Showing posts with label Iran war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran war. Show all posts

Sunday, July 19, 2026

The PSEi-ICTSI Show, Part II: When One Stock Becomes the Market

 

The reflexive interaction between the act of lending and collateral values has led me to postulate a pattern in which a period of gradual, slowly accelerating credit expansion is followed by a short period of credit contraction-the classic sequence of boom and bust. The bust is compressed in time because the attempt to liquidate loans causes a sudden implosion of collateral values—George Soros

In this issue: 

The PSEi-ICTSI Show, Part II: When One Stock Becomes the Market

I. The Liturgy of Consequentialism

II. How the PSEi Leadership Changed Hands

III. The PSEi 30s Volte-Face, Engineered

IV. Market Breadth Tells a Different Story

V. PSEi 30-ICTSI’s Liquidity-Gains Drive Volume

VI. July's “UMIC” Rally—and the Missing Confirmation

VII. When Daily Trading Patterns Become the Story

VIII. Concentration and Shrinking Market Participation

IX. Concentration Across the Financial System

X. Benchmark-ism: From Market Benchmark to Political Instrument

XI. Conclusion: The Applause Before the Inflection Point 

The PSEi-ICTSI Show, Part II: When One Stock Becomes the Market

Benchmark-ism, Concentrated Liquidity, and the Erosion of Price Discovery 

In Part I, we mapped how International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) had quietly become the Philippine Stock Exchange Index's (PSEi 30) single point of vulnerability — one company, ranked 16th by assets among the index's 30 constituents, dictating the benchmark's direction while breadth collapsed underneath it. Five weeks on, the show hasn't ended. It's gone to Broadway. 

I. The Liturgy of Consequentialism 

The Philippine Stock Exchange

"Port operator International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICT) closed at a record market capitalization of Php2.01 trillion on July 14, 2026, becoming the first domestic company to breach the Php2 trillion milestone in Philippine Stock Exchange history..." 

PSE President and CEO Ramon Monzon called the run-up — a doubling of market cap in under ten months — a reflection of "confidence in the leadership of ICT Chairman and President, Mr. Enrique K. Razon, Jr., and in the strategic direction of the company." 

The PSE didn't ask how Php1 trillion became Php 2 trillion in ten months. It didn't ask why one port operator's equity should double while the rest of the index bled or struggled. It simply certified the outcome and read confidence backward into it — consequentialism as institutional reflex: the end justifies, and explains, the means. 

The more fundamental questions—How did prices arrive here? What incentives produced these outcomes? Are these valuations products of decentralized market discovery or increasingly centralized intervention? —remain largely unasked. 

Echoing populist politics, the exchange eulogized the "confidence" embedded in serial bidding activity, as though price were self-authenticating. One has to wonder — if ICTSI reverses, will the PSE eulogize that too, or will the microphone quietly go elsewhere? 

Markets, however, are not merely scoreboards. Their principal economic function is to facilitate price discovery, the continuous process through which dispersed knowledge is aggregated into prices that guide capital allocation. When this process becomes impaired, rising prices cease to communicate genuine information and instead begin transmitting distorted signals throughout the economy. 

The issue is whether one company's extraordinary ascent has gradually transformed the Philippine equity market into something increasingly detached from its traditional role as a mechanism for economic calculation. 

II. How the PSEi Leadership Changed Hands


Figure 1

ICTSI assumed the PSEi's primary-driver role in August 2025, displacing SM Investments Corporation. (Figure 1, topmost window)   

Since the index's February 2026 peak, though, the PSEi 30 rapidly plunged to an interim low of 5,768 on June 1 — and that low did not arrive alone. 

It landed alongside a cluster of events that, viewed individually, might each be dismissed as coincidence, but taken together describe a single phenomenon: 

  • Philippine treasury yields spiked to interim peaks across the curve as the peso fell to record lows — a quasi-meltdown in domestic financial markets. (Figure 1, middle graph) 
  • EO 110, launched at the outset of the Iran war on March 24, and a cascade of BSP bank-relief measures rolled out from April through June. 
  • Money supply (M3) posted a four-month (February–May), double-digit surge. (Figure 1, lowest image) 
  • Manufacturing, employment, CPI, and fiscal statistics allbrightened in near-lockstep

But when multiple indicators across finance, banking, macroeconomics, and public statistics simultaneously reverse direction immediately following aggressive policy interventions, it becomes increasingly difficult to attribute the entire sequence to chance alone. 

Demonstrated preferences often reveal more than official rhetoric. 

Governments and central banks ultimately reveal their priorities not through speeches but through the policies they implement under pressure. 

III. The PSEi 30s Volte-Face, Engineered 

June delivered the reversal driven overwhelmingly by ICTSI—anchored by a single-day 6.14% PSEi spike on June 15. 


Figure 2

With the prior pace of record gains apparently not enough and with the broader market still insouciant, ICTSI's price advance had to intensify further to reverse the downtrend and foment upside momentum. And so it did. 

The timing mattered. 

ICTSI's acceleration coincided with the period during which policy easing, liquidity expansion, and official stabilization measures were simultaneously gathering force. Whether viewed as coincidence or interaction, the market's reversal cannot be understood by examining ICTSI's price action in isolation from its broader monetary and financial backdrop. 

The PSEi 30 rose 4.65% month-on-month in June, trimming its year-on-year deficit to -5.15% and its year-to-date loss to -0.26%, while lifting quarterly returns to 1.48%. (Figure 2, middle table) 

Financials—led by the top three banks—contributed. But the real engine was the services sector: +13% MoM, +47.4% YoY, +34.03% YTD, and +17.75% QoQ. By month's end, ICTSI alone accounted for 64% of the services index! (Figure 2, lowest chart) 


Figure 3 

At that point, it is not inaccurate to say ICTSI is the services index—the sector classification has become little more than a wrapper around one stock. (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

When a single company accounts for nearly two-thirds of an entire sector's capitalization, movements in that sector cease to reflect the collective judgments of numerous businesses. Instead, they increasingly mirror the behavior of one dominant security. 

Markets derive their informational value from decentralization. The broader the participation, the richer the information embedded within prices. Conversely, as leadership narrows, prices increasingly cease to aggregate dispersed knowledge and instead become reflections of concentrated flows of capital

Price discovery is fundamentally a distributed process. Every listed company conveys information about a different segment of the economy—consumer demand, credit conditions, exports, construction, manufacturing, property, investment, and countless firm-specific developments. As market leadership contracts into progressively fewer securities, the amount of independent information incorporated into the benchmark necessarily diminishes, regardless of whether the index itself continues rising. 

The issue, therefore, is not merely index concentration. 

It is the gradual replacement of decentralized market discovery with benchmark construction increasingly dependent upon the fortunes—and bidding activity—of a handful of securities. 

This is central to understanding what has unfolded within the Philippine equity market over the past year. 

If concentration has indeed become the benchmark's defining characteristic, the natural place to verify it is market breadth. 

IV. Market Breadth Tells a Different Story 

Headline indices often conceal more than they reveal. 

The PSEi's impressive 4.65% gain in June appeared to signal a broad-based recovery in Philippine equities. Yet beneath the benchmark's encouraging performance lay a markedly different reality. 

Although sixteen of the PSEi's thirty constituent companies advanced during the month while fourteen declined, the average gain among all thirty members was barely 0.3%—despite ICTSI's extraordinary 18.3 % surge! (Figure 3, middle diagram) 

Market breadth painted an even weaker picture. Total issues favored sellers, 2,049 to 1,738, while decliners outnumbered advancers during fourteen trading sessions compared with only seven advancing days. 

In other words, the benchmark appeared healthy while much of the market continued to struggle. 

The divergence became even more striking when viewed over the first half of 2026. 

Although the PSEi finished the semester nearly unchanged, declining by only 0.26%, the average return among its thirty constituents was a negative 6.8 %. 

More tellingly, twenty-one of the index's thirty companies were in negative territory! (Figure 3, lowest graph) 


Figure 4

2026's advance-decline spread worsened back to 2022 levels, reversing three years of gradual improvement. (Figure 4 topmost window) 

The average share of main-board value commanded by the top 10 brokers held at 63.46% in June and 62.26% for the half — concentration not just in names, but in the hands executing the trades. 

The principal reason for this discrepancy was straightforward. 

ICTSI alone returned 56.97 % during the first semester! 

This is the arithmetic of capitalization-weighted indices. A sufficiently large company need not merely outperform; it can increasingly overwhelm the collective performance of the remaining constituents. Consequently, the benchmark begins communicating something fundamentally different from what the average listed company is experiencing. 

Capitalization weighting is not itself the problem. Such indices are designed to reflect the market value investors collectively assign to listed firms. The concern arises when sustained gains become increasingly dependent upon a narrow set of (one or two) constituents, causing the benchmark to communicate strength that is no longer broadly shared across the market it purports to represent. 

This is not merely a deformation of representation but strikes at the heart of price discovery

The purpose of an equity index is to summarize the collective judgments of thousands of market participants regarding the prospects of corporate Philippines. As leadership narrows, however, the benchmark progressively ceases to represent dispersed information and instead becomes an increasingly concentrated expression of capital flowing into a handful of securities. 

The index still moves. But it carries progressively less information about the broader market. 

As informational density declines, benchmark movements become increasingly susceptible to being interpreted as evidence of economic strength when they may instead reflect increasingly concentrated capital allocation—or the cumulative effects of capital misallocation

Because policymakers, investors, and the public often treat the index itself as a proxy for underlying economic conditions, they risk understating the market's growing fragility and the distortions developing beneath an apparently “resilient” benchmark 

This is benchmark-ism: political and institutional narrative management aimed at cultivating perceptions of stability by embellishing financial markets and manicuring headline statistics to sustain "animal spirits." 

V. PSEi 30-ICTSI’s Liquidity-Gains Drive Volume 

Price appreciation of this magnitude does not occur in a vacuum. 

Persistent advances require not only willing buyers but a continuous flow of liquidity capable of absorbing selling pressure as valuations rise. Markets require continuous buying pressure to sustain extraordinary valuations. ICTSI's remarkable advance therefore demanded an equally remarkable expansion in trading activity. 

That is precisely what transpired. 

During June, ICTSI's trading volume climbed to an unprecedented Php 37.7 billion, a 41% increase from the previous month. This represented 26.52% of the Philippine Stock Exchange's Main Board Volume (MBV), contributing materially to the exchange's overall 19.6% increase in trading activity. Foreign transactions accounted for only 8.12% of ICTSI's Main Board Volume, suggesting that domestic institutional flows remained the dominant source of turnover. (Figure 4, middle image) 

Liquidity, therefore, became increasingly concentrated around the benchmark's largest constituent. 

Liquidity performs an economic function beyond merely facilitating transactions. It enhances marketability by enabling continuous exchange among market participants, allowing prices to incorporate dispersed information. As trading activity becomes increasingly concentrated in one security, the informational content of prices across the broader market diminishes, weakening the market's ability to guide capital toward its most productive uses. 

Such concentration is economically significant because liquidity itself becomes a scarce resource. Investment capital is finite at any given point in time. Every peso repeatedly committed to sustaining one increasingly dominant security represents capital unavailable for competing firms, alternative sectors, or productive investment elsewhere in the economy. 

Rather than facilitating broader price discovery, liquidity becomes centralized, reinforcing the very concentration that generated the benchmark's impressive performance in the first place

Concentration, therefore, is not merely an outcome. It becomes a mechanism capable of perpetuating itself. 

This creates a self-reinforcing dynamic. 

The implicit design/expectation is that sufficiently strong benchmark performance will eventually spill over into the broader market through sectoral ‘rotation,’ allowing the initial concentration of liquidity to evolve into generalized participation—the familiar "rising tide lifts all boats" dynamic. 

VI. July's “UMIC” Rally—and the Missing Confirmation 

Predictably, many observers attributed July's continued advance to the Philippines' attainment of Upper Middle-Income Country (UMIC) status. 

From July 1 to July 17, the PSEi gained 366.94 points, or 6.08 %. ICTSI alone contributed 186.9 points, accounting for more than half (50.94 %) of the benchmark's free-float return! 

The five largest constituents—ICTSI, SM Investments, BDO, BPI, and SM Prime—collectively generated 75.69 % of the index's advance. 

ICTSI's PSEi weight hit a record 27.47 % on July 13 before easing slightly to 26.97 % by week's end (July 17). Meanwhile, the ICTSI-led top five market-cap components reached a historic 56.12 % share of the benchmark! (Figure 4, lowest diagram) 

This isn't retail FOMO (fear of missing out), nor is it a thematic rally riding a global narrative. Unlike South Korea's Samsung and SK Hynix AI-driven melt-up, none of ICTSI's international peers—notably Adani Ports or Shanghai International Port—display anything resembling this price behavior, as previously pointed out. 

The parabola is local, institutional, and largely unaccompanied by comparable moves among global port operators. That makes it considerably more difficult to attribute solely to sectoral fundamentals or international market trends, leaving sustained institutional bidding activity as the more plausible explanation. 

More importantly, the benchmark’s optimism stood isolated, unsupported by the broader signals of domestic financial markets. 

If the UMIC upgrade truly represented a fundamental reassessment of the Philippine economy, one would reasonably expect that optimism to extend beyond equities. A stronger peso and declining government bond yields would normally accompany a broad improvement in investor perceptions. 

Instead, the opposite occurred.


Figure 5

While the PSEi continued advancing, the peso failed to exhibit comparable strength (USD/PHP rose from 61.36 on June 30 to 61.587 on July 17), while Treasury yields largely remained elevated across the belly of the curve, with the principal exception of shorter-term Treasury bills. (Figure 5, upper chart) 

Equity investors focus primarily on expected corporate earnings, foreign exchange markets continuously price the interaction of external and domestic forces—including competitiveness, capital flows, and relative monetary conditions—while government bond markets evaluate sovereign fiscal and monetary risks. 

When these markets tell different stories, the divergence itself becomes valuable information

When a purported improvement in national fundamentals is reflected almost exclusively in one segment of one financial market—particularly one increasingly dominated by a handful of securities—the absence of confirmation elsewhere becomes analytically significant rather than incidental. 

Rather than confirming a broad-based improvement in Philippine fundamentals, July's market action suggests that optimism remained concentrated within a relatively narrow segment of the financial system—a product of benchmark-ism. 

The timing adds a further dimension. The UMIC designation arrived ahead of the President's State of the Nation Address (SONA), with approval ratings at record lows. Whether by design or coincidence, a rallying PSEi headline serves the same political function as a favorable labor report or a narrowing fiscal deficit: it contributes to the official narrative of resilience at a moment when that narrative requires the most support

The index becomes not merely a financial benchmark but a communications asset — selectively legible as evidence of progress precisely when progress is most politically necessary. 

The question is whether the incentive structure surrounding the index, the SONA, and the approval ratings creates conditions in which such concentration is tolerated, encouraged, or simply left unexamined. 

VII. When Daily Trading Patterns Become the Story 

How was the July run actually achieved? 

The same intraday choreography repeated for two straight weeks: frantic early bidding concentrated on ICTSI, generating momentum that encouraged broader market participation and invited additional buying interest. 

Then came the reversal of what I had previously been described as the "afternoon delight"—the synchronized push into the close. The pattern increasingly appeared to shift toward synchronized distribution, with early buyers potentially realizing gains into the retail and institutional demand created by the day's momentum. This phenomenon was already visible in Part I but became considerably more pronounced throughout July. (Figure 5, lower graph) 

The timing and intensity naturally varied from day to day. 

The pattern across two weeks did not. 

A sequence this consistent, occurring with this degree of concentration in the benchmark's dominant constituent, does not resemble ordinary fragmented market activity. It suggests a level of synchronization that warrants closer examination—what might as well be described as the activity of an undeclared "national team." 

Whether such behavior reflects coordinated positioning, institutional incentives created by benchmark mechanics, or activity requiring regulatory investigation is ultimately a matter for market surveillance. 

Market forensics is the responsibility of regulators, not commentators. 

Yet regulatory scrutiny does not occur in a vacuum. When institutions, policymakers, and market operators have collectively embraced a rising benchmark as evidence of confidence and stability, the incentives for early intervention becomes distorted. 

The same narrative that celebrates market strength also discourages examination of the mechanisms sustaining it. 

This is where moral hazard emerges. When participants observe market outcomes being reinforced or supported by political and institutional actions, risk perception further risks becoming detached from underlying conditions. 

Regulatory attention may arrive only after the cycle reverses, when the costs of previously tolerated distortions become impossible to ignore.


Figure 6

Yet, this past week did show broader participation—21 gainers, 7 decliners, and 2 unchanged—for a 1.87 % week-on-week advance. Yet the average gain was only 1.54 %, still lower than the headline return and still largely explained by market-cap weighting rather than genuine breadth. (Figure 6, upper visual) 

Tellingly, ICTSI's trading volume peaked on July 10 and has since declined, even as Main Board volume rebounded on Friday. (Figure 6, lower graph) 

Read plainly, ICTSI's own engine may be losing momentum even as the index it drives continues climbing on residual momentum. Alternatively, the extraordinary buying pressure sustaining the rally may simply be encountering natural limits. 

VIII. Concentration and Shrinking Market Participation 

The concentration visible in the equity market does not exist in isolation.


Figure 7

The PSE's own 2025 data shows both retail and institutional participation remarkably shrinking, with active institutional accounts declining from 7,622 in 2022 to roughly 4,366 in 2025. (Figure 7, upper chart) 

That’s right. Fewer active accounts controlling a larger share of trading activity is not a paradox; it is the mechanism through which concentration expresses itself

The concern is not merely that fewer participants are active. It is that market influence increasingly resides among a narrower group of actors, reducing the diversity of independent judgments incorporated into prices and increasing the surface area for synchronized positioning. 

The decline in participation may itself be a consequence of this process. When outside participants—whether retail investors or independent institutions—repeatedly find themselves disadvantaged by a market increasingly dominated by insider-directed, concentrated flows from the undeclared "national team," participation naturally declines. 

Losses, frustration, and the perception that the game is structurally tilted toward a small circle of powerful participants create withdrawal, leaving the remaining pool of active capital even more concentrated. 

In this sense, declining participation is not merely a separate statistic. It is a ramification of policies and institutional tolerance that permit a market structure where concentration reinforces itself—facilitating the redistribution of trading gains, liquidity, and market influence toward dominant participants while weakening the broader participation necessary for genuine price discovery. 

Concentration, therefore, is not only a condition of the market. 

It becomes a self-reinforcing process. 

IX. Concentration Across the Financial System 

This concentration extends beyond the exchange itself. 

It mirrors developments within the Philippines’ financial system, where total banks led by universal and commercial banks now control a record 83.14% of total financial-system assets, with universal and commercial banks alone accounting for 77.08% as of Q2 2026—a share that has risen steadily since 2008 and accelerated following the pandemic. (Figure 7, lower graph) 

Concentration in the credit system and concentration in the equity benchmark are not separate stories. 

They are the same story expressed through different balance sheets. 

The connection is not merely institutional ownership or market influence. Bank balance sheets are themselves exposed to asset valuations, including equity holdings, securities investments, and collateral values that support lending decisions. When asset prices become increasingly concentrated, the financial system inherits exposure to the stability of those same valuations

The allocation of savings, the creation of credit, and the valuation of listed assets are increasingly shaped by a smaller number of institutions. The result is not merely greater efficiency or scale; it is a financial system in which fewer decision points increasingly influence the direction of capital flows and the transmission of financial risk. 

This creates a second-order vulnerability—one that the BSP's latest Financial Stability Report itself acknowledges. 

When collateral values decline, banks may be forced to reassess exposures, increase provisions, reduce lending, or raise capital buffers. The feedback mechanism works in reverse: asset weakness pressures balance sheets, weaker balance sheets restrict credit, and tighter credit conditions accelerate economic stress. 

The BSP's recent capital-relief measures demonstrate the tension facing regulators: while such measures may temporarily ease balance-sheet pressures, their repeated use reveals the diminishing effectiveness of successive interventions. As the effects of previous measures accumulate without resolving underlying mismatches, additional accommodation becomes increasingly necessary merely to maintain existing conditions. Rather than restoring normal adjustment mechanisms, repeated intervention risks deepening balance-sheet dependence on continued support and reinforcing the concentration that created the vulnerability in the first place. 

The political convenience of concentration is therefore accompanied by a growing systemic risk. A financial structure built around fewer and larger institutions may appear stable during expansionary periods, but its vulnerabilities become more pronounced when the assets, collateral values, and market narratives supporting that stability begin to reverse. 

X. Benchmark-ism: From Market Benchmark to Political Instrument 

Here the ICTSI show stops being a market curiosity and becomes a stagflation-series exhibit. Deepening centralization — in banks, in brokers, in the index itself — hands the establishment ammunition to dominate the Overton window through benchmarkism: shaping political narrative via statistics and market signals that appear neutral but are, in fact, constructed. 

The objective isn't merely the survival of the current administration, though that's part of it. It's sustaining a model in which easy money and cheap access to public savings keep the savings-investment gap open long enough for the rent-seeking, build-and-they-will-come model to keep running — a model that benefits the government and entrenched elites first, and the broader public only as runoff, if at all. 

Applied to the PSE, when a benchmark designed to aggregate the collective judgment of investors increasingly reflects the trading behavior of one dominant constituent, valuations lose informational content, economic calculation becomes distorted, and capital allocation becomes vulnerable to misdirection. 

In practice, capital is not formed; it is consumed through investments sustained by distorted signals, artificial liquidity, and expectations of future gains unsupported by productivity. 

Asset bubbles are, at their core, manufactured claims on wealth without the foundation to validate them — a something‑for‑nothing process

Capital appears to multiply through rising valuations, but when those valuations fail to correspond with genuine returns, resources committed to sustaining them are evenutally revealed as consumed rather than formed capital. 

And when a bubble is celebrated by the very institution meant to police it, that celebration isn’t confidence — it is the late‑cycle tell, the applause that arrives just before the topping process begins, or signals its inflection point. 

XI. Conclusion: The Applause Before the Inflection Point 

Part I warned that ICTSI had become the PSEi’s single point of vulnerability. Part II shows that the vulnerability has metastasized into a system of concentrated liquidity, shrinking participation, and benchmark-driven narrative management. 

Now, with the Iran war reigniting and the risk of an AI-driven global slump beginning to spill across markets, the external shock may become the catalyst that exposes the imbalances already embedded beneath the PSEi’s rally. 

When an exchange celebrates a bubble instead of interrogating it, the applause is no longer a sign of confidence—it is the late-cycle sound heard just before the market discovers what price discovery was supposed to reveal all along. 

____

Reference: 

PSEi 30: The ICTSI Show June 7, 2026

 


Sunday, April 19, 2026

Stagflation by Design: Policy Contradictions and the Return of the Pandemic Rescue Playbook

   

It used to be that recessions were accompanied by falling prices. Because of this few people realised that though prices in general fell consumer prices rose relative to producer prices. In other words, capital goods suffered the greatest price declines. Now that central banks inflate to prevent price declines we can find ourselves in a situation where consumer prices are rising faster than producer prices even as a large pool of unemployed emerges. This is stagflation—Gerard Jackson 

In this issue:

Stagflation by Design: Policy Contradictions and the Return of the Pandemic Rescue Playbook

I. Colliding Policies in an Emerging Stagflation Environment

II. The Triangle of Intervention

III. The Return of War-Time Economics

IV. Energy Bailouts and Socialized Losses

V. BSP’s Hawkish Rhetoric, Shadow Monetary Easing

VI. Ratchet Effect: The Pandemic Rescue Framework That Never Ended

VII. Oil Shock Meets Banking System Stress Beneath the Surface

VIII. External Risks: Oil and the Strait of Hormuz

IX. A System Moving Toward Structural Stagflation

X. Conclusion: The Institutionalization of Crisis Policy 

Stagflation by Design: Policy Contradictions and the Return of the Pandemic Rescue Playbook 

How fiscal dependence on inflation, regulatory interventions, and shadow monetary easing are locking the Philippine economy into a structural stagflation regime.

I. Colliding Policies in an Emerging Stagflation Environment 

Recent policy developments across the Philippine economy reveal a system increasingly defined by conflicting interventions. 

Authorities have attempted to cushion consumers from rising costs by suspending excise taxes on Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and Kerosene, while refusing similar relief for gasoline and diesel. The explanation offered by policymakers was not economic but fiscal: the government argued that suspending excise taxes on gasoline and diesel would result in roughly Php 43 billion in lost revenue, compared with about Php 4.1 billion for LPG and kerosene

This framing reveals the real constraint—fiscal dependence on inflation-driven tax revenues

At the same time, authorities are pushing in the opposite direction elsewhere in the economy.

The National Food Authority has raised rice buying prices in an attempt to support farmers, while wage pressures are intensifying following minimum wage hikes in Central Luzon and renewed calls for increases in Baguio City

Authorities are also expanding a new round of credit and income support programs across multiple sectors of the economy. Emergency loan facilities have been announced for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), while the Department of Agriculture has introduced loan moratoriums for farmers and fisherfolk facing rising production costs. 

The Social Security System has also proposed allocating roughly Php 60 billion for expanded lending programs while accelerating pension increases, alongside discussions of targeted cash assistance for middle-income households and minimum-wage earners. 

These measures inject liquidity and sustain household demand while simultaneously raising production costs upstream. The result is a dual pressure dynamic: stronger consumption collides with weakened supply conditions, compressing producer margins, discouraging output, and increasing reliance on imports. 

Margin compression weakens domestic supply responses, forcing greater reliance on imports. For a country already structurally dependent on imported food, fuel, and intermediate goods, this dynamic worsens trade deficits and exposes the economy further to external shocks. 

Such policy contradictions lie at the core of what economists describe as stagflationary dynamics—a situation where policies designed to alleviate inflation instead weaken production and reinforce price pressures elsewhere.

II. The Triangle of Intervention 

Many of the policies now unfolding can be understood through the concept of triangular intervention—a term used by Austrian economist Murray Rothbard to describe government actions that compel or prohibit exchanges between two private parties. 

Unlike taxation or subsidies, which transfer resources directly between the state and citizens, triangular interventions reshape the conditions under which individuals and firms are allowed to transact. Price controls, regulatory mandates, credit allocation programs, and production quotas are classic examples because they force market participants to exchange under state-imposed terms—or prevent them from exchanging altogether. 

Once such interventions are introduced, additional policies often follow in order to manage the distortions they create.

In practice, the Philippine policy response increasingly resembles a triangular structure of intervention linking fiscal transfers, monetary accommodation, and regulatory relief. 

These policy actions are not isolated. They form a self-reinforcing intervention triangle. 

  • Price relief measures reduce immediate political pressure from rising costs. 
  • Subsidies and fiscal transfers sustain demand and prevent short-term economic adjustment. 
  • Inflation-driven tax revenues, particularly through value-added taxes and excise collections, provide the fiscal space to finance those subsidies. 

Each corner of the triangle reinforces the others. 

A. Price relief

reduces political pressure

allows inflation to persist elsewhere

B. Subsidies

sustain demand

delay supply adjustment

C. VAT windfalls

finance interventions

encourage further policy expansion. 

Because value-added taxes are collected as a percentage of nominal prices, inflation automatically boosts government revenue even without legislative tax increases. This dynamic effectively transforms inflation into an implicit tax mechanism that helps finance fiscal deficits 

The result is a system characterized by persistent inflation, expanding fiscal intervention, and weakening supply responses—a structure that gradually locks the economy into a stagflationary trajectory. 

This dynamic also reflects a broader pattern identified by several strands of economic theory. 

Murray Rothbard described how successive government interventions often generate distortions that then justify further intervention in a cumulative process. 

János Kornai later characterized similar systems as operating under “soft budget constraints,” where firms and institutions come to expect rescue when financial pressures emerge

In financial markets, Hyman Minsky observed that prolonged stabilization policies can encourage rising leverage and risk-taking, gradually transforming stability itself into a source of fragility. 

The Philippine policy mix increasingly exhibits elements of all three dynamics simultaneously.

III. The Return of War-Time Economics 

Many of these policies also resemble the economic management frameworks historically used during wartime mobilization or the "war economy." 

Price controls, directed credit programs, industrial coordination, and regulatory mandates were originally designed to manage supply shortages and stabilize critical sectors during periods of national emergency. 

In the Philippine case, however, similar instruments are now being deployed outside wartime conditions—reflecting an economy increasingly governed through administrative intervention rather than decentralized market coordination. 

IV. Energy Bailouts and Socialized Losses 

Recent developments in the power sector illustrate how these dynamics operate in practice. 

Regulators recently approved a mechanism allowing Meralco to recover more than Php 4 billion from consumers through tariff adjustments tied to disruptions in gas supply from an affiliate-linked generation facility, effective September. 

This episode demonstrates how upstream contractual disruptions are transformed into regulated cost pass-throughs, effectively socializing losses across captive electricity consumers. 

Such arrangements stabilize corporate balance sheets while transferring the burden of adjustment to households and businesses. 

Additionally, this confirms our November 2025 analysis of the SMC–MER–AEV deal—an implicit bailout that magnifies the fragility loop. 

V. BSP’s Hawkish Rhetoric, Shadow Monetary Easing 

Against this backdrop, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has sought to maintain a public posture of policy discipline, signaling that it has room to raise interest rates. 

However, the measures being deployed tell a different story. 

Recent announcements include

  • loan grace periods for affected borrowers
  • discretion for banks in restructuring distressed loans
  • regulatory relief affecting nonperforming loan classification.

While presented as targeted assistance, these policies function as shadow monetary easing. They support bank balance sheets and credit expansion while allowing the central bank to maintain the appearance of a cautious monetary stance. 

Crucially, these actions coincide with successive interest rate cuts, aggressive reductions in reserve requirement ratios and the doubling of deposit insurance coverage, both of which expand liquidity within the financial system. 

Persistent liquidity expansion also increases pressure on the exchange rate, forcing the central bank to balance domestic financial stabilization against currency defense

The BSP’s demonstrated preference—judging by its policy actions—points clearly to an easing bias. 

Yet, not all bank rescues appear directly in fiscal budgets. 

During the 2023 United States banking crisis, for instance, large-scale stabilization measures were implemented primarily through central bank liquidity facilities rather than explicit fiscal bailouts. 

The Philippine approach appears to be moving along a similar path.

VI. Ratchet Effect: The Pandemic Rescue Framework That Never Ended 

Authorities deployed this stabilization framework during the pandemic recession as an emergency response. 

More than five years later, however, that emergency architecture has not been unwound. Instead of normalization, deficit spending has become structurally embedded in the system.


Figure 1

Public debt continues to reach new highs. Universal and commercial bank lending relative to GDP is at record levels, while public debt-to-GDP has climbed back to levels last seen in 2005.  (Figure 1, upper and lower graphs)


Figure 2

At the same time, both banking system net claims on the national/central government (NCoCG) and central bank exposures have expanded significantly, drifting near or exceeding historical peaks. (Figure 2, upper window) 

Fiscal outcomes reinforce this pattern. The 2025 deficit ranks among the largest in the country’s history, while combined public and formal financial sector leverage has risen to approximately 113 percent of GDP. 

Liquidity conditions tell the same story. Although M2 broad money has declined from its pandemic peak of roughly 76 percent of GDP in 2021, it remained near 70 percent in 2025—well above historical norms. (Figure 2, lower diagram) 

All told, these trends suggest that pandemic-era interventions did not merely stabilize the economy temporarily; they fundamentally reshaped its structure. 

The system now operates with a deepening reliance on elevated leverage, abundant liquidity, and recurring policy support. 

This dynamic closely reflects the Robert Higgs concept of the "ratchet effect," where government expansion during crises is rarely reversed. Instead, emergency measures leave behind institutional and political legacies that permanently raise the baseline of state intervention, making each subsequent intervention easier to justify and more difficult to unwind. 

VII. Oil Shock Meets Banking System Stress Beneath the Surface 

Pre-Iran war banking data indicates that pressures may already be building beneath the surface.


Figure 3

The ratio of cash to deposits fell in February 2026 to its lowest level in at least a decade. (Figure 3, upper pane) 

Meanwhile, liquid assets relative to deposits, although rebounding slightly in February, remain near levels last seen during the early months of the pandemic in 2020. 

At the same time, banks have been rapidly increasing their holdings of available-for-sale (AFS) securities, which surged over the past three months to one of the highest nominal levels on record. This expansion may be temporarily boosting reported liquidity metrics. (Figure 3, lower image) 

Credit quality indicators show similar dynamics.


Figure 4

Allowances for credit losses have reached record levels, reflecting suppressed loan provisions as total loan portfolios continued expanding. Gross nonperforming loans also jumped in February to a new high. (Figure 4, upper and lower charts) 

For much of the past year, rapid credit growth masked a deterioration in loan quality. The recent surge suggests that this buffer may now be fading—which may help explain the latest regulatory relief measures affecting NPL classification.


Figure 5

Interbank lending has also reached record levels, while repos with other banks remain near historic highs. (Figure 5, upper visual) 

Meanwhile, banks increasingly rely on bond and bill borrowings as funding sources rather than traditional deposit growth. (Figure 5, lower image) 

Conjointly, these trends resemble a classic “Wile E. Coyote” dynamic from the denominator effect—where balance sheet stresses remain temporarily suspended by rapid credit expansion until underlying conditions eventually reassert themselves. 

An oil shock may ultimately expose the fragilities embedded in this dynamic.

VIII. External Risks: Oil and the Strait of Hormuz 

These domestic vulnerabilities are unfolding at a time when external risks are rising. 

Despite earlier statements about reopening the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian officials appear to have reversed course and announced its continued suspension, raising the risk of disruptions to global shipping along one of the world’s most critical oil transit routes. 

For energy-importing economies such as the Philippines, any disruption in Gulf oil flows would amplify domestic inflation pressures and widen trade deficits—further complicating monetary policy decisions.

IX. A System Moving Toward Structural Stagflation 

All told, these developments reveal an economy increasingly shaped by persistent and deepening intervention, expanding leverage, and fragile financial balances

Fiscal authorities attempt to suppress consumer price pressures while raising upstream costs. The central bank maintains hawkish rhetoric while quietly deploying liquidity support measures. Banks rely increasingly on credit expansion and market funding to sustain balance sheets. 

The policy framework introduced during the pandemic—once described as temporary emergency stabilization—now appears to have become the operating regime

Current developments are unfolding broadly in line with the expectations we articulated in June 2025 regarding the government’s response to rising economic pressures. 

Without a doubt, the BSP will likely rescue the banks and the government, perhaps using the pandemic template of forcing down rates, implementing reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts, massive injections (directly and through bank credit expansion), and expanding relief measures—though likely with limits this time.  

If the central bank ultimately resorts to a full revival of its pandemic rescue playbook—aggressive rate cuts, further reserve requirement reductions, and large-scale liquidity injections—the consequences are unlikely to resemble the temporary stabilization achieved in 2020. 

Instead, the outcome could be a familiar combination:

  • a weakening currency or the Philippine peso,
  • renewed inflation pressures,
  • rising risk of unemployment,
  • slowing economic growth, and
  • rising interest rates.

In other words, the economy may be drifting toward the very outcome policymakers are attempting to avoid—a structurally entrenched stagflationary cycle. 

X. Conclusion: The Institutionalization of Crisis Policy 

What is emerging in the Philippines is not merely a temporary economic slowdown triggered by external shocks. Instead, it reflects the gradual institutionalization of a policy framework built around continuous crisis management. 

Emergency transfers, directed credit programs, regulatory relief, and fiscal expansion have become the populist default responses to economic stress. While each intervention may appear justified in isolation, their cumulative effect is to embed an economic system increasingly dependent on state support. 

Over time, such policies weaken market discipline, distort investment decisions, and transfer growing economic risks onto public balance sheets. 

As economists Hyman Minsky and János Kornai observed in different contexts, systems sustained by repeated stabilization measures often appear stable until underlying imbalances become too large to contain. 

The danger is not simply that stagnation and inflation coexist. 

The deeper risk is that a policy regime designed to manage crises may itself become the mechanism through which crisis dynamics intensify.