Showing posts with label derivatives. Show all posts
Showing posts with label derivatives. Show all posts

Monday, June 13, 2016

China Yuan Weakens as BIS Says Foreign Exchange Markets have Systematically Failed

Friday, overseas stocks got hammered. The popular reason was that with recent polls suggesting that UK’s Brexit was suddenly in a commanding 10 point lead against Bremain, markets have viewed this as a surge in uncertainty.

By sector, the decline in US stocks was led by the energy (XLE -2.16%) and the financial industry (XLF -1.24%). While the S&P 500 was down (-.92%, year to date), the S&P Bank Index ($BIX) was slammed 1.74% (-2.6% week on week and -9.3% year to date). The NYSE Broker Dealer ($XBD) was hit -2.11% -3.63% w-o-w, -10.73% y-t-d)

The Stoxx Europe 600 Bank index plummeted 3.7% (-4.8% wow, -23.48% ytd) to approach a two month low. Deutsche Bank crashed 5.8% (-7.74% wow, -35% ytd). The FTSE Italia All Share Bank Index plunged 5.03% (down 5.85% wow, 43% ytd) now nears the 2012 lows. Now even before the Brexit poll announcement, Japan’s Topix Bank ETF dropped 1.31% (-3.2% wow and -29.44% ytd)

So while it may be true that Brexit (political risk) could have been a factor, there must be something else that must have been affecting financial stocks.


That other major factor must have been the Chinese yuan.

Last May 28, I wrote that the USD-yuan was making strides to hit its previous highs. While the Chinese went into a 5 day holiday to celebrate the Golden Week Spring Festival and because of this, the onshore yuan CNY was last traded to reflect on a rebound mostly in reaction to the weak US payroll data of the other week, the offshore yuan got clobbered.

By Friday, the offshore yuan (CNH) suffered its biggest weakly decline since March (Bloomberg). Importantly, the CNH appears to have outpaced the CNY which like in August and January incited a global asset convulsion.

And if you haven’t noticed, the strains on the China’s yuan have appeared like clockwork—every SIX months.


And why shouldn’t this happen? The January yuan (deflationary) strain has prompted the Chinese government to unleash a staggering USD 1 Trillion of Total Social Financing (lowest window)! And the magnitude of credit expansion perked up domestic liquidity which subsequently caused food inflation even when the general measure of inflation the CPI barely budged.

From the supply side alone, the flood of credit by itself should be indicative that the yuan is southbound or headed lower! 

Additionally, with the inundation of credit, the public went into a speculative binge. They revved up speculations in commodities such as iron ore and steel rebars—which eventually collapsed. Moreover, Chinese property prices have gone berserk.

So it is likely that such developments may have prompted those in the know to escalate capital flight.

Chinese May imports reported a minimal .4%. But that’s most likely because imports from Hong Kong skyrocketed by a nosebleed 242%!!! Much of these imports have likely been about over-invoicing of imported goods which serves as a way to go around capital controls to send capital abroad.

China’s reserves have most likely been propped up by derivatives, (forex swaps and futures contracts). And with such derivative tools being short term in nature, borrowed dollars will again need to be paid back or rolled over. So the 6 months cycle could have signified expiring contracts.

So even when Chinese reserves dropped by only $28 billion in May to just $3.19 trillion to its lowest level since 2011, current pressures reveal that China’s “dollar” strain may have been vastly understated.

Again China’s currency ailment could be a symptom or a manifestation of the escalating pressure on the US dollar “shortages” through wholesale finance, in particular fx swaps and forward contracts.

In a recent speech by Bank for International Settlement’s, Economic Adviser and Head of Research, Hyun Song Shin, Mr Hyun opined that a critical measure of the foreign exchange markets have broken down or in his words a “widespread failure”.

Such systematic failure which has become pronounced in the last 18 months have been seen through the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP)

Covered Interest Rate Parity is “a condition where the relationship between interest rates and the spot and forward currency values of two countries are in equilibrium” (Investopedia)

In short, the relationship between interest rates and currency values has been rendered dysfunctional.

For an overview. A currency’s forward rate and the current “spot” rate provides for the implied interest rate on the US dollar. Thus the difference between Libor and FX swap-implied dollar interest rate is called “cross-currency basis”

And when the implied interest rate from the fx dollar swap is above Libor, then the borrower of dollars will be paying more than the rates at the open market.


The systemic failure or breakdown occurs when cross currency basis have consistently been in negative, or when the fx swap dollar borrowers are, as noted above, paying above the market rates.

Negative cross currency basis occurred during the Great Recession. Today it has been happening for the 18 months even “during the period of relative calm”

But such correlational breakdown has been anchored on a strong US dollar which is a symptom of tighter credit conditions. 

Mr Hyun*

The breakdown of covered interest parity is a symptom of tighter dollar credit conditions putting a squeeze on accumulated dollar liabilities built up during the previous period of easy dollar credit 

*Hyun Song Shin Global liquidity and procyclicality World Bank conference, “The state of economics, the state of the world” Washington DC, 8 June 2016 Bank for International Settlements

Ironically, the CIP breakdown has not been seen only in emerging markets but in the yen, Swiss franc and the euro. Yes negative rates economies!

And these accumulated dollar liabilities or “ dollar shorts” emanate from three aspects of the US dollar’s currency reserve and cross border transaction role: namely, trade finance, invoicing currency and funding currency.

As trade finance currency, hedging activities are usually channeled through US denominated bank credit.

As invoicing currency, borrowing and lending occurs on the currency from which trade has been denominated in. For instance, exporters who trade in US dollars tend to borrow US dollars to finance operations and real assets.

As funding currency, globalization of financial markets means that a significant number of financial- institutions (such as pensions) or investors invest or take advantage of trade or speculative arbitrages around the world. In doing so, they convert foreign currency to domestic currency where investments are made. This leads to currency mismatches which these institutions or investors apply hedge positions. And the hedging counterparty is typically a bank. And as consequence, the bank will likely resort to mitigating its currency risk exposure by borrowing dollars. In this way, dollar claims are counterbalanced by dollar debts.

In other words, dollar liabilities built the period of easy dollar credit are equivalent to dollar "shorts".

So when credit conditions tighten, the race to meet dollar obligations are magnified, hence fx borrowers to pay above market rates to cover dollar “short” positions or dollar liabilities. This leads to the systemic CIP failure. Thus the recent rise of the US dollar, which has been accompanied by the negative cross currency basis, means that global conditions have been tightening.

I might add that such correlational breakdown have also been tied with ZIRP, NIRP and QE which provided the “period of easy dollar credit” and the incentives to hedge and leverage up in USD.

Aside from the above mentioned strains, China’s weakening currency could be in part,  brought about dollar shorts and also in part from a stampede to meet such obligations.

The BIS’ latest outlook on China’s external credit conditions provides some clues [Bank for International SettlementsHighlights of the BIS international statistics (June 6, 2016)] "Cross-border bank credit to emerging market economies (EMEs) was down by $159 billion during Q4 2015, or 8% in the year to end-December 2015 – the sharpest year-on-year contraction since 2009” And this was largely due to China where “ The $114 billion decline in cross-border lending to China was the second quarterly drop in a row, and it pushed the annual growth rate down to –25%.”

Furthermore, “The $114 billion decline in cross-border lending to China was the second quarterly drop in a row, and it pushed the annual growth rate down to –25%.”

And for potential supply of dollar shorts “New data published by China confirm that banks on the mainland are becoming an increasingly important source of international bank credit. They are an especially important source of US dollar credit: their cross-border dollar assets totalled $529 billion at end-December 2015."

So if there is anything, the bank selloffs and yuan’s weakening are symptoms of the ongoing tightening credit conditions around the world.

And tightening credit conditions should extrapolate to a weaker economy and narrowing access to credit. This subsequently implies greater credit risk which should transpose into greater systemic fragility.

Is it a wonder now why George Soros made a huge bet on a market crash and called for a sell on Asia? 





Friday, December 18, 2015

Infographics: All of the World’s Money and Markets in One Visualization

An infographic on the estimated stock of the world's money, credit and asset markets from the Visual Capitalist. They write:
All of the World’s Money and Markets in One Visualization

How much money exists in the world?

Strangely enough, there are multiple answers to this question, and the amount of money that exists changes depending on how we define it. The more abstract definition of money we use, the higher the number is.

In this data visualization of the world’s total money supply, we wanted to not only compare the different definitions of money, but to also show powerful context for this information. That’s why we’ve also added in recognizable benchmarks such as the wealth of the richest people in the world, the market capitalizations of the largest publicly-traded companies, the value of all stock markets, and the total of all global debt.

The end result is a hierarchy of information that ranges from some of the smallest markets (Bitcoin = $5 billion, Silver above-ground stock = $14 billion) to the world’s largest markets (Derivatives on a notional contract basis = somewhere in the range of $630 trillion to $1.2 quadrillion).

In between those benchmarks is the total of the world’s money, depending on how it is defined. This includes the global supply of all coinage and banknotes ($5 trillion), the above-ground gold supply ($7.8 trillion), the narrow money supply ($28.6 trillion), and the broad money supply ($80.9 trillion).

All figures are in the equivalent of US dollars.

Courtesy of: The Money Project

A bonus chart from the late economist John Exter with his eponymous Exter's Pyramid


The table represents the proportionality of fiat money/credit/derivatives with gold (chart from goldcore.com)

Monday, March 03, 2014

Has the Falling Yuan and Tumbling Chinese Stocks Been Signs of Capital Flight?

I have raised the issue that the disorderly yield spread adjustments have landed on the shores China’s financial markets.

At the start of the year or prior to the Chinese New Year, a liquidity squeeze, as expressed by high interest rates, on the shadow banking industry has prompted the Chinese government to bailout one of the afflicted trust company[1].

Over the following month, the government via the central bank the PBoC appears to have worked on to stabilize the strained credit markets.

Lately a new form of strain seem to have afflicted the Chinese markets; the Chinese currency has stumbled to a record low

From Bloomberg[2]:
China’s yuan tumbled by the most on record on speculation the central bank will widen the currency’s trading band, allowing greater volatility at a time when growth is slowing in the world’s second-largest economy.

The yuan slid as much as 0.9 percent to a 10-month low of 6.1815 per dollar, the largest decline since China unified official and market exchange rates in 1994, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The currency lost 1.3 percent in February, the biggest monthly drop on record. Trading in yuan options surged in New York, making them the most traded contracts among major currencies.

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The above is the 3 year chart of the USD-yuan which shows this week’s record dramatic fall yuan or surge in the USD.

There has been many rationalizations from the above ranging from plans to double trading bandwith in order to liberalize exchange rate, to acts by the PBoC to attack currency speculators and a supposed recourse to devalue in order to promote exports.

I am not persuaded by all these. Speculation that the Chinese government wants to liberalize contradicts her very action of conducting a bailout, extending subsidies to automarkers[3] and of the recent interventions by the PBoC to stabilize the market via injections or withdrawals of liquidity.

Next if the current problem of the Chinese government has been the greater risk of an economic slowdown due to debt woes, how will devaluation ease on her debt conditions? If Chinese exporters who rely on either banking system or shadow banks feel tighter credit conditions via limited access to affordable credit impede on their operations, how will the problem of access to cheaper credit be resolved by a cheaper currency?

Third, why would the Chinese government want to attack the so-called entrenched one way street speculators? Is the Chinese government ready to prick on the interest rate carry trade where nationality based dollar bonds and bank loan exposures by Chinese companies have totalled $ 655 billion at the 3rd quarter of 2013 according to estimates by Bank of America Merrill Lynch? And what’s the point of the earlier bailout?

Moreover is the Chinese government willing to pop about $350 billion worth of complex derivative called the “target redemption forward” (TRF) mostly sold from last year and which according to Morgan Stanley analysts, there remains about $150bn outstanding? The TRF has reportedly been a popular bet on the firming yuan. And since the TRF seems a levered bet, the Financial Times reports that should the renminbi break past 6.20 per dollar, analysts warns that there will be a huge collateral call where “hedging strategies could force banks to call in collateral, accelerating the currency’s decline.[4]

So it would be bizarre for the Chinese government roil the markets in the face of growing debt concerns.

The Chinese government seems to have managed calm many segments of the credit markets.

But credit strains remain as banks have reportedly been reluctant to lend to each other.

From another Bloomberg report[5]
China’s credit-market gauges are triggering alarm bells, as banks grow cautious in lending to each other while investors prefer the safest government bonds.

The spread between the two-year sovereign yield and the similar-maturity interest-rate swap, a gauge of financial stress, reached 121 basis points on Feb. 19, the widest in Bloomberg data going back to 2007. Two days later, the cost to lock in the three-month Shanghai interbank offered rate for one year reached an eight-month high of 94 basis points over similar contracts based on repurchase agreements, which are considered safer because they involve government securities as collateral.

Billionaire investors George Soros and Bill Gross have drawn parallels between the situation in China now and that in the U.S. before the 2008 financial crisis, when traders gauged lending appetite by monitoring the difference between the London Interbank Borrowing Rate and the overnight indexed swap.
So the debt problems appear to be leaking out from various segments of the marketplace. 

Absent in the radar screens of the consensus has been the dramatic fall of China’s stock markets which appears to be one market that has reacted violently to the yuan’s weakening.

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The Shanghai index fell by about 5% in four days[6], before recovering part of the early losses. By the week’s close, the index lost 2.72%. This week’s loss essentially wipes out over 1 month of gain. This is fundamental example of volatility in both directions with a downside bias. 

Why should the stock market react violently if a falling yuan merely has been about liberalization, or devaluation or attack on currency speculators?

I would add that new reports peg debt by Chinese non financial corporations at about $12 trililon or equal to over 120% of GDP based on Standard& Poor’s estimates[7]. The fast expanding size of China’s debt levels is by itself creating risk dynamic.

I offer you my guess. This is not one which the PBoC may be in control of for now. The PBoC seem to be focusing on credit markets. What they or the consensus seem to be missing or ignoring is that these could be incipient signs of capital flight. This may even be capital flight by those in power. The PBoC could be trying to deflect on the issue by putting up strawmen.

And if I am right about this, and if the yuan falls more, we could see the next financial tremor soon.

Given that some publicly listed domestic companies has business exposure on China it would be logical for them to have access to credit. Perhaps I would have to take a look at their exposures.






[4] Financial Times Falling renminbi heightens derivatives risks February 27, 2014



Monday, February 17, 2014

Global Markets: How Sustainable is the Recent Risk ON?

From Risk OFF suddenly to Risk ON. 

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Most of global stock markets led by the US went into hyperdrive mode.

Some bulls have come out of their hibernation to aver “you see I told you, forex reserves, floating currency, low NPLs neatly did the trick. And this has been all about ‘irrationality’”. Of course, I will keep pointing out—the so-called financial market ‘irrationality’ represents a two way street, because such involves the base human impulses of both greed and fear. Bluntly put, fear can be irrational as much as greed. However, any idea of a one directional bias for irrationality signifies in and on itself “irrational” logic

A mainstream foreign report even implied that the “short-lived” emerging market woes have passed. I can’t agree to the notion that 7 ½ months of Emerging Market volatility represents a “short” time frame period. Neither can I reconcile how the repeated ON and OFF volatilities over the same period equals the conclusion that EM troubles have passed.

EM guru Franklin Templeton’s Mark Mobius, for instance, flip flopped for the second time in 2 weeks, earlier by noting how EM selloff will “deepen” to this week’s “probably nearing the end of this big rush out of emerging markets.”[1]

Such seeming state of confusion from the mainstream signifies desperation to resurrect the boom days underpinned by cheap money.

Yet has the current rally been really indicative of the end of the EM selloff? Or has this been the proverbial calm before the storm or the maxim “no trend goes in a straight line”? Or a stock market lingo—a dead cat’s bounce?

Nonetheless as I keep pounding on the table, we should expect “sharp volatility in the global financial markets (stocks, bonds, commodities and currencies) in the coming sessions. The volatility may likely be in both directions but with a downside bias”[2]

Acute market volatilities represent a normative character of major inflection points whether bottom or top. Incidentally since the present volatilities has been occurring at record or post-record highs of asset prices particularly for the stock market, then current volatility logically points to a ‘topping’ formation rather than to a ‘bottoming’ formation.

Severe gyrations tend to highlight the terminal phase of a bull market cycle. Again in whether in 1994-1997 or in 2007-2008, denial rallies can be ferocious to the point of expunging all early bear market losses but eventually capitulate to the full bear market cycle[3].

The bottom line is that stock markets operate in cycles and that the best way to play safe is to first understand the cycle and ride on the cyclical tide.

China: Stocks Soar as Default Risks Escalates

Let us examine why global stock markets resumed a risk ON scenario this week. 

Take China, the Shanghai Composite celebrated the first week of the year of the wooden horse with a blistering 3.5% run.

Monday’s ramp was allegedly prompted by the extension of subsidies by the Chinese government to automakers[4]. Incidentally one of the beneficiaries of the extended subsidies to automakers has been BYD Co., an automaker with investments from Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. More signs that Mr. Buffett once a value investor has transformed into a political entrepreneur.

Moreover, this one week stock market blitzkrieg has partly been an offshoot to the Chinese government’s rescue of a troubled shadow banking wealth management ‘trust’ product worth 3 billion-yuan ($496 million) at the near eve of the New Year’s celebrations[5].

So prior to the New Year, the Chinese government conducted a bailout. After the New Year, the Chinese government extends a subsidy (another bailout?) to a politically privileged sector.

Yet will the two interventions be enough to stabilize China’s markets? Or will the Chinese government have to employ serial bailouts in increasing frequency in order to keep the China’s highly fragile financial markets and economic system from falling apart?

How about reports where six trust firms which has 5 billion ($826.6 million) loan portfolio to a delinquent coal company have been in danger of default[6]? The debt exposure by the six trust firms account for 67% more than the size of the one recently bailed out by the world’s largest China’s state owned bank, the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd (ICBC).

The Reuters’ report adds that another trust, Jilin Province Trust Co Ltd, with exposure to struggling coal company Shanxi Liansheng Energy Co Ltd have failed to pay off “763 million yuan in maturing high-yield investments it sold to wealthy clients of CCB (China Construction Bank)”.

Ironically this is the same coal company with which the ‘first’ bailed out trust firm has exposure to. Has Jilin Province Trust’s debt payment delinquency been in the hope for a bailout? Will other creditors with exposure to the same coal company follow suit?

So has the pre-New Year bailout of the ICBC sponsored Trust firm exposed to Shanxi Liansheng Energy, opened the Pandora’s box of the moral hazard of dependency on government life support system? Will shadow banks resort to defaults or threats of defaults in order to be bailed out? Should we expect a wave of bailouts? How will the Chinese government pay for all these?

Yes while foreign currency reserves of the Chinese government tabulates to a record high of $3.82 trillion at the close of December 2013, as proportion to shadow banking debt this represents only half of $7.5 trillion based on JP Morgan estimates[7] and one fourth if based on the estimates of the controversial former Fitch’s analyst Charlene Chu[8]

And this is just the shadow banks. Of course not every shadow banks will fail, but the point is how deep will a potential contagion be? This is some dynamic which I think no one has a clue.

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Aside from tremors from the shadow banks, private Chinese companies who lack implicit guarantees from the government have either postponed or canceled debt issuance. The Zero hedge reports[9] 9 companies who recently backed down from raising $1 billion worth of debt.

Moreover, Chinese non-performing loans (NPL) have been racing higher for the 9th consecutive quarter to the highest level since the 2008 crisis.

As you can see, the Chinese NPL experience demolishes the false notion that falling NPLs are free passes to bubbles. Credit bubbles implode from their own weight or from rising interest rates or from a reversal of confidence by lenders. In China’s case, rising NPLs are symptoms of the hissing overstretched credit bubble which has been transmitted via higher consumer price inflation and rising interest rates.

The growing risk of debt default, shrinking access to credit and rising NPLs are troubling signs of rapidly deteriorating China’s credit conditions. Yet these are signs of stability?

Even the China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has been cognizant of the growing risks of debt defaults. As quoted by Bloomberg[10]:
China’s central bank signaled that volatility in money-market interest rates will persist and borrowing costs will rise, underscoring the risk of defaults that could weigh on confidence and drag down growth.

“When the valve of liquidity starts to tame and curb excessive credit expansion, money-market rates, or the cost of liquidity, will reflect that,” the People’s Bank of China said in a Feb. 8 report. “The market needs to tolerate reasonable rate changes so that rates can be effective in allocating resources and modifying the behavior of market players.”
Meanwhile China’s banking regulator, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, in the face of rising concerns of defaults has ordered some small financial institutions to “set aside more funds to avoid a cash shortfall” according to another Bloomberg report[11].

As you can clearly see, the Chinese government has been preparing for their financial Yolanda.

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Moreover, the Chinese government dramatically infused money into the financial system last January based on the latest PBOC data where the Zero Hedge observed, “this month's broad liquidity creation was the largest monthly amount in China's history!”[12]

China’s infusion of a tsunami of liquidity, where China’s loan creation (left window) totalled $218 billion in January while total social financing (right window) spiked by $425 billion has essentially dwarfed the $75 billion by the US Federal Reserve and the $74 billion by the Bank of Japan.

Why the gush of government sponsored loan creation-total social financing in the face of rising risks of defaults? Has the Chinese government been forced to play the debt musical chairs in the recognition that a stoppage in credit inflation would extrapolate to a Black Swan event[13]

All these represents newfound stability and a conclusion to the EM sell off? All these are bullish reasons to bid up on stocks? Will ASEAN or the Philippines be immune to a potential debt implosion?

Or have the recent spurt in China’s stocks been signs of communications (public relations/ signalling channel in central bank gobbledygook) management by Chinese government aimed at creating a financial Potenkim Village in order to assuage creditors?

As risk analyst, I’d say good luck to all those who believe that “this time is different”.

US Stocks: Fed’s Janet Yellen Gives Go Signal for More Stock Market Bubble

How about US stocks?

US stocks sprinted for the two successive weeks expunging most if not all of the earlier losses. As of Friday, the S&P 500 knocks at the door of new record highs.

The melt up in US stocks began the previous week when the ECB made a “teaser” to further ease by suspending sterilization in March.

As a side note, this week the enticement for more easing came with a report the ECB has been “seriously considering” negative overnight bank deposit rates[14]. This may have also compounded on the frenzied charge by US-European stock market bulls.

Europe’s stocks have been on a blitz. But ECB’s overture for more easing reveals of the stagnation of Europe’s real economy. 

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Europe’s economic stagnation has been reflected on corporate earnings. Forward revenues of European stocks have been in a steady decline since 2012.

Ironically, European stock markets seem to see heavenly bliss from such negative streak of earnings.

Such parallel universe exhibits why this has hardly been your granddaddy’s stock markets.

Central bank policies have transformed financial markets into a loaded casino (backed by central bank PUT or implicit guarantees) where people mindlessly chase yields with the singular aim of jumping on the stock market bandwagon financed with a deluge of credit money and rationalizing such actions by shouting statistics, regardless of their relevance.

Moreover, the unimpressive US job data whetted on the speculative appetite of the Pavlovian momentum chasing crowd. 

Bad news in the real economy has been good news for Wall Street. Why? Because Wall Street expects subsidies provided by the US Federal Reserve to them, via zero bound rates and asset purchases charged to the real economy, to continue.

In terms of present policies, this implies that the Fed’s “tapering” may be truncated.

Bad news in the real economy is good news for Wall Street has been one of this week’s main theme.

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Retail sales fell most since June 2012 blamed mostly on the “bad weather”. Revised data showed that retail sales slumped also even in December but at a lesser degree[15]. So this has hardly been about bad weather or that bad weather represents a convenient rationalization for the stock market meltup.

The chart from Businessinsider reveals that core retail sales has been in a downtrend even as retail employment has been rising[16]. Yet how will a sustained fall in retail sales continue to finance retail employment?

Most importantly factory production dropped most since 2009[17] again blamed on the bad weather.

So the unexpected declines in factory output, jobs and retail sales, which not only translates to sluggish economic growth but may even reinforce on each other, have been seen as bullish for stocks by Wall Street.

This reveals how central banking policies have been driving a wedge or a gulf between the Main Street and Wall Street as evidenced by such seeming economic and social schadenfreude, where Wall Street benefit from the sufferings of the real economy. This also means more polarization or partisanship in the political sphere.

Another very significant catalyst for US stock market melt UP has been the debut testimony given by Fed Chairwoman, Ms. Janet Yellen, at the House Financial Services Committee hearing[18].

While Ms. Yellen admits that low interest rate can fuel asset bubbles, she denies that US stocks have been a bubble, where her personal sentiment sent a flurry of bid orders that powered stocks to a frenetic melt up mode.

Ms. Yellen’s admission that low interest rates serves fuel to bubbles…(bold mine)
We recognize that in an environment of low interest rates like we've had in the Unites States now for quite some time, there may be an incentive to reach for yield. We do have the potential to develop asset bubbles or a build up in leverage or rapid credit growth or other threats to financial stability. Especially given that our monetary policy is so accommodative, we are highly focused on trying to identify those threats.
Ms. Yellen’s grants a license to the US stock market bubble…
I think it's fair to say our monetary policy has had an effect of boosting asset prices. We have tried to look carefully at whether or not broad classes of asset prices suggest bubble-like activity. I have not seen that in stocks, generally speaking. Land prices, I would say, suggest a greater degree of overvaluation.
First, admit it and then deny it. Except for land prices, for Ms. Yellen “threats to financial stability” has been anything but relevant to the US. Does Ms. Yellen own a lot of stocks?

As another side note: Contra other central bankers like those from the Philippines, at least Ms Yellen acknowledges that low interest rates “may be an incentive to reach for yield” and thus “have the potential to develop asset bubbles”.

I don’t know which metrics Ms Yellen uses in valuing stocks or measuring credit growth. But the Russell 2000 at 81 price earnings ratio (!!!) as of Friday February 14th close, certainly looks like a bubble from whatever angle.

And that “potential to develop asset bubbles or a build up in leverage or rapid credit growth or other threats to financial stability” has already been present via record net margin debt, and record issuance of various types of bonds e.g. junk bonds, corporate bonds that has been used to finance equity buybacks.

Perhaps the FED may be looking at solely the credit from the banking sector. If so, then such blinders will come at a great cost. Are bonds not financial assets held by US banks?

Yet systemic build up in leverage or rapid credit has been relentless.

The latest financial engineering has been to increasingly use shadow banks via “synthetic” derivatives based on corporate bonds in the face of shrinking liquidity in the bond markets. This novel approach has been meant to hedge on assets or to bet on their performance which according to the Financial Times represents a “dramatic shift in the nature of the corporate bond market”[19].

Moreover equities have increasingly played an important role as collateral for repo trades. From a Bloomberg report[20] “Repurchase agreements, known as repos, backed by equities rose 40 percent during the year ended Jan. 10, according to Federal Reserve data. Rising equity-collateral usage combined with a slide in repos backed by government securities pushed equities share to 9.6 percent of the $1.55 trillion tri-party repo market in January, up from 5.7 percent a year earlier, Fitch said in a report published yesterday.”

This growing moneyness or liquidity yield of equities seem to play right into Mr. George Soros’ reflexivity theory[21] in that “when people are eager to borrow and the banks are willing to lend, the value of the collateral rises in a self-reinforcing manner and vice versa.”

Hence soaring stocks, which leads to increasing values of equity based collateral, feeds on the borrowing appetite of stock market participants. The latter are likely to use proceeds from such borrowing to finance even more equity purchases that would be used to obtain more credit for speculation. Such collateral-lending-price feedback loop mechanism only serves as fodder to a deeper stock market Wile E. Coyote mania.

Manias may persist for as long as return on assets outpaces the cost of servicing debt or upon the sustained confidence of creditors on the capability and willingness of borrowers to fulfil their financial obligations.

If the cost of servicing debt is measured by the actions of the US treasury markets, then we should see how the latter has recently behaved.

Yet the dramatic melt UP in stocks have translated into wild swings in the yields of 10 year UST notes.

Why? Because rising stocks based on intensifying demand for credit tends to push up on yields, while adverse main stream economic data tend to push down yields as economic uncertainty spurs concern over asset selloffs or asset “deflation”.

Yet over the week, yields of 10 year notes climbed 7 bps to 2.75%. This means that the stock market melt UP seem to have bigger influence on the UST markets than the sluggish growth data.

This also means that regardless of what the Fed does (whether they persist on tapering or Untapers) for as long as, or in the condition that the stock market (and real estate) mania persists, yields of USTs are most likely to edge up.

This seems as signs that the US inflationary boom has reached a maturation phase where available resources have not been adequate to finance bubble projects on the pipeline. The entrepreneurial cluster of errors has been based on the misplaced belief of the abundance of savings from artificially lowered interest rates. Such errors are being reflected on rising interest rates and or an up creep of inflation.

Bernanke’s QE 3.0 in September 2012 had only a 3 month impact in the suppression of yields. Since July 2012, yields of USTs trekked higher, but the upside momentum accelerated when Abenomics and the Bernanke’s “taper” was announced in the second quarter of 2013.

This also is one reason why past data can hardly be relied on. That’s because central policies have so vastly distorted the pricing mechanism that has altered the traditional functional relationship of firms, markets and the economy.

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What has driven yields of USTs down of late has been a pseudo meltdown in US stocks. While “bad news is good news” may hinder rising yields, strength in economic data will expedite the advance.

As one would note from the above overlapped charts of the yields of 10 year notes (TNX) and the S&P, over the last 9 months, there seems to be new correlation where yields of 10 year USTs decline ahead of the S&P (green rectangle). And the S&P rallies ahead of the bottoming TNX.

And rising UST yields (higher interest rates) amidst rising asset prices fuelled by massive debt expansion only exacerbates on the Wile E. Coyote momentum which eventually will lead to the Wile E. Coyote moment or what Ms. Yellen calls as “threats to financial stability”.

And all the RECORD credit inflation seems to escape the eyes of an econometric technician like Ms. Yellen who seems to think that all these operates in a vacuum.

Unfortunately blindness leads to Black Swans.














[12] Zero Hedge Spot The Real Liquidity Bubble February 15, 2014


[14] Wall Street Real Time Economic Blog ECB Considers Negative Deposit Rate February 12 2014,


[16] Businessinsider.com Something Has To Give Here February 13, 2014



[19] Financial Times Investors turn to ‘shadow’ bond market February 10, 2014


[21] George Soros The Alchemy of Finance John Wiley & Sons p 23