 16 fell, with an average change of -3.49%. (Figure 2, lowest chart)


Figure 3 

Taiwan's Taiex crashed 17.5%, its worst week since 1991. The Nikkei fell 7.7% and the KOSPI 7.95%, ending the week 48% below its June record. (Figure 3, topmost diagram) 

The Dow, S&P 500 and Nasdaq lost 8.02%, 8.61% and 10.02%. Gold, silver and copper fell 8.92%, 15.44% and 9.78%, and Bitcoin 14.36% (StockCharts). (Figure 3, middle and lower visuals) 

The dollar rose 0.4% while the 10-year TNX slid from 5.154% to 4.912%. 

The order matters. Financial market stress first appeared at the periphery, where funding is thinnest: Indonesia's crash in October, Korea, then Brazil, whose real has lost about 14–15% since the re-election and whose central bank intervened for the first time since 2024. Now it has reached the core: the Nasdaq, US banks (KBW -9.5%), the Magnificent 7, high-yield credit. Weak balance sheets lose dollar funding and risk capital first. When the core starts selling, no one is left to fund the periphery. 

The Philippines sits on the periphery side of that line, so this week's PSEi selloff is the same signal on a smaller screen. 

Gold falling with equities matters too. Leveraged holders are selling what they can sell, not what they want to sell. That is deleveraging, not rotation. 

Reflexivity turns market stress into a self-reinforcing process. Falling prices do not merely reflect deteriorating confidence; they help produce it. Asset-price declines impair collateral, tighten financing conditions, trigger margin calls and force liquidation. Forced selling then pushes prices lower, further weakening balance sheets and restricting access to funding. What begins as a repricing becomes a deleveraging cycle. The market is no longer simply discounting economic weakness; it is transmitting and amplifying it. 

The AI unwind, in causal order: 

Falling AI equities are the symptom. Nvidia lost 22.9% on the week, semiconductors 17.1% and the Magnificent 7 index 10.3%. 

Collateral falls and funding tightens. Oracle's CDS hit a record 341 bps, CoreWeave's yields jumped 84 bps to 15.11%, and high-yield spreads widened 51 bps, the most since April 2025. Banks are reportedly selling data-center loans at the 80s and 90s. Falling valuations weaken collateral, while widening credit spreads raise refinancing costs. The financing conditions that amplified the boom now accelerate the unwind. 

Stress reaches circular financing. Chipmakers fund neoclouds, which buy chips, which are pledged against loans. The ECB counts over $4 trillion of off-balance-sheet commitments among big tech. The structure depends on continuously rising valuations, continued financing and demand. A weak link therefore threatens the entire chain. What appeared as independent sources of demand was partly circular capital formation. 

The unwind reaches the supply chain and geopolitics. The US is moving to require licenses for AI chip exports to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil. Strategic initiatives such as Pax Silica and national semiconductor policies make commercial adjustment more politically costly. Governments increasingly treat AI and semiconductor capacity as strategic assets rather than ordinary commercial investments. This creates another layer of rigidity: capital, infrastructure and supply chains become harder to redirect even when their economic returns deteriorate. 

But strategic importance cannot repeal profit and loss. 

The policy response risks transferring rather than resolving the adjustment. Guarantees, liquidity injections and monetary accommodation may interrupt forced selling and postpone balance-sheet recognition. They cannot, by themselves, restore the economic viability of misallocated capital. If intervention sustains excess capacity, debt and demand against constrained productive supply, the adjustment can migrate from financial markets into the currency and price level. Losses that cannot be absorbed through asset repricing eventually be transferred to currency holders through monetary accommodation and inflation. 

This time the policy dilemma is sharper. The Fed is debating hikes even as financial markets demand relief. The traditional central-bank put collides with inflation. Easing may stabilize asset prices but weaken the currency and reignite price pressures; tightening may contain inflation but intensify deleveraging. Policymakers face a conflict between financial stability and monetary stability that cannot be resolved simply by supplying more liquidity.


Figure 4

The Philippine link. Semiconductor exports soared 86% in September to a record, lifting their share of exports to a record 57.5%, but imports surged too (see Stagflation 19). (Figure 4, topmost window) 

September imports rose 25.7% to $15.03B against exports up 35.6% to $9.87B, a $5.15B deficit. 9-month deficit was $47.158B—a record. The export boom is smaller than the import bill it creates. A bust cuts the export leg quickly while the oil and debt-service bills stay put. 

A note on the week's outages (Microsoft, the FAA ground stop, four major US banks, United, the NSA network and Apple): coincidence cannot be ruled out, but neither should the events be viewed in isolation. In a war economy, communications, transportation, financial infrastructure and digital networks are strategic assets and potential points of vulnerability, therefore potential targets. Whether these disruptions were ordinary technical failures, stress-induced operational fragility, strategic probing or something more remains unresolved. The important point is that systemic complexity has created vulnerabilities with geopolitical consequences. The distinction between civilian infrastructure and strategic infrastructure is increasingly difficult to maintain. 

The current “periphery to the core” market stress increasingly resembles a crisis dynamic in progression. 

III. Whac-a-Mole 2: The Peso Borrows from the Reserves 

The dollar rose against 7 of 10 Asian currencies, yet the regional average was +0.02%. India's rupee and Japan's yen rallied, offsetting weakness in the Korean won and ASEAN currencies. USDPHP rose 0.14% to 63.81, close to the 64.17 record of October 27. 

That is a quiet print in a week when Brazil's real fell 4.7%, South Africa's rand 3.7% and Mexico's peso 3.3%. A stable price in a stressed week is information only if you ask who paid for it. The reserves did. 

The BSP reported a $1.5B October BOP deficit, $10.6B for January to October, and GIR down to about $98B. The 10-month deficit is 15% above the BSP's $9.2B full-year forecast, and the BSP's year-end reserves forecast of $104B is $6B above where reserves stand with two months left. The forecast has already failed. (Figure 4, middle graph) 

The Treasury also awarded an initial $453.4M from its third Retail Onshore Dollar Bond issuance at a 5.65% coupon, against $839.5M in tenders—4.2 times the initial $200M offer. The offer remains open until November 24. 

The onshore issuance mobilizes dollar savings for sovereign financing rather than directly generating new external borrowing from international capital markets. It converts privately held dollar claims into a sovereign dollar liability, which the government must eventually service in foreign currency. Residents queuing more than four times over for dollar paper at 5.65% is also a statement about how they expect the peso to behave. 

The mainstream awaits a Q4 spending recovery, but Q3 GDP grew 2.1% and nine-month growth is 2.45%. Importantly, Q4 and household GDP has been materially slowing since 2021, printing 3.8% and 3% in 2025. (Figure 4, lowest image) 

Year-end government spending without real savings behind it is financed by money creation or foreign borrowing. 

Expect the record fiscal gap to widen, alongside another record trade and current account deficit (twin deficits). That widens the saving-investment gap, which only foreign funding or reserve depletion can bridge. The BOP is where the bridge shows up. 

IV. Whac-a-Mole 3: The Mallet Hits the T-Bills 


Figure 5 

The Philippine (BVAL) yield curve is flattening from both sides Bills are being pulled up while the 3- to 10-year belly is pulled down, closing the spread from both sides. The 1-, 3- and 6-month bills rose 44.4, 22.58 and 10.54 bps on the week, reaching multi-year highs.

Mid-curve moves were +7.79 (1y), -4.04 (2y), -10.13 (3y), -14.16 (4y), -15.91 (5y) and -15.9 bps (7y), while the 10-year fell 8.2 bps. Against October 30, bills are up 36 to 73 bps and 7- to 10-year yields down 10 to 50 bps, while the 20- to 25-year sector is up only about 4 bps, essentially unchanged. (Figure 5, topmost pane) 

Against October 30, bills are up 36 to 73 bps and 7- to 10-year yields down 10 to 50, while the 20- to 25-year is up only about 4 bps, essentially unchanged. (Figure 5, middle image) 

The front end is being pulled up, the belly pulled down, and the long end barely moves. The front-end repricing raises the possibility that markets are anticipating further BSP tightening. (Figure 5, lower graph) 

Persistent peso weakness, reserve depletion and inflation risks constrain the BSP's policy marking ability to either ease, or force it to raise rates despite weakening economic growth. The multi-year highs in short-term bills reflect this tightening pressure, although market yields do not establish that a policy hike is inevitable. 

There are three candidates for the belly's rally: 

  • Weak growth. Materially slowing Philippine GDP growth points to weaker economic activity and lower future credit demand, putting downward pressure on intermediate-term yields. 
  • Imported duration demand. US 10-year yields fell about 20 bps and 2-year yields 22 bps this week. Falling US yields provide an external tailwind for Philippine intermediate bonds, even as domestic short-term funding costs rise. 
  • Domestic liquidity. This is likely the more consequential factor. Diminishing bank liquidity buffers and tighter funding conditions coexist with growing demand for government financing. Banks and other institutions face competing demands for liquidity, while short-term government securities must offer increasingly higher yields to attract funding. This helps explain why bills are repricing upward even as intermediate yields decline. 

There is another complication. The local bond market is losing both turnover and foreign participation.


Figure 6

PHP Treasury volume keeps falling and now sits at 2024 lows. (Figure 6, upper graph) The market is clearing with less turnover, making price movements more dependent on the marginal transaction. Lower volume does not establish the absence of demand, but it raises the question of how much depth remains to absorb a larger adjustment. 

The BSP reports four consecutive quarters of foreign outflows from Philippine bonds, bringing cumulative withdrawals to $4.477 billion. Q3 alone accounted for $748 million, while year-to-date outflows reached $2.941 billion. (Figure 6, lower chart) 

This sustained retreat came as the 10-year yield hit a multi-year high. The foreign bid built around the announced JPMorgan index inclusion, starting next year, is retreating even before the index arrives. 

Higher yields are also a fiscal fact. Every bill that rolls over at a multi-year high raises the cost of refinancing a record deficit, and the interest bill competes with everything else the budget has promised. 

The adjustment has moved from the stock market and the peso into the government's own cost of funds. 

V. Three Markets, One Signal: The Mallet Moves the Pressure, Not the Problem 

  • In stocks, the support stock became the fault line. 
  • In the peso, stability is being sustained through reserve depletion against persistent external deficits. 
  • In bills, the price of liquidity is rising while market volume shrinks. 

All three expose the same shortage of real savings, while the AI unwind removes the external subsidy that had been papering over it. 

Engineering support for the heavyweights does not create market breadth; it suppresses it. Smoothing the peso through intervention and dollar borrowing does not create savings. Institutional demand for government securities at higher yields does not eliminate the cost of debt. Each intervention moves the pressure to the next price that cannot be controlled. 

The mole was never the problem. The mallet is. 

Prices are information. Strategic importance cannot repeal the laws of scarcity.


Sunday, November 01, 2026

Three Markets, One Signal: How the PSEi, Peso and BVAL Priced Suppression in October

 

Price controls take some time for their flaws and distortions to develop: for the longer they last, the more do their controlled prices diverge from the prices that would be obtaining on the free market—Murray N. Rothbard 

In this issue: 

Three Markets, One Signal: How the PSEi, Peso and BVAL Priced Suppression in October

I. The PSEi’s “Rotation” Is the Cover Story

II. A Floor Is a Price Control

III. GCASH: The IPO With a Subsidy Bid Underneath

IV. “Don’t Panic” Is a Policy

V. The Yield Curve Takes No Orders

VI. Whac-a-Mole Economics

VII. Periphery to Core

VIII. What October Priced: The Cost of Suppressing Adjustment

VIII. Conclusion: October’s Cost of Suppressing Adjustment 

Three Markets, One Signal: How the PSEi, Peso and BVAL Priced Suppression in October 

Every intervention bought stability in one market and billed another. In October, the bill is showing up in bond yields and FX reserves as global liquidity drains from the outside 


I. The PSEi’s “Rotation” Is the Cover Story


Figure 1

The PSEi 30 ended October almost unchanged month on month (-0.02%). It is still down 6.16% year to date and 4.2% year on year. The headline hides a redistribution of index leadership. (Figure 1, table) 

ICTSI, the largest heavyweight, surrendered 89.54 gross points (-5.84%). The next four largest names (SM +7.84%, BDO +4.42%, BPI +1.08%, SMPH +10.34%) contributed 91.23 points and more than offset it. Breadth tilted positive at 18 advancers against 12 decliners. Yet heavier losses in SCC, DMC and CNPF dragged the simple average change across the 30 members to -0.66%. (Figure 1, middle image) 

The gap between -0.02% and -0.66% comes from free-float market-cap weighting. A handful of names decide the headline. After ICTSI’s drop, the five largest still command 55.24% of the index. (Figure 1, lowest graph) 


Figure 2 

The wider PSE tells the real story. 

Breadth was 1,811 advancers against 2,113 decliners, which extends broad-market selling to eight of the first ten months of 2026. (Figure 2, topmost pane) 

Main Board volume (MBV) rose 20.4% year on year to Php 129.67 billion, but cross transactions took 27.71% of it. (Figure 2, middle diagram) SM’s Php 8.736 billion block alone was about 24% of the month’s cross volume. 

ICTSI’s share of Main Board volume (MBV) climbed from 19% in September to 23.75% in October, while foreigners net sold about Php 1.3 billion of the stock as it fell. Local institutional buying absorbed the selling. (Figure 2, lowest chart) 

The index’s “stability” rests on an engineered domestic support for a heavyweight under foreign liquidation. 

II. A Floor Is a Price Control


Figure 3 

The top 10 brokers averaged 66.8% of daily MBV, and the top 10 issues averaged 72%. That concentration put an implicit floor near 5,600 under the PSEi all month. (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

A floor held by a few brokers and a few issues is a price control, whatever name it goes by. 

The PSEi is a free float market capitalization-weighted benchmark. It does not measure the breadth or health of the equity market. The media and the establishment treat it as if it did, though five issues decide most daily outcomes. Confusing the two is how benchmarkism disguises concentration as stability. 

Leadership rotated in October, but concentration did not go away. It only changed where the support was pointed. Extreme trading concentration, persistent negative breadth and thinning liquidity are the symptoms, and the distorted price signals they produce misallocate capital. 

Ironically, almost no one comments on it—as if it is a taboo. 

III. GCASH: The IPO With a Subsidy Bid Underneath 

The GCash listing offered another illustration of the market's dependence on concentrated liquidity. 

GCASH’s weekly share of Main Board volume fell from 34.9% to 9.22%. The stock swung -5% on the week of October 23 and +5.42% the following week. It closed at Php 6.61, a hair above the Php 6.60 offer price. The price is where it is because someone is buying it. (Figure 3, middle image) 

UBS, the sole stabilizing agent, bought 786.57 million shares at an average of Php 6.571 in the week ending October 23. That cost about Php 5.17 billion and used up 65% of its maximum stabilization buying capacity in the first trading week. The budget is the 1.204 billion overallotment shares, worth Php 7.95 billion at the offer price. That leaves about 417.5 million shares, roughly Php 2.75 billion. The support window runs about 30 days from the October 20 listing. There is no update on this as of October 30th. 

The mechanism is simple. The agent sells the overallotment shares short at the offer price, then buys them back in the open market to defend it. A bid sits just under Php 6.60 until the money runs out. It is the PSEi’s floor in miniature: a price held by a dedicated buyer and not by savings. 

An IPO can generate enormous turnover and retail participation without leaving behind durable secondary-market liquidity. The question is what happens when the support expires. 

IV. “Don’t Panic” Is a Policy 

The peso is the second signal. 

The peso touched Php 64.17 per dollar on October 27. That was its 33rd record low of 2026, the eighth in October, and the fifth consecutive record session from October 21 to 27. The President then said, “Don’t panic...we have defenses,” and USDPHP retreated to Php 63.74 by the week’s close. 

No leader makes that statement without his agencies behind it. It signals that the political leadership will do what it takes to “stabilize” the peso. The motive is to look stable. The policy is intervention. The effects arrive later… or in other prices. 

A managed retreat does not touch the cause, which is the savings-investment gap. Free-lunch politics and the policies behind it sustain spending beyond what the economy can finance from its own production. 

The USDPHP rose 1.76% in October, taking its gain to 8.42% year to date and 8.31% year on year. That was the second biggest monthly rise of 2026 after March’s 5.35% (from February's 57.665 to March's 60.748). (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

The external side of the gap is tightening. OFW remittances, tourism, FDI and portfolio inflows have all weakened. BPO and AI-linked electronics exports help but cannot close the gap, and they carry their own exposure. 

A reversal in AI capital spending would move from global markets into Philippine export receipts and widen the deficit. 

Administered prices, regulatory relief, FX management and accommodative monetary measures have postponed the recognition of the imbalance. Postponement is not resolution. The pressure surfaces through other prices, balance sheets and markets. 

With the balance of payments (BoP) under record pressure and reserves falling, the BSP’s quasi-soft peg has given way to a low-volume, low-volatility crawl. The string of records is that adjustment showing up. 

The BSP still has “tools,” but none is free. It can run down reserves, lever up through repos and derivatives, monetize part of its gold, borrow more (via the National Governnment) or turn to trade and price controls. These extend the process, but none creates dollars, domestic savings or productive resources. 

September shows the cost. Gross international reserves fell from $104.846 billion to $99.494 billion, a $5.352 billion drop to a three-year low. 



Figure 4 

The BSP attributes it mainly to its net foreign exchange operations. The composition is the tell. Other Reserve Assets, the bucket that holds net derivative positions, repo assets and investment pools, fell from $15.471 billion to $9.985 billion, about $5.5 billion and 35% in one month. That is larger than the entire decline. Gold valuation took off another $1.287 billion. Total currency and deposits rose about $1.54 billion. The drain came from the derivative and repo positions behind the peso defense, not from the plain securities and deposits the headline suggests. (Figure 4, topmost image) 

The September BOP deficit was a record $3.144 billion, taking the year-to-date deficit to a historic $9.087 billion—which is just a hairline short of the DBCC’s revised 2026 target of US$9.2 billion (1.8 percent of GDP) with a quarter to go. Borrowed support can defer the adjustment. It cannot remove the financing constraint. (Figure 4, middle chart) 

V. The Yield Curve Takes No Orders 

The sovereign bond market supplied the third signal. 

The public watches the PSEi and the peso. It pays little attention to government bonds, and that is where the cost of financing the state shows up. 

More than anything else, these pressures are most clearly reflected in the interest rate environment, as evidenced by the Philippine Treasury's BVAL yield curve. 

The yield curve shifted upward across all tenors in October compared with September, with positive spreads and the largest increases concentrated in the belly of the curve—a bulge. (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

More importantly, from the one-year tenor onward, yields are at or near multi-year highs. Rising yields are the market’s way of repricing inflation, duration risk and the cost of financing the state. 

The fiscal connection is direct. Government borrowing competes with private investment for finite pools of savings. As financing needs rise, the state’s demand for funds presses against the resources available to businesses (and even banks) seeking capital for production and expansion. 

This is the crowding out effect—and it does not require a textbook interest-rate shock to operate. 

Financial repression adds another channel. Directed credit, captive institutional demand and policies that steer savings toward government or favored borrowers can suppress the visible cost of financing while displacing alternative uses of capital. The allocation changes even when the headline rate does not fully reveal the pressure. 

The result is a distorted investment process: financing follows political and institutional priorities rather than the unrestrained signals of market prices, risk and expected returns. 

The rising yield curve is the market pushing back against that arrangement. Government can influence the terms under which savings are mobilized. It cannot command away scarcity.


Figure 5 

Equities hide the weakness through benchmark concentration. The peso absorbs external pressure through intervention. Bonds reprice the cost of the state. As evidence, the Philippine 10-year Treasury yield has climbed to multi-year highs even as the PSEi tests its 2025 lows (Figure 5, topmost window) 

Three markets, one imbalance. 

VI. Whac-a-Mole Economics 

This is the intervention spiral I call Whac-a-Mole Economics. Support the PSEi and the pressure moves to the peso and bonds. Lean on the peso and the valve opens in equities and bonds. Suppress one price and the imbalance resurfaces in another. 

The mechanism is not mysterious. Prices coordinate competing claims over scarce resources. Interfering with their adjustment does not remove the scarcity. It changes where the pressure builds, who absorbs it and when the cost becomes visible. 

The price signal is not the disease. It is the information that reveals scarcity. Suppress the signal and the distortion grows while its symptoms migrate across markets and time. 

VII. Periphery to Core 

The Philippines is not alone in this. 

The magnified paroxysm across several equity benchmarks—the Indonesian JKSE, Korea’s AI-heavy KOSPI, and, more recently, Brazil’s Bovespa—exhibits a common denominator.  (Figure 5, middle visual) 

As an aside, in Brazil, Lula's reelection triggered a rout in Brazilian stocks, deepening an already prolonged contraction in Latin America's equity-fund industry, where more than 400 equity funds have disappeared and IPO activity has stalled. (Figure 5, lowest image) 

Yet each crash has a local headline, whether politics or AI, but they share the global liquidity cycle. 

The crashes did not need to arrive on the same day to demonstrate this. Peaks came at different points in the year, and the common condition is liquidity withdrawal. 

I call this periphery-to-core transmission. 

Withdrawal first exposes the weakest links: the markets, sectors, and balance sheets most dependent on cheap financing, leverage, and steady inflows. Rising yields then collide with accumulated malinvestments and balance-sheet mismatches. The war economy, supply disruptions, incumbent monetary policies, and fiscal conditions add further pressure.


Figure 6 

Even gold has become an ATM for liquidity-strapped investors. Its sharp declines alongside Bitcoin reflect forced liquidation and the demand for cash, not a change in its long-term monetary role. (Figure 6, upper chart) 

The core is now under pressure. This week’s AI dumpfest hit the Nasdaq Composite with a 2.0% weekly loss, its third consecutive weekly decline, and a 7.04% slide over three weeks. Friday’s 2.9% drop was its largest one-day percentage decline since June 5, following disappointing results from Intel and Amazon. 

Meanwhile, hyperscalers are financing build-outs in debt markets, adding leverage to an already capital-intensive cycle. AI off balance sheet commitments hits $4.1 trillion: Up 1 trillion in 90 days.  (Figure 6, lower graph) 

When the cost of capital rises, the expected returns on long-duration investments become harder to justify. What starts as an equity repricing can migrate into corporate credit, debt servicing, and investment spending. 

The danger is contagion: falling asset prices, tighter financing, forced deleveraging, and contracting credit. A global recession is the risk embedded in this process, and a broader debt crisis is becoming highly probable. 

The periphery is not insulated from the core, and the core is not immune to the financing constraints already visible at the periphery. 

VIII. Conclusion: October’s Cost of Suppressing Adjustment 

Free lunch politics is NEVER FREE. 

The PSEi is held up by the five biggest market caps, a persistent concentrated broker bid and a stabilizing agent for GCASH. 

The peso crawls to records while the BSP burns reserves and the President says don’t panic.

Yields rise from the one-year tenor outward to multi-year highs. 

The motive behind each intervention is the same: to show stability before the financing gap is closed. The policy is price support, administered relief and reserve burn. The effect is that pressure moves to the next price. Postponement has a cost, and the cost compounds. 

Almost everyone has been programmed to believe that spending drives the economy. Spending is the visible half. Before anyone can spend, someone has to have made something others want: a harvest, a service, a product, an export. A fisherman buys rice with the fish he sold. Money is the claim ticket, and the claim is worth only what stands behind it. What you can buy is set by what you or others produced. Or imagine booking a vacation at a resort on the Moon. There may be demand, but there is no supply. 

So printed money, borrowed money and extended credit can raise spending today. They cannot create the rice, or the dollars, that the spending needs to meet. They only change who gets the existing output and push the bill onto future output. 

That is why the pressure shows up where it does. Dollars come from selling something to the world. Savings come from producing more than you consume. When spending commitments outrun both, the gap appears as a record BOP deficit, a weaker peso and higher yields, because savings are scarce and the state is bidding for them. 

A stock, a peso and a bond are all claims on real output and real savings. A floor can hold a quote, but it cannot create the output behind the claim. Indices, GDP and gross savings add up claims into one number and hide who actually produces and who just holds paper. That is the difference between accounting stability and economic resilience. 

The three markets are not telling three different stories. In October, they converged on one signal: the growing cost of suppressing adjustment. Support the PSEi and the pressure shows up in the peso. Lean on the peso and it shows up in the bond curve. 

Close one valve in a system under rising pressure and the pressure does not disappear. It finds the weakest seam. In October, the seams were the PSE’s market internals, the peso and the bond curve. 

The next one may not be in Philippines’ hands at all. Global liquidity is draining, and the pressure is now being fed from outside.


Monday, April 28, 2025

Why the Philippine Peso's Strength Masks Underlying Vulnerabilities

 

If the governments devalue the currency in order to betray all creditors, you politely call this procedure 'inflation'--George Bernard Shaw 

In this issue

Why the Philippine Peso's Strength Masks Underlying Vulnerabilities

I. Philippine Peso in the Face of a Weak Dollar

II. Is the Peso’s Strength Rooted in Fundamentals? Portfolio Flows: A Mixed Picture

III. Remittances: Diminishing Returns

IV. Tourism: Geopolitical Headwinds

V. Trade Data: Structural Deficiencies Revealed

VI. Balance of Payments and Gross International Reserves: A Fragile Façade (Boosted by Borrowings)

VII. BSP’s Tightening Grip on FX Markets and the Illusion of Stability

VIII. The Speculative Role of the BSP: Other Reserve Assets

IX. Rising External Debt: A Ticking Time Bomb

X. Conclusion: Transitory Strength, Structural Fragility 

Why the Philippine Peso's Strength Masks Underlying Vulnerabilities 

A strong Philippine peso hides the cracks of FX debt, deficits, and interventions.

I. Philippine Peso in the Face of a Weak Dollar 


Figure 1

Surprisingly, the Philippine peso has outperformed its regional peers. Year-to-date, the USD-Philippine peso USDPHP has declined by 2.73% as of April 25. (Figure 1, upper window) 

Despite a generally weak dollar environment, the greenback has risen against some ASEAN currencies: it has appreciated by 4.32% against the Indonesian rupiah (IDR) according to Bloomberg data, and by 2.2% against the Vietnamese dong (VND) based on TradingEconomics data, year-to-date. 

The USDPHP’s behavior has largely mirrored the oscillations of the USD-euro $USDEUR pair and the Dollar Index $DXY, both of which have declined by -9.5% and -9% YTD, respectively. The euro commands the largest weight in the DXY basket at 57.6%, amplifying its influence over the index's performance. (Figure 1, lower image) 

II. Is the Peso’s Strength Rooted in Fundamentals? Portfolio Flows: A Mixed Picture  


Figure 2

Foreign portfolio flows have been volatile. 

The first two months of 2025 recorded a modest net inflow of USD 176.6 million, following significant outflows of USD 283.7 million in January and inflows of USD 460.34 million in February. These inflows were mainly directed towards government securities (USD 366 million), while the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) suffered USD 189 million in outflows. (Figure 2 topmost graph) 

In 2024, Philippine capital markets saw foreign portfolio inflows of USD 2.1 billion—the largest since 2013—suggesting a temporary vote of confidence, albeit in a risk-on environment favoring emerging markets more broadly. 

Meanwhile, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) reported that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows fell 20% year-on-year to USD 731 million in January 2025 from USD 914 million the year prior. (Figure 2, middle chart) 

Still, 71% of January’s FDI consisted of debt inflows, rather than equity investments. 

Ironically, despite the administration's aggressive international junkets (2022-2024) aimed at wooing investors through geopolitical alliances, these efforts have borne little fruit. 

What happened? 

As previously noted, an overvalued peso—maintained by a de facto USDPHP soft peg—along with high "hurdle rates" stemming from bureaucratic red tape and regulatory barriers, and the implicit consequences of "trickle-down" easy money policies benefiting the government and their elites (i.e., crony capitalism), have collectively undermined Philippine competitiveness. 

III. Remittances: Diminishing Returns 

Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) remittance flows continue to grow, but at a marginal and slowing pace. Personal remittances rose 2.6% in February, with cumulative year-to-date growth at 2.7%. (Figure 2, lowest visual) 

However, the long-term trend in remittance growth has been declining since its 2013 peak—a period that coincided with the secular bottoming of the USDPHP. 

This trend reflects the diminishing marginal impact of remittances on the peso’s valuation. 

In short, remittances are becoming less material in influencing the peso’s foreign exchange rate. 

A more sustainable strategy would be to foster structurally inclusive economic growth—creating more high-quality domestic jobs and raising incomes—to reduce the country’s dependence on labor exportation and mitigate brain drain. 

Sadly, the slowdown in remittance growth does not point toward such an outcome. 

IV. Tourism: Geopolitical Headwinds


Figure 3 

The Philippine tourism sector's recovery may have stumbled. 

Foreign tourist arrivals fell by 2.42% in Q1 2025, while total arrivals—including overseas Filipino visitors—dropped by 0.51%. This was largely driven by a staggering 28.8% collapse in Chinese tourist arrivals in March and a 33.7% year-on-year plunge in Q1. This slump mirrors the escalating geopolitical tensions between the Philippines and China, particularly as Manila increasingly aligns itself with U.S. strategic interests. (Figure 3, upper diagram) 

Interestingly, American tourist arrivals also fell by 0.7% in March, although they rose by 7.9% for Q1 overall. Nonetheless, the growth in American tourists has hardly offset the sharp loss of Chinese visitors. (Figure 3, lower chart) 

In effect, a ‘war economy’ reduces the Philippines’ attractiveness as a tourism and investment destination. 

V. Trade Data: Structural Deficiencies Revealed


Figure 4

The Philippines' trade deficit narrowed by 11.44% to USD 3.16 billion in February, owing to a 1.8% contraction in imports and a muted 3.94% increase in exports, year-on-year. (Figure 4, upper graph)

While many mainstream talking heads argue that tariff liberalization will eventually benefit the Philippines, external trade figures tell a different story—one marred by structural weaknesses: high energy costs, a persistent credit financed savings-investment gap (a byproduct of trickle-down policies), the USDPHP peg, human capital limitations, economic centralization, regulatory hurdles and more.

Since 2013, total external trade (imports + exports) has grown at a CAGR of 4.84%—driven by imports growing at 5.95%, compared to exports at only 3.42%. Adjusted for currency movement (with the USDPHP CAGR at 3.01%), this yields a real export CAGR of just 0.41% versus 2.85% for imports, implying a real external trade CAGR of only 1.77%. (Figure 4 lower image)

While rising imports may superficially suggest robust consumption, a deeper question emerges: Is consumption fueled by genuine productivity gains—or by unsustainable credit expansion?

Ultimately, the data show that import-driven consumption has widened the trade deficit, and that local manufacturing remains largely uncompetitive relative to regional peers.

Against this backdrop, how realistic is it to expect that Trump's proposed tariffs will magically turn the Philippines into an export hub?

VI. Balance of Payments and Gross International Reserves: A Fragile Façade (Boosted by Borrowings)


Figure 5

The BSP reported a Balance of Payments (BoP) deficit of USD 2 billion for March 2025, following a staggering USD 4.1 billion deficit in January—an 11-year high—and a temporary surplus of USD 3.1 billion in February. The Q1 2025 BoP deficit stood at USD 2.96 billion. (Figure 5, upper window)

The BSP attributed these outflows to "drawdowns on reserves to meet external debt obligations" and to fund foreign exchange operations—justifications previously offered for January’s record deficit.

Meanwhile, February’s surplus largely stemmed from net foreign currency deposits by the National Government, sourced from proceeds of ROP Global Bond issuances and income from BSP’s foreign investments—in other words, from external borrowings.

Notably, the BSP has admitted that the year-to-date BoP deficit mainly reflects the widening goods trade deficit. Either this conflicts with PSA trade data showing a narrowing February deficit, or it hints at a possible sharp deterioration in March's trade balance.

Regardless, the BoP reports clearly indicate heavy BSP intervention in the FX market, even though the USDPHP remains well below the 59-level psychological ceiling.

Consequently, the BSP’s gross international reserves (GIR) dropped from USD 107.4 billion in February to USD 106.7 billion in March—a USD 725 million decline. (Figure 5, lower diagram)

Importantly, much of the GIR’s support comes from the government’s external borrowings deposited with the BSP. Thus, the GIR has been padded up artificially.


Figure 6

Even more striking: gold’s record high prices have prevented a steeper GIR decline, despite the BSP selling small amounts of gold in February.  

Gold's share of GIR slipped marginally from 11.4% in February to 11.22% in March. (Figure 6, upper pane)

Had it not been for ATH (all-time high) gold prices, the GIR would have deteriorated more significantly. 

As previously explained, as with the 2020 episode, sharply falling gold inventories preceded the devaluation of the peso. (Figure 6, lower chart) 

Outside of gold, a large share of GIR now constitutes "borrowed reserves"—a growing vulnerability tied directly to the BSP’s soft peg strategy for the USDPHP. 

This suggests that the recent GIR stability could be masking underlying vulnerabilities.

VII. BSP’s Tightening Grip on FX Markets and the Illusion of Stability 

It is therefore almost amusing to encounter this news item, based on the BSP’s publication: 

Inquirer.net, April 24: "The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) tightened regulations on foreign exchange (FX) derivatives involving the Philippine peso to ensure these are not used for currency speculation. Circular No. 1212, signed by Governor Eli Remolona Jr., mandates that banks authorized to transact in non-deliverable FX derivatives must ensure these are used for legitimate economic purposes." 

But who are the likely participants in FX swaps, non-deliverable forwards, and FX derivatives?

Not me. Not the general public. 

Given that PSE participation is only around 1% of the total population (as of 2023), the obvious answer is: banks and their elite clientele—the BSP’s own cartel members. 

Thus, what is the real message behind this announcement? 

First, banks and their elite clients may have been positioning against the peso, in ways inconsistent with BSP policy—prompting the BSP to tighten currency controls. 

Second, the BSP wants to show the public it is taking action, even as real risks accumulate. 

Third, something is amiss if the BSP feels compelled to impose tighter controls even with the USDPHP hovering at 56—well away from their upper band limit. 

Ultimately, who is truly engaged in currency speculation here? 

VIII. The Speculative Role of the BSP: Other Reserve Assets


Figure 7

Since 2018, the BSP has increasingly used Other Reserve Assets (ORA) to manage its GIR. (Figure 7) 

According to IMF IRFCL guidelines, ORA includes:

-Net, marked-to-market value of financial derivatives (forwards, futures, swaps, options)

-Short-term foreign currency loans

-Long-term loans to IMF trust accounts

-Other liquid foreign currency financial assets

-Repo assets 

The BSP’s ORA surged by 210.3% in February, lifting its share of GIR to 9.18%. Yet, even this rise was overshadowed by gold's role in preserving GIR totals. 

In truth, the BSP itself is a speculator—aggressively managing USDPHP levels against market forces. 

In pursuing short-term stability, it risks building imbalances that will eventually unwind with greater force. 

This has been evident in the widening BoP deficit, the rising share of "borrowed reserves," and the sustained gold sales. 

IX. Rising External Debt: A Ticking Time Bomb


Figure 8

Perhaps most revealing is this BSP announcement: 

BSP, April 25, 2025: "The Monetary Board approved USD 6.29 billion worth of proposed public sector foreign borrowings in Q1 2025, up by 118.91% from USD 2.87 billion during the same period last year." (bold mine) [figure 8, upper graph] 

Whatever the justification—whether for infrastructure, green (climate), defense, or welfare or others—debt is debt. 

Even though the BSP paid down nearly half its obligations (posting a Q1 BoP deficit of USD 2.96 billion), the residual balance should add to the swelling external debt stock. (Figure 8, lower chart) 

Recall that as of Q4 2024, government debt already accounted for 58% of total external debt. Banks and non-finance institutions are likely to add to this pile. 

Higher public debt implies higher future debt servicing costs, crowding out resources from productive investments, draining savings, increasing leverage, and deepening the Philippines’ dependence on foreign financing. 

X. Conclusion: Transitory Strength, Structural Fragility 

The Philippine peso’s strength in 2025, buoyed by a weak U.S. dollar, masks underlying vulnerabilities. Structural issues—overvalued currency, uncompetitive manufacturing, declining remittance growth, geopolitical strains, and reliance on borrowed reserves—undermine long-term stability. 

Through the USDPHP soft peg, the BSP’s interventions, while stabilizing the peso in the short term, foster imbalances that could unravel with a global tightening of monetary conditions. 

Without addressing these structural challenges through inclusive growth, deregulation, and reduced dependence on debt and remittances, the Philippines risks a rude awakening. The peso’s current resilience is less a reflection of economic strength and more a temporary reprieve, vulnerable to shifts in global financial tides. 

Nota bene: Although we discussed tourism and remittances, we did not cover business process outsourcing (BPO) and other export services in depth, largely due to limited data and the need to rely on GDP proxies. Regardless, surging debt levels are exposing widening FX liquidity vulnerabilities that services alone cannot offset. 

____

reference 

IMF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND FOREIGN CURRENCY LIQUIDITY GUIDELINES FOR A DATA TEMPLATE 2. OFFICIAL RESERVE ASSETS AND OTHER FOREIGN CURRENCY ASSETS (APPROXIMATE MARKET VALUE): SECTION I OF THE RESERVES DATA TEMPLATE, p.25 IMF.org