Saturday, February 14, 2015

JGB Watch: Cracks in the JGB Bubble? Yields Spike Across the Curve!

Very interesting turn of events in Japan’s sovereign debt markets last week…

From Nikkei Asia: (bold mine)
The yield on newly issued 10-year JGBs touched a two-month high Friday, driving the yen higher against the dollar on the one hand and putting a damper on stocks on the other.

The benchmark yield has been climbing since Jan. 20, when it hit a record low of 0.195%. Growing market skepticism over the Bank of Japan's quantitative easing policy is cited as a major reason.

A Ministry of Finance auction of five-year JGBs proved lackluster Friday, with the bid amount dropping to the lowest level since April 2013. JGB sell-offs ensued after the auction, and the long rate surged 3.5 basis points at one point to 0.435%.

Bond uncertainty is rippling through other financial markets. The Japanese currency swung around 0.5 yen higher against the greenback at one point in Friday trading, while the Nikkei Stock Average's slide picked up speed.

An interest rate spike calls for skepticism over the effectiveness of the BOJ's monetary policy," said Minoru Uchida of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ. "With no additional easing on the radar, the weak-yen scenario backed by easy money is losing ground."
First of all, we can do away with the negative spin that recent actions by the JGB has been a “damper on stocks”.

For the week, the Nikkei has been up 1.5% and the Topix 2.27%. Year to date, as of Friday’s close, both equity bellwethers have been up 2.65% and 2.97% respectively

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Also we can do away the claim that “Bond uncertainty is rippling through other financial markets”. That’s because Europe and US stock markets are at record levels while as much 16% of global bond markets have been negative yielding according to the Wall Street Journal Money Beat Blog

As for negative bond yields, we have come point where savers and lenders even pay borrowers to lend money!

With credit risk priced out of existence, it’s a sign of a massive breakdown of incentives undergirding the current global financial markets. It’s now about borrow, borrow, borrow and spend spend spend!

With savings and production sidelined, all the rest of growth statistics have transformed into smoke and mirrors!

But there is another potential reaction from negative yields, which has not been in the radar screens of policymakers…cash hoarding! Some dynamic we are likely to see in the future.

Back to the uncertainty effect of JGBs. The yen was up this week against the US dollar by about .3% this week. Where destruction of the currency has been seen as a benefit, then a rising yen may have been perceived as part of “uncertainty”


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10 year JGB yields have been on the upside since a month ago as shown in the chart from Investing.com. So this has little to do about a rippling effect…so far.

And rising yield has been across the yield curve 1, 2 and 3 year (they had been at the negative zone last month but has now moved into the positive), the  5 year 7 year, 9 year, 15 year, 20 year, 30 year and 40 year have all resembled the 10 year (as seen from a 1 year perspective). So milestone high stocks comes in the face of a bond market selloff!

But aren’t JGBs supposedly an example of “we owe it to ourselves”? 

The unstated purpose of Abenomics  has been to vanquish interest rates, which should lower debt servicing cost thereby buying time for the Japanese government to manage her increasingly untenable debt levels. Another undeclared purpose has been to inflate away her debts.

Unfortunately, what seems may not turn out as reality.

The lackluster demand for the 5 year JGBs auction which added to the surge in yields last week, and where rising yields again has been a one month dynamic, exposes on the myth that government debt is a free lunch. JGBs are sensitive to the markets after all!

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The share of JGBs held by the Bank of Japan via Abenomics has now risen to 25%.

According to Japan Macro Advisors: In terms of the BoJ's market share in the JGB market, it renewed its new peak. In January 2015, the BoJ owned 25.6% of the JGB market, measured in value, and 20.9% measured in aggregate duration risk. We expect BoJ's market share will exceed 30% by the end of 2015, and approach 40% by the end of 2016.

So by siphoning liquidity out of the JGB markets, the ramifications of BoJ’s actions has been to increase volatility. Such volatility has emerged in the form of reduced demand for JGBs that has spiked yields. Current events may signify as the unintended long term consequences from the BoJs inflationary policies.

As far back during November 2013, I quoted a market participant who called the end of the JGB market: “The JGB market is dead with only the BOJ driving bond prices...These low yields are responsible for the lack of fiscal reform in the face of Japan’s worsening finances. Policy makers think they can keep borrowing without problems.”

I have also warned in the past that not only has the BoJ sucked liquidity out of the system, and not only has QE broken the price discovery mechanism of the JGBs by skewering the incentives of the marketplace, importantly there will be other implicit effects via the banking and financial system: “Such massive misalignment in the JGB markets entails magnified unseen risks in Japan’s banking and financial system who owns a bigger share of JGBs. And the possible channels for these could cover collateral, capital adequacy and more…

Thus JGBs have been a ticking time bomb (which I previously called this a potential Black Swan).

Finally the article above has a a striking quote from a market participant: “An interest rate spike calls for skepticism over the effectiveness of the BOJ's monetary policy”

Has the BOJ been losing credibility? Have markets been embolden to fight or defy them? Has rising yields represented a “short” on the BoJ? Are these signs of a possible inflection point? If so, will this spillover to the other major financial markets?

Hmmmm. We will see.

Friday, February 13, 2015

My Son’s Art Blog: The Harmony of Painting

My youngest son has a penchant for art, so he has recently opened a blog to publish his portfolio.

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His latest the “Red Petals” has been intended for Valentine’s Day.

If you are interested with paintings, pls do drop by my son’s blog: The Harmony of Painting

Thanks.

yours in liberty

Benson

China’s Xiconomics: The Comeback of State (and Crony) Capitalism

I haven’t been actively posting lately as I have been shopping mall hopping and writing private my observations to my clients.

Anyway, in the past, I have been a skeptic on the trumpeted liberalization reforms by the Chinese government. For instance, I wrote then, “However, implementation will mark the difference from rhetoric”

Also I have been saying that the so-called anti-corruption campaign has been nothing more than consolidation of power by the incumbent government by jettisoning the old political order: “anti corruption campaings have usually been euphemism for or disguise on political persecution”

The Chinese government has been exhibiting a multitude of actions that have been  anti-market; as I recently noted:  “The Chinese government has launched “targeted easing” last June, has resorted to selective bailouts of firms which almost defaulted last July, imposed price controls on stock market IPOs last August, injected $125 billion over the last two months and announced the schedule of the Hong Kong-Shanghai stock market link on November 17, 2014”

I also noted then that current statistical growth targets have been channeled through state owned enterprises: “And part of the Chinese government’s selective bailout on the economy has been to use State Owned Enterprises to take on the slack abandoned by private developers, take for instance current developments in Guangzhou, where “China's state-backed developers are making unprecedented investments in Guangzhou, as the private firms that have dominated the wealthy southern city for decades grapple with tight liquidity and Beijing's corruption crackdown. The waning fortunes of the "Guangzhou Five Tigers" - the city's big private developers - are giving state-owned enterprises the chance to muscle in on one of China's most prestigious property markets for the first time.

I guess all these have become so obvious that the mainstream has seen it too.

From Nikkei Asia (bold mine)
As Beijing's deeper involvement in economic affairs suggests, pundits were wrong to assume that Chinese leadership would let market forces transform the country's economy. On the contrary, China seems eager to leverage the scale of its government-owned enterprises to snag lucrative orders overseas.

China CNR's ascent is a case in point. The company said on Jan. 26 that it signed a 4.11 billion yuan ($660 million) contract to supply railway cars to Boston's subway system. Japan's Kawasaki Heavy Industries also bid for the U.S. contract, but could not compete against the low price offered by the Chinese rival.

Under Beijing's approval, state-controlled China CNR struck a deal to merge with another state-owned rival, CSR. The merged entity, which will effectively control the domestic market, will dwarf its global competitors in sales. Armed with its massive scale, the new company is expected to bid for a high-speed railway project in California.
The comeback of state and crony capitalism
At a meeting held in January, Premier Li Keqiang made clear the government's intent to help infrastructure-related companies land order overseas. In fact, Li has been jetting around the world promoting China's high-speed rail systems, nuclear power plants and other infrastructure.

Li was a leading advocate of economic reform based on market principles. Overseas news media dubbed his vision of market-led economic growth "Liconomics." Judging by the premier's recent comments and actions, however, the policy to unleash more market forces has been wound back.

During the third plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, in autumn 2013, leaders agreed on a plan to tap the power of the private sector to reform an economic system centering the government and state-run enterprises. The centerpiece of this reform was to bring private competition into areas dominated by state-owned companies.

But in reality, Beijing has been allowing the birth of bloated state-owned enterprises through mergers.
What seems isn’t what has been. 
It was initially believed that Xi shared the same reform-minded vision as Li. The president's crusade against corruption had been interpreted as part of reform efforts. By getting rid of vested interests within state-owned enterprises, especially in the oil, electricity and coal industries, Xi has also weakened political rivals who draw power from those businesses. This gives the president more power to dismantle state-owned monopolies and pave the way for reforms, or so the thinking went.

That Beijing has been allowing large state-owned corporations to combine and become even bigger, however, suggests that was not his intention at all. It seems Xi's economic policy is more aligned with his oft-stated vision of realizing the great revival of the Chinese people, rather than introducing more market forces.

Instead of privatizing state enterprises and pursuing higher productivity, Xi appears to be aiming to expand China's influence in the world. If this in fact is his vision, "Xiconomics," in essence, is about using state capitalism to cultivate overseas markets and make up for slowing domestic growth. Such a policy puts China on a crash course with developed countries not only in the political and military realms, but in economics as well.
Market based reforms, where?

Xiconomics has all been about political power. In the context of economics, it is the equivalent of jumping the frying pan and into the fire.

Sunday, February 08, 2015

Rationalizing the Record Phisix 7,700

If you look at the typical stock on the New York Stock Exchange, its high will be, perhaps, for the last 12 months will be 150 percent of its low so they’re bobbing all over the place. All you have to do is sit there and wait until something is really attractive that you understand. And you can forget about everything else. That is a wonderful game to play in. There’s almost nothing where the game is stacked in your favor like the stock market. What happens is people start listening to everybody talk on television or whatever it may be or read the paper, and they take what is a fundamental advantage and turn it into a disadvantage. There’s no easier game than stocks. You have to be sure you don’t play it too often. You need the discipline to say no. –Warren Buffett

In this issue:

Rationalizing the Record Phisix 7,700
-False Investment Flows and Blind Confidence
-Marking the Close as Confidence Booster?
-Record Phisix 7,700 Equals Overtrading!
-Phisix 7,700: BSP Chief Express Concerns Over External Forces
-China’s PBOC and Danish Central Bank Panics!

Rationalizing the Record Phisix 7,700

This week Phisix broke through the 7,700 levels. Record after record.

False Investment Flows and Blind Confidence?

The PSE’s press release on the ninth record streak (bold mine): Year-to-date, the PSEi has broken through new record highs 9 times. It has also posted a 6.9 percent gain since the start of the year. "We are pleased with the market's movement in the last five weeks. The record numbers registered by the index highlights the level of investor confidence in our market. We hope that our initiatives to raise awareness about investing at the PSE to fund managers here and abroad will see more investment inflows into our market," PSE President and CEO Hans B. Sicat said.

First of all, the fact is that there is NO such thing as investment flows. For every buyer of a security there is a matching seller, the matching is expressed via peso (buy) per peso (sell) trades. What changes is the composition of the stock market ownership. For instance if foreign funds are buying, then the sellers would be local entities and vice versa.

This is not meant to nitpick on the PSE but to show how real exchanges work.

What record prices have been indicating instead has been the degree of aggressiveness of buyers to bid up prices relative to sellers.

It’s not about flows.


Over the past 5 weeks, there has been an “improvement” in foreign participation, but this has mostly been from special block sales of FGEN (January 21), JGS (January 22) and GTCAP (February 3)

Yet the PSE has not clearly stated why record after record stock levels should highlight as foreign investment attraction. 


The year to date performance accompanied by the PER ratio of the entire Phisix basket demonstrates how the Phisix has reached the current levels. The arrangement in the chart has been ranked according to market weightings as of February 6 close.

The green rounded rectangle on the left reveals of the quality and quantitative aspects of 7,700

There have been 12 stocks (with 6% and above) that have buoyed the Phisix while the rest has been underperforming the bellwether. Remember the Phisix has posted 6.9% returns year to date.

The above implies that the pump and push has not only been in the most popular trades but on the biggest market caps! In short, these stocks have been mostly responsible for Phisix 7,700. The concentration of pump on the biggest market caps, which has been a continuation of the trend from 2014, has led to nose bleed PERs (see right boxes).

Basically the top 15 issues have PERs at celestial levels, ranging from 18 to 50!

Let me cite an example. Consumer stock URC declared that for 2014, profit growth came at 15.2%. In 2014, URC’s stock price generated 73.3%. This means that markets paid a shocking premium of 4.82% for every 1% earnings growth. Such pump has led to URC’s PER to 40+ (45.87 as of February 5 based on PSE data)!

As a side note, the reason I chose URC is because I just came across their first quarter performance (last quarter 2014) 12.6% performance.

Let us do some back of the envelop calculations and grant the past will project into the future where 2014 will repeat in toto this year.

At the end of year, URC’s stock price will be at 340 (196 * 73.3%) while EPS will jump from (Thursday’s close 204/ PER 45.87) 4.45 to 5.13 or 15.2% earnings growth. This implies PE at 66.28!

Such level of valuations will become an attraction for foreign investors? Perhaps for Wall Street high rollers or momentum traders financed by carry trades, but not serious fund managers.

As shown in the above, all these have nothing to do G-R-O-W-T-H, but about speculative orgies founded on the catchphrase of G-R-O-W-T-H. Domestic punters have become like Pavlov’s dogs, conditioned to pump and push at every citation of G-R-O-W-T-H. But instead of dogs drooling in the sound of ringing of the bells, when media, politicians and experts utter G-R-O-W-T-H, punters go into a blind hysteric bidding spree! Risk and valuations have been thrown under the bus!

Yet how much of these bidding orgies have been financed by debt?

Marking the Close as Confidence Booster?

Third, it doesn’t seem that 7,700 Phisix has been all about the “level of investor confidence”.

Record 7,700 Phisix as noted above has been about concentration of pumps on popular and biggest market cap stocks. The Phisix year to date performance can be squared with the “marking the close” activities or attempts at managing the index. 

“Marking the close” is supposed to be a violation of the Philippine Securities Code but yet such practice has become rampant.

Record 7,700 Phisix has now been seen as a ONE way street. Corrections are simply not tolerated. Last week’s major marking the close has been used during corrections.

Last Monday February 2 (see left pane), the Phisix fell by as much 99 points or by 1.3% but the index managers ensured that losses will have to be mitigated. So the last minute pump resulted to the Phisix down by only 59.2 point or by .77% or .53% of the losses evaporated from a manic buying spree at the last minute. (charts above from technistock and colfinancial)

The same has been applied to the session on February 5, where marking the close reduced losses to just .54% (see middle). A minor “marking the close” became part of 7,700.

The serial “Marking the closes” has created a false perception of level of confidence. What it has really done has been to contribute to the ludicrous mangling of the pricing discovery system that has spawned outrageous mispricing of domestic securities.

As I have been saying the higher the Phisix, the greater the risks. This means that instead of sound market dynamics, Phisix 7,700 signifies a symptom of progressing financial instability.

Yet I am not sure that foreigners will see attractiveness in markets that have been gamed.

Record Phisix 7,700 Equals Overtrading!


The “I belong to the mainstream” crowd claims that the peso volume has been “heavy”. The claim is meant to justify the pump by appealing to the majority. Yet “heavy” really depends on data or reference points of comparison.

On an absolute level this has hardly been true or PSE data suggests the contrary. While peso volume (averaged on a daily basis) has been rising, peso volume remains off from the May 2013 levels. So far, current levels have reached the taper tantrum selloff volumes. And a significant chunk of current volume has been helped by huge special block sales.

What has really been a standout has been the number of daily trades. Trade churning has bloated by an astounding 50% from 2013 highs. The swelling of trade churning perhaps has likely been less about the growth of retail trades but more about, as I suspect, the managing of the index.

Historically, overtrading has been symptoms of a market top or market inflection points. Historian Charles Kindleberger sees overtrading as a symptom of a progressing “mania” where he noted[1],
The result of the continuation of the process is what Adam Smith and his contemporaries called ‘overtrading.’ This term is less than precise and includes speculation about increases in the prices of assets or commodities, an overestimate of prospective returns, or ‘excessive leverage.’ Speculation involves buying commodities for the capital gain from anticipated increases in their prices rather than for their use. Similarly speculation involves buying securities for resale rather than for investment income attached to these commodities. The euphoria leads to an increase in the optimism about the rate of economic growth and about the rate of increase in corporate profits and affects firms engaged in production and distribution
And how asset inflation tends to camouflage imbalances…
Even though bank loans are increasing, the leverage—the ratio of debt to capital or to equity—of many of their borrowers may decline because the increase in the prices of the real estate or securities means that the net worth of the borrowers may be increasing at a rapid rate.
And how asset inflation incites a bandwagon effect applied to social status and the credit system…
A follow-the-leader process develops as firms and households see that others are profiting from speculative purchases. ‘There is nothing as disturbing to one’s well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich.’ Unless it is to see a nonfriend get rich. Similarly banks may increase their loans to various groups of borrowers because they are reluctant to lose market share to other lenders which are increasing their loans at a more rapid rate. More and more firms and households that previously had been aloof from these speculative ventures begin to participate in the scramble for high rates of return. Making money never seemed easier. Speculation for capital gains leads away from normal, rational behavior to what has been described as a ‘mania’ or a ‘bubble.’
Phisix 7,700: BSP Chief Express Concerns Over External Forces

And yet while officials of the PSE have been patting their backs on the record after record levels, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas honcho, Amando Tetangco Jr., continues to raise the prospects of risks from the external environment.

In a recent speech he said[2]: (bold mine)
The steep decline in oil prices has complicated the market appreciation of the outlook for monetary policy in 2015.  Some analysts say, the Fed would be hard-pressed to hike rates by any significant measure (as in June this year) if oil prices continue to drop because inflation in the US will be soft.

In addition, low oil prices increase the risk of deflation in the EU and Japan, raising the likelihood that more easing measures would be put in place.

In other words, ladies and gentlemen, whereas markets used to have the confidence in the trend of monetary policies, this new uncertainty from oil price movements is now seen to heighten volatility in financial markets by unsettling investor risk appetite and unseating inflation expectations.

Further, a continued decline in oil price could also change the balance of global growth prospects. There will be winners and losers if low oil prices persist.  While the decline in oil is a dampener to inflation and could raise purchasing power for oil importers, it could also result in a loss of revenues for oil producers and lead to weak aggregate demand. With overall global growth still fragile, the significant drop and the weak prospects in oil prices have gotten more analysts discussing the risk of deflation in recent weeks.
Nonetheless while the BSP chief sanitizes and downplays the risks to the Philippine economy due to the alleged “strong environment”, he sees a potential reemergence of market volatility. 

Also the BSP chief seems to signal the possibility for them to lower interest rates.
Our initial projections using lower oil prices show that inflation would still be within the target range for 2015, which is now lower at 2-4 percent compared to the previous year’s target of 3-5 percent. Indications of easing inflationary pressures owing in part to the decline in international oil prices as well as signs of robust domestic economic growth allow the BSP some room to maintain its current monetary policy stance. Even so, we do not pre-commit to a set course of action. As I have always said, the stance of monetary policy will remain data-dependent.

One thing we keep in the back of our minds is that prices can reverse and often very quickly. If you have been in this market long enough – as I believe some in the audience have – you know that markets tend to get ahead of themselves.  So, we continue to watch developments in the oil market carefully and how these affect inflation and growth dynamics, to see if there is any need to make adjustments in the stance of policy.

Remember what I wrote last week on the 4Q 6.9% GDP[3]?
if the BSP, suddenly cuts rate for one reason or another, say below inflation target, or external based alibis, then this proves that 4Q 6.9% GDP 2014 has all been a Potemkin Village.

In the same speech, the BSP chief denies the risks of deflation, supposedly due to the “ramping up of government spending”, yet this outlook overlooks Japan’s experience.

Following the bursting of the stock market and property bubble, in the 90s Japan’s government engaged into a spending spree but failed to create meaningful growth. Reason? Japan’s economy had been shackled by a mountain of non-performing loans and by a refusal to let the markets clear. Japan’s economy stagnated for decades (continuing until today, hence Abenomics) with CPI prices fluctuating between marginal increases and slight decreases. Such ‘lost decade(s)’ have been misinterpreted by the mainstream as ‘deflation’ when this has been about stagnation.

As a side note, record Phisix 7,700 came as Bank of Japan’s governor Haruhiko Kuroda rang the opening bell for the PSE last Friday. The BoJ’s chief has been the architect of Japan’s incredible divergence, milestone stock market performance in the face of an economic recession! The BoJ’s visit to the Philippines has reportedly been about arranging for peso credit facilities for Japanese companies backed by yen as collateral. With the BoJ so far intent on destroying the yen, the BoJ wants the BSP to accept Japanese collateral with vastly diminishing value. The peso has been climbing against the yen since January of 2012 and has gained 57% as of Friday’s close from the same period. [I understand that currencies may be hedged, what this does is to spread the risks but not to diminish it]. Yet local punters seem to project to BoJ’s Kuroda: if you can do it we can do it! Be careful of what you wish for.

Going back to the BSP, statistics isn’t economics. 

Debt represents the intertemporal distribution of spending activities. Borrowing money to spend simply means the frontloading of spending. The cost of debt financed spending today is spending in the future. Debt will have to be repaid at the expense of future spending. Of course there are productive and non-productive debts. But policies of financial repression via zero bound rates tend to promote non-productive ‘speculative’ and consumption debts.

The BSP fails to understand that having too much debt, which constrains balance sheets, will undermine real economic growth. The transmission mechanism from balance sheet problems will affect prices and subsequently the economic coordination process. The mainstream sees this as lack of aggregate demand when they are in fact balance sheet imbalances. Debt is not a free lunch, not even government debt. McKinsey Quarterly estimates that global debt grew by $57 trillion since 2007 where debt to GDP has reached 286%! Why do you think the negative interest rate policies adapted by many central banks? 


And one only needs to look at the growth conditions of loan and statistical GDP to see how disproportionalities have been mounting in the Philippines.

From end of the year 2008 to end of the year 2014, or in 6 years, production or supply side banking loans has inflated 125% (CAGR 14.51%) whereas gdp (at current prices) has only amassed 70.2% (CAGR 9.3%). The bigger buildup of debt relative to gdp means slower real economic growth ahead. This is regardless whether debt based spending has been due to government or private sector. The government can pump statistical economy but not the real economy.

And since consumer spending accounts for about 70% of the expenditure GDP, HFCE has grown by about a similar rate to statistical gdp of 73.43% (CAGR 9.61%) over the same period.

Yet from the same timeframe, supply side GDP has swelled by outlandish rates as follows: construction 135.1%, trade 105.71%, finance 142.94% and real estate 273.38%. This has been financed mostly by bank credit growth with incredulous growth rates for the said industries at 200.85%, 176.92%, 194.68% and 178.77% respectively. 

So even if Real Estate GDP has ballooned more than the rate of credit growth, the huge disparity between consumer growth and industry growth means severe accumulation of excess capacity in motion. And this will become evident when credit growth slows.

Oh by the way, as possible symptom of excess capacity combined with a slump in retail 4Q GDP—have you seen the dramatic surge in store vacancies in many of the major malls at the metropolis? The vacancy rates of a high end mall have recently soared and appear to have already exceeded 10% of their total retail space! 6.9% 4Q GDP in the face of soaring vacancies in shopping malls! Duh!

And I’m not sure if the BSP chief has merely been just parroting what the central bank of central banks, the Bank for International Settlement has been saying, or if he is just underwriting an escape clause to exonerate (him and the BSP) when risks transforms into reality, nevertheless, the concerns of the BSP chief (or by the BSP) seem at material odds with the heady outlook of PSE officials.

Statistics isn’t economics. What seems as may not be what’s real. Notice how “strong” statistics have often been masked by an inflation boom as indicated by historian Charles Kindleberger? Warren Buffett’s alternative axiom has been: Only when the tide goes out do you discover whose swimming naked.

Two recent examples of “swimming naked” exposed.

Remember Brazilian tycoon Eike Batista whose worth was once quoted as anywhere from $25 to $35 billion in 2012 and was named as the 8th richest man in the world by Forbes Magazine in 2011? Well he is now a “negative” billionaire. Now, Mr. Batista reportedly owes $1.2 billion. Thus authorities have been seizing his assets, which includes white Lamborghini and $32,490 in cash, computers, and watches — as well as any real estate, six other cars, his boat and his airplanes, according to the Businessinsider.com

Worst, compounding his financial woes, the erstwhile mining and oil tycoon has now been faced with charges of insider trading and stock market manipulation.

Mr. Batista’s financial crash took only less than two years to happen. Who would have thought that billions worth of wealth (paper) can vaporize so fast? And yet when revulsion and discredit sets in, the blaming part begins.

At the turn of the business cycle, I believe that there will many miniature Eike Batistas, here and abroad.

For the domestic setting, I predict that “when the tide goes out”, the serial “marking the closes” will likely become a future legal issue.

Next, another account of what seems as, may not really be: Brazil’s state firm Petrobas

From Bloomberg: (bold mine) When Brazil emerged from the global financial crisis as one of the world’s great rising powers, Petrobras was the symbol of that growing economic might. The state-run oil giant was embarking on a $220 billion investment plan to develop the largest offshore crude discovery in the Western hemisphere since 1976 and was, in the words of then-President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the face of “the new Brazil.” Today the company epitomizes everything that is wrong with a Brazilian economy that has been sputtering for the better part of four years: It’s mired in a corruption scandal that cost the CEO her job this week; it has failed to meet growth targets year after year; and it’s saddling investors with spectacular losses. Once worth $310 billion at its peak in 2008, a valuation that made it the world’s fifth-largest company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA is today worth just $48 billion.

The face of “New Brazil”—another slogan highlighting euphoric “this time is different” demolished!

Rings a bell?

China’s PBOC and Danish Central Bank Panics!

Two central banks seem as in a panic mode. 

In Denmark, the Danish Central Bank cut interest rates by another 25 basis points which brings Danish interest rates deeply into negative territory -.75. This marks the fourth cut in less than 3 weeks intended to defend the Danish krone-euro peg which has reportedly been under heavy assault from speculators. Will the krone-euro peg break soon? Will there be a huge demand for cash too…reinforcing deflation?

China’s PBoC seems to have panicked too. The PBoC suddenly cut reserve requirements in the wake of a slower than expected bank lending, an unexpected contraction of factory activities and a slowdown in the service industry.

Government economists as quoted by media say that the cut, which injects $96 billion to the economy, has been aimed at curtailing the yuan’s slide as a result of accelerating capital outflows. Capital flight hit a record $91.2 billion in the fourth quarter according to a report from Bloomberg. The said report also noted that PBoC injected $31 billion over the past three weeks. 

If cutting reserves had been intended to defend the yuan then this will hardly work.

First some data. Chinese credit to GDP has been reported by McKinsey Quarterly at 282% as of 2Q 2014. Corporate debt has been estimated by McKinsey at 125% of GDP the highest level in the world! In addition, Chinese debt has been concentrated to the real estate sector, along with a massive growth in Shadow Banking and in local government debt.

Given the sustained downturn in housing prices, which continues to put pressure on the economy and on credit conditions, capital flight would be a natural response for investors and currency holders anticipating a far worse outcome.

Cutting reserve requirements would free up resources for banks to lend but this will hardly attract credit activities if the balance sheets of Chinese residents and companies have been hocked to the eyeballs with debt.

Given the above statistics, what happens instead will be more access to credit in order to pay off existing loans (debt rollover) rather than for investment. The end result of the ‘extend and pretend’ strategy will be to increase debt levels as GDP cascades.

The Chinese government seems in a bind to desperately defer the inevitable distressing adjustments.

Interestingly, Hong Kong’s tourism seems as suffering from a facelift. Chinese tourists have become dominated by ‘Day Trippers’ which now accounts for a record 60%of Chinese tourists. According to a report from Bloomberg, Day-trippers spent an average of around HK$2,700 ($350) per capita in Hong Kong in 2013, compared with about HK$8,800 by overnight tourists, according to government data.

Wow, that’s a 69% collapse in spending budget by tourists! And this has resulted to a slump in luxury brand sales but a surge in medicine and cosmetic sales! What the report suggests has been that China’s economic slowdown and the government’s anti-corruption drive (political persecution) have changed the character of Hong Kong based Chinese tourists.

Well if the trend continues, then this will radically shake up the Hong Kong economy!

Now the report also says that the wealthy have been shifting visits to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, but they didn’t give the numbers.

Anyway, Hong Kong’s dilemma seems to have been shared by the miseries of Macau as expressed by the crashing share prices and earnings of casinos. 

And applied to the Philippines, if those wealthy Chinese high rollers don’t come streaming into the Philippine casinos soon, excess capacity will lead to losses and subsequently credit troubles.

The effects of the looming shortage of Chinese gamblers will not be isolated to casinos but will extend to creditors, suppliers and workers of the industry. The chain reaction will spread to the economy. If you add other risks areas like shopping mall or other property related industries the direct and indirect effects will be magnified.

In addition, a radical makeover of the Hong Kong’s economy may jeopardize domestic OFWs working there.

But then, according to the record Phisix 7,700 risks and valuations have all been expunged out of existence! Stocks and economic conditions are a one way street! So for the mainstream, we should not only buy, buy, buy!...but also borrow borrow borrow to buy, buy, buy! Money’s free!



[1] Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes A History of Financial Crises Fifth Edition, Now and Futures

[2] Amando M. Tetangco Jr. Working Together towards a Stronger Economy January 30, 2014 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

Saturday, February 07, 2015

The Agency Problem: The Difference between an Investment Firm and a Marketing Firm

Wall Street Journal's business columnist Jason Zweig frames the agency problem in a remarkably different light: the fiduciary duty of finance managers.

Excerpted from Mr. Zweig’s excellent speech entitled “Putting Investors First”, as published at his website (hat tip Tim Price) [bold mine]
How do a marketing firm and an investment firm differ?  Let us count the ways:

-The marketing firm has a mad scientists’ lab to “incubate” new funds and kill them if they don’t work.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm charges a flat management fee, no matter how large its funds grow, and it keeps its expenses unacceptably high.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm refuses to close its funds to new investors no matter how large and unwieldy they get.  The investment firm does not. 

-The marketing firm hypes the track records of its tiniest funds, even though it knows their returns will shrink as the funds grow.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm creates new funds because they will sell, rather than because they are good investments.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm promotes its bond funds on their yield, it flashes “NUMBER ONE” for some time period in all its stock fund ads, and it uses mountain charts as steep as the Alps in all its promotional material.  The investment firm does none of those things.

-The marketing firm pays its portfolio managers on the basis not just of their investment performance but also the assets and cash flow of the funds.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm is eager for its existing customers to pay any price, and bear any burden, so that an infinite number of new customers can be rounded up through the so-called mutual fund supermarkets.  The investment firm sets limits.

-The marketing firm does little or nothing to warn its clients that markets do not always go up, that past performance is almost meaningless, and that the markets are riskiest precisely when they seem to be the safest.  The investment firm tells its customers these things over and over and over again.

-The marketing firm simply wants to git while the gittin’ is good.  The investment firm asks, “What would happen to every aspect of our operations if the markets fell by 67% tomorrow, and what would we do about it?  What plans do we need in place to survive it?”

Thus you must choose.  You can be mostly a marketing firm, or you can be mostly an investment firm.  But you cannot serve both masters at the same time.  Whatever you give to the one priority, you must take away from the other.

The fund industry is a fiduciary business; I recognize that that’s a two-part term.  Yes, you are fiduciaries; and yes, you also are businesses that seek to make and maximize profits.  And that’s as it should be.  In the long run, however, you cannot  survive as a business unless you are a fiduciary emphatically first.

In the short term, it pays off to be primarily a marketing firm, not an investment firm.  But in the long term, that’s no way to build a great business.  Today, tomorrow, and forever, the right question to ask yourselves is not “Will this sell?” but rather “Should we be selling this?”  I will praise every fund company that makes that choice based on what is right for its investors, because I believe that standard of judgment is the right standard.
Amen.

But don’t expect the fiduciary role to be adapted by the sellside industry who predominantly embraces the "marketing" aspect as their core function. That's because most of them seem as adherents to JM Keynes' sound banker principle:
A sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional way along with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him.

Quote of the Day: The Scarcest Ability Among Economist is Good Judgment

I am thinking that you may well share my view, which I have held for a very long time, that the scarcest ability among economists (and others who purport to have expertise about economic matters) is good judgment. Many economists are obviously very smart, in the sense that they are good at math and can wheel and deal with pretty complex mathematical models and econometric exercises. But this sort of technical ability may — and sad to say, usually does — have little or nothing to do with actually understanding how the world works. What I call good judgment about economic reality seems to depend much more heavily on a combination of (1) mastery of basic applied price theory, the theory of how changes in incentives and relative costs affect actions taken at the margin(s); (2) substantial knowledge of economic history and the institutional context of economic actions; and (3) a level-headedness that keeps the economist from falling in love with what is merely possible (usually in a fairly other-worldly model) and losing sight of what is likely. In other words, most economists and other purported economic experts, notwithstanding their cleverness and mathematical prowess, have no “feel” for how the economy works at all. It’s as if they never see past the trees of technicalities and possibilities to the forest of real economic actions and interactions, not to mention having an appreciation of the relative magnitudes of various factors. This aspect of economics, as the great majority of economists practice the craft, has always put me off, ever since I was an undergraduate; and, if anything, it puts me off even more now, after I have spent half a century trying to do economics right.
(bold mine)

This is from Austrian economist Robert Higgs’ who contributes to what makes for a good economist as published at the Café Hayek (hat tip Mises Blog).

As I have been saying, statistical analysis doesn’t make for economic analysis.

Friday, February 06, 2015

Charts of the Day: As of 2Q 2014,Global Debt has reached 286% of GDP! China Debt at 282% of GDP!

From a recent study by McKinsey Quarterly : Debt and (Not Much) Leveraging

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McKinsey summary: Since 2007, global debt has grown by $57 trillion, raising the ratio of debt to GDP by 17 percentage points.* Developing economies account for roughly half of the growth, and in many cases this reflects healthy financial deepening. In advanced economies, government debt has soared and private-sector deleveraging has been limited. 

My comment: As for developing economies: has this been about financial deepening or about boom bust cycles?

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McKinsey summary: Fueled by real estate and shadow banking, China’s total debt has quadrupled, rising from $7 trillion in 2007 to $28 trillion by mid-2014. At 282 percent of GDP, China’s debt as a share of GDP, while manageable, is larger than that of the United States or Germany.* Several factors are worrisome: half of loans are linked directly or indirectly to China’s real estate market, unregulated shadow banking accounts for nearly half of new lending, and the debt of many local governments is likely unsustainable. 

My comment: How "manageable" is manageable? Comparing China's capacity with US or Germany signifies a contrast effect--depends on what is being compared. To give you an idea, per capita GDP (IMF measures  2013) of China has been estimated at $11,868 while the US and Germany has $53,001 and $43,475 respectively. If we use this in the prism of looking at the debt levels, then the US and Germany has more capability to manage debt than China has been. Again contrast effect.

Nonetheless the critical issue has been how nations today have become addicted to debt. And debt is no free lunch.

Hong Kong is Doomed for its Anti-Keynesian Model: Budget Surplus, Leaving Cash to the Public by Lowering Taxes

Sovereign Man’s prolific Simon Black explains why Hong Kong is doomed—in the eyes of the Keynesian consensus! (bold mine)
The government committee was clear—if nothing was to be done, the government’s finances would be doomed in as little as seven years.

The Finance Secretary had some tough decisions to make. Raising more revenue for the government over the next few years is crucial.

He was also being targeted and mocked because his ministry’s predictions for economic performance and taxes raised have been consistently wrong every year since 2007.

This is common for government agencies in pretty much every country, but Hong Kong is possibly the worst—they continually underestimate the numbers.

The government will finish the fiscal year ending next month, for example, with a surplus of at least HK$60 billion (probably more, given how horrible they are at forecasting), which is six times more than the finance ministry projected. 

A surplus! Who does that anymore??

Couldn’t they find something else to spend money on? Armored vehicles and combat gear for the police (they did face a massive uprising just a few months ago after all)? Welfare? Crony subsidies? Drones? New government committees and agencies? Surveillance?

At least build a bridge, dammit! What are you going to do with all that extra money now??

I’ll tell you what they’re going to do. The Hong Kong government is so foolish that they’ll… I’m utterly disgusted saying this… they’ll -gulp- give it back to the people

They’ll institute measures like a salary tax rebate of about HK$10,000, a waiver on property rates, and a PERMANENT increase in the tax allowance for parents from HK$70,000 to HK$80,000 per child—which is a second increase in child tax allowance in three years already!

One of the officials said: “There is a need to stimulate the city’s domestic consumption by introducing measures to leave more cash in the hands of the public.”

What are you talking about, man? Everyone knows that you stimulate the economy by increasing government spending, not reducing it and just leaving the people to decide what they’re going to spend it on. It’s insane.

Reducing already low taxes because you’re running budget surpluses? And you’re only taxing people and companies on the money they earn within Hong Kong? Really? You’ve got much to learn…

Even though following this practice has transformed the once barren island at the mouth of the Pearl River Delta into a global financial and trading center with one of the highest standards of living in the world, this clearly unsustainable bubble of a free market economy, minimal government, and fiscal prudence is bound to end in disaster.

Thursday, February 05, 2015

Grexit Drama: ECB Suspends Greece Bonds as Bank Collateral

The Grexit drama appears to be crescendoing.

In a move to forcefully address the stalemate between the new government of Greece and the EU, the ECB has partly withdrawn funding of the Greece financial system by suspending Greek bonds as bank collateral


Marketwatch.com explains the ECB action: (bold mine) 
What did the ECB just do? 

The ECB’s Governing Council suspended a waiver that had allowed Greek banks to use the country’s junk-rated government bonds as collateral for central bank loans. 

Why did the ECB do it? 

Greek bonds are junk rated, thus the waiver was needed to allow the banks to post collateral that could be used for cheap funding from the ECB. One of the prerequisites for the waiver was that Greece remain in compliance with a bailout program.

In its decision, the ECB said it pulled the plug on the waiver because it can’t be sure that Greece’s attempts to secure a new program will be successful.

Beyond the official reasons, the move is seen as a definitive warning that, like Germany, the ECB is in no mood to give in to Athens’s request for a debt swap. News reports also indicated the ECB isn’t open to requests to allow Greece to raise short-term cash by issuing additional Treasury bills in an effort to keep the government funded as it attempts to reach a new deal with its creditors. 

Where does that leave Greek banks? 

It’s not a welcome development. Greek banks have suffered significant deposit withdrawals before and after the January election that brought the antiausterity government, led by Syriza’s Alexis Tsipras, to power.

“This news will likely scare depositors and result in further bank runs,” said Peter Boockvar, chief market analyst at the Lindsey Group in Fairfax, Va.

“This all said, if Greece can come to an agreement with the troika[ i.e., the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the ECB], I’m sure the ECB will reinstate the waiver,” Boockvar added.

While the kneejerk reaction in markets has been negative, analysts note that junk-rated Greek sovereign debt made up a relatively small portion of the collateral used by Greek banks in funding operations as of the end of last year. Karl Whelan, economics professor at University College Dublin, recently estimated that Greek banks were using a maximum of €8 billion in Greek government debt as collateral for loans from the Eurosystem as of December versus total loans of €56 billion.

Meanwhile, the ECB said Greek banks will be able to tap funds through a program known as emergency liquidity assistance, or ELA. Under the program, the loans are more expensive and remain on the books of Greece’s central bank rather than the ECB.

image

The BBC diagram above shows of the share distribution of Greek creditors via holdings of Greek Bonds

The BBC says that : Greece has about €20bn (£15bn; $22.5bn) to repay this year, according to the Greek finance ministry. Economists estimate that Greece needs to raise about €4.3bn in the first quarter.

By withdrawing ECB guarantee, it’s not just about withdrawing liquidity but likewise to implicitly exacerbate the downgrade of what has been already rated as “junk”.

In addition, the remaining lifeline for Greek banks would be the ELA. The ECB’s bailout program is due to expire in February 28, which if not renewed would mean Greece will be on its own. 

So the showdown between the ECB and Greece has become a “game of chicken”. And the “game of chicken” will have consequences. One of them is likely the intensification of “significant deposit withdrawals” which is a euphemism for “bank run”…a systemic Greece bank run. Yet if a run materializes, where will the money go...Germany, Swiss, US or Asia or under the household pillow mattress?

It’s true that since official institutions have become the biggest creditors to Greece, there has been less exposure by the private sector which is probably why the reactions of the financial markets to the ECB hardline stance has hardly been violent…yet. But this lack of drama doesn’t imply that current reactions will project to the future. Or said differently, since sentiments have always been fickle, should a radical shift occur, then the momentum of the ballgame may reflect on such a shift.

And official exposure on high risk junk Greek debt doesn’t extrapolate to free lunch too.

If the Greek government defaults, whether the governments of the Eurozone, IMF or the ECB, someone would have to pay for those losses and that someone, the forgotten man, would be the taxpayers.

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As the Zero Hedge points out: (bold original)
yet Bloomberg does bring up a relevant point: "The nominal amounts at stake do illustrate the motives for German resistance to restructuring. Yet a more relevant measure would adjust for a country's ability to absorb those losses. The picture radically changes when that exposure is expressed as a share of 2013 nominal GDP. On this ranking, Germany falls to No. 9 with an exposure amounting to 2.2 percent of its economy's size. France falls to No. 8 (2.2 percent) and Italy to No. 7 (2.5 percent). Portugal (3.2 percent), Cyprus (2.8 percent) and Slovenia (2.6 percent) top the ranking, meaning these countries have the most to lose if Greece decides to write down its public debt."
Should the EU-Greece game of chicken lead to a Grexit, there will be pain for these debt holders. The degree pain will not  be the same, but again there will be pain. The subsequent question is what will be the indirect (non-linear) ramifications?

Of course, in a world where governments have been hocked to the eyeballs with debt, and where central banks have provided the band-aid or patchwork for all the accruing imbalances via the extinguishment of risk conditions through financial asset pump, a Grexit may change the complexion of risk. Risk, like the mythical Phoenix, may resurrect or may be reborn.

Remember all it takes is for a Bear Stearns to lead to a Lehman moment. Could Grexit be the modern day version of Bear Stearns or the Great Depression's Creditanstalt?

Will record high stocks be immune to this? 

Very interesting.

Wednesday, February 04, 2015

The Relationship between Oil Prices and Philippine Assets Invokes the Butterfly Effect

A researcher from a business broadsheet wrote me if I can help in their article to establish the relationship between oil prices and Philippine financial assets.

Though I would like to help and am profusely thankful for such opportunity, I realized that it would likely take me laborious effort, perhaps more than 20+ or more pages (a paper) to explain the many possible transmission channels of oil prices to asset prices. And not only will this be time consuming to explain complex relationships, in the understanding of how mainstream media operates, complex discussions will only be truncated or simplified--so I backed off.

Here is my reply:
There is what is known as the chaos theory. For instance, mathematician Edward Lorenz explains that a flapping of the wings of a butterfly can cause hurricane in parts of the world (Butterfly effect). The issue of the butterfly effect is the non-linearity of causal linkages. I believe that a lot of your questions invoke the butterfly effect: the linkages won’t be linear, so this will be hard to explain to the public who looks for simplified explanations of complex dynamics.