Whac-a-Mole Economics: The Week the Philippine Financial Markets Cracked

 

There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue: 

Whac-a-Mole Economics: The Week the Philippine Financial Markets Cracked

I. The Peso and Bonds Send the Bill

II. Intervention Meets Its Limits

III. When Liquidity Loses Its Punch

IV. Whac-a-Mole Is a Displacement Mechanism

V. The PSEi’s Engineered Pumps Amidst Worsening Breadth

VI. Conclusion: Cracks in the Feedback Loop, The Bursting Bubble in Motion 

Whac-a-Mole Economics: The Week the Philippine Financial Markets Cracked 

The peso broke records, sovereign yields broke out, and the PSEi needed another round of mechanical props. 

Figure 1 

There is little appreciation of how eventful this week was for Philippine financial markets. Three pressure points flashed warning signals almost simultaneously: the peso, government bonds, and equities. (Figure 1, upper window) 

I. The Peso and Bonds Send the Bill 

USDPHP hit a record 62.90 on Thursday and closed Friday at 62.801. It was the 26th record-high milestone of 2026. As the records multiply, day-on-day changes have compressed while volume has remained moderate. (Figure 1, lower image) 

A market discovering a price produces wider ranges as it travels. A market being walked produces tight ranges at each new level. The pattern is consistent with managed price adjustment. Simply put, this is intervention.

Figure 2 

September 2026's GIR figures—$100 billion, a three year low—offer another clue to the cost of that management: The BSP’s FX policy regime is eroding. (Figure 2, topmost pane) 

Meanwhile, most of the BVAL yield curve broke its April–May 2026 peak, into multi-year highs. The 20- and 25-year yields surged 69.26 and 70.38 basis points for the week. (Figure 2, middle visual) 

Treasury bills jumped too: 36.31 bps for one month, 24.03 bps for three months, and 26.72 bps for six months. Intermediate maturities, from one to seven years, rose by 5.11 to 25.03 bps. 

Each cluster prices a different risk. The belly prices inflation. The bills price a BSP that will have to follow with hikes. (Figure 2, lowest graph) 

The 20-to-25-year sector must be held by someone willing to carry duration with no policy backstop, so it is the market price of fiscal credibility. 

The ten-year yield slipped below 8% on Friday to 7.8737%, but remained above its May 20 high of 7.8094%. The 20- and 25-year yields, at 8.1976% and 8.2003%, are well past their recent highs. The pattern points to bearish steepening, driven primarily by the long end. 

Essentially, the long end prices the state itself: expected inflation, future financing needs, and the premium investors demand to carry sovereign duration

Figure 3 

The thin market is part of the finding, not an excuse for it. Daily Treasury turnover has been weakening with daily turnover headed toward 2024 levels. (Figure 3, upper diagram) 

September's PDS-reported volume of Php 613.8 billion was the lowest of 2026, below the 2024 monthly average. Simply put, yields rose even as turnover fell or mounting losses have led to reduced transactions. This is also a sign of the corrosion of savings. 

Notwithstanding, the timing is awkward for the BSP's J.P. Morgan emerging-market bond inclusion plan. Peso-denominated government and corporate bonds will adopt international pricing conventions for settlement effective January 4, 2027. The plumbing is being built just as bond prices fall at home and abroad. Amazing. 

Leave no doubt, better infrastructure does not mechanically buy better prices. 

The bond vigilantes need not stage a rebellion. They only need to charge more for financing the state. 

II. Intervention Meets Its Limits 

The convenient explanations are already available: fare hikes, September's 7.2% CPI, the August employment bounce, elevated oil prices, foreign bond vigilantes, and September's second-largest GIR decline of the year, driven by other reserve assets (ORA) and gold. 

These matter. But they are triggers and symptoms, not the entire panorama. 

But the most critical force—the unseen—is the domestic ledger. 

Global rates set the tide; they do not determine the entire slope of a local yield curve, because the slope is where local risk resides. 

With Q3 closed, quarter-end spending and financing requirements add to a fiscal position already burdened by record debt and twin deficits, as discussed in Stagflation Part 17. 

The bond’s long end is reading the domestic ledger. 

III. When Liquidity Loses Its Punch 

The credit market offers another clue. Philippine sovereign CDS—the cost of insuring against sovereign default—registered Asia's largest weekly widening as of October 8, according to ADB's AsianBondsOnline data, while Indonesia and Vietnam moved in mixed directions. (Figure 3, lower chart) 

Figure 4 

The bond market tells the same story. 

The Iran war’s oil shock helped push the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield above 5.3%, before it retreated to 5.24% by this week’s close (October 9th). Yet ASEAN’s 10-year yields were comparatively subdued—except the Philippines, which crossed 8% on October 8. (Figure 4, upper image) 

More significantly, the Bloomberg reported last week that Philippine bonds were the worst-performing in emerging markets since the Iran war began, losing 13% in dollar terms across an index tracking 19 emerging markets. (Figure 4, lower diagram)

To repeat, worst performing. 

The 10-year yield's surge, the peso's slide, and the widening CDS spread are converging signals of Philippine-specific stress—not merely collateral damage from global tightening. 

The Philippines is becoming an outlier in both sovereign credit risk and bond performance. 

Think about what has actually been happening. 

Global tightening is not transmitted evenly: the weakest links feel it first. As liquidity's marginal effects diminish, the periphery begins to crack, potentially transmitting stress toward the core. 

This is the reverse Cantillon effect—liquidity withdrawal exposing the malinvestments and the most fragile balance sheets first that easy money had kept afloat. 

Financial structures built around cheap liquidity do not adjust painlessly when that regime changes. 

What looks like isolated market weakness may be structural unwinding—a clearing phase for malinvestments, not merely another market event. 

IV. Whac-a-Mole Is a Displacement Mechanism 

When the sustained widening savings-investment gap is papered over with administered prices, relief measures, and managed FX, the adjustment does not vanish. 

It relocates to the next weakest valve. 

Suppress CPI and the pressure shows up in the peso. Lean on the peso and it shows up in yields. Prop the yields and it shows up in equities. This week all three showed it at once. 

V. The PSEi’s Engineered Pumps Amidst Worsening Breadth 

Monday's (October 5) low-volume pump lifted the PSEi by 2.03%. The record-low peso and yield breakout then coincided with a 2.2% plunge on Thursday, bringing the index within reach of its November 14, 2025 low of 5,584. Note that this low came amidst stable yields.

Figure 5

Friday’s 1.6% rebound came from the same post-recess “afternoon delight” seen pattern seen last Monday and Thursday with ICTSI supplying a third of the day’s gain and a pre-close dump once again. (Figure 5, topmost window) 

For the week, the index closed up 1.28%, or 71.96 points, with SM, AC, and MER contributing about 58.4% of the gain. (Figure 5, middle graph) 

The index's 18–12 breadth contrasted with PSE-wide breadth of 431 advancers to 484 decliners, extending the deterioration in broader participation for a fifth week. (Figure 5, lowest diagram) 

Average daily Main Board volume fell 23.23%, from Php 5.95 billion to Php 4.57 billion 

The benchmark rose. Participation weakened. 

An index lifted by three names, against a falling-volume, seller-leaning market, measures the headlines, not the economy. 

Hayek's insight on dispersed knowledge applies. Prices are supposed to compress information held by millions of participants. 

When benchmark mechanics steer attention and capital, the price reflects index-driven flows instead of entrepreneurial discovery, and the exchange’s allocative function degrades. 

Figaro Culinary's planned delisting is the latest symptom. It joins the broader pattern of departures and proposed exits, including Asian Terminals, City & Land Developers, Robinsons Retail, and MerryMart.

Figure 6 

This helps explain why the PSEi remains one of Asia's laggards despite years of easy money, why the PSE’s active investor participation has strikingly weakened, and why delistings keep accumulating. (Figure 6, upper window) 

Capital markets should connect savings to productive investment, MSMEs included. Instead, the incumbent policy environment skews the playing field toward politically connected oligarchic interests. 

VI. Conclusion: Cracks in the Feedback Loop, the Bursting Bubble in Motion 

The PSEi’s relationship with 10-year government bond yields is more than a chart pattern. (Figure 6, lower chart) 

Rising yields raise the discount rate applied to future earnings, increase financing costs, and make equities less attractive relative to fixed-income alternatives. 

But the transmission runs both ways: sovereign stress also affects bank balance sheets, credit allocation, and the economy underpinning corporate earnings. 

The peso, bonds, and equities are entwined through financing costs, bank balance sheets, capital allocation, and purchasing power. 

Higher yields penalize the heavily indebted: the government, conglomerates, and banks financing both. 

• Currency weakness raises imported-energy, food and manufacturing costs. 
• Inflation squeezes real incomes, while slower economic growth makes debt service harder. 
• Banks are not detached observers of fiscal stress; as counterparties, they are among its primary transmission channels. 

Once again, as liquidity tightens, the weakest links are exposed first. Stress can then travel from the periphery toward the financial system's core, threatening structures built around years of cheap money. 

An engineered rebound can restore certain index level/s. It cannot restore purchasing power, erase debt, or manufacture the savings investment requires. 

The Whac-a-Mole game continues. The problem is that the moles are connected, and the mallet is getting heavier. 

This is the bursting bubble in motion.

Philippine Oil Shock Politics Meets Systemic Fragility: Crisis Without a Crisis and a Deepening Web of Interventions

 

The picture of the free market is necessarily one of harmony and mutual benefit; the picture of State intervention is one of caste conflict, coercion, and exploitation—Murray N. Rothbard

 In this issue:

Philippine Oil Shock Politics Meets Systemic Fragility: Crisis Without a Crisis and a Deepening Web of Interventions

I. Crisis Without a Crisis

II. Oil Shock Politics and Organized Interests

III. The Ratchet Effect of Crisis Policy

IV. The Oil Shock Is Already Affecting the Real Economy

V. When Price Signals Are Suppressed

VI. Interventions Beget Interventions

VII. Markets Are Already Responding

VIII. Conclusion: Deepening Interventions Intensify Systemic Fragility 

Philippine Oil Shock Politics Meets Systemic Fragility: Crisis Without a Crisis and a Deepening Web of Interventions 

“Crisis Without a Crisis”: As officials urge calm, subsidies, price caps, and emergency policies spread across the economy. 

I. Crisis Without a Crisis 

The Marcos administration is urging the public not to panic: "Everything is normal. No need to hoard." 

Officials have repeatedly warned consumers against hoarding while insisting that the Philippine economy remains stable despite the surge in global oil prices. 

Yet the government’s own policy actions suggest a very different reality. 

Within days of the oil shock, authorities introduced a rapidly expanding set of interventions across multiple sectors of the economy: 

• fuel subsidies for transport operators, with discussions of extending support to commuters
• suspension of public transport fare increases
• 50 percent fare discounts for MRT and LRT passengers
• suspension of toll rate hikes and applying steep discounts
• investigations into gasoline stations accused of overpricing, imposing early unauthorized price hikes, and carrying out sudden closures
• voluntary price freezes from processed food manufacturers
• discussions on imposing price caps on imported rice
• plans to suspend mandatory biofuel blending requirements
• and signals from the Palace that a state of emergency remains under consideration 

At the same time, the political debate is widening. 

Senator Tito Sotto has filed legislation to repeal the Oil Deregulation Law, while economist Winnie Monsod has proposed a wealth tax to finance expanding subsidies. 

Taken together, these measures resemble a broad attempt to suppress the transmission of rising energy costs throughout the economy. 

But the deeper story may lie in the political incentives behind such policies. 

II. Oil Shock Politics and Organized Interests 

The response to the oil shock reflects dynamics long described by political economist Mancur Olson. 

In Olson’s theory of collective action, small, well-organized interest groups often exert disproportionate influence over economic policy. Because their benefits are concentrated while the costs are widely dispersed, these groups are able to secure subsidies, protections, or regulatory advantages from government. 

Energy shocks tend to accelerate this process. Some examples: 

• Transport operators seek subsidies to offset fuel costs.
• Food producers lobby for relief from input price pressures.
• Agricultural sectors push for price supports.
• Infrastructure operators also seek regulatory relief when shocks threaten profitability. 

For instance, the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) is considering power rate adjustments in April that would allow utilities to recover rising generation costs and financial losses. Similar pressures have already appeared in earlier policy discussions—from real property tax (RPT) relief for power producers to increased GEA-All subsidies benefiting renewable producers, as well as negotiated asset transfers in the SMC–Meralco–AEV energy deal—illustrating how fragile sectors increasingly rely on regulatory protection when market conditions deteriorate. 

Each group frames its demands as necessary for stability, employment, or consumer protection. 

The result is an expanding patchwork of sector-specific interventions. 

Individually, each measure may appear justified. Collectively, however, they create a growing system of economic management in which prices and incentives are increasingly shaped by political decisions rather than market signals. The result is an expanding patchwork of sector-specific interventions. Intensifying competition for public resources drives rising demands for government spending, crowding out the productive economy and accelerating the centralization of the economy. 

III. The Ratchet Effect of Crisis Policy 

Economic historian Robert Higgs described a recurring pattern in government responses to crises: what he called the "ratchet effect." 

During emergencies—wars, financial crises, pandemics, or commodity shocks—governments introduce extraordinary interventions to stabilize politically sensitive sectors of the economy. These measures are typically framed as temporary responses to exceptional circumstances. 

Yet once the crisis subsides, the state rarely returns fully to its previous size or scope. 

Instead, some interventions remain in place, while others leave behind new fiscal commitments, regulatory authorities, or political expectations of continued support. Each crisis therefore pushes the boundary of government involvement forward in a stepwise fashion—much like a mechanical ratchet that moves only in one direction. 

The Philippines’ pandemic episode illustrates this dynamic clearly.

Figure 1

During the COVID crisis, fiscal deficits widened to record levels, justified as emergency stimulus designed to cushion the economic collapse. (Figure 1, upper window) 

Yet much of that spending expansion became structurally embedded in the fiscal framework. Political pressures for continued subsidies and transfers, created under the purview of social democratic free-lunch politics, have made these programs difficult to unwind even after the emergency has passed. 

As a result, the country’s savings–investment gap widened to unprecedented levels, financed by historically high public borrowing and still-elevated liquidity conditions, as reflected in measures such as the M2-to-GDP ratio. These dynamics have increased the economy’s sensitivity to inflation while intensifying crowding-out pressures already evident in domestic output, consumption, and credit markets. 

Energy shocks historically amplify this ratchet dynamic. 

Subsidies introduced to stabilize transport costs become permanent programs. Temporary price controls evolve into long-term regulatory oversight. Emergency fiscal transfers create new political expectations that governments will shield key sectors from market fluctuations.

The Philippine response to the current oil shock risks reinforcing this pattern. Policies such as fare subsidies, price caps, toll suspensions, and regulatory enforcement may begin as short-term measures to contain inflation and social unrest. 

But once introduced, they often prove politically difficult to reverse. 

Over time, repeated crisis interventions accumulate into a broader system of economic management—expanding the role of the state while leaving the underlying structural vulnerabilities unresolved. 

IV. The Oil Shock Is Already Affecting the Real Economy 

Signs of strain were emerging. 

Automobile sales had already begun to decline, even before the latest surge in oil prices, suggesting that rising fuel costs have yet to add to the erosion of discretionary consumption. (Figure 1, lower chart) 

Transport activity is now reflecting the same pressures. 

Reports indicate that the MMDA expects vehicle traffic in Metro Manila to decrease by around 30,000 units. Meanwhile, bus trips at the Parañaque Integrated Terminal Exchange (PITX) have dropped significantly, as operators scale back services and commuters reduce their travel. 

Air travel is also absorbing the shock. Airlines have begun imposing higher jet fuel surcharges, raising the cost of domestic and international flights. 

The shock is also beginning to affect overseas labor flows. Filipino workers continue to be repatriated from conflict areas in the Middle East, with roughly 2,000 overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) already returning to the country. While still modest in scale, such movements highlight another channel through which geopolitical shocks can affect the Philippine economy. Remittances from OFWs have long served as a stabilizing source of foreign exchange for the peso. Disruptions to overseas employment—particularly in energy-sensitive regions—therefore risk amplifying pressures already visible in labor, currency and financial markets. 

These adjustments illustrate the normal transmission mechanism of an energy shock: rising fuel prices ripple through transport, logistics, and consumer spending. 

Instead of allowing those adjustments to occur through price changes, the government is intervening across multiple points in the transmission chain. 

V. When Price Signals Are Suppressed 

Economists such as Friedrich von Hayek emphasized that prices function as a decentralized information system: "the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place." 

Prices communicate knowledge about scarcity, costs, and consumer preferences across millions of economic actors. 

When governments suppress those signals—through fare freezes, price caps, subsidies, or regulatory pressure—the information embedded in prices becomes distorted. 

Consumers may continue to demand goods whose true costs are rising. 

Producers may reduce supply when prices no longer cover costs. 

Adjustments that would normally occur through prices instead emerge as reduced service, shortages, declines in quantity or quality, and even fiscal transfers. 

In this sense, partial price controls recreate elements of the problem identified by Ludwig von Mises in his critique of socialist planning: when prices are manipulated, rational economic calculation becomes increasingly difficult. As the great Mises explained, 

Without calculation, economic activity is impossible. 

VI. Interventions Beget Interventions 

Once price controls begin to distort economic signals, additional interventions often follow. 

This dynamic was emphasized by Murray Rothbard, who argued that government interventions frequently generate secondary effects that policymakers then attempt to correct with further interventions. 

• Fare caps create losses for transport operators, prompting subsidies.
• Price freezes create supply pressures, prompting enforcement actions.
• Rising fiscal costs generate calls for new taxes or regulatory changes. 

Each policy attempts to fix the unintended consequences of the previous one. 

Over time, what begins as a limited intervention can evolve into a broad regime of economic management, representing a gradual transition toward centralization. As the dean of Austrian economics, the great Murray Rothbard wrote,

Whenever government intervenes in the market, it aggravates rather than settles the problems it has set out to solve. This is a general economic law of government intervention. 

VII. Markets Are Already Responding 

While policymakers attempt to stabilize prices and shield consumers from the oil shock, financial markets appear to be reacting to the broader macroeconomic implications.

Figure 2

The PSEi 30, the primary equity benchmark of the Philippine Stock Exchange, has declined, although the drop has been relatively muted—likely reflecting institutional support and collateral management dynamics. (Figure 2, topmost graph) 

Other markets are sending a more cautionary signal. The peso has weakened significantly, with the USD/PHP exchange rate reaching a record high of 60.1 this week, making it one of the worst-performing currencies in Asia. 

At the same time, the government bond market has undergone a structural shift. 

Philippine Treasury yields have moved from bearish flattening to bearish steepening, with long-term yields rising faster than shorter maturities over the past week. Such shifts often reflect growing concerns about inflation persistence, fiscal sustainability, or sovereign risk. (Figure 2, lower chart)

Figure 3

As of March 19, Philippine 10-year Treasuries ranked as the worst-performing bond market segment in Asia (Figure 3, upper table) 

Although the current spike in T-bill yields may not yet prompt a response from the BSP, it is important to note that its policies are shaped more by market developments than by its own actions. The directional movement of one-month T-bill yields has historically preceded BSP policy shifts, including rate cuts in 2018 and 2023–2024, and rate hikes in 2022. (Figure 3, lower image) 

Thus, if the upward trajectory of T-bill rates persists, rate hikes are likely to come onto the BSP’s radar.

Figure 4

These concerns are not unfounded. The Philippines already faces record debt-service burdens amid persistent fiscal deficits. (Figure 4, topmost pane) 

Expanding subsidies and price controls risk adding further pressure on the government’s balance sheet. 

According to ADB data, the Philippines has recorded the largest increase in credit default swap (CDS) spreads since the outbreak of the Middle East conflict—indicating that markets are pricing in higher default risk for Philippine debt. (Figure 4, middle and lower charts)

VIII. Conclusion: Deepening Interventions Intensify Systemic Fragility 

What is unfolding may not simply be a temporary response to a spike in global oil prices. 

Rather, the episode illustrates how modern interventionist economies evolve when confronted with external shocks. 

As Mancur Olson observed, mature political systems tend to accumulate powerful distributional coalitions—organized groups capable of securing targeted protections, subsidies, and regulatory advantages from the state. Energy shocks often accelerate this process as sectors facing sudden cost increases mobilize to shift those costs elsewhere. 

The result is a widening network of state interventions designed to stabilize politically sensitive sectors. 

But crisis interventions rarely remain temporary. Economic historian Robert Higgs described this dynamic as the ratchet effect: during periods of emergency, governments expand their role in managing the economy, and once the crisis passes, those powers rarely return fully to their previous limits. 

Each shock therefore leaves behind a larger structure of fiscal commitments, regulatory authority, and political expectations of continued support. 

Once prices begin to be suppressed in this way, the informational role of markets deteriorates—a problem emphasized by Friedrich Hayek. Prices no longer convey reliable signals about scarcity and cost, making economic coordination increasingly difficult. 

This is where the broader critique developed by Ludwig von Mises becomes relevant. When governments repeatedly intervene to correct the unintended consequences of earlier policies, economic management gradually expands across more sectors of the economy. Mises described this process as the dynamic of interventionism—a cycle in which policy distortions generate new problems that invite further intervention. 

The Philippine response to the oil shock increasingly reflects this pattern. 

• Fare caps require subsidies.
• Price freezes invite enforcement.
• Rising fiscal costs trigger proposals for new taxes or regulatory changes. 

Each populist band-aid policy attempts to stabilize the distortions created by the previous one. 

What emerges is not a single intervention but an expanding system of economic management—one reinforced by the ratchet effect of successive crises. 

And when such systems face external shocks—particularly commodity shocks that simultaneously affect inflation, trade balances, and fiscal accounts—the pressures tend to migrate toward the weakest macroeconomic points: the government’s fiscal position, the sovereign debt market, and the currency. 

The oil shock may therefore be revealing something deeper about the Philippine economy. 

Rather than simply confronting higher energy prices, policymakers appear to be navigating the accumulated tensions of an interventionist regime already stretched across multiple sectors—and increasingly across the economy as a whole. 

Suppressing the immediate price effects of the shock may buy time—but it also risks amplifying underlying maladjustments. 

Importantly, it cannot eliminate the adjustment the economy must eventually make. At best it postpones that process, increasing the risk that the eventual correction will be larger and more disorderly. 

And markets—especially currency and sovereign bond markets—tend to recognize that reality long before policymakers do.

 

The 2024 Pre-SONA Pump: Philippine PSEi 30 Soars to 6,800 - History, Details, and Effects

In economics, hope and faith coexist with great scientific pretension and also a deep desire for respectability—John Kenneth Galbraith 

In this issue

The 2024 Pre-SONA Pump: Philippine PSEi 30 Soars to 6,800 - History, Details, and Effects

I. 2024 SONA Pump: Are Philippine Stocks and the Peso Immune to Global De-Risking and Deleveraging?

II. The History of BBM's Pre-SONA PSEi 30 Pumps 

III. Explaining the Index Pump: Concentrated Gains and Rotational Activities

IV. 2024 SONA Pumps: Concentrated Trading Activities amidst Decadent Volume

V. 2024 SONA Pumps: Concentration in Broker Activities with Marginal Brokers Squeezed Dry 

VI. More Signs of Liquidity Squeeze: Decaying Market Depth and Weakening Market Breadth 

VII. Divergent Signals from the SONA 2024 Pump: Key Points to Ponder

VIII. 2024 SONA Pump: Foreign Money Cushions Domestic Savings Deficiency

IX. 2024 SONA Pump: Engineered by Domestic Financial Institutions?

X. 2024 SONA PUMP: PSEi 30 at 6,800: Windfall from Liquidity Expansion and Conclusion 

The 2024 Pre-SONA Pump: Philippine PSEi 30 Soars to 6,800 - History, Details, and Effects 

As the Philippine President is about to deliver his third SONA, the PSEi 30 has surged for a fourth straight week to 6,800. What makes these gains artificial? 

I. 2024 SONA Pump: Are Philippine Stocks and the Peso Immune to Global De-Risking and Deleveraging? 

The Philippine PSEi 30 closed the week ending July 19th just shy of the 6,800 level. 

Philstar.com, July 20: The local stock market inched its way closer to the 6,800-level, finishing the week on a high note despite a downtrend in Asian shares. The local stock market inched its way closer to the 6,800-level, finishing the week on a high note despite a downtrend in Asian shares… a stronger peso and optimistic economic prospects buoyed local market sentiment… also anticipating the second quarter corporate earnings results. 

In addition to the above, 'strong net foreign buying' contributed to this outperformance. 

Previously, a more prominent explanation had been expectations of rate cuts by the Fed and potential monetary easing by the BSP. 

Financial market news coverage has been mechanically influenced by current events—specifically, the 'availability bias' described in post hoc narratives: because of this event, therefore that. As a result, recent events receive disproportionate attribution and focus. 

However, there seems to be a crucial event missing from this coverage: the political leadership is slated to deliver the annual State of the Nation Address (SONA) on July 22nd, Monday. 

Figure 1 

With a 2.16% advance this week, the PSEi 30 has enjoyed its fourth consecutive weekly winning streak. This weekly gain has propelled the Philippine benchmark to be the second-best performer among its regional peers, following Mongolia’s MSE. (Figure 1, topmost image) 

Remarkably, the PSEi outperformed amidst a prevailing downturn in the Asian market, where 12 out of the 19 national benchmarks closed lower by an average of 0.53%. 

Furthermore, the increased risk appetite for Philippine assets was also reflected in the Philippine peso, which was the only Asian currency to advance this week amidst a strong USD. (Figure 1, middle graph) 

The US dollar index $DXY grew by 0.27% WoW, but eight of the nine regional currencies, excluding Japan, closed lower. 

The USD-Philippine peso $USDPHP retraced by 0.08%, from last July 12’s quote of Php 58.38 to Php 58.335. 

While the yield of the Philippine 10-year bond dived a week earlier, paving the way for its outperformance in the region, it remained unchanged this week as most of the regional peers experienced declines. (Figure 1, lowest diagram)

Figure 2

In contrast, Emerging Asia’s 5-year credit default swap (CDS) exhibited a 520-basis points spike in Philippine CDS (ADB data), indicating that while it comes from a low base, a sustained regional risk-off sentiment could reverse any recent gains. China’s CDS soared by 930 bps. (Figure 2, topmost and middle charts) 

How do the causalities cited by the local media fit into this context? 

The strengthening dollar, falling bond yields, declining stocks, and rising CDS are likely symptoms of de-risking and deleveraging in the face of slowing economies and potential rate cuts. 

Are Philippine stocks and the peso suggesting immunity to this emerging phenomenon? 

II. The History of BBM's Pre-SONA PSEi 30 Pumps

Here is the most important thing the echo chamber has critically missed: 

Since the inauguration of the incumbent President in 2022, the PSEi 30 has enjoyed a series of pre-State of the Nation Address (SONA) pumps. 

The incumbent's previous SONAs were on July 25, 2022, and July 24, 2023. 

From the 6,065.23 trough on June 23, 2022, the PSEi 30 soared to a peak of 6,863.86 on August 19 of the same year, delivering a 13.17% return. (Figure 2, lowest graph) 

The PSEi 30 then surrendered all of those gains and more but found a second post-election honeymoon in October, alongside the UK’s Bank of England (BoE) rescue of its emerging pension crisis, which saw global stocks bottom and reverse to the upside. 

The second SONA pump began on July 7, 2023. It emerged from an interim low of 6,379.03 to reach an interim high of 6,679.13 on July 26, 2023, resulting in a 4.7% return. 

In both instances, the PSEi 30 surrendered all its fleeting gains in no time. 

The third SONA pump came at the temporary bottom of 6,158.48 on June 21, 2024, following the Ayungin Shoal incident. Through July 19th or at 6,791.69, the PSEi 30 has returned by 10.3%. 

How will this time be different compared to its recent predecessors? 

Nota Bene: The SONA pumping cycle doesn’t necessarily end on its actual date, as factors such as momentum and domestic and local liquidity flows may determine its lifespan. 

III. Explaining the Index Pump: Concentrated Gains and Rotational Activities 

Why is it an index pump?

Figure 3

This week's 2.16% gain represents the largest week-before-SONA returns. (Figure 3, topmost chart). The difference between the present and previous environments doesn't provide a relevant comparison or suitable probabilities for making a forecast. For instance, the political-economic landscape of 2009 and 2010 was influenced by the climax of the Great Financial Crisis. 

This week’s gains were once again concentrated on the (free float) market cap heavyweights. 

While it may be true that 20 of the 30 member issues were up this week, the outsized gains of the top 10 issues, which carried an astounding 72% share of the PSEi 30 (as of July 19th), delivered the gist of this week’s 2.16%. (Figure 3, middle graph) 

On average (equal-weighted price change), the weekly return was only .92%. 

The substantial difference between the average and the change in the headline index was principally due to the free float weights. 

And this week’s activities resonated with the last four-week performance. 

Fundamentally, while the PSEi 30 was up 10.3% from June 21st to July 19th, the accrued gains were largely derived from the top 5. 

Again, while 22 of the 30 member issues rose during this period, the average gain was 5.48% indicating the spread caused by distortions of the free float market cap relative to the equal-weighted price change. (Figure 3, lowest visual) 

Moreover, the top 5 issues, which expanded by an average of 15.4%, accounted for most of the 5.5% four-week average growth. 

Figure 4

In addition, the 51.17% pie of the top 5 heavyweights have drifted close to their recent milestone levels, with the index pumps rotating among the heavyweights. (Figure 4, topmost graph)

That is, shifting or rotational pumps from ICTSI to the financial 3 to the other market cap heavies—which presently includes the real estate members! (Figure 4, middle and lowest windows)

IV. 2024 SONA Pumps: Concentrated Trading Activities amidst Decadent Volume

Figure 5

Aside from the incredible pre-closing pumps and dumps contributing to the headline returns, the 2024 version of SONA pumps has emerged against the backdrop of a DETERIORATING mainboard volume! (Figure 5, topmost graph)

As an aside, we omitted posting recent charts of pre-closing massive pumps and dumps to conserve space.

At least there was some volume surge in previous SONA pumps, which is certainly lacking today. And incredibly, little is known about how cross-trades have padded such low-volume pumps.

However, it has not just been the PSEi 30 market cap weightings; the lean trading volume has also been concentrated among the heavyweights.

For instance, the Sy Group's share of the main board volume has been rising in support of the pumps to its shares. (Figure 5, middle pane)

Additionally, the volume share of the top 20 traded issues accounted for 83.6% over the 4-week period, slightly higher than the 83.1% year-to-date. This means that less than 20% of the volume has been dispersed among the other 264 listed companies. Duh!

The PSE noted that there are 284 listed firms as of the second quarter. 

V. 2024 SONA Pumps: Concentration in Broker Activities with Marginal Brokers Squeezed Dry

More to this point:

Although the overwhelmingly dominant share of the top 10 brokers decreased from 59.16% YTD to 57% in the four-week SONA pump, the number of total active participating brokers fell to its lowest level (since I began plotting it). (Figure 5, lowest image)

This means that while transactional volume has spread to a wider scope of brokers, which is good news, the plunge in the active share of participants implies that current conditions have squeezed the marginal brokers, which is bad news.

The PSE also noted that there are a total of 122 active brokers in their Second Quarter Report. 

Could this be confirmation of our prediction that a large segment of marginal brokers will become extinct soon?

And the above data reveals the extent of concentration of trading volumes and trading participants to an elite cabal, who are likely managing the PSEi 30 levels.

VI. More Signs of Liquidity Squeeze: Decaying Market Depth and Weakening Market Breadth

Figure 6

Naturally, the insufficiency in volume and market depth translates to the underperformance of market breadth.

While this week's market internals showed advancing issues marginally higher by 53 against declining issues, from the June 21st low to the present (SONA pump 2024), decliners remained ahead of advancers 1,924 to 1,888, a spread of 36 in favor of decliners.

This means that the headline performance has starkly diverged from the PSE universe. Incredible.

Another likely indicator of general market sentiment is the participation level of traded issues.

Unlike in the prior SONAs where the number of traded issues saw slight increases, we have been witnessing the opposite in the present conditions—a contraction!

The decreasing rate of average daily traded issues accentuates the ongoing liquidity squeeze at the PSE.

Other measures, such as the average daily number of trades and the average daily volume per trade, exhibit the same worsening liquidity drought.

VII. Divergent Signals from the SONA 2024 Pump: Key Points to Ponder

Yet, for prudent investors, here are some critical points to ponder:

-How can this be a bullish sign when the 10% increase in the Index has been accompanied by a drought in volume supported by stagnant participation and decaying breadth?

-Why would the increasing concentration of the index, trading, and market activities not signify an INCREASING risk to financial stability?

-How could the ARTIFICIAL embellishment of the index signify a bullish sign?

Lastly, why and how would these orchestrated campaigns to impose price distortions not magnify increasing imbalances and malinvestments in the PSE, the local capital markets, and the economy?

VIII. 2024 SONA Pump: Foreign Money Cushions Domestic Savings Deficiency

What is the source of financing for the SONA pump?

In essence, savings or credit are the sources of investments (real or financial).

Under the classical gold standard, credit represents the savings of another individual, intermediated by depository institutions.

Under the current fiat money, the US dollar standard, credit can account for "money from thin air."

How has the PSE's low volume signified a sign of increased savings? Or has institutional money been tapping credit for the SONA pump?

Or has the PSEi 30 been reliant on foreign savings and leverage (carry trades)?

PSE data provides some clues:

True, aggregate foreign money flows surged to PHP 2.8 billion this week, the largest since May 17, 2024. 

However, the degree of flow has failed to boost the PSEi 30 during the SONA pump in 2023 and may represent a temporary dynamic today.

As it stands, in the world of global financialization, foreign money flows may account for fund flows by affiliates or subsidiaries of PSE-listed firms registered abroad and offshore firms of allies and colleagues, rather than from money managers in search of higher returns.

These fund flows may be used to artificially inflate statistics to show increased interest by foreigners "to paint the tape."

In any case, while foreign flows cushioned the ongoing decline in trading volume this week, these inflows accounted for a mere PHP 93.6 million from the June 21st trough. 

The spike in this week's flows reveals that foreign flows have largely been absent in the previous three weeks, and it is likely that the 2024 SONA pump has been engineered by domestic financial institutions. 

Our guess: Could this partly be the handiwork of the Maharlika Sovereign Wealth Fund and other government financial institutions? 

More importantly, despite foreign flows, trading volume remains in the doldrums, exposing only the deficiency in savings. 

Yes, the Philippine Statistics Authority declared an increase in gross savings in 2023. However, the broader picture tells us a different story: a marginal rebound following a collapse. 

Yet, questionably, this savings data is determined by GDP! 

IX. 2024 SONA Pump: Engineered by Domestic Financial Institutions?

There are clues pointing to this possibility. 

The SONA pumps may involve Other Financial Corporations (OFCs). 

For instance, according to BSP data covering Q3 2023: "Based on preliminary results of the Other Financial Corporations Survey, the domestic claims of the other financial corporations grew by 2.4 percent in Q3 2023… the other financial corporations’ claims on the other sectors, particularly the private sector, grew as the sector extended more loans to households and increased its holdings of equity shares in other nonfinancial corporations" (bold added)

Figure 7 

Claims on the private sector surged at the end of Q2 2023 going into Q3 2023. (Figure 7, topmost graph) 

Did flows from the OFCs account for the SONA 2023 pump? 

What about in 2022? 

While the Q3 2022 data was silent on claims on the private sector, the reversal from outflows in Q2 2022 could have been indirectly responsible for the June to August 2022 SONA pump, which delivered a 13% gain. 

X. 2024 SONA PUMP: PSEi 30 at 6,800: Windfall from Liquidity Expansion and Conclusion

Furthermore, signs of accelerating liquidity growth could extrapolate to money diffusion into the PSEi 30, channeled through orchestrated or engineered asset pumps. 

May's fourth largest public spending, possibly representing an early-stage distribution of liquidity from the pre-Election "Marcos-nomics stimulus," may also have been used by banks and non-bank financial institutions for the 2024 SONA pump. 

This has a precedent. 

An uptrend in the growth of cash in circulation financed the previous national (Presidential) elections, which percolated into the pumps of SONA 2022 and the 2022 post-election stock market honeymoon. 

Another factor was the spillover from the historic PHP 2.3 trillion liquidity injections in 2020-2021 by the BSP to rescue the banking system—which was sold to the public as benefiting the economy. 

An uptick in the growth of cash in circulation from April to October 2023 also supported the 2023 SONA and the Q4 2023 rally in the PSEi 30. 

How does this apply to the present? 

May 2024's cash in circulation growth of 6.1% represents the highest level since December 2022, which fund flows have likely spurred this SONA 2024 pump. (Figure 7, middle image) 

It is unsurprising that a substantial part of liquidity growth has been partly funded by bank credit expansion. 

Universal Commercial Bank lending growth, which may have been used to finance pre-election spending in 2021-2022, has been manifested in the pumps of SONA 2022 and the post-election honeymoon. And its reduced growth may have depressed the returns of the SONA 2023 pump. (Figure 7, lowest chart) 

Finally, the accelerating UC bank lending growth from Q4 2023 to the present has been instrumental in financing the 2024 SONA pump. 

As previously explained, though disinflation could prevail in the interim due to the slowing real economy, supported by the rise in non-performing loans (NPLs), which may constrain the uptrend in bank lending, sustained increases in deficit spending should put a floor on inflation. 

A resurgence of inflation, which should cap interest rate cuts, will further expose imbalances and malinvestments resulting from all these orchestrated attempts to create an artificial economic and financial boom through credit expansion, price manipulation, and statistical artifices. 

Although the political leadership did not explicitly mention the stock market to boost his political capital during the previous SONAs, the message—implying "strong earnings growth ", "optimistic economic prospects", a "stronger peso," and so on—represents the commonplace conveyance by institutional mouthpieces in explaining the recent spike in the PSEi 30. 

However, when everything goes off the rails, it has to be either the US Federal Reserve or something foreign, but hardly ever local affairs (attribution bias). 

QED.