Sunday, September 24, 2017

Wow. BPO Investments Collapse as the Phisix Storms to New Heights! ICTSI’s Razon Sells 3.18% of BLOOM; Signs of Wave of Insider Selling

In this issue

Wow. BPO Investments Collapse as the Phisix Storms to New Heights! ICTSI’s Razon Sells 3.18% of BLOOM; Signs of Wave of Insider Selling
-The Astounding Collapse of BPO Investments
-Phisix Sets Artificial Record High on Money Supply Growth and Price Fixing
-Demonstrated Preference: Mr. Razon’s Selling of 3.18% Shares of Bloomberry and Wave of Insider Selling

Wow. BPO Investments Collapse as the Phisix Storms to New Heights! ICTSI’s Razon Sells 3.18% of BLOOM; Signs of Wave of Insider Selling

The Astounding Collapse of BPO Investments

In 2015, I prognosticated that the one-way projection by the mainstream of the BPO industry’s growth trend will eventually falter. And that’s because BPO growth dynamic will eventually reach its natural economic limits: [Phisix 7,100: Downgrades Transforms into Capex Cuts! More Signs of Cracks in the Philippine Property Bubble! Sept 20 2015]

Like all human activities, BPOs are subject to changes in demand and supply. The supply side of BPOs are dependent on many fluidly variable factors such as political, legal, labor/manpower, wages, input prices, infrastructure, competition and many others. A significant change in one or two of them may alter whatsoever comparative and competitive advantage the Philippines holds today. For instance, soaring taxes, or skyrocketing wages or a war with a neighbor will likely reduce the appeal for BPO investments or operations.

India used to be the lone powerhouse of BPOs, that’s until the Philippines got into the fray. Yet India holds six of the top ten in BPO destinations with 2 from the Philippines, one from Poland and from China based on the 2015 rankings by Tholons

The same applies to the demand side or the clients or principals of local BPOs, where any major changes in the conditions of their host nations or on global conditions may affect BPO investment or operations. For example, a global recession or depression may likely upend or delay the BPO boom.

Nothing is set on the stone.

If I am not mistaken, such limits have arrived. The law of diminishing returns has begun to afflict the BPO industry.

From the Inquirer.net (bold mine)

New investment pledges in the IT-BPM industry registered through various promotion agencies fell 34 percent in the second quarter from a year ago, continuing the decline in one of the country’s top dollar earners that the trade chief had partly attributed to the uncertainty in US policy.

Collecting the pledges registered through seven investment promotion agencies (IPAs), data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) showed that investment commitments in the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector totaled P4.9 billion in the April-to-June period in 2017, falling from P6.27 billion registered in the same months last year.

The latest figures of the Information Technology and Business Process Management (IT-BPM) industry showed the continued decline in investment pledges. The PSA earlier reported a 34-percent decrease in new pledges during the first quarter to P4.18 billion from P6.34 billion in the same three-month period in 2016…

Not the first time, instead a follow through from 2016…

This is not the first time that pledges shrank in terms of their growth rate.

According to PSA data, the expansion rate of these pledges had been on a decline since the third quarter of 2016. In spite of a more than 35-percent increase in pledges during the second quarter of 2016, commitments still finished the full year with a 22.6-percent decline to P30.74 billion from the previous year that had P39.73 billion.

PSA data suggested that the “anchor accounts” were not enough to offset the drop in new investment commitments. The latest figures pointed to a 28-percent decrease in the first half of the year, reaching P9.08 billion from P12.61 billion in the first semester of 2016.

Wow! TWENTY-THREE percent decline in BPO investments 2016! THIRTY-FOUR percent decrease in both 1Q and 2Q in 2017! A fall of 23% and 34% would signify as crashes!

Sorry, the IT-BPM provides no data set to the public for me to come up with a chart. Hence, I am limited on the citation of the news.

First of all, Mr. Trump won the US Presidency in the 4Q of 2016.  BPO investments started to fall in the third quarter of the same year. Thus, uncertainty over US policy may be rationalization or reasoning from price changes.

Second, the BPO industry has been projected to grow at a fantastic rate by almost every outlook published by the mainstream domestic and international institutions. They seem to have forgotten that since we live in a world of scarcity, the same scarce factors would serve to restrain an industry’s growth rate. As the great classical economist Adam Smith wrote, trade by virtue of the division of labor is limited “by the Extent of the Market

Third, a collapse in BPO investments has tremendous implications. It would not only affect the sector’s output, productivity, and profits but likewise impact job generation, income and wage growth, as well as, financial conditions.

Fourth, like the auto industry*, a slump in investment would spread to the entire BPO ecosystem. Or a magnified slowdown will adversely impact the BPO’s upstream (e.g. real estate) and downstream (e.g. retail) sectors.


The ‘race-to-build-supply’ of the real estate, shopping mall and hotel industry had partly been premised on the expectations of the linear growth rate of the BPO industry. Just what would happen when the glaring mismatch between output and expectations becomes a reality? What industry or industries will replace the erstwhile sunshine BPO industry?

As a reminder**, OFW remittances are not the same as BPO remittances. OFW remittances signify as money intended for final consumption. BPO remittances signify as gross business revenues for BPO firms. It would be a folly to believe that apples (OFWs) are similar to oranges (BPOs), because the distribution of spending will be different between them.


Many major economic activities such as construction (construction permits and cement), manufacturing, car sales, consumer sales (retail sales) and BPO investments have manifested considerable weakness over the same timeframe. Has such been merely a coincidence? Or has there been a common causal mechanism that has spread to affect them?

Phisix Sets Artificial Record High on Money Supply Growth and Price Fixing

Curiously, the Philippine Phisix has stormed to unparalleled heights in spite of these unfolding crucial shortfalls in the real economy.

Add to the intensifying bifurcation of the Phisix and the real economy has been the near-zero net income growth in the 1H of PSEi 30 firms which had been brought about by one-third of its components which endured negative net income growth and the stellar 19% surge in PSEi non-bank debt!
 
Price actions in Philippine stocks have become totally detached from reality.

While it may be true that the Risk ON sentiment in Asia has partly filtered into domestic stocks, foreign participation has been largely absent.

In Asia, 8 of 17 national bourses have recorded 15% returns and above; as of September 22. (see upper window)  Except for two bourses, Asian equity bellwethers have either set new records or have reached some milestone levels.

The strengthening of the local currency has mostly been responsible for most of the record-setting of national benchmarks in the region.

However, like Mongolia, the Phisix has been one of the outliers where record stocks have coincided with the fall of the currency or the peso.

As an aside, Mongolia’s boom recently had a dramatic turnabout; the nation nearly plunged into an economic crisis until it was bailed out by the IMF in May 2017. Although, the IMF delayed part of its bailout payments, a week ago, due to political turmoil or the ouster of the government. This bailout must have spiked its stocks.

And unlike foreign-backed buying of the PSEi 30 during the run-up to the landmark high in April 2015 and in the test of the same level in 2016, September 2017’s fresh record has been MAINLY about local activities. Local punters have indulged in mindless and relentless bidding binges on select index sensitive issues. And that’s aside from the brazen price rigging which apparently has been countenanced by authorities.

The BSP’s data on the monthly portfolio flows (middle window) shows the difference in foreign participation in 2015 and in 2016 relative to the present. Foreign money has largely been a nonevent in the recent record run.

And this explains the low volume pump and the awesome divergence between the broader market and the PSEi 30.

Of course, the record PSEi 30 run can be traced to the BSP’s emergency policies: the historic low interestrates and the monumental deployment of domestic Quantitative Easing or monetization of the NG’s debt, as well as, the unprecedented use of wholesale finance to bolster GIRs.

 
As money supply growth picked up tempo, so did the Phisix.

More importantly, the intensive price fixing practices focused on the biggest market cap issues have been designed to elevate the index.

The top 6-7 issues have borne the extreme PERs of the PSEi 30 which has been a manifestation of the disproportion of bidding activities over the past years.

As I recently noted***: To be clear, I am not saying that the 2015 record won’t be broken. Given the intense price fixing process, whether it does or doesn’t shouldn’t be a concern. What matters will be the peso as an outlet for present policiesThe Phisix hasn’t only been outclassed by the falling peso, in the context of record breakthroughs. The plight of the peso will also serve as a critical obstacle to the Phisix.


Let me guess, because the Phisix broke into new territory, August-September M3 may have likely surged past the highs of May 2016 and July 2017 at 13.5%

Demonstrated Preference: Mr. Razon’s Selling of 3.18% Shares of Bloomberry and Wave of Insider Selling

And there are anecdotal and empirical evidence of listed companies forcing up share prices of their own firm or of related companies. Such activities can be seen through disclosed interventions (SM Prime), as well as buybacks (Macro Asia, and lately AGI).

Interestingly, waves of insider selling can be seen in the PSE’s disclosures involving “Change in Shareholdings of Directors and Principal Officers”.

I may add that the recent sale by ICTSI tycoon Mr. Enrique Razon of his 350 million shares representing 3.18% stake in Bloomberry Resorts Corporation at Php 10.85 per share worth approximately Php 3.8 billion from his holding firm Prime Metroline Holdings Inc. to international institutional investors through an overnight placement emits the same symptoms.

Mr. Razon’s disposal of BLOOM shares would mark the third major sale by a majority stakeholder of their firm in the last two years.

The Gokongwei sold Php 11 billion ($250 million) worth of JG Summit shares at around Php 82.1 per share in May 2016 (September 22 close at Php 77) while the Ty family sold $172 million worth of GTCAP shares at about Php 1,539 (September 22 close at 1,201) in August 2016****


I have explained the sales by tycoons in the context of demonstrated or revealed preferences.

Mr. Razon justified his actions by stating that the sale would increase liquidity that will be beneficial for investors and the company. Will the addition of 3.18% of liquidity or market float really improve the company’s financial conditions? The answer is no.

The critical factor of company’s financial conditions ultimately takes root from the long-term stream of revenues. Mr. Razon knows this. Hence, opportunity costs dictated the actions of Mr. Razon. He sold becausehe sensed cash as having more value than holding 3.18% shares worth Php 3.8 billion in shares. He can opt to sell at Php 4.0 billion, Php 4.5 billion, Php 5.0 billion or more. But he chose not to. That is because he is not sure that there would be takers at that level. Action speaks louder than words.

Mr. Gokongwei and the Ty family sold at the price climax of the shares of their respective firms. I would bet that Mr. Razon thinks the same way too.

And I would bet that the slew of insider selling from a diverse set of listed issues has been emitting the same signals. Corporate insiders may be cashing in on what they think as overvalued securities where cash would be a better option.

Why shouldn’t they? BPO investments have crashed.

Economic activities such as construction (construction permits and cement), manufacturing, car sales and consumer sales (retail sales) and listed firms’ eps have yet to present convincing clues of a meaningful recovery. 

Because of the reappearance of upside pressures and of price instability in the real economy, the prospects of a material rebound in these sectors would seem unlikely.

And the enormous growth in government expenditures would compound on such growth obstacles mainly through the ‘crowding-out’ effect in the real economy and in financial conditions.

Moreover, signs of strains in the real economy have induced companies to ramp up credit growth. And this gorging of credit has hardly brought about its desired effects. What this would bring is more risk in their balance sheets.

Debt Troubled Alliance Global (AGI) Resorts to Financial Engineering to Boost Earnings and Share Prices!

In today’s ambiance of free money, when earnings can barely grow organically, there is always the option to engineer it.

And that’s exactly the route taken by Alliance Global Group.

From their press release: “Alliance Global Group, Inc. (AGI), the investment holding company of tycoon Dr. Andrew L. Tan, has announced a two year share repurchase program of up to P5 billion. “The Board of Alliance Global has approved a share buyback of up to P5 billion over a 24-month period,” said Kingson U. Sian, president, AGI. “We are undertaking this corporate action because we believe that our shares are grossly undervalued. Our Group has been consistently profitable, with attractive growth prospects, and enjoys strong brand equity and therefore views this exercise as a means to enhance shareholder value over time.” (bold mine)

Despite the recent record breakout by the Phisix, would it not be a wonder that the market seems to have disagreed with the official AGI outlook of “undervalued” shares and “attractive growth prospects”?
 

 
A week ago, AGI was off 53% from its record highs. But because of the stock buyback announcement, the company’s share price had been jolted to rocket 15.5% over the week! Year to date returns suddenly spiked to 31.77%!

The company bought 2.487 million shares worth Php 39.4 million in two days which accounted for 5.7% of the shares and volume traded.

The buyback means the withdrawal from the outstanding, shares that were bought for the company’s treasury.

The company further boasted: “AGI posted new levels of revenues and core net profit in 2016 of P139.6 billion and P22.8 billion, respectively. Consolidated EBITDA grew at a healthy rate of 9% year-on-year to P38.8 billion, while attributable net income rose another 6% to P14.8 billion. “AGI continues to build on its strength with a business model that is time-tested and stress-tested,” according to Sian”

But that would represent only a segment of the story.

After all, the positives in today’s asset inflation environment have mostly been about the “framing” or “presentation”. Bad news would have to be buried.

Hardly anyone from the establishment would like to investigate what has been under the hood.

Here are AGI’s annual reports: 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013 and 2012


 
In reality, AGI has been drowning in debt!

Here are the numbers: The Company’s debt Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) since the end of 2012 to 2016 has been at a phenomenal 33.22%! Yes, THIRTY THREE percent!

Meanwhile, revenue CAGR was at a mediocre 8.16% over the same period. Moreover, net income CAGR has been at a lackluster rate of 2.72%!

Debt has grown over FOUR times revenue growth and TWELVE times net income growth!
In the 1H of 2017, the company borrowed a staggering Php 48.226 billion or 139% of its annualized net income. AGI posted a net income growth of Php 10.084 billion in the 1H

To put in perspective, 100% of AGI’s net income has inflated by debt. Or, AGI’s earnings have principally been dependent on debt! Said differently, AGI’s earnings have signified a mirage!
 
Since the company has operated in the same financial conditions for over 4 years, such underperformance cannot be discerned as anomalous. Worst, despite the supposedly upbeat sentiment by officials, the deterioration in financial conditions have only been intensifying!

AGI’s nominal outstanding debt level jumped to Php 187.888 billion in the 1H of 2017 from the Php 138.661 billion at the close of 2016. The 1H 2017 nominal level signifies a 34% increase over the company’s 2016 revenues at Php 139 billion.  Stunning!

And this implies that the Php 5 billion share buyback will be financed by debt!

Fascinatingly, AGI has resorted to such financial engineering at a time when the company’s debt has escalated at a furious pace! Why?

The massaging of earnings per share by reducing the denominator or the number of outstanding shares to boost eps PLUS the company’s tinkering of its share prices corresponds to the milieu of the blatant practice of marking the close.

Yes, manipulate the markets to foster more unsustainable invisible transfers from the public to huge debtors, such as AGI

Perhaps, AGI will use the inflation of its share prices to pay down its ever-burgeoning liabilities.

However, the fact that AGI will use a significant amount of money to create a charade of superficial positives translates to the unproductive and inefficient use of capital. Worse, the leverage it uses for such exercise will translate to greater financial risks!

Many real estate-shopping mall firms such as AGI have embodied or exemplified the remarkable illusion of prosperity brought about by credit inflation.

As I have been saying here, these are signs of historic times.

Monday, September 18, 2017

Bank for International Settlements: Global Risk ON Financed by Record Leveraged Carry Trades and Margin Debt as Balance Sheets Deteriorate, Parabolic PSEi!

In their Quarterly Review (September 2017) released yesterday, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) or the central bank of central banks described the latest global RISK ON phase

Excerpted from the BIS: (bold and underline mine)

A “risk-on” phase

As is typical for periods of low volatility and a falling dollar, a “risk-on” phase prevailed.

Against the backdrop of persistent interest rate differentials and a depreciating dollar,returns from carry trades rose sharply and EME equity and bond funds saw large inflowsduring the period under review (Graph 7, first panel). Speculative positions also pointed topatterns of broader carry trade activity: large net short positions in funding currencies, such as the yen and Swiss franc, and large net long positions in EME currencies and the Australian dollar (Graph 4, right-hand panel).

Equity market investors also employed record amounts of margin debt to lever up their investments. In fact, margin debt outstanding was substantially higher than during the dotcom boom and around 10% higher than its previous peak in 2015 (Graph 7, second panel).
 
While margin debt levels breached new records, traditional valuation benchmarks, such as long-run average price/earnings (P/E) ratios, indicated that equity valuations might be stretched. Recent market moves pushed cyclically adjusted P/E ratios for the US market further above long-run averages. Cyclically adjusted P/E ratios also exceeded this benchmark for Europe and for EMEs, though by a smaller amount (Graph 7, third panel). That said, given the unusually low bond yields, valuations may not be out of line when viewed through the lens of dividend discount models. Indeed, estimates of bond yield term premia remained unusually compressed, well below historical averages in the United States and drifting further into negative territory in the euro area (Graph 7, fourth panel). This suggests that equity markets continue to be vulnerable to the risk of a snapback in bond markets, should term premia return to more normal levels.

There were also some signs of search for yield in debt markets, as issuance volumes of leveraged loans and high-yield bonds rose while covenant standards eased. The global volume of outstanding leveraged loans, as recorded by S&P Global Market Intelligence, reached new highs (above $1 trillion). At the same time, the share of issues with covenant-lite features increased to nearly 75% from 65% a year earlier (Graph 8, left-hand panel). Covenant-lite loans place few to no restrictions on the borrowers’ actions and as such might signal a less discriminating attitude on the part of lenders while potentially fostering excessive risk-taking on the part of borrowers. According to Moody’s, the covenant-lite share in the high-yield bond market also increased while covenant quality declined to the lowest levels since Moody’s started to record these numbers in 2011.

While corporate credit spreads were tightening, the health of corporate balance sheets deteriorated. Leverage of non-financial corporates in the United States, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Europe has increased continuously in the last few years (Graph 8, first panel). Even accounting for the large cash balances outstanding, leverage conditions in the United States are the highest since the beginning of the millennium and similar to those of the early 1990s, when corporate debt ratios reflected the legacy of the leveraged buyout boom of the late 1980s. Anddespite ultra-low interest rates, the interest coverage ratio has declined significantly. While the aggregate interest coverage ratio remained well above three, a growing share of firms face interest expenses exceeding earnings before interest and taxes – so-called “zombie” firms(Graph 8, third panel).4 The share of such firms has risen especially sharply in the euro area and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the distribution of ratings has worsened (Graph 8, fourth panel). The share of investment grade companies has decreased by 10 percentage points in the United States, 20 in the euro area and 30 in the United Kingdom from 2000 to 2017. 5 The relative number of companies rated A or better has fallen especially sharply, while the share of worst rated (C or lower) companies has increased. Taken together, this suggests that, in the event of a slowdown or an upward adjustment in interest rates, high debt service payments and default risk could pose challenges to corporates, and thereby create headwinds for GDP growth.

Based on the BIS’s description, the Risk-ON climate can be summarized as record yield chasing asset boom financed by surging leverage as balance sheets deteriorates

Rings a bell?

Oh, the BSP’s free money has sparked a bacchanalian orgy at the PSE!

The Asia's most expensive stock market has just become even more offensively expensive!