Showing posts with label commodity geopolitics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commodity geopolitics. Show all posts

Sunday, April 05, 2026

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet? The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II)

 

It is particularly odd that economists who profess to be champions of a free-market economy, should go to such twists and turns to avoid facing the plain fact: that gold, that scarce and valuable market-produced metal, has always been, and will continue to be, by far the best money for human society— Murray Rothbard

In this issue

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet?  The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II)

I. What the Quiet Actually Means

II. Safe Havens and the Hierarchy of Money

III. The Gold–Oil Ratio and Crisis Transmission

IV. Mean Reversion or Regime Shift? Interpreting the Gold–Oil Ratio

V. Liquidity Stress: When Gold Falls First

VI. Real-Time Example: Central Banks Mobilize Gold, Turkey’s Gold Sales

VII. Real-Time Example: Liquidity Stress in the UAE

VIII. Gold Across Monetary Regimes

IX. Conclusion: The Signal in the Silence 

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet?  The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II) 

Energy shocks, dollar liquidity stress, and why gold often lags before it leads during financial crises 

Part II 

I. What the Quiet Actually Means 

Part I examined why gold has remained surprisingly subdued despite escalating geopolitical tensions and rising oil prices. The explanation lies not in the failure of gold’s safe-haven role, but in the mechanics of liquidity stress and the structure of the global bullion system

Part II explores what that quiet may be signaling. By examining the relationship between gold and oil, the liquidity dynamics of financial crises, and gold’s behavior across monetary regimes, a clearer picture begins to emerge. 

Gold’s silence may not reflect stability. 

It may instead reflect the early stage of a broader liquidity adjustment inside the global dollar system. 

While modern financial systems are built on credit rather than metal, periods of stress often reveal that the hierarchy of money still persists beneath the surface. 

II. Safe Havens and the Hierarchy of Money 

Safe-haven assets are often misunderstood. In practice, they represent savings held in forms with high moneyness—assets expected to preserve value (store of value) while remaining readily marketable during periods of stress. 

Their appeal rests on two characteristics: the ability to preserve purchasing power and the ability to be converted into cash quickly with minimal price disruption or marketability. 

Crucially, these properties are context-dependent. Assets perceived as safe are not inherently risk-free; their status reflects market confidence in their liquidity and convertibility. U.S. Treasuries, for example, are technically government liabilities, yet they function as safe assets because of their deep, liquid markets and the central role of the dollar in global finance. 

Gold occupies a distinct position in this hierarchy. Its moneyness is reinforced not only by the absence of counterparty risk but also by physical characteristics—durability, divisibility, recognizability, and malleability—that historically supported its acceptability across time and geography. 

These features contributed to gold’s persistent marketability, particularly in environments where trust in financial intermediaries weakens

However, as Austrian economist Gary North emphasized, these properties do not constitute intrinsic value. Value is not inherent in the metal itself but is imputed by market participants. Gold’s status as a safe-haven asset therefore arises from sustained confidence in its liquidity and acceptability, especially under conditions of stress

This hierarchy becomes clearer when markets transition from stability to crisis. 


Figure 1

The divergence among major fiat currencies highlights how gold’s moneyness becomes more pronounced as confidence in fiat purchasing power declines. (chart from Jesse Colombo’s The Bubble Bubble Report) [Figure 1] 

As described by Hyman Minsky, prolonged financial stability encourages leverage and risk-taking. When stress emerges, this dynamic reverses abruptly. Market participants experience a liquidity squeeze, reprioritizing assets according to their moneyness—favoring those that can be converted into cash quickly and reliably without significant loss of value. 

III. The Gold–Oil Ratio and Crisis Transmission 

One way to understand gold’s muted response to current geopolitical tensions is through its relationship with oil. 

Oil represents an immediate claim on global liquidity. It is consumed, dollar-priced "Petrodollar", and highly sensitive to geopolitical disruption. Gold, by contrast, represents stored value—held primarily as protection against monetary instability. 

(Incidentally, oil is often called “black gold,” reflecting its quasi-monetary properties: global acceptability, scarcity, and embedded value as the economy’s primary energy input.)  


Figure 2

In real terms, Brent oil’s price trend appears to have formed a secular bottom in the late 1990s around the Asian Financial Crisis. (Figure 2, upper chart) 

Since then, the broader trajectory has been upward, interrupted by the 2000s commodity spike and the pandemic collapse. This pattern points to deeper structural forces: monetary expansion, chronic underinvestment in energy, and rising geopolitical risk

With Middle East tensions intensifying and war-economy dynamics increasingly shaping policy, the current oil shock may prove more persistent than markets expect. 

When geopolitical shocks drive oil prices sharply higher, the global financial system experiences a liquidity drain as energy-importing economies scramble for additional dollars to fund higher fuel costs—tightening financial conditions across currencies and credit markets. 

With dollar credit estimated at roughly $14 trillion—over half in debt securities (Bank of International Settlement)—this dynamic amplifies dollar demand during periods of stress. [Figure 2, lower image] 

This mechanism echoes economist Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation dynamics: rising costs and tightening collateral conditions force economic actors into a dollar funding pressure

In such episodes, gold does not always rise immediately

Instead, the gold–oil ratio compresses as oil outpaces gold. The system prioritizes settlement over preservation—dollars are needed to pay for energy before reserves can be accumulated as protection. 

Historically, this reflects the early phase of crisis transmission. Energy shocks propagate rapidly through trade balances, currencies, and funding markets, triggering collateral demand that can temporarily suppress traditional hedges. 

Only later—once liquidity pressures ease or policy responses take hold—does gold tend to reassert itself. 

IV. Mean Reversion or Regime Shift? Interpreting the Gold–Oil Ratio 

The gold–oil ratio captures the relative performance of the two commodities; recently, gold has significantly outperformed oil. Heuristically, it can be read as follows:

  • High ratio: monetary stress, weak growth, disinflationary pressures
  • Falling ratio (oil catching up): cyclical inflation, supply shocks, rearmament, and stronger industrial demand

If the global economy is transitioning toward a war footing—characterized by higher defense spending, rising commodity intensity, and tightening energy geopolitics—then near-term oil outperformance relative to gold is plausible. 

Even in a less oil-dependent world, geopolitical tensions can amplify supply–demand imbalances. 

That said, these forces can overlap. Inflationary pressures, financial stress, and supply shocks may coexist rather than unfold sequentially. 

Mean reversion suggests scope for oil to outperform gold, with historical anchors around ~18–22 (mean) and ~15–18 (median). However, these benchmarks may no longer be stable.

First, Goodhart’s Law applies: once the ratio becomes a widely targeted signal, its reliability deteriorates.

Second, base effects distort comparisons, especially after extreme moves. When ratios are measured off extreme starting points—such as the pandemic collapse in oil or gold’s surge during periods of monetary stress—subsequent moves can appear disproportionately large or directional. In reality, these shifts may reflect mechanical normalization from distorted bases, rather than a clean cyclical signal.


Figure 3

Third, the apparent gold-oil ratio uptrend since 2008 indicates shifting structural drivers—implying that historical mean/median benchmarks may themselves be drifting higher. (Figure 3) 

In short, while mean reversion remains a useful guide, the regime may be evolving—making static historical anchors increasingly unreliable. 

It may be that the recent compression in the gold–oil ratio reflects gold’s prior fat-tailed outperformance, with the current move representing a normalization back toward its two-decade trend channel rather than a structural reversal. 

V. Liquidity Stress: When Gold Falls First 

One of the most counterintuitive features of financial crises is that gold can weaken precisely when investors expect it to strengthen. 

This occurs because gold is not only a store of value—it is also one of the most liquid assets in global markets

When financial stress intensifies, institutions face margin calls, collateral demands, and funding obligations. To meet these pressures, they liquidate assets that can be sold quickly.

Gold often becomes one of those assets.

This reflects the liquidity phase described by Hyman Minsky, in which the immediate need for funding temporarily overrides longer-term investment considerations.

During this stage of a crisis, the system prioritizes cash over protection.

Gold may weaken not because its safe-haven role has disappeared, but because it remains one of the few assets capable of generating immediate liquidity.

VI. Real-Time Example: Central Banks Mobilize Gold, Turkey’s Gold Sales 


Figure 4

Recent news reports indicates that Turkey deployed gold-linked lira and foreign-exchange swaps, alongside outright sales, to support the lira during a period of market stress, as the USD/TRY exchange rate surged to successive record highs. Its gold reserves fell by roughly 50 tonnes (to 772 tonnes), the largest decline since 2018. [Figure 4] 

Such operations illustrate another dimension of gold’s role in modern reserve management. By mobilizing gold through swaps, central banks can generate immediate foreign-currency liquidity, effectively using gold as a liquidity bridge—complementing direct FX intervention rather than fully substituting for it. 

However, these tools primarily address short-term liquidity pressures rather than underlying macroeconomic imbalances. 

When markets perceive that a central bank is actively deploying finite reserve assets, these actions can signal constraint—potentially raising risk premia and intensifying pressure on the currency. 

As external buffers are drawn down, the policy path often becomes increasingly dependent on domestic liquidity provision, with central banks resorting to expansion of the monetary base to sustain market functioning. 

This dynamic highlights the reflexive nature of intervention: measures intended to stabilize markets can amplify fragilities over time through resource misallocation.

Importantly, such actions do not diminish gold’s monetary role. On the contrary, they demonstrate that gold continues to function as high-quality collateral within the global financial system during periods of stress. 

VII. Real-Time Example: Liquidity Stress in the UAE 

Recent developments in the Gulf financial system offer a contemporary illustration of these dynamics.


Figure 5

Following a sharp collapse in banking liquidity—reportedly approaching 45 percent in parts of the regional funding market—the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates moved to inject massive amounts of liquidity into domestic banks. [Figure 5, upper diagram] 

The intervention aimed to stabilize funding conditions and prevent disruptions in the region’s financial system. 

While such measures can temporarily ease liquidity pressures, they also reveal the underlying structure of modern crises. When funding conditions tighten, policymakers must often intervene rapidly to maintain the functioning of credit markets. In the short term, these interventions can strengthen demand for dollar liquidity, particularly in economies closely tied to global energy markets. 

The result is a paradox. 

Even as geopolitical tensions rise and energy prices surge—conditions that would normally support gold—financial systems may initially prioritize liquidity stabilization over reserve accumulation. 

Gold’s subdued behavior during such episodes may therefore reflect not complacency, but temporary pressure within the global funding system. 

This dynamic is further illustrated by recent developments in the U.S. dollar. Despite shocks including the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict, the DXY index has shown muted gains and even diverges from 2-year rate differentials. [Figure 5, lower pane] 

This suggests that dollar strength in this period is less about a classic safe-haven bid and more about liquidity demand driven by de-risking and deleveraging. 

The lack of coordinated upside in gold, bonds, and bitcoin points to collateral stress rather than a simple flight to safety. Meanwhile, interest rates themselves may reflect not only policy and war risk, but also fiscal pressures and issuance dynamics, blurring the signals that rate differentials typically provide. 

In classic safe-haven episodes, defensive assets tend to rise together. When that coordination breaks down, it often signals that markets are prioritizing liquidity and collateral access rather than portfolio hedging. 

VIII. Gold Across Monetary Regimes


Figure 6 

Gold’s long-term behavior is non-linear. Its bull markets tend to move in waves associated with epochal shifts in global monetary regimes. [Figure 6] 

The first bull cycle followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system after the Nixon Shock and lasted until the early 1980s. This was followed by a bear market and a two-decade lull, reflecting the “salad days” of the U.S. dollar standard—characterized by the rise of globalization, the Fed’s drift toward easy-money policies, and the deepening of the dollar’s exorbitant privilege. 

A second wave emerged in the early 2000s and accelerated after the Global Financial Crisis, when central banks dramatically expanded their balance sheets in response to economic shocks. 

The current period represents a third phase—marked by a drift toward a war economy: protectionism, sanctions, and kinetic conflict—while also shaped by overlapping forces including evolving monetary policies, the weaponization of the dollar, oil and commodity dynamics, AI-driven structural uncertainty, and central bank accumulation of gold. 

These forces are gradually reshaping how gold is accumulated, traded, and—for central banks—deployed within national reserve strategies. 

IX. Conclusion: The Signal in the Silence 

Gold’s current calm should not be mistaken for irrelevance. 

Financial crises rarely begin with a clean flight to safety. Instead, they begin with liquidity stress. Funding markets tighten, institutions scramble for cash, and the most liquid assets are often sold first to meet obligations. 

In these early stages, the global financial system prioritizes settlement over preservation. Energy shocks drain dollars from the system, trade balances shift abruptly, and capital flows reprice risk across currencies and credit markets. 

This sequence helps explain why gold can appear subdued even as geopolitical tensions escalate. Oil shocks transmit stress through the real economy first, tightening liquidity before investors turn toward long-term stores of value. 

Only later—once liquidity pressures ease or policy responses expand—does gold typically reassert its defensive role. 

The current compression in the gold–oil ratio may therefore reflect not the failure of gold as a safe haven, but the timing of crisis transmission within a dollar-centric financial system

If the emerging environment is indeed shifting toward a more fragmented geopolitical order—characterized by energy insecurity, fiscal expansion, de-globalization, kinetic conflicts, and a gradual erosion of monetary trust—then gold’s quiet phase may represent the prelude rather than the conclusion of its cycle. 

The signal is not absent. 

It may simply be arriving later in the crisis sequence. 


Monday, April 17, 2023

Investing Gamechanger: Commodities and the Philippine Mining Index as Major Beneficiaries of the Shifting Geopolitical Winds!

 

Governments lie; bankers lie; even auditors sometimes lie: gold tells the truth— William Rees-Mogg 

 

Investing Gamechanger: Commodities and the Philippine Mining Index as Major Beneficiaries of the Shifting Geopolitical Winds!  

 

Geopolitics is now a primary driver of the transitioning global economic structures.  Since commodities are one of its beneficiaries, the Philippine mining index should reflect this dynamic. 

 

Geopolitics is the Name of the Game: Philippine Enters the Geopolitical Hegemonic Contest via the Reinforcement of the VFA-EDCA Agreement with the US 

 

Unless one lives under a rock, geopolitics is the name of the game! 

 

And commodities are one of the primary elements of geopolitics. 

 

Signed in 2014, the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) represents an agreement between the US and the Philippine governments to expand their defense alliance by allowing the United States government "to build and operate facilities on Philippine bases for both American and Philippine forces." (Wikipedia) 

 

From the original five (non-permanent) bases (Palawan, Cebu, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Cagayan de Oro), the incumbent administration has added four more facilities for US military access (Palawan, Isabela, Lal-lo Cagayan, and Santa Ana Cagayan) early April. 

 

And it is no coincidence that the expanded "pivot" by the Philippine government towards the US occurred as the Chinese military's partial intrusions on Taiwan's border to test Taiwan's defense capability has grown with frequency and scale.   

 

China's military has also been aggressively encroaching on the maritime boundaries of different neighbors as the Philippines in the South China Sea. 

 

The Xi regime has accused the Philippine government of interfering with the China-Taiwan conflict. 

 

The broader picture is that these territorial disputes are an extension of the hegemonic contest between the reigning superpower, the US, and her (NATO) allies against her emerging challengers (the Global South/BRICs).  The Russo-Ukraine War is a ripe example of the manifestations of the unfurling power struggle via kinetic warfare.  

 

But this increasingly confrontational hegemonic conflict has stretched to cover many other areas, including but not limited to trade, investments, financing, money, commodities, social mobility, space, deep-sea, technology and information, and more.  

 

And this expanded friction will unlikely diminish even if contending parties miraculously find a settlement to the Russo-Ukraine War—the other areas of dispute will persist. 

 

That said, commodities will be a principal element in a fragmented world. 

 

And NO economic analysis will be complete WITHOUT the role of geopolitics. 

 

Why Commodities Will Play a Principal Role in the Era of Fragmentation/Inflation 

 

One crucial evidence of malinvestments from the easy money policies of central banks is the severe underinvestment in the commodity sector that has led to a shortfall in supplies. 

 

The liquidity bailouts of global central banks during the pandemic exposed this accrued imbalance. 

 

Figure 1 

 

For instance, the stockpiles of industrial metals, like copper, are at their lowest in history. (Figure 1, top and middle charts)  

 

Yet it requires massive amounts of capital and time to increase exploration activities to generate expanded output.  And this isn't happening anytime soon. 

 

Further, with the world standing on the precipice of an expanded kinetic war, global public spending on defense will likely take a lead role, reshaping subtlely the global economic backdrop to a quasi-war economy. (Figure 1, lowest window) 

 

In nominal terms, global defence spending has been on a strong upward trajectory over the last five years, increasing from a nominal USD1.7 trillion in 2017 to USD2.0tr in 2022. Until recently, the same could be said of defence spending in real terms, but this upward trend stalled in 2021 and 2022 owing to escalating inflation, leading to a widening delta between nominal and real spending. Using 2015 as the base year for real terms calculations, the difference came to USD101bn in 2020. This more than doubled to USD222bn in 2021 and increased again to USD312bn in 2022. (McGerty, 2023)  

 

More public spending to develop an end-to-end military system diverts resources and finances from the private sector, which leads to production inefficiencies and relative shortages of consumer goods—which means structural supply-side imbalances, ergo contributor to inflation. 

 

In this case, the build-up of armaments requires massive amounts of different commodities/metals, like copper, nickel, silver, and more.   

 

The increasingly fragmented world should aggravate such supply constraints through the various restrictive and protectionist policies anchored on nationalism and geopolitical alliances. 

 

Again, the multi-faceted aspects of this power struggle won't be limited to military and trade but will involve the currency and financial system.  

 

Ergo, a potential challenger to the de facto USD standard--should emerge with this transition to a multipolar world. 

 

As evidence, several countries have been realigning their geopolitical relationships in favor of the Global South/BRIC. 

 

In the past few weeks, earth-shaking announcements from several countries with the intent to join the bandwagon of the establishment of an emerging rival currency system. 

 

Here are some events as compiled by the Kobeissi Letter (Twitter) 

 

-Iran said they are reducing their dependence on the US Dollar for regional and international trade.  

-France said Europe should reduce dependence on the US.  

-Meanwhile, Russia, Saudi Arabia and China are now trading with Chinese Yuan. 

 

Figure 2 

 

In any event, in conjunction with the drawing of the financial and monetary divide, global central banks amassed a record amount of gold in 2022. (Figure 2, topmost window) 

 

And instead of mimicking the current USD system, structured on a Triffin dilemma of debt and inflation-financed twin deficits, the competing currency standard will likely be backed by a basket of commodities.  A Bretton Woods 3 template as proposed by Credit Suisse's Zoltan Pozsar, perhaps? 

 

Commodity reserves will be an essential part of Bretton Woods III, and historically wars are won by those who have more food and energy supplies – food to fuel horses and soldiers back in the day, and food to fuel soldiers and fuel to fuel tanks and planes today.  

 

 

 

This is serious: Bretton Woods II served up a deflationary impulse (globalization, open trade, just-in-time supply chains, and only one supply chain [Foxconn], not many), and Bretton Woods III will serve up an inflationary impulse (de-globalization, autarky, just-in-case hoarding of commodities and duplication of supply chains, and more military spending to be able to protect whatever seaborne trade is left). (Pozsar, 2023) 

 

Central banks will also play a significant role in financing public spending.  And in the backdrop of supply tightness, such monetary expansion should extrapolate to higher inflation, which also implies rising rates. 

 

And though the demand for metals in the electric vehicle industry may also be a part of the narrative, the focal point of the economics of commodities is the increasing fragmentation of the global economy. 

 

So decades of underinvestments that led to shortfalls in supply, the fracturing of the international division of labor and its geopolitical realignment, the quasi-militarization of the global economy, principally through central bank finance and partly via private sector participation, and finally, the emergence of competition to the US standard, heralds to higher demand and increased prices of commodities.  

 

The era of globalization, financed by easy money, will likely usher in the eon of fragmentation, marked by a milieu of high inflation and elevated rates. 

 

The Philippines will not be exempt from this seismic global transformation.   

 

The complementary bases under the VFA-EDCA, the Balikatan exercises, and other related participations constitute crucial economic and geopolitical drifts, which along with their corresponding risks, will likely come with consequences—as history has shown. 

 

The Philippine Mining Index in the Era of Fragmentation/Inflation 


To an observant eye, the subtle shifts have already been happening.  The unspoken changes in the performance of the share prices of listed commodity producers illustrate such developments. 

 

While USD coal prices rocketed from 2020 through September 2022, it had given up most of its gains.  But it is still above the highest level since at least 2010. (Figure 2, middle chart) 

 

As in the case of Europe, Japan, and elsewhere, the ESG thrust to replace coal with renewables as baseload supply will likely backfire.  Natural gas and nuclear power could be the future of Philippine energy.  The Philippines saw its first LNG import this month. 

 

Despite the short-term oscillations, USD prices of copper and nickel are in a long-term uptrend but below their recent highs. (Figure 2, copper-lowest diagram) (Figure 3, nickel topmost chart) 


Figure 3 

 

On the other hand, while USD gold prices have also been on a structural uptrend, it has yet to show a convincing breakout. (Figure 3, middle pane) 

 

But it did so against 5 ASEAN currencies (Philippine peso, Thai baht, Malaysian ringgit, Indonesian rupiah, and Vietnam dong) last April 6th. 

 

In any case, coal (Semirara SCC), Nickel (Nickel Asia NIKL, Global Ferronickel FNI, and Marcventures MARC), and Gold-Copper (Atlas AT, Philex PX, and Lepanto LC and LCB) comprise 96.32% of the Philippine Mining index as of April 14th.  Oil exploration firm PXP completes the 9-member roster.  (Figure 3, pie chart) 

 

The Philippine mining index is the most unpopular and possibly the "least owned" sector.   The institutional punters have likely ignored the industry.  

 

Figure 4 

 

As proof, the industry has had the smallest share of the monthly trading volume since 2013. (Figure 4, upper window) 

 

Local participants perceived this as highly speculative (higher beta), thus subject to intense ebbs and flows.   

 

Nota bene: Though several other mining and oil issues have not been part of the index—a rising tide usually lifts all—if not—most boats. 

 

More, its lack of correlation with the PSEi 30 should make it a worthy diversifier.  

 

But with the current climate of overindebtedness and rising rates seen with most mainstream issues, the market may likely have second thoughts about this disfavored sector. Soon. 

 

In the 70s, mines constituted many members of the Philippine Phisix, presently PSEi 30.   

 

That 70s show, marked by the age of inflation, may yet stage a comeback. (Figure 4, lowest pane)  

Figure 5 


Despite the low volume and a depressed sentiment in the general market, a divergence has emerged between the Mining index and the headline index. (Figure 5, upper chart) 

 

In fact, as a ratio of the PSEi 30, the mines have been reservedly outperforming since March 2020. (Figure 5, lowest diagram) 

 

If the advent of the era of fragmentation or the age of inflation materializes, could the consensus eventually be chasing a new bubble? 

 

Disclosure: This author holds exposure to some of the mining & oil issues. 

 

____ 

References 

 

McGerty Fenella Global defence spending – strategic vs economic drivers; Military Balance Blog, February 15, 2013, International Institute for Strategic Studies 

 

Pozsar, Zoltan: Money, Commodities, and Bretton Woods III; March 31, Credit Suisse Economics 

 

Nota Bene: The newsletter intends to apprise readers of the market conditions based on the information available at the time of the items’ writing, whose accuracy and timeliness of the issues concerned are subject to change without prior notice.   Solicitation to trade is neither intended by the contents. In the meantime, the discussion of occasional positioning on particular issues are opinions of this author.