Sunday, October 09, 2016

Pressure on the Philippine Markets: It’s Not Just the Economy, It’s the Politics Stupid!

This interesting (October 4) Reuter’s article “It's the economy: Duterte not main cause of Philippines market selloff” draws from a James Carville’s political campaign “It’s the economy, stupid” shibboleth (bold mine)

Philippine markets have been heavily sold down since July, primarily for economic reasons, not the festering row between new President Rodrigo Duterte and traditional ally the United States over his war on drugs, money managers say.

A slowdown in remittances from Filipinos working overseas, which have historically been a big driver of growth in the Southeast Asian nation, is a cause of concern.

For bond investors, a bigger concern is the heavy correlation between Philippine bonds and US Treasuries, and the potential for Philippine bond prices to drop as market participants prepare for the Federal Reserve to raise its near-zero rates.

"Everybody's pointing to Duterte," said Erwin Balita, a fund manager at BPI Asset Management in Manila. "But for me, it’s really the fundamentals of the country. The drop in remittances is a big game changer," he said. BPI manages around P700 billion ($14.5 billion) in the Philippines.

The Philippines is one of Asia's most active issuers of US dollar-denominated bonds. With Asia's second-highest growth rate, it has been a haven for yield-hunting foreign investors over the past couple of years… 

I see two perspectives here. One, cited experts truly believe in what they say. Or two, the above represents a press release aimed to whitewash domestic politics.

Yes, Pre Duterte Economy Has Been a Factor

If the idea is that the pre-Duterte regime economy has signified as the critical issue for the recent market weakness, then has the mainstream been finally coming into my fold?

For instance, remittance was been cited as a major factor “big game changer”.

But the decline in remittances has NOT been new (based on the government’s own data). I have been saying since time immemorial.

Remittances growth has been on a declining trend since peaking out in 2013. Yet it’s only in the 2H of 2015 where remittances have started to exhibit negative growth or contractions (see below chart/upper window). The difference was that in 2015, the BSP resorted to statistical chicanery to shield the public from learning of such negative developments. And this is one major reason why I suspected that the BSP moved to implement silent stimulate the economy in 4Q 2015 and 1Q 2016.

But remittance as “it’s the economy stupid” slogan has critically been ignored and dismissed by the mainstream consensus when the stock market rose.

As proof, the Phisix had been vertically pumped in 6 months from late January to July 2016 to almost reach the April 2015 high. The scale of vertical pumping incredibly halved the 13 month period accomplished by the 2014-2015 predecessor. Such impassioned one directional conviction essentially dismissed the influence of declining remittances on the economy.

The fundamental premise sold by the same mainstream consensus has been soaring stocks equals G-R-O-W-T-H! Period.

Remittances? Well, these were consumed by the economic black hole.

It’s only from the July 2016 data that posted a 5.4% contraction in OFW remittances which ironically coincided with the peak of the vertical pumping at the PSE that appears to have attracted expert opinion.

Aside from remittances, beyond the government's raft of “buoyant” statistics, I have repeatedly been pointing out that government revenues or taxes have likewise been on a significant downtrend.


The paradox has been while the government continues to churn out fantastic G-R-O-W-T-H or GDP numbers, revenue collections have been going in the opposite direction!

Like remittance growth, government revenue growth rates culminated in 2013 and have generally turned lower. In the 2Q 2016, government revenue growth shriveled to just 1.1% even as GDP was cited at simmering 6.8%

In the first month of the new administration or in July 2016, government revenues even contracted by a huge 4.6% as the public sector’s deficit swelled by 57%!

Just how can a rapidly growing economy see tax revenues diminish at a swift pace which almost signified a mirror image of GDP (in 2015)?  Beats me. But this represents mainstream economics. Or self-contradictingopinions from highly paid experts whose role appears to only pitch sales. Except that the advertising themes have been garbed with economic vernaculars to make them look like an economic opinion from an expert.

Even changes in eps for PSE listed firms stagnated in 2015.  Yet it took the BSP’s stoking of bank credit (silent stimulus) to boost 2Q earnings. Ironically, the BSP’s action managed to substantially boost eps conditions of a few companies which lifted the average. But this is enough because mainstream fixates only on headline issues.

Strangely, I haven’t seen the August data on the fiscal balance of the government. The Bureau of Treasury usually publishes the government’s fiscal balance during the first week of the month. Must there be some kinks for the procrastination?

As one can see, even prior to the assumption of the new administration, economic troubles have already been building. Such has been occurring underneath the torrent of survey based fabulously constructed various G-R-O-W-T-H numbers. Apparently, such has been designed to boost the animal spirits to line up the pockets of the establishment.

And du jour politics reveals of the extent of free money mentality—or the belief that money has been so abundant for them to do anything they want! That’s because, for them, costs do not exist!

This is not to exculpate the Duterte government, but to demonstrate of causality (the cause and effect relationship) in the context of ordinal sequences. Actions by the previous administrations represent the first order of causes. Actions by the current leadership aggravate on EXISTING conditions while at the same time CREATING new conditions. This represents a transition from first order to the second order (epiphenomenon)

It’s Not Just the Economy, It’s the Politics Stupid!

As a second perspective, I propounded that the comments by experts cited in the article as an official press release that masquerades as financial opinion.

Why do I say so?

Because if one reads mainstream materials, the Philippines has already achieved economic NIRVANA!

Asset prices (stocks, bonds and properties) are the only prices that have material significance to the economy, that’s the predominant themes gleaned from their literatures.

And these have been justified with a litany of statistics to prove G-R-O-W-T-H as the pillar to impulsive price chasing dynamics. And because of G-R-O-W-T-H, valuations do not matter at all!

In the mainstream’s world, costs are essentially swept under the rug. That’s because political actions, bank credit inflation and soaring asset prices can only have net benefits!

And in the mainstream’s world, because of “sound” endogenous conditions, risks can emerge only from exogenous sources.

For instance, the US Fed has served as the most convenient bogeyman for the turmoil in Philippine assets. The Fed’s proposed actions to raise interest rates have become a meme. That’s even if the FED has delayed raising rates for the sixth time! From Bloomberg September 21: “The sixth straight hold extends U.S. central bankers’ run of getting cold feet amid risks from abroad and inconsistent signs of economic strength.”

And if turbulence from risks should transpire, this will signify only "an anomaly" where the troubles will simply breeze over.  Happy days, from free lunches, will be back!

Yet fascinatingly the same report evinces signs of domestic bubbles: “The Philippines is one of Asia's most active issuers of US dollar-denominated bonds. With Asia's second-highest growth rate, it has been ahaven for yield-hunting foreign investors over the past couple of years…”

So another irony or perhaps coincidence would be that the currency, the Philippine peso has weakened from the same starting point as with remittances and government revenues—in 2013!  Have these been signs of diminishing global liquidity?

And as one of the “most active issuers of US dollar-denominated bonds”, this means that a significant part of the domestic financial system’s leverage buildup has been anchored on “US dollar shorts”. 

Many firms earn pesos just to pay such USD equivalent liabilities. Or, these firms would have to source or secure USD first (through an exchange with peso) to pay USD debts. This makes the system vulnerable to the changes in the conditions of “stocks” or “inventory” of US dollar, or the availability of US dollars.

Should a USD shortage occur, then the same borrowers will effectively scrounge for US dollars at even higher cost! As I noted last week, this has been happening now to wholesale financial markets of Europe viaeuro USD swap rates (Bloomberg September 30) and in Japan. Here’s the Financial Times October 6 on Japan’s USD crunch: “In euro-dollar and yen-dollar basis markets we have seen a strong impact,” said Camille de Courcel, an interest rate strategist at BNP Paribas. “Foreign banks have to pay more to get dollar funding and investors are using it more than in the past as well.” A three-month swap exchanging yen for dollars tied to the benchmark borrowing rate Libor has a basis of minus 75 basis points, meaning it costs the investor about 0.75 per cent over the three months to borrow dollars. This stood at just minus 30 bps at the start of the year. The increasing cost of accessing the basis market appears to be taking its toll, with volume in the yen-dollar market in September 2016 falling to its lowest level since June 2014, according to data from ClarusFT.”

And the higher cost would crimp on profits at a time when eps conditions have been fragile.

So in my view, the domestic mainstream experts may be (perhaps mis-) quoted by media as to explain current market developments in connection with current events or factors readily identifiable by readers or the “available bias”.

As a side note, I am no stranger to this. In the past, I had been occasionally interviewed and quoted by domestic media. But when media began selectively choosing my quotes to reinforce what they want to say rather than what I was talking about, I abstained and refrained from further exposures.

But then again, based on establishment literatures, risks are hardly considered as factors to the incumbent economic and financial environment. It's a one-way trade!

So it must be that the information culled from quoted experts may have been part of the PR campaign to blanch negative influences from actions made by the political leadership.

Let me rephrase or paraphrase James Carville’s “It’s the economy stupid”. From the present Philippine setting, it should be: it’s not just the economy, but it’s also the politics, stupid!

The BSP’s Derivatives Propped GIRs Will Add Pressure on the Peso, Philippine CDS Prices Soar!

And here’s more on USD shorts. The BSP declared last week that Gross International Reserves (GIR) zoomed to a new record $85.9 billion (see lower right window)

To be fair, the BSP didn’t say new record. That’s my imputation given the nominal official figures.

The BSP attributed the rise “to the National Government’s (NG) net foreign currency deposits, the BSP’s foreign exchange operations and its income from investments abroad, along with revaluation adjustments on its gold holdings resulting from the increase in the price of gold in the international market. These were partially offset by payments made by the NG for its maturing foreign exchange obligations.”

By category, GIRs rose by USD 107 million in September. Gold rose by only USD 45 million. The deficits as publicly enunciated as “maturing foreign exchange obligations” can be seen via the USD 276.5 millionretrenchment in foreign investments (lower window left pane).

In replacement, or to neutralize such deficit, the BSP used “foreign exchange operations” or the forward derivatives book to the tune of USD 328 million to reach a record high of USD 2.3 billion! (upper window)

In other words, the BSP has been borrowing USD at record amounts to cosmetically embellish the USD stock of the Philippine financial system!!!!

Aside from forex derivatives, it is likely that 5%+ growth in USD debt incurred by the Philippine government as noted by the Bureau of Treasury data over the past 13 months may have been partly channeled to bolster BSP reserves

Unless an audit will be authorized, the public will never know the true nature of “international reserves” held or stashed at the BSP.

Given the amplified weakness in the peso, it’s pretty much obvious that all these must have been contrived to stabilize the peso through the illusion of ampleness or the supposed wall of USD stocks.

The fact that the currency (USD php) market “disagrees” or brazenly distances itself with the BSP’s statistics reveals that either the currency market recognizes the artificiality of the GIR conditions, or that they have been projecting future weakness through a massive deterioration of the GIRs, most likely from an explosive rise in budget deficits due to huge expansion in public spending, or a perceived weakness in the economy or both!

And while the BSP thinks that artificial props may be enough to reverse or contain the surge in USD demand, official USD borrowing or US shorts used to shore up international reserves through wholesale finance can only accelerate the decline of the peso and international reserves by shifting funding disruption into the future.

And beyond all the statistical artifices and PR campaign mounted by establishment apparatchiks where the popularity of leadership has been reasserted as the primary force of the evolving state of the Philippine political economy, the same Reuter’s article reiterates the warning by US credit rating agency S&P on the Philippines.

Meanwhile, one fallout of Duterte's erratic behavior is likely to be the Philippines' sovereign ratings. Standard & Poor's rating agency has warned that the unpredictability over his policies could undermine the chances of an upgrade for the Philippines and might even lead to a downgrade of the country's BBB/A-2 investment grade rating.


Not only does it seem that the public is being conditioned for a credit downgrade (it’s the second time in less than a month for S&P to air such threats), aside from the peso, the cost to insure Philippine debt or 5 year CDS (based on Deutsche Bank data) has spiraled to pre-election highs!

And any further price spikes in Philippine CDS that exceeds the January 2016 highs will most likely presage a credit downgrade!

And this should be expected given the sustained antagonistic, brinkmanship and blackmail geopolitics embraced by the leadership just to promote an ochlocratic dictatorship!

The spike in CDS means the price of credit goes up. A downgrade institutionalizes diminished access or more costly access to credit.

Downgrades are just a part of the many potential ramifications from present policies.

The other templates (discussed last week): reduction of investments, portfolio and credit flows and diminished access not only to credit but to investments as well, heightened risks of economic and financial sanctions, geopolitical isolationism, and political destabilization. The ultimate black swan could be a shooting war with the US government.

One thing leads to another. Eventually, the establishment may not able hide the adverse consequences from the actions of the leadership who will serve as the accelerator not only to the unraveling of the mounting economic and financial imbalances inherited by this government from the previous two regimes but more importantly, to the fresh risk horizon they have created.

Actions have consequences. Present political developments have exhibited consequences that have emerged faster than I thought it would.

Final Thoughts: Why the September CPI Surge Bodes Ill for Domestic Consumption

By the way, I was right, the USD peso did retrace (-.4%). There may be more pullback considering the sizeable overbought conditions from the vertical climb. USD Php 48 should be a buying entry point.

But watch for the next leg up!

And another thing, actions have consequences, the cost of the BSP silent stimulus has emerged in the form of higher CPI (no data yet for M3 and bank loans).

The BSP declared that CPI soared to 2.3% September from 1.8% in August. The BSP noted that the uptick in inflation for September was traced mainly to higher price increases in key food items particularly fish, fruit, as well as oils and fats. Rice prices were also higher due to the ongoing lean season while vegetable prices were pushed up by tightness in domestic supply owing to weather-related production disruptions. At the same time, upward price adjustments of selected domestic petroleum products also contributed to higher non-food inflation.”

Higher CPI must have also been a factor to the peso’s weakness

Yet forces that have most likely contributed significantly to the surge in September CPI.

One, a likely spike in September bank loans and subsequently M3. Two, a weak peso.  Three, huge public sector deficit in September from a massive increase in government spending on the bureaucracy (possibly even infrastructure). Four, a combination of the above.

While the political segments of the political economy may have acquired additional purchasing power due to mandatory increases in pay and from an expanded bureaucracy, this will come with enlarged deficits that will be financed by present taxes and or future taxes (higher debt, higher taxes) and or BSP monetization (inflation) of deficits.

Resident consumers have hardly recovered from the stealth raid on the purchasing power of their peso through 10 months of 30+++% money supply growth that spiked CPI to 4.9% in 2013-2014, now comes a resurgence of government’s measure of CPI!

Regardless of what government “rosy” data say, I believe that it won’t take another 4.9% CPI to substantially attenuate consumer spending.

That’s because whatever spending bonanza that has graced tax consumers will come at the immediate expense of tax producers. And not only will investments and job growth slow, consumption from the tax producers will materially languish.

With the present direction towards an ochlocratic dictatorship, tax consumers will continue to gnaw at resources of tax producers at a rapid clip.

As a dear friend recently suggested, aside from foreign currencies, perhaps an insurance against having one’s standard of living from being sustainably plundered is to become a tax consumer.

Hmmm.

Wednesday, October 05, 2016

Newton’s Law Lives! TEL Surrenders 100% of May-July Run

Last June, when TEL had furiously been pushed higher, and where the push had been popularly anchored on the supposed success of the 4G deal, I wrote:

TEL was, in part, responsible for the shoring up of the index. That’s because another hysteric bidding episode sent TEL prices to the sky! The firm’s share price closed up by an astounding 4.9%! Since its milestone low at 1,624 in May 24, 2016, the largest Philippine Telco company have accrued a mindblowing 29.55% in just 11 trading days! 

TEL has been no stranger to major and minor boom-bust cycles, though.

So far, the magnified intensity and fantastic speed of TEL’s parabolic moves seems to parallel the firm’s share price activities during the 1998-1999 saga.

Yet the justification for these wild bidding sessions has been the joint acquisition by the duopoly, TELand GLO of SMC’s “4G”. Albeit such deal officially transformed the duopoly into a monopoly. As explained before, technology and growth are not written on the stone. Many other factors as prices, income, monopoly and politics will play a big role in determining the success of the rollout.

Finally…

Also note that there was a short parabolic bout when TEL set a new record in September 2014. Unfortunately Newton’s Third Law of motion—For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction—became reality. So the mini boom eventually ended with essentially all the gains returned!

Yet this will serve as template to most of TEL’s historical performance

Apparently, history has repeated again!

 
As of today's close, PLDT has surrendered 100% of its 33% May to July meltup!

Newton’s Law Lives!

Sunday, October 02, 2016

USD Peso Stages Breakaway Run! Correction Due; Global Liquidity Conditions, Like Deutsche Bank and Euro Money Market’s Dilemma will Play a Role


The Philippine peso was clobbered this week by 1.06% for the fifth consecutive week of losses. The USD 
phpclosed at 48.50 for the week.



The peso presently owns the tiara as Asia’s worst performing currency on a week on week (top) basis, as well as, year to date basis.

Malaysia’s ringgit has been the second runner-up for the week, while the peso has supplanted the Chinese yuan as tailender on a year to date basis.

 
In my view, the sharp vertical uptick of the USD php has now reached severely overbought levels and could be bound for material contraction or Newton’s law.

But since the currency markets have the tendency to be more volatile, thus Newton’s law may not be as effective as they apply to stocks. But they still apply.

History shows the way.

Over the past three years or since 2013, the USD php has spiked FOUR times.

The biggest vertical move occurred during the taper tantrum where the USD peso soared 7.4% in one monthand two weeks. Newton’s law has not appeared here.

The second leg of the USD php run had another 5.5% vertical run (on top of the 7.4%). It was here where Newton’s law emerged to erase all the gains of the second leg

But the gains from the first leg had virtually been unscathed or untouched.

Newton’s law only took the froth off the second leg but maintained the gains of the first leg which served as a staging point for the third leg.

The third leg was during the 3Q of 2015 where the USD php surged by 4%. Newton’s law reemerged but didn’t take back all of the gains.

That’s because the USD php crawled back to hit a high of 47.995 last January 26 in harmony with the downturn in global markets.

When global central banks went on a full-scale rescue of the stock market via the Shanghai accord where negative rates were implemented, this coincided with the BSP’s unleashing of the stimulus, so along with local stocks, the peso rallied.

But unlike stocks which rebounded furiously, the peso’s ascent had virtually been capped.

As I have noted here, the inverse correlation between the peso and stocks seem to have been broken. It’s only recently where the correlation seems to have been resurrected.

Present events signify as the fourth leg of the USD php upside trend. As of Friday’s close at Php 48.5, this serves as a BREAKAWAY run from the January 26 high.

Such breakaway run makes the USD php at 50 (November 2008 high) a visible horizon.

That’s most likely a target AFTER the USD corrects or sloughs off some of its overbought conditions.

Interestingly, from the close of 2012, the USD php has delivered 18.1% in returns, over the same period the Phisix generated 31.2%.

So the Phisix massively outclassed the USD php. But if I am right those fortunes will soon reverse.

Prices of exchange rates are fundamentally a product of demand and supply.

The surge in USD php has presently been from greater demand for the USD than the peso.

As I have previously observed, this may be a knee-jerk reaction, there may be a real run on the peso, and finally, the peso has been used as a political weapon by geopolitical forces.

Yet this has been happening ironically in the face of reported record GIRs




The BSP also reported its August banking system’s loan conditions as well as the liquidity conditions last week. While the bank loan growth remains substantially elevated (at 4Q 2014 levels), fascinatingly, money supply M3 has sharply decelerated to 11.8% from 13.1%.

It is as if lots of bank borrowers have stopped spending. So the funds that they have borrowed may have been used to hoard cash, pay down debt or buy USD.

And a sustained fall in M3 will likely translate to a downside trajectory for NGDP and nominal sales.

Yet even at 11.8% money supply growth remains a rapid clip. This shows the longer term supply influence of the peso to the exchange rate

 
Another curiosity, growth of government’s external debt plunged to 2.68% last August from the 6-8% range it registered during the past 9 months. Has the government raised sufficient taxes, as well as USD dollars last August enough to cover its deficits last July?

Or has the present improvement been part of the PR campaign to embellish statistics to bolster the peso and the economy’s conditions?

Lastly, not everything will be about the domestic conditions. Global factors will increasingly come into the picture.

The unfolding banking crisis in Europe will also play a big role.

So as with the surging LIBOR and TED spreads in the US (largely blamed to 2a7 reforms), the untamed China’s interbank rate Shibor, and the still ongoing problems Japan’s banking system, as well as, Saudi Arabia’s liquidity problems

It took rumors that Deutsche Bank reached a settlement with the US justice department worth $5.4 billion in fines which have been  far lower than the original $14 billion to stem the collapse in share prices last week.

Because of the massive short positions on Deutsche Bank’s shares, the rumor impelled for an intense short covering which lifted global stocks on Friday. DB soared 14.02% last Friday where the market cap was last at $17.7 billion (yahoo Finance).

And because of a holiday in Germany in Monday, regulators have become so sensitive to any potential liquidity squeezes for them to float temporary responses.

Like Wells Fargo, several employees at the Deutsche Bank have also been charged by the Italian government for creating false accounts. So aside from financial woes, impropriety will partly play a role in the coming sessions.

Rumors have been floated that DB will be rescued, but German’s media says that the German governmentwon’t do this. A bailout by the German government would set a precedent for Italian government to bailout its besieged banks, which the German government has stridently opposed. In my view, further stress in the market will force their hands. But whether the bailouts or bailins will be successful is another matter.

And anent the lingering bank and financial concerns, it’s not just DB, Germany’s second-largest bank Commerzbank announced that it would cut dividends and slash 9,600 jobs. Netherland’s largest lender, theING will also announce job cuts this week. So even banks in creditor nations of Europe are being affected.

Incidentally, USD liquidity conditions have been stretched out at the money markets in Europe such that the cost to borrow USD via cross currency swaps has risen to 2012 levels. And it’s not just in Europe, hedging cost for the USD yen also via cross currency swaps have experienced a “blowout”. These are signs of USD shortages.

The ongoing liquidity shortages have become apparent such that the Saudi Arabian government had to inject $5.3 billion into the banking system to tame surging interest rates and contain stress in her currency, the riyal. 
As the chart from the Alhambra Partners shows, the surge in US TED spread has mirrored (inverse) DB’s share prices (along with many other price signals including treasury fails) way back to 2014.

As the prolific analyst and research manager Jeffrey Snider wrote:

While attention is rightly focused on Deutsche Bank it is only so because the bank is the most visible symptom being the most vulnerable participant in this “something.” DB is just an outbreak so prominent that the mainstream can no longer pretend there is nothing worth reporting – but they can still obscure why that might be, focusing on the canard about the DOJ settlement. This is a systemic issue, one that is as plain as Deutsche’s stock price.

Liquidity risk is indicated pretty much everywhere, a direct assault not just on mainstream conventions about monetary policy but monetary competency itself.

Use any weakness in the USD to accumulate.