Showing posts with label collateral swap. Show all posts
Showing posts with label collateral swap. Show all posts

Sunday, April 05, 2026

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet? The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II)

 

It is particularly odd that economists who profess to be champions of a free-market economy, should go to such twists and turns to avoid facing the plain fact: that gold, that scarce and valuable market-produced metal, has always been, and will continue to be, by far the best money for human society— Murray Rothbard

In this issue

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet?  The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II)

I. What the Quiet Actually Means

II. Safe Havens and the Hierarchy of Money

III. The Gold–Oil Ratio and Crisis Transmission

IV. Mean Reversion or Regime Shift? Interpreting the Gold–Oil Ratio

V. Liquidity Stress: When Gold Falls First

VI. Real-Time Example: Central Banks Mobilize Gold, Turkey’s Gold Sales

VII. Real-Time Example: Liquidity Stress in the UAE

VIII. Gold Across Monetary Regimes

IX. Conclusion: The Signal in the Silence 

Why Isn’t Gold Acting Like a Safe Haven—Yet?  The Gold–Oil Ratio and the Liquidity Stress Behind Early-Crisis Gold Weakness (Part II) 

Energy shocks, dollar liquidity stress, and why gold often lags before it leads during financial crises 

Part II 

I. What the Quiet Actually Means 

Part I examined why gold has remained surprisingly subdued despite escalating geopolitical tensions and rising oil prices. The explanation lies not in the failure of gold’s safe-haven role, but in the mechanics of liquidity stress and the structure of the global bullion system

Part II explores what that quiet may be signaling. By examining the relationship between gold and oil, the liquidity dynamics of financial crises, and gold’s behavior across monetary regimes, a clearer picture begins to emerge. 

Gold’s silence may not reflect stability. 

It may instead reflect the early stage of a broader liquidity adjustment inside the global dollar system. 

While modern financial systems are built on credit rather than metal, periods of stress often reveal that the hierarchy of money still persists beneath the surface. 

II. Safe Havens and the Hierarchy of Money 

Safe-haven assets are often misunderstood. In practice, they represent savings held in forms with high moneyness—assets expected to preserve value (store of value) while remaining readily marketable during periods of stress. 

Their appeal rests on two characteristics: the ability to preserve purchasing power and the ability to be converted into cash quickly with minimal price disruption or marketability. 

Crucially, these properties are context-dependent. Assets perceived as safe are not inherently risk-free; their status reflects market confidence in their liquidity and convertibility. U.S. Treasuries, for example, are technically government liabilities, yet they function as safe assets because of their deep, liquid markets and the central role of the dollar in global finance. 

Gold occupies a distinct position in this hierarchy. Its moneyness is reinforced not only by the absence of counterparty risk but also by physical characteristics—durability, divisibility, recognizability, and malleability—that historically supported its acceptability across time and geography. 

These features contributed to gold’s persistent marketability, particularly in environments where trust in financial intermediaries weakens

However, as Austrian economist Gary North emphasized, these properties do not constitute intrinsic value. Value is not inherent in the metal itself but is imputed by market participants. Gold’s status as a safe-haven asset therefore arises from sustained confidence in its liquidity and acceptability, especially under conditions of stress

This hierarchy becomes clearer when markets transition from stability to crisis. 


Figure 1

The divergence among major fiat currencies highlights how gold’s moneyness becomes more pronounced as confidence in fiat purchasing power declines. (chart from Jesse Colombo’s The Bubble Bubble Report) [Figure 1] 

As described by Hyman Minsky, prolonged financial stability encourages leverage and risk-taking. When stress emerges, this dynamic reverses abruptly. Market participants experience a liquidity squeeze, reprioritizing assets according to their moneyness—favoring those that can be converted into cash quickly and reliably without significant loss of value. 

III. The Gold–Oil Ratio and Crisis Transmission 

One way to understand gold’s muted response to current geopolitical tensions is through its relationship with oil. 

Oil represents an immediate claim on global liquidity. It is consumed, dollar-priced "Petrodollar", and highly sensitive to geopolitical disruption. Gold, by contrast, represents stored value—held primarily as protection against monetary instability. 

(Incidentally, oil is often called “black gold,” reflecting its quasi-monetary properties: global acceptability, scarcity, and embedded value as the economy’s primary energy input.)  


Figure 2

In real terms, Brent oil’s price trend appears to have formed a secular bottom in the late 1990s around the Asian Financial Crisis. (Figure 2, upper chart) 

Since then, the broader trajectory has been upward, interrupted by the 2000s commodity spike and the pandemic collapse. This pattern points to deeper structural forces: monetary expansion, chronic underinvestment in energy, and rising geopolitical risk

With Middle East tensions intensifying and war-economy dynamics increasingly shaping policy, the current oil shock may prove more persistent than markets expect. 

When geopolitical shocks drive oil prices sharply higher, the global financial system experiences a liquidity drain as energy-importing economies scramble for additional dollars to fund higher fuel costs—tightening financial conditions across currencies and credit markets. 

With dollar credit estimated at roughly $14 trillion—over half in debt securities (Bank of International Settlement)—this dynamic amplifies dollar demand during periods of stress. [Figure 2, lower image] 

This mechanism echoes economist Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation dynamics: rising costs and tightening collateral conditions force economic actors into a dollar funding pressure

In such episodes, gold does not always rise immediately

Instead, the gold–oil ratio compresses as oil outpaces gold. The system prioritizes settlement over preservation—dollars are needed to pay for energy before reserves can be accumulated as protection. 

Historically, this reflects the early phase of crisis transmission. Energy shocks propagate rapidly through trade balances, currencies, and funding markets, triggering collateral demand that can temporarily suppress traditional hedges. 

Only later—once liquidity pressures ease or policy responses take hold—does gold tend to reassert itself. 

IV. Mean Reversion or Regime Shift? Interpreting the Gold–Oil Ratio 

The gold–oil ratio captures the relative performance of the two commodities; recently, gold has significantly outperformed oil. Heuristically, it can be read as follows:

  • High ratio: monetary stress, weak growth, disinflationary pressures
  • Falling ratio (oil catching up): cyclical inflation, supply shocks, rearmament, and stronger industrial demand

If the global economy is transitioning toward a war footing—characterized by higher defense spending, rising commodity intensity, and tightening energy geopolitics—then near-term oil outperformance relative to gold is plausible. 

Even in a less oil-dependent world, geopolitical tensions can amplify supply–demand imbalances. 

That said, these forces can overlap. Inflationary pressures, financial stress, and supply shocks may coexist rather than unfold sequentially. 

Mean reversion suggests scope for oil to outperform gold, with historical anchors around ~18–22 (mean) and ~15–18 (median). However, these benchmarks may no longer be stable.

First, Goodhart’s Law applies: once the ratio becomes a widely targeted signal, its reliability deteriorates.

Second, base effects distort comparisons, especially after extreme moves. When ratios are measured off extreme starting points—such as the pandemic collapse in oil or gold’s surge during periods of monetary stress—subsequent moves can appear disproportionately large or directional. In reality, these shifts may reflect mechanical normalization from distorted bases, rather than a clean cyclical signal.


Figure 3

Third, the apparent gold-oil ratio uptrend since 2008 indicates shifting structural drivers—implying that historical mean/median benchmarks may themselves be drifting higher. (Figure 3) 

In short, while mean reversion remains a useful guide, the regime may be evolving—making static historical anchors increasingly unreliable. 

It may be that the recent compression in the gold–oil ratio reflects gold’s prior fat-tailed outperformance, with the current move representing a normalization back toward its two-decade trend channel rather than a structural reversal. 

V. Liquidity Stress: When Gold Falls First 

One of the most counterintuitive features of financial crises is that gold can weaken precisely when investors expect it to strengthen. 

This occurs because gold is not only a store of value—it is also one of the most liquid assets in global markets

When financial stress intensifies, institutions face margin calls, collateral demands, and funding obligations. To meet these pressures, they liquidate assets that can be sold quickly.

Gold often becomes one of those assets.

This reflects the liquidity phase described by Hyman Minsky, in which the immediate need for funding temporarily overrides longer-term investment considerations.

During this stage of a crisis, the system prioritizes cash over protection.

Gold may weaken not because its safe-haven role has disappeared, but because it remains one of the few assets capable of generating immediate liquidity.

VI. Real-Time Example: Central Banks Mobilize Gold, Turkey’s Gold Sales 


Figure 4

Recent news reports indicates that Turkey deployed gold-linked lira and foreign-exchange swaps, alongside outright sales, to support the lira during a period of market stress, as the USD/TRY exchange rate surged to successive record highs. Its gold reserves fell by roughly 50 tonnes (to 772 tonnes), the largest decline since 2018. [Figure 4] 

Such operations illustrate another dimension of gold’s role in modern reserve management. By mobilizing gold through swaps, central banks can generate immediate foreign-currency liquidity, effectively using gold as a liquidity bridge—complementing direct FX intervention rather than fully substituting for it. 

However, these tools primarily address short-term liquidity pressures rather than underlying macroeconomic imbalances. 

When markets perceive that a central bank is actively deploying finite reserve assets, these actions can signal constraint—potentially raising risk premia and intensifying pressure on the currency. 

As external buffers are drawn down, the policy path often becomes increasingly dependent on domestic liquidity provision, with central banks resorting to expansion of the monetary base to sustain market functioning. 

This dynamic highlights the reflexive nature of intervention: measures intended to stabilize markets can amplify fragilities over time through resource misallocation.

Importantly, such actions do not diminish gold’s monetary role. On the contrary, they demonstrate that gold continues to function as high-quality collateral within the global financial system during periods of stress. 

VII. Real-Time Example: Liquidity Stress in the UAE 

Recent developments in the Gulf financial system offer a contemporary illustration of these dynamics.


Figure 5

Following a sharp collapse in banking liquidity—reportedly approaching 45 percent in parts of the regional funding market—the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates moved to inject massive amounts of liquidity into domestic banks. [Figure 5, upper diagram] 

The intervention aimed to stabilize funding conditions and prevent disruptions in the region’s financial system. 

While such measures can temporarily ease liquidity pressures, they also reveal the underlying structure of modern crises. When funding conditions tighten, policymakers must often intervene rapidly to maintain the functioning of credit markets. In the short term, these interventions can strengthen demand for dollar liquidity, particularly in economies closely tied to global energy markets. 

The result is a paradox. 

Even as geopolitical tensions rise and energy prices surge—conditions that would normally support gold—financial systems may initially prioritize liquidity stabilization over reserve accumulation. 

Gold’s subdued behavior during such episodes may therefore reflect not complacency, but temporary pressure within the global funding system. 

This dynamic is further illustrated by recent developments in the U.S. dollar. Despite shocks including the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict, the DXY index has shown muted gains and even diverges from 2-year rate differentials. [Figure 5, lower pane] 

This suggests that dollar strength in this period is less about a classic safe-haven bid and more about liquidity demand driven by de-risking and deleveraging. 

The lack of coordinated upside in gold, bonds, and bitcoin points to collateral stress rather than a simple flight to safety. Meanwhile, interest rates themselves may reflect not only policy and war risk, but also fiscal pressures and issuance dynamics, blurring the signals that rate differentials typically provide. 

In classic safe-haven episodes, defensive assets tend to rise together. When that coordination breaks down, it often signals that markets are prioritizing liquidity and collateral access rather than portfolio hedging. 

VIII. Gold Across Monetary Regimes


Figure 6 

Gold’s long-term behavior is non-linear. Its bull markets tend to move in waves associated with epochal shifts in global monetary regimes. [Figure 6] 

The first bull cycle followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system after the Nixon Shock and lasted until the early 1980s. This was followed by a bear market and a two-decade lull, reflecting the “salad days” of the U.S. dollar standard—characterized by the rise of globalization, the Fed’s drift toward easy-money policies, and the deepening of the dollar’s exorbitant privilege. 

A second wave emerged in the early 2000s and accelerated after the Global Financial Crisis, when central banks dramatically expanded their balance sheets in response to economic shocks. 

The current period represents a third phase—marked by a drift toward a war economy: protectionism, sanctions, and kinetic conflict—while also shaped by overlapping forces including evolving monetary policies, the weaponization of the dollar, oil and commodity dynamics, AI-driven structural uncertainty, and central bank accumulation of gold. 

These forces are gradually reshaping how gold is accumulated, traded, and—for central banks—deployed within national reserve strategies. 

IX. Conclusion: The Signal in the Silence 

Gold’s current calm should not be mistaken for irrelevance. 

Financial crises rarely begin with a clean flight to safety. Instead, they begin with liquidity stress. Funding markets tighten, institutions scramble for cash, and the most liquid assets are often sold first to meet obligations. 

In these early stages, the global financial system prioritizes settlement over preservation. Energy shocks drain dollars from the system, trade balances shift abruptly, and capital flows reprice risk across currencies and credit markets. 

This sequence helps explain why gold can appear subdued even as geopolitical tensions escalate. Oil shocks transmit stress through the real economy first, tightening liquidity before investors turn toward long-term stores of value. 

Only later—once liquidity pressures ease or policy responses expand—does gold typically reassert its defensive role. 

The current compression in the gold–oil ratio may therefore reflect not the failure of gold as a safe haven, but the timing of crisis transmission within a dollar-centric financial system

If the emerging environment is indeed shifting toward a more fragmented geopolitical order—characterized by energy insecurity, fiscal expansion, de-globalization, kinetic conflicts, and a gradual erosion of monetary trust—then gold’s quiet phase may represent the prelude rather than the conclusion of its cycle. 

The signal is not absent. 

It may simply be arriving later in the crisis sequence. 


Monday, February 11, 2013

Phisix and Global Asset Markets: More Signs of Mania

SIX consecutive weeks of gains backed by 11% in nominal local currency returns has simply been amazing!

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The Phisix has now gone parabolic.

Deepening Mania Reflected on Market Internals

And equally incredible are claims that many have resorted to in defense of the current mania such as “many people are waiting for a correction to get in” and that “only Phisix heavyweights have been benefiting from the current run”. Sidestepping the issue will not help disprove the theory backed by evidences of the formative bubble which the Phisix seems to be transitioning into.

While “waiting for a correction” could be true for some people, and while indeed Phisix issues have been major beneficiaries from the current boom, how valid are these assertions from the general perspective?

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The chart above accounts for the total or cumulative issues traded for the week divided by the number of trading days per week or the daily number of issues traded (averaged weekly).

This trend has been ascendant and could be at record levels. I have no comparative figures for the 1993 boom. 

Yet such indicator suggests that the market have been looking and scouring for issues to bid up. This also means formerly illiquid issues are becoming tradeable. Today about 62% of the 344 issues[1] listed in the Philippine Stock Exchange are now being traded compared to about 50% in 2011.

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How can we say that most of the growth in the number of issues traded has favored the bulls?

Well, the ratio of the advance-decline averaged on a weekly basis reveals of an increasing trend. The widening spread simply means that significantly more issues have been advancing than declining. Gains have been spreading.

The percentage share of listed companies within 10% of the 52-week highs could be a helpful indicator, but I don’t have a measure on this.

I may add that another sentiment indicator has been suggesting of the growing intensity of speculative activities: The number of trades.

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The above represents the weekly cumulative trades divided by the number of trading days per week, which gives us the daily number of trades (averaged weekly).

The current boom has brought trading activities to the pedestal of the first quarter 2012.

The implication is that people have become more restive possibly signified by increasing frequency of account churning or short term trades.

Another is that retail investors have been jumping into the bandwagon.

It is simply naïve to believe that the prospects of easy money won’t lure the vulnerable.

People are social animals. Many fall for fads or faddish risk activities.

We have seen business fads in lechon manok, shawarma, pearl shakes and etc…, where at the end of the day either the more efficient ones become the major players at the expense of the marginal players or that the vogue theme fades (but not entirely). The difference is that business fashions have not translated to systemic issues. In short, they have not morphed into bubbles.

Fads are also why people have been drawn towards scams such as Ponzi schemes or pyramiding. The revelation of huge Ponzi scheme that hit the Southern Philippines late last year has been something I expected and had warned about[2].

People not only want to partake of newfound economic opportunities, importantly they see fads as opportunities to signal participation which translates to social acceptance channeled through talking points.

Anecdotal evidences suggests of a blossoming mania too.

A dear friend fortuitously dropped by an office which is proximate to an online trading office and told me that he saw about 200 people applying for online trading accounts. Of course, this may just be a coincidence or that it could be a symptom.

Additionally, I am asked by a close friend, who owns a manpower training agency to teach investing in the stock market to prospective retail participants. Lately, my friend says that they have been encountering increasing number of queries on this at their office. The last time I did so was about the same period in 2007. The rest is history.

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Finally, the ongoing price level rotation dynamic has been prevailing. This has been validating my predictions consistently which also serves as concrete evidence to the inflationary boom.

While the property sector continues to dazzle, last year’s laggards led by the mining sector, as well as, the service sector seem to be reclaiming leadership. The domestic mining sector has been catapulted to the top anew, widening its lead relative the property sector.

On the other hand, the service industry, at third spot, appears to be closing in on the second ranked property sector.

Rotation also means relative price gains will spread from the core to the periphery. This is being confirmed by the number of issues traded and the advance decline ratio.

The bottom line is that market internals have been exhibiting broad based growth of risk appetite which has not been limited to Phisix issues.

Record levels of issues traded, the dominance of advancing issues, record high of number of trades, price level rotation among the industries, and the ongoing rotation from the core to periphery represent as symptoms of a flourishing manic phase in the Phisix.

While some may indeed be “waiting for correction to enter”, the bigger picture shows otherwise, retail participants have been piling onto the market’s ascent, churning of accounts seem to become more frequent and there appears to be increasing interests by the general public on the domestic stock market, all of which appears to reinforce general overconfidence.

A further help on this which I don’t have access to is the industry’s net margin to clients. Although I suspect that this has also been ballooning.

Mainstream Chorus: This Time is Different

Another set of incredulous claim has been that “local authorities have learned from their mistakes” and that “low interest rate policies are sound” 

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Let me put this in simple terms, business cycles exists not because of sheer patterns or mechanical responses or repetitious actions, but because social policies induce or shapes people incentives to commit errors in economic calculation that are ventilated on the markets and the economy.

Global financial crisis have become more frequent[3] (see grey bars) since the Nixon Shock[4] or when ex US President Nixon overhauled the world’s monetary system by closing the gold anchor of the Bretton Woods[5] or the “gold exchange standard” in August 15, 1971.

The intensification of international financial crisis reveals that contrary to the false notion that authorities have learned from their mistakes, policymakers have fallen for the curse of what philosopher, essayist and literary artist George Santayana said about the repetition of history[6]:
Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
In short, policymakers hardly ever learn.

Additionally, if low interest rate policies are “sound” why stop at being low, why not simply abolish it altogether?

Unfortunately the war against interest rates has long been a political creed which has been masqueraded as an economic theory that has been embraced by interventionists.

As the great Professor Ludwig von Mises warned[7],
Public opinion is prone to see in interest nothing but a merely institutional obstacle to the expansion of production. It does not realize that the discount of future goods as against present goods is a necessary and eternal category of human action and cannot be abolished by bank manipulation. In the eyes of cranks and demagogues, interest is a product of the sinister machinations of rugged exploiters. The age-old disapprobation of interest has been fully revived by modern interventionism. It clings to the dogma that it is one of the foremost duties of good government to lower the rate of interest as far as possible or to abolish it altogether. All present-day governments are fanatically committed to an easy money policy.
Indeed today, such doctrine has been adapted as the standard operating tool used by political authorities in addressing economic or financial recessions or crises.

The policy of lowering of interest rates appears to have almost been concerted and synchronized. As I pointed out at the start of the year[8], more than half of the world’s central banks have cut rates in 2012. Developed economies have appended zero bound rates with radical balance sheet expansion measures.

In January of 2013, of the 41 central banks that made policy decisions, 9 central banks cut interest rates while 30 were unchanged[9].

Unfortunately, credit expansion from low interest rates meant to foster permanent quasi booms only results to either boom-bust cycles (financial crisis) or a currency collapse (hyperinflation).

Again the great Mises[10]
The wavelike movement affecting the economic system, the recurrence of periods of boom which are followed by periods of depression, is the unavoidable outcome of the attempts, repeated again and again, to lower the gross market rate of interest by means of credit expansion. There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved.
The basic reason why interest rates can’t be kept low forever is simply because of the changing balance of demand and supply for credit. There could be other factors too, such as inflation expectations, state of the quality of credit and availability and or access to savings.

In a credit driven boom, where demand for credit rises more relative to supply, the result would be to raise price levels of interest rates

As German banker, economist and professor L. Albert Hahn[11] explained[12],
Interest rates cannot be held down in the long run, for interest rates rise because higher prices demand greater amounts of credit.

If larger amounts of credit are created through the progressive increase of money, i.e., by the printing press, the process ends in a hopeless depreciation of the currency, in terms of both domestic goods and foreign exchange.
In other words, manipulation of interest rates means that inflationary booms are temporary and will translate to an eventual bust, which is hardly about “sound” economic theories.

So when people argue from the premise of extrapolating future outcomes solely based from past performances, they are essentially seduced by the “outcome bias” and similarly fall prey to “flawed perception” trap—based on the reflexivity theory. The latter means that many tend to create their own versions of reality by misreading price signals. Yet such arguments are in reality based on heuristics and cognitive biases rather than from economics.

Bubble cycles are not just about irrational pricing of securities, but rather bubble cycles represent the market process in response to social policies where irrationalities are fueled or shaped by credit expansion accompanied or supported by faddish themes.

While I don’t believe that we have reached the inflection point, manifestations of the transition towards a mania, not only in the Philippines but elsewhere, are being reinforced through various aspects as.

And one of the strongest signs hails from the four deadliest words of investing according to the late investing legend John Templeton “This Time is Different” as above.

Moreover, there are many ways to skin a cat as they say. One way to chase for yields by increasing access to credit has been to launder quality of collateral via collateral swaps.

This has been best captured from the recent speech by the speech of US Federal Reserve governor Dr. Jeremy C. Stein which he calls as collateral transformation[13].
Collateral transformation is best explained with an example. Imagine an insurance company that wants to engage in a derivatives transaction. To do so, it is required to post collateral with a clearinghouse, and, because the clearinghouse has high standards, the collateral must be "pristine"--that is, it has to be in the form of Treasury securities. However, the insurance company doesn't have any unencumbered Treasury securities available--all it has in unencumbered form are some junk bonds. Here is where the collateral swap comes in. The insurance company might approach a broker-dealer and engage in what is effectively a two-way repo transaction, whereby it gives the dealer its junk bonds as collateral, borrows the Treasury securities, and agrees to unwind the transaction at some point in the future. Now the insurance company can go ahead and pledge the borrowed Treasury securities as collateral for its derivatives trade.

Of course, the dealer may not have the spare Treasury securities on hand, and so, to obtain them, it may have to engage in the mirror-image transaction with a third party that does--say, a pension fund. Thus, the dealer would, in a second leg, use the junk bonds as collateral to borrow Treasury securities from the pension fund. And why would the pension fund see this transaction as beneficial? Tying back to the theme of reaching for yield, perhaps it is looking to goose its reported returns with the securities-lending income without changing the holdings it reports on its balance sheet.
So markets are looking at innovative ways to arbitrage on the incumbent regulations.

Also when celebrities such as 16 year old Desperate Housewives star Rachel Fox preaches about stock market investing by bragging about how she earned 64% last year[14], these again signify signs of overconfidence. This reminds me of the “basura queen” in 2007[15] who swaggered in a local TV news program how she made millions betting on third tier issues. Ironically that program was shown at the zenith of the pre-Lehman boom

Yet every blowoff phase simply posits that accelerating gains in asset prices will only whet on the public and financial institution’s enthusiasm to expand and absorb more credit or to increase leverage in the system. Such phase would also magnify systemic fragility and vulnerability to internal or external shocks that eventually will be transmitted through higher interest rates.

Emerging markets, like China and the ASEAN, cushioned the global economy and markets from the 2007-2008 US mortgage-housing-banking crisis; a crisis that eventually spread to the Eurozone that still lingers on today.

Yet the difference then and today is; as the crisis stricken nations have hardly recovered, as manifested by the accelerating bulge in the balance sheets of major central banks, emerging markets like the Philippines[16], Thailand[17], India, China[18] and many more have been blowing their respective domestic bubbles. For instance, reports say that bad debts in India are headed for a decade high[19] 

And should another crisis resurface, which is likely to have a ripple effect across the world and equally prick homegrown bubbles, then it would be possible that even emerging markets will embark on similar frenetic balance sheet expansion programs. And this will run in combination with developed economies whose easing programs are even likely to intensify.

When most central banks run wild, the return to the current RISK ON environment will not be guaranteed. Instead I expect more of a cross between stagflation and volatilities from bursting bubbles.

Yet one thing seems clear; whatever tranquility we are seeing today looks fleeting.

Yellow Flag: Rising US Interest Rates May Impact the Phisix Mania

The Philippine Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas reported that price inflation rose by 3% in January from 2.9% last year[20].

Although my neighborhood sari-sari store’s beer which rose by 9.5% in November 2012 (from Php 21 to Php 23), has risen again this weekend from (Php 23 to Php 24) or by 4.34%. I believe that the current rise may have partly been due to the implementation of the “sin taxes”.

Yet I don’t see how statistical inflation has been reflecting on reality.

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Bond markets of ASEAN majors looks placid. The yield of Thailand’s 10 year government bond (topmost) has risen from the lowest point in 2010 but remains rangebound. This seems in contrast to her contemporaries Indonesia (middle) and the Philippines (lower pane) whose yields have been trading at the lows. Chart from tradingeconomics.com

Nonetheless the level of bond yields so far resonates with how the market accepts statistical inflation. And such has been supportive of the ASEAN equity outperformance.

But events have been changing at the margins.

The firming boom in the stock markets and in the property sector in the US appears to be pressuring interest rates upwards.

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The iShare Barclays 20+ Year Treasury Bond Fund (TLT) continues to flounder. The same goes with the iShares Barclays MBS Fixed-Rate Bond Fund (MBB), a benchmark for mortgage bond ETF, the SPDR Barclays High Yield Bond ETF (JNK), a benchmark for high yield high risks corporate bonds and even the iShares JPMorgan USD Emerging Market Bond Fund (EMB) have recently dropped[21].

Sinking bond funds only signify rising interest rates.

Reflation in the US property has become evident during the last quarter[22]. And considering that rents have accounted for as the biggest weight in the US CPI basket, it would not be a surprise if price inflation ticks higher if not makes a surprise jump[23]

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Part of this seems to have already been building up through resurgent inflation expectations as shown by the US 10 year constant maturity (DGS10) minus the 10 year inflation indexed security (DFII10).

As I have been pointing out, if inflation expectations continue to rise and breakout from the triangle, then the US Federal Reserve will be caught in a big predicament of their own making.

Many have begun to notice them too. The number of bond bears appears to be growing.

Investing savant George Soros predicts a spike in US interest rates this year[24]. Another investing guru Jim Rogers recently chimed with bond sage PIMCO’s Bill Gross[25] in warning of a possible bond market rout.

Pardon my appeal to authority but rising interest rates are unintended consequences or a backlash to the Fed’s policies which all of them recognizes.

And a sustained increase in interest rates will also pose as a threat to the overleveraged US political economy that will unmask many of the malinvestments, as well as, asset bubbles that may even force the FED to accelerate on her balance sheet expansion

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Rising US interest rates could impact also Philippine asset prices.

As indicated by the above charts from Reuters[26], sensitivity of emerging markets to US treasuries has materially increased, as measured by the proportion of the yield of 10 year US Treasuries relative to her Emerging Market counterpart.

The risk is that the narrowing of spreads reduces the attractiveness of emerging market assets that may induce outflows. Of course not everything is about arbitraging spreads.

And as stated above, credit booms will alter the balance of demand and supply of credit which will be reflected on interest rates, which is what rising interest rates in the US has been about.

I still believe that unless there should be an abrupt move via a spike interest rates in the US markets, creeping rates will hardly be a factor yet for Philippine asset markets during the first quarter of 2013.

This means that I expect the Phisix to remain strong until at least the end of the first quarter. Although we should expect the much needed intermittent pullbacks.

Rising Rates In Crisis Europe: Credit Risks or ECB Balance Sheet Shrinkage?

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Rising interest rates could also mean concerns over credit standings or credit quality.

Are increasing rates of 10 year government bonds of Portugal (GSPT10YR:IND ; orange), Italy (GBTPGR10:IND; red) and Spain (GSPG10YR:IND, green) evincing recovery? Or has the effects of the stimulus been receding, where markets are beginning to reappraise credit risks? I am inclined to see the latter.

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Or could rising rates have been representative of the recent contraction of the balance sheet of the European Central Bank[27] (ECB) which recently shrank to an 11 month low? Could gold’s suppressed activities been also due to this?

A revival of the euro crisis will likely lead to the activation of the unused Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT[28]) and the reversal of the current balance sheet shrinkage.

Since markets have essentially been a feedback loop or a Ping-Pong between market responses and the subsequent reactions from political authorities, it is necessary to observe the evolution of events.

It’s hard to view the long term when markets operate within the palm of political authorities led by central bankers.





[3] Zero Hedge 200 Years Of Escalating Policy Mistakes February 8, 2013

[4] Wikipedia.org Nixon Shock


[6] George Santayana CHAPTER XII—FLUX AND CONSTANCY IN HUMAN NATURE REASON IN COMMON SENSE Volume One of "The Life of Reason" The Life of Reason (1905-1906)

[7] Ludwig von Mises 8. The Monetary or Circulation Credit Theory of the Trade Cycle XX. INTEREST, CREDIT EXPANSION, AND THE TRADE CYCLE Human Action

[8] See What to Expect in 2013 January 7, 2013


[10] Mises Ibid

[11] Wikipedia.org Louis Albert Hahn

[12] L. Albert Hahn The Economics of Illusion July 3, 2009 Mises.org

[13] Dr. Jeremy C. Stein Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses US Federal Reserve February 7, 2013




[17] See Thailand’s Credit Bubble January 26, 2013



[20] BSP.gov.ph January Inflation at 3.0 Percent February 5, 2013

[21] Mike Larson Bond Forecasts Coming True — in Aces and Spades! Are You Protected?, MoneyandMarkets.com February 8, 2013





[26] Sujata Rao U.S. Treasury headwinds for emerging debt Global Investing Reuters Blog February 5, 2013