Phisix-ASEAN Market Volatility: Politically Induced Boom Bust Cycles

It’s hard enough for politicians to face the music, to dispense bad news, to make hard choices, allocate pain to constituencies whether it’s spending cut or tax increase. But when the Fed destroys the bond market, which is the benchmark for the whole capital market, and tells the Congress that you can borrow money for two years at eighteen basis points, which is -- as far as Washington’s concerned -- that’s a rounding error. It’s the same as free. When you’re giving that kind of signal, then there is no incentive, there’s no motivation for people to walk the plank and face down this monster of a fiscal deficit and imbalance that we have. Washington thinks you can kick the can down the road, the debt is more or less free, and we’ll get around to solving the problem. But today, let’s not make any tough choices. That’s where we are. - David Stockman

It’s the Boom Bust Cycle, Stupid

Why would global markets fall in sync in September 22^nd?

It would appear an idiotic idea to suggest that most people woke up on the wrong side of the bed and thus abruptly decided to dump equity holdings en masse.

It would also seem myopic to suggest that this has been a byproduct of liquidity trap[1], where monetary stimulus—low interest rates and an increase in money supply—had been the cause of this.

The chart above of the ASEAN markets has been emblematic of what I have been repeatedly saying long ago—the message of which has been encapsulated from my earlier remarks[2] during the bear market embers of November 2008, (bold highlights original)

The other important matter is that of the understanding of the mutually reinforcing dynamics of inflation and deflation. Deflation and inflation is like assessing the virtues of right and wrong- an ex-post measure of a previous action taken. An action and an attendant reaction. Yet, you can’t have deflation when there have been no preceding inflation. At present times, the reason government has been massively inflating is because they have been attempting to combat perceived threats of equally intense debt deflation…

Thus, reading political tea leaves seem likely a better gauge in determining how to invest in the stock markets.

Since 2009, ASEAN markets had climbed on the back of the intensive inflationism employed by global central banks mostly led by the US Federal Reserve, through its zero bound rates and asset purchases or Quantitative Easing (see black arrow).

If this has been about a global liquidity trap then obviously there would have been no antecedent boom in ASEAN or global market equities during the stated period (2009-2010).

Yet during the past quarter where the Eurozone debt crisis has escalated, exacerbated by visible signs of an economic slowdown in the US and parts of the global economy, global financial markets has been strained.

Yet financial market expectations, whom have been deeply addicted towards bailout policies, have increasingly embedded expectations of another US Federal Reserve rescue.

Such expectation had not been realized.

The Liquidity Trap Canard

Before proceeding, it is important to point out that despite the current financial market turmoil, the Eurozone has not been suffering from ‘deflation’ as a result of lack of ‘aggregate demand’.

On the contrary, the EU has exhibited symptoms of stagflation[3].

In the US, aside from exploding money supply, consumer and business loans have been materially improving.

5 year chart of Business Loans from St. Louis Federal Reserve

5 year chart of Consumer Loans from St. Louis Federal Reserve

Both charts depict that the current problem or market meltdown hasn’t been about liquidity traps.

Importantly consumer spending in the US has remained robust.

To quote Angel Martin [4]

real personal consumption expenditures have recovered from pre-recession levels. This recovery can be clearly seen in this graph, which shows quarterly data from the first quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2011.

So the recent downdraft seen in the financial markets has NOT been about liquidity traps, which has been fallaciously and deceptively peddled by some.

Politically Induced Monetary Paralysis

So what has been the market ruckus all about?

In a September speech prior to the Federal Open Meeting Committee[5] (FOMC) meeting, which decides on the setting of monetary policy, Federal Reserve chief Ben Bernanke hinted that he would consider the lengthening the duration of bond purchases and possibly include further Quantitative Easing as part of the measures to further ease credit conditions[6].

Apparently going into the FOMC meeting on September 22^nd, opponents of Bernanke’s asset purchasing program mounted a publicity assault which included several Republican legislators[7], and most importantly, even Mr. Bernanke’s predecessor Mr. Paul Volker at the New York Times[8].

Even the outcome of the FOMC meeting, where Mr. Bernanke’s telegraphed policy of manipulating the yield curve via “Operation Twist” had been formalized or announced, the decision arrived at had not been unanimous and reflected internal political divisions.

Except for the inattentive or those blinded by bias, it has been obvious that only half of what had been impliedly promised by the Mr. Bernanke became a reality.

The net result has been a global financial market jilted by Mr. Bernanke[9].

Lately, even Federal Reserve of the Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher acknowledged that their institution has been under siege “from both ends of the political spectrum”[10].

Such political impasse is not only seen in the US Federal Reserve, but also over fiscal policies in Washington, as well as, the schisms over prospective measures required to deal with debt crisis in the Eurozone. A good example has been the rebuff US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner received from the German Finance Minister[11].

This has been coined by some as ‘political paralysis’ which continues to plague the markets[12].

As proof of politically driven markets, this week’s furious rally in global markets has been bolstered by renewed expectations of bailouts, as the German parliament overwhelmingly voted to beef up their contributions to the European Financial Stability Facility bailout fund. There are still 6 of the 17 euro zone countries[13] whom will need to pass the agreement reached in July 21^st.

Rumors have also floated that IMF might expand her exposure towards Euro’s bailout to a whopping tune of $3.5 trillion[14], which means the world, including the Philippines, will be part of the rescue team to uphold and preserve the privileged status of Euro and US bankers as well as the Euro and US political class.

Yet all these seem to have helped market sentiment and partly reversed earlier losses.

The point of all of the above is to exhibit in essence, how global financial markets have been substantially dependent on policy steroids. In other words, markets have been mainly driven by politics than by economic forces or that the current state of financial markets has been highly politicized and whose price signals has been vastly distorted.

And most importantly, the latest financial market meltdown represents as convulsions over failed embedded expectations from the apparent withholding of the expansion of rescue programs from which the financial markets have been operating on.

To analogize, today’s jittery volatile markets are manifestations of what is usually called as ‘withdrawal syndromes’ or symptoms of distress or discomfort from a discontinuation of a frequented or regularized activity.

In addition, financial markets appear to be blasé on merely promises, and seem to be craving for concrete actions accompanied by “big package approach[15]” from global policymakers. In short, policymakers will have to positively surprise the markets with even larger dosages of bailouts.

Non-Recession Bear Markets

I would like to further point out that it is not a necessary condition where recessions presage bear markets.

While some global equity indices have broken into bear market territory[16], the US and ASEAN markets have not yet reached the 20% loss threshold levels enough to be classified as bear markets.

Bear markets occur mainly because of political actions that creates boom bust conditions. This has been the case of China and Bangladesh[17].

The US has also experienced TWO non-recession bear markets.

The first instance was in 1962 which was known as the Kennedy Slide[18] where the S&P fell 22.5%.

Ironically the Kennedy Slide coincided with the failed original experiment of Operation Twist in 1961, as Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack wrote in a 2004 paper[19],

Operation Twist does not seem to provide strong evidence in either direction as to the possible effects of changes in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet.

Except that the authors thought that the limits to the size had been responsible for this policy inadequacy, and Ben Bernanke today is conducting this experiment in a very large scale.

The Kennedy Slide’s boom phase appears to be triggered by the dramatic lowering of interest rates following the recession of 1960-61.

The bear market turned out to be short lived as the S & P 500 had fully recovered in a about a year later.

The second non-recession bear market is the notorious Black Monday Crash of October 1987.

The expansionary policies of the Plaza Accord[20] which represented coordinated moves by major developed economies to depreciate the US dollar, fuelled a boom bust cycle which eventually paved way for the lurid global one day crash.

As the great Murray N. Rothbard wrote[21],

To put it simply: the reason for the crash was the credit boom generated by the double-digit monetary expansion engineered by the Fed in the last several years. For a few years, as always happens in Phase I of an inflation, prices went up less than the monetary inflation. This, the typical euphoric phase of inflation, was the "Reagan miracle" of cheap and abundant money, accompanied by moderate price increases.

By 1986, the main factors that had offset the monetary inflation and kept prices relatively low (the unusually high dollar and the OPEC collapse) had worked their way through the price system and disappeared. The next inevitable step was the return and acceleration of price inflation; inflation rose from about 1% in 1986 to about 5 % in 1987.

As a result, with the market sensitive to and expecting eventual reacceleration of inflation, interest rates began to rise sharply in 1987. Once interest rates rose (which had little or nothing to do with the budget deficit), a stock market crash was inevitable. The previous stock market boom had been built on the shaky foundation of the low interest rates from 1982 on.

The crash had been a worldwide phenomenon according to the Wikipedia.org[22]

By the end of October, stock markets in Hong Kong had fallen 45.5%, Australia 41.8%, Spain 31%, the United Kingdom 26.45%, the United States 22.68%, and Canada 22.5%. New Zealand's market was hit especially hard, falling about 60% from its 1987 peak, and taking several years to recover. (The terms Black Monday and Black Tuesday are also applied to October 28 and 29, 1929, which occurred after Black Thursday on October 24, which started the Stock Market Crash of 1929. In Australia and New Zealand the 1987 crash is also referred to as Black Tuesday because of the timezone difference.) The Black Monday decline was the largest one-day percentage decline in the Dow Jones. (Saturday, December 12, 1914, is sometimes erroneously cited as the largest one-day percentage decline of the DJIA. In reality, the ostensible decline of 24.39% was created retroactively by a redefinition of the DJIA in 1916.)

Yet many experts had been misled by the false signal from the flash crash to predict a recession, again from the same Wikipedia article,

Following the stock market crash, a group of 33 eminent economists from various nations met in Washington, D.C. in December 1987, and collectively predicted that “the next few years could be the most troubled since the 1930s”. However, the DJIA was positive for the 1987 calendar year. It opened on January 2, 1987, at 1,897 points and would close on December 31, 1987, at 1,939 points. The DJIA did not regain its August 25, 1987 closing high of 2,722 points until almost two years later.

And in typical fashion, central banks intuitively reacted to crash by pumping mass amounts of liquidity into the system[23].

It took 2 years for the S&P to return to its pre-crash level.

The non-recession bear markets reveal that in the case of the US, such an occurrence would likely be shallow and the recovery could be swift.

But it would different story in China as the Chinese government continues to battle with the unintended effects of their policies which has spilled over to the real estate or property markets. Apparently, China’s tightening policy drove money away from the stock market, which continues to drift near at September 2009 lows, but shifted them into the real estate sector.

In short, like the crisis afflicted West, the current depressed state of China’s stock market signifies as an extension of the bubble bust saga which crested in October 2007, a year ahead of the Lehman episode. China’s cycle remains unresolved.

Should the US equity markets suffer from a technical bear market arising from the current stalemate in Federal Reserve policies, but for as long as a recession won’t transpire from the current market distress, then the downside may be mitigated.

So far, the risk for a US recession has not been that strong and convincing as shown by the above recovery in lending.

Conclusion: Navigating Turbulent Waters Prudently

And as I concluded two weeks ago[24],

I would certainly watch the US Federal Reserve’s announcement and the ensuing market response.

If team Bernake will commence on a third series of QE (dependent on the size) or a cut in the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER), I would be aggressively bullish with the equity markets, not because of conventional fundamentals, but because massive doses of money injections will have to flow somewhere. Equity markets—particulary in Asia and the commodity markets will likely be major beneficiaries.

As a caveat, with markets being sustained by policy steroids, expect sharp volatilities in both directions.

The point of the above was that my expectations had conditionally been aligned to the clues presented by Ben Bernanke of putting into action further bailouts which apparently did not occur.

And since Mr. Ben Bernanke appears to be politically constrained to institute his preferred policies, it is my impression that he would be holding the financial markets hostage until political opposition to his policies would diminish that should pave way for QE3.0. This means that the balance of risks, in my view, have now been tilted towards the downside unless proven otherwise.

Remember, it has been a dogma of his that the elixir to US economy emanates from asset value determined ‘wealth effect’ spending via the transmission mechanism which he calls the Financial Accelerator[25]

To quote the BCA Research[26],

But until QE3 is credibly articulated by Bernanke, there could be more downside for risky assets and further upside for the dollar.

And converse to my abovestated condition or premises, and because I practice what I preach, I materially decreased exposure in the local markets, as I await further guidance from the actions of policymakers.

Although I still maintain a bullish bias, in order to play safe, I would presume a worst case scenario—current global bear markets are signifying a recession—as the dominant forces in operation.

It’s easy to falsify the worst case scenario with incoming policy actions, data and unfolding market events.

Alternatively, this means that for as long as a non-recession scenario becomes evident then it would be easy to position incrementally, hopefully with limited downside risks.

In other words, for as long as there remains no clarity in the policy stance, I see heightened uncertainty as governing the markets. Thus I would need to see the blanc de l'oeil or the French idiom for seeing ‘the white of their eyes’ before taking my shots.

Bottom line: In the understanding that incumbent markets have been driven by politics, reading political tea leaves or the causal realist approach will remain as my principal fundamental analytical methodology in ascertaining my degree of market level risk-reward exposure.

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[1] Wikipedia.org Liquidity trap

[2] See Stock Market Investing: Will Reading Political Tea Leaves Be A Better Gauge?, November 30, 2008

[3] See Stagflation, NOT DEFLATION, in the Eurozone, October 1, 2011

[4] Martin Angel The Stagnant U.S. Economy: A Graphical Complement to Higgs’s Contributions, Independent.org, September 23, 2011

[5] US Federal Reserve Federal Open Market Committee

[6] See US Mulls ‘official’ QE 3.0, Operation Twist AND Fiscal Stimulus, September 9, 2011

[7] Yahoo News Republican lawmakers warn Federal Reserve against action on economy, September 21, 2011

[8] See Paul Volker Swings at Ben Bernanke on Inflationism, September 20, 2011

[9] See Bernanke Jilts Markets on Steroids, Suffers Violent Withdrawal Symptoms, September 22, 2011

[10] Bloomberg.com Fisher Says Central Bank Is Under Attack From Ron Paul, Barney Frank, September 28, 2011

[11] See German Minister Calls Tim Geithner’s Bailout Plan ‘Stupid’, September 28, 2011

[12] New York Times, Stocks Decline a Day After Fed Sets Latest Stimulus Measure, September 23, 2011

[13] New York Times, Germany Approves Bailout Expansion, Leaving Slovakia as Main Hurdle, September 29, 2011

[14] See Will IMF’s bailout of Euro Reach $ 3.5 trillion? September 30, 2011

[15] Johnson Simon What Would It Take to Save Europe?, New York Times September 29, 2011

[16] Bloomberg.com Global Stocks Drop 20% Into Bear Market as Debt Crisis Outweighs Profits, September 23, 2011

[17] See Can Bear Markets happen outside a Recession? China’s Shanghai and Bangladesh’s Dhaka Indices October 1, 2011

[18] Wikipedia.org Kennedy Slide of 1962

[19]Bernanke Ben S., Reinhart Vincent R., and Sack Brian P. Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment, 2004 US Federal Reserve

[20] Wikipedia.org Plaza Accord

[21] Rothbard, Murray N. Nine Myths About The Crash, Making Economic Sense Mises.org

[22] Wikipedia.org Black Monday (1987)

[23] Lyons Gerard, Discovering if we learnt the lessons of Black Monday, thetimesonline.co.uk, October 19, 2009

[24] See Definitely Not a Reprise of 2008, Phisix-ASEAN Equities Still in Consolidation, September 18, 2011

[25] Bernanke Ben S. The Financial Accelerator and the Credit Channel, June 15, 2007 US Federal Reserve

[26] BCA Research U.S. Dollar: Waiting For More Policy Action, September 27, 2011

Bernanke Jilts Markets on Steroids, Suffers Violent Withdrawal Symptoms

Despite my current circumstances, I felt the compulsion to offer a reaction on today’s market meltdown.

Here is what I recently wrote,

I would certainly watch the US Federal Reserve’s announcement and the ensuing market response.

If team Bernake will commence on a third series of QE (dependent on the size) or a cut in the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER), I would be aggressively bullish with the equity markets, not because of conventional fundamentals, but because massive doses of money injections will have to flow somewhere. Equity markets—particulary in Asia and the commodity markets will likely be major beneficiaries.

As a caveat, with markets being sustained by policy steroids, expect sharp volatilities in both directions.

Obviously the market’s response on team Bernanke’s failure to deliver on what had been expected has apparently been violent.

The Philippine Phisix (chart from technistock.net), as well as ASEAN equity markets, has basically suffered the same degree of bloodbath relative to her developed economy equity market peers

This reaction from a market participant captures the underlying sentiment. From a Bloomberg article

“This is not likely to provide any significant stimulus,” said Jason Schenker, president of Prestige Economics LLC in Austin, Texas. “The market really needed a boost of confidence. There is no confidence from this.”

So what did the Mr. Bernanke deliver?

Again from the same article at Bloomberg

The Federal Reserve will replace $400 billion of short-term debt in its portfolio with longer- term Treasuries in an effort to reduce borrowing costs further and counter rising risks of a recession.

The central bank will buy securities with maturities of six to 30 years through June while selling an equal amount of debt maturing in three years or less, the Federal Open Market Committee said today in Washington after a two-day meeting. The action “should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative,” the FOMC said.

Chairman Ben S. Bernanke expanded use of unconventional monetary tools for a second straight meeting after job gains stalled and the government lowered its estimate of second- quarter growth. Yields on 30-year Treasuries fell below 3 percent for the first time since 2009 and U.S. stocks had their biggest drop in a month on the Fed’s plan, dubbed “Operation Twist” after a similar Fed action in 1961.

The twist, as earlier stated, has been telegraphed. What was not expected has been the non-appearance of Bernanke’s QE which resulted to today’s convulsions.

The ‘twist’ which essentially attempts to flatten the yield curve basically reduces the banking system’s profitability from the borrow short and lend long (maturity transformation) platform that has partly catalyzed these selloffs.

From the Wall Street Journal

But for bankers, who are already struggling with low interest rates on loans and tepid loan demand, the twist option could further dent already-weakened profits. That is because lower long-term interest rates would result in contracting net interest margins for banks—essentially, the profit margin in the lending business—at a time when their revenue is growing slowly, if at all. Banks would earn less on loans and investments, and might end up making fewer loans as well.

"Ouch" is how one executive at a big retail bank described the prospect of Operation Twist. (Bankers typically don't publicly comment on Fed policy given the central bank's role as a bank regulator.)

Austrian Economist Bob Wenzel says that Operation Twist represents a failed experiment…

So how did the original Operation Twist turn out? Three Federal Reserve economists in 2004 completed a study which, in part, examined the 1960's Operation Twist. Their conclusion (My bold):

“A second well-known historical episode involving the attempted manipulation of the term structure was so-called Operation Twist. Launched in early 1961 by the incoming Kennedy Administration, Operation Twist was intended to raise short-term rates (thereby promoting capital inflows and supporting the dollar) while lowering, or at least not raising, long-term rates. (Modigliani and Sutch 1966).... The two main actions of Operation Twist were the use of Federal Reserve open market operations and Treasury debt management operations.. Operation Twist is widely viewed today as having been a failure, largely due to classic work by Modigliani and Sutch.”

The economists go on to state that the size of Operation Twist was relatively small, possibly too small to determine if such an operation could be successful if carried out at on a larger scale. That experiment is now being conducted on the economy of the United States with the $400 billion Operation Twist announced today. How big was the original Operation Twist? $8.8 billion.

The three Fed economists, who seem to concur that the first Operation Twist was a failure, are sure going to get an experiment on the United States economy on a much grander scale to see if this time it will work different than it did the first time. So who are these three lucky Fed economists who are now going to be able to witness Operation Twist on a grander scale? Vincent R. Reinhart, Brian P. Sack and BEN S. BERNANKE.

So part of the market’s virulent reaction signifies a revolt on Bernanke’s experimental policy. This is an example of how interventionist measures prompts for heightened uncertainties.

The Fed also promised to support mortgage markets by keeping the interest low. Again from the same Bloomberg article,

The central bank said today it will also reinvest maturing housing debt into mortgage-backed securities instead of Treasuries “to help support conditions in mortgage markets.”

Yields on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage securities that guide U.S. home-loan rates tumbled the most in more than two years relative to Treasuries. The average rate on a typical 30-year fixed loan fell to a record low 4.09 percent last week.

So why has Bernanke failed to live up with the expectations for more QE?

Like in the Eurozone, there has been mounting opposition to Bernanke’s inflationist bailout policies as seen by a divided FOMC… (same Bloomberg article)

The FOMC vote was 7-3. Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota and Charles Plosser of the Philadelphia Fed voted against the FOMC decision for a second consecutive meeting. They “did not support additional policy accommodation at this time,” the Fed statement said today.

…and from some Republicans who mostly recently who made public representations against further QEs.

Republican lawmakers including Boehner and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell urged Bernanke in a letter this week to refrain from additional monetary easing to avoid “further harm” to the economy.

This is aside from political pressures applied by his predecessor, Paul Volker

In my view, Chairman Ben Bernanke could be:

-trying to lay the blame of policy restraints at the foot of his opponents in the recognition that markets would behave viciously from a stimulus dependent ‘withdrawal syndrome’, or

-that his penchant for grand experiments made him deliberately withhold QE to see how the markets would respond to his innovative ‘delusion of grandeur’ measures.

By withdrawal, I don’t mean a reduction of the Fed’s balance sheet, which the Fed aims to maintain (which probably would incrementally expand on a less evident scale) but from further specifically targeted asset purchases. The ‘twist’ essentially sterilizes the operation which means no money supply growth.

Today’s brutal reaction in global financial markets essentially validates my view that the contemporaneous market has been built on boom bust policies such that NOT even gold prices has been spared.

The tight correlations in the collapsing prices of equities and commodities as well as the rising dollar (falling global currencies) are manifestations of a bust process at work.

The primary issue here is that in absence of government’s backing via assorted stimulus, mostly via monetary injections, artificially established price structures from government stimulus or from credit expansion unravels.

Only when the tide goes out, to paraphrase Warren Buffett, do we know who has been swimming naked.

Or as Austrian economist George Reisman writes,

A fundamental fact is that our present monetary system is characterized both by irredeemable paper money, i.e., fiat money, and by credit expansion. There is no limit to the quantity of fiat money that can be created. This is the foundation for potentially limitless inflation and the ultimate destruction of the paper money, when the point is reached that it loses value so fast that no one will accept it any longer. The fact that our monetary system is also characterized by credit expansion is what creates the potential for massive deflation — for deflation to the point of wiping out the far greater part of the money supply, which in the conditions of the last centuries has been brought into existence through the mechanism of credit expansion

Phisix-ASEAN Outperformance Despite Global Meltdown

Real knowledge is to know the extent of one's ignorance.– Confucius

This week’s global market rout puts into perspective the issue of ‘decoupling’ vis-à-vis divergence.

As I previously wrote[1],

So it is unclear whether ASEAN and the Phisix would function as an alternative haven, which if such trend continues or deepens, could lead to a ‘decoupling’ dynamic, or will eventually converge with the rest. The latter means that either global equity markets could recover soon—from the aftermath of the Greece (or PIIGS) bailout and the imminent ratification of the raising the US debt ceiling—or that if the declines become sustained or magnified, the ASEAN region eventually tumbles along with them. My bet is on the former.

Therefore, I would caution any interpretation of the current skewness of global equity market actions to imply ‘decoupling’. As I have been saying, the decoupling thesis can only be validated during a crisis.

The bloody losses of this week had been distinct. On a regional basis they ranged as follows: in the Americas 5-9%, in the Eurozone 8-11% and in Asia 5-9%.

The ASEAN-4 rubric seems to have been likewise influenced by the bloodbath, but on a substantially lesser degree (see lower window).

The Philippine Phisix was down 1.47%, but the bulk the week’s decline was accounted for by Friday’s (-1.42%) loss. In other words, the Phisix traded in the neutral zone prior to the reaction to the global equity market crash on Friday.

While Indonesia’s JCI endured the most losses (-5.06%) in the region, followed by Thailand’s SET (3.54%) [see Bloomberg chart upper window], these two neighboring bourses has outperformed the Phisix and Malaysia’s KLSE when seen from the year to date chart. The KLSE on the other hand, had been on a downside streak since early July.

So the lion’s share of the region’s losses, particularly Indonesia -4.86%, Thailand 2.73% and Malaysia -1.45%, also came during the meltdown contagion on the ASEAN-4 last Friday.

In short, prior to Friday’s meltdown, the region was essentially trading neutral (Malaysia, Philippines) to slightly lower (Thailand, Indonesia).

I construe such actions as mainly profit taking, the degree of which ran parallel to the previous gains. Notice that the pecking order of losses mirrors the ranking of best performers.

And importantly, this week’s regional action can be seen in the light of an expression of sympathy to the world.

While this provides little validation of ‘decoupling’ dynamics in the face of a crisis, this week’s significant outperformance presented some evidence to the alternative haven theme in favor of ASEAN bourses. This will likely hold true in absence of sharp volatility.

I’d further posit that losses weighed more on the region’s currencies than the equity markets in terms of relative market scale. The Peso’s 1.04% fall signifies a much larger loss for the Phisix than last week’s 1.47%.

During the last bear market, for every 1% loss suffered by the Peso, the Phisix fell 2.3%. In addition, during the stated period, the Peso had a 5 month time lag to the cratering Phisix. Of course, this has NOT BEEN an established bear market. So there is no need to freak-out.

One would further note that outflows based on net daily foreign trade (averaged on a weekly basis) has been marginal, despite the global market thrashing. Friday’s activities posted a net Php 99 million pesos of outflows.

The falling Peso in reaction to the selloff could have emanated more from the actions of the locals than from foreigners. Local market participants seem to have been hardwired to the misguided perception that US dollar will continue to serve as a safe haven currency.

The previous bearmarket (2007-2008) saw massive foreign selling. Yet this has not been the case today.

Moreover, Friday’s global meltdown had been broadbased, and featured a bear market breadth where decliners trounced advancers by 134 issues. The last time we had the same magnitude of losses was in January 22, 2008 where declining issues predominated the trading session by 144.

Friday’s action could be representative of an emotionally hijacked market. It may or may not highlight a continuation.

Again computed for the weekly averages, the advance decline spread has not even reached the level of deterioration from the losses which occurred during Arab Spring-Japan Triple Whammy shakeout. And this goes with average total traded issues which also remain significantly above the February-March lows.

Bottom line:

The Phisix and the ASEAN-4 bourses have not been unscathed by the brutal global equity market meltdown.

However, excluding Friday’s emotionally charged fallout and despite the weak performances of developed economy bourses during the week, the Phisix and ASEAN bourses has managed to keep afloat and has even demonstrated significant signs of relative strength, signs that could attract more divergent market activities in a non recessionary setting.

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[1] See The Phisix-ASEAN Alpha Play, July 31, 2011

Graphic: 7 (+1) Ingredients That Led To Today's Financial Crisis

Interesting graphic on the anatomy of today's crisis [hat tip: Barry Ritholtz/wallstats.com]

I'd like to add an 8th variable; policies and regulations that has skewed the public's incentives towards the bubble.

As Tyler Cowen wrote in the New York Times, ``And legislation that has been on the books for years — like the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and the Community Reinvestment Act — helped to encourage the proliferation of high-risk mortgage loans. Perhaps the biggest long-term distortion in the housing market came from the tax code: the longstanding deduction for mortgage interest, which encouraged overinvestment in real estate.

``In short, there was plenty of regulation — yet much of it made the problem worse. These laws and institutions should have reined in bank risk while encouraging financial transparency, but did not. This deficiency — not a conscientious laissez-faire policy — is where the Bush administration went wrong."

To add, this from Arnold Kling of Econlib, ``Our high corporate tax rate, along with the deductibility of interest for corporations, encourages corporations to look for ways to minimize equity financing. For individuals, government-subsidized mortgages and the tax deductibility of mortgage interest help to encourage over-leveraging."

Markets and Inequality: What Goes Up Must Come Down?

In our October’s Spreading the Wealth? Market IS Doing It! we averred that falling markets have been reducing the net worth of the richest. This has possibly been closing much of the controversial “inequality” gap.

We’ve got some interesting charts from the Economist….

Fabulous "inflationary" driven booms almost equal horrendous "deflationary" bust.

According to the Economist, ``INVESTORS are told that the value of their shares may go down as well as up. Rarely, however, do they plummet as far as they did in 2008. The total return of the S&P 500 index fell by nearly 40% last year, the second-worst performance by America's stockmarket since 1825, according to calculations by Value Square, a Belgian asset-management firm. Comparisons to the Depression are clear: only in 1931 and 1937 were there similarly abysmal losses. The firm looked at various predecessors of the S&P 500 from 1923 onwards, and for earlier years took data from a working paper by Yale Management School on the returns of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Since 1825, 129 years saw rising returns, whereas 55 suffered falls—four of them in this century.”

And since stock market exposure is highest with those from the upper income strata….

Courtesy of Investment Company Institute

Apparently falling markets hurt them more, where according to the Economist,

``Over a third of American millionaire households said they lost at least 30% of their net worth since September, according to a new report by Spectrem Group, a financial consultancy. Property, mutual funds, shares and annuities took the biggest knocks. Unsurprisingly, financial advisors are under more scrutiny, with satisfaction levels falling from 60% earlier in the year to 40%. A majority of the wealthy say they may not be able to support their lifestyles and nearly 20% will delay retirement.”

Liberals must be enjoying these…

The US Mortgage Crisis Taxpayer Tab: $4.28 TRILLION and counting…

In the face of this crisis, how much money has the US government thrown to “save the system” so far?

CNBC has this tabulation…

``Try $4.28 trillion dollars. That's $4,284,500,000,000 and more than what was spent on WW II, if adjusted for inflation, based on our computations from a variety of estimates and sources.”

Incredible. $4.28 trillion +++ as the days go by! And that's about 30% of the US GDP.

Makes you wonder who's gonna pay for all these and how one can be bullish on the US dollar, except when considering the recent spate of the deleveraging process-which is a short term dynamic.

Table below as of November 18, are CNBC’s estimates (see article)…

Great stuff from CNBC

Also, CNBC made a nifty comparison of how this bill has dwarfed the other major taxpayer programs in the past as shown through this slideshow.

Here are 3 of the ten, courtesy of CNBC.

World War II

Original Cost: $288 billion

Inflation Adjusted Cost: $3.6 trillion

NASA (Cumulative)

Original Cost: $416.7 billion

Inflation Adjusted Cost: $851.2 billion

Vietnam War

Original Cost: $111 billion

Inflation Adjusted Cost: $698 billion

(Pictured: Pres. Lyndon Johnson and Sen. Richard Russell)

Check CNBC slideshow for the write up and the rest of the other largest taxpayer bill

(Hat Tip: Mr. C. McCarty)

The Icelandic Drama in Video

In our previous post, Iceland, the Next Zimbabwe? A “Riches To Rags” Tale?, we pointed out how the global financial crisis has prompted Iceland's sudden transformation from a rich country to one mired with extreme financial difficulties.

Naturally economic difficulties will always be vented through politics, as this video courtesy of Wall Street Journal shows..

Watching For A Bottoming Confirmation

``For October 10 to be the bottom it is necessary for the sequence to continue. We believe that it will but to raise confidence we need to witness the proof of more credit spreads tightening and bonds rallying. So the best answer we can give today is, it’s likely October 10 was a bottom but it is also too soon to say decisively yes. We will position accounts as if it is the bottom and we will be vigilant and reverse those positions if we see a reason to do so. The Ned Davis database offers some help. They measure 42 global stock markets; all made new lows in recent days before their rallies. All declines qualify as “bear” markets. 11 of their 12 bottoming indicators have reached extremes that suggest October 10 was the bottom. Retests of those lows have been on declining volume; that is a good sign. Breadth indicators suggest it was a bottom. There are many more pieces of evidence in favor of the October 10 bottom conclusion. I will stop listing here.”-David Kotok, Cumberland Advisors, Tinker to Evers to Chance

The global stock markets have remarkably rallied from the lows of last week. But one curious development is that while the many measures of credit stresses seem to be narrowing (see Credit Spreads: Some Improvements But Not Enough), US mortgages appear to be inching higher. These extrapolate to the still significant economic risks to the US economy.

From market action perspective, the present rally could be construed as merely a bounce off from the latest lows than to imply of a BOTTOM yet.

Besides the rollercoaster market action suggests of a mixed message, while we see some semblance of history possibly repeating itself by a significant recoil from its lows typical of the 1973-1974 bear market bottom, the market volatility of over 4% swings in a day seem reminiscent of the actions of the great depressions (see Global Markets: A Wild, Wild October!).

Markets seem to have already priced in the outcome of the US presidential elections considering the tremendous gaps in survey polls and prediction markets months going into November. And as we have stated earlier, the bear markets and deteriorating economic conditions may have even induced the Americans to embrace the opposition as alternative or as a vote against the present administration than for the opposition (Remember, Republican Senator John McCain grabbed the lead from Senator Barack Obama in August-to suggest that it wasn’t totally dominated by the latter-until the US stock markets melted following the Lehman bankruptcy). It now seems likely that the outcome of the Presidential election will be a lopsided affair infavor of the Democrats.

Unless we are considering a return to a new millennium version of the Great Depression, the main focus will be on how the new US president will deal with the woes of US and global markets and the US banking system.

And our guess is that the US markets should probably be in the process of forming a bottom, as they may already have factored in much of the ongoing but unofficially declared recession in the US and elsewhere.

Figure 3: US Global /Credit Suisse: Market Performance During Recessions

The steep drop to the previous recession levels probably points to a possible bottoming out formation in figure 3, albeit we would like to see lesser intraday volatility swings to accompany the coming sessions as a sign of stabilization.

Frank Holmes of US Global Investors also notes of the large chunk of institutional cash waiting at a sidelines as potential drivers of a recovery in the market. But this would actually depend on the scale of losses that has already been priced in, meaning that if there will be less degree of forcible liquidations, then markets may attempt to gradually regain its confidence levels.