Showing posts with label welfare state. Show all posts
Showing posts with label welfare state. Show all posts

Sunday, September 07, 2025

When Free Lunch Politics Meets Fiscal Reality: Lessons from the DPWH Flood Control Scandal

 

Democratic socialism—thereby fusing populist authorization with bureaucratic command—inverts civil society’s logic: spontaneous coordination yields to electoral control, property, and precedent to administrative discretion. The quest for legibility breeds discretion, opacity, colonizing associations, and politicizing provision. The polity grows more ceremonially majoritarian as its structure turns illiberal. Human relations become increasingly politicized. The space for autonomous and dissenting freedom steadily recedes—Vibhu Vikramaditya 

In this issue: 

When Free Lunch Politics Meets Fiscal Reality: Lessons from the DPWH Flood Control Scandal

I. Selective Framing: The "Smallest Deficit" Headline

II. Bigger Picture: Weak Revenues, Sluggish Spending, Cumulative Deficit Near Record Highs

III. Quietly Moving the Goalposts, Budget Gaps: Enacted vs. Revised

IV. Interventionist Mindset: The Root of the Fiscal Imbalance

V. The Economics of "Free Lunch" Politics: The Law of Scarcity Meets the Welfare State

VI. Debt Dynamics and the Savings–Investment Gap

VII Corruption as Symptom, Not Cause

VIII. Public Spending at Historic Highs and the DPWH Flood Control Scandal

IX. The DPWH Scandal: A Systemic Threat

X. A Policy Dilemma: The Impossible Choice 

When Free Lunch Politics Meets Fiscal Reality: Lessons from the DPWH Flood Control Scandal 

What the DPWH scandal reveals about the fragility of a spending‑driven political economic order

I. Selective Framing: The "Smallest Deficit" Headline 

Inquirer.net, August 29, 2025: A modest increase in government spending narrowed the Philippines’ budget deficit in July to its smallest level in nearly five years, keeping the shortfall within the Marcos administration’s target. The state continued to spend more than it collected after recording a fiscal deficit of P18.9 billion, albeit smaller by 34.42 percent compared with a year ago, latest data from the Bureau of the Treasury showed.


Figure 1

The July budget deficit headline—“smallest in nearly five years”—is a textbook case of selective framing. 

While technically accurate, it obscures deeper fiscal concerns by exploiting the optics of quarterly VAT reporting, which front-loads revenue at the start of each quarter. Since 2023, firms have filed VAT returns quarterly instead of monthly, so revenues at the start of each quarter appear inflated, producing artificial “surpluses” or unusually slim deficits. (as discussed last year, see reference) [Figure 1, upper image] 

This makes July look exceptional, but it is little more than a timing quirk—not a sign of genuine fiscal improvement.

II. Bigger Picture: Weak Revenues, Sluggish Spending, Cumulative Deficit Near Record Highs 

In reality, the cumulative January–July shortfall has ballooned to Php 784.4 billion, the second-largest on record. [Figure 1, lower chart] 

Revenues grew by only 3.26% while expenditures posted a meager 1.02% increase. The Bureau of the Treasury itself attributed the spending slowdown to the "timing of big-ticket disbursements of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of Social Welfare and Development, and Department of National Defense for their respective banner programs." 

Year-to-July, expenditures are up 8.2%, slower than 13.2% in 2024, but the bigger story lies in revenue weakness: collections grew just 4.8% this year compared with 14.75% in 2024. The 24.9% contraction in non-tax intake and the sharp deceleration in Bureau of Customs growth (1.5% vs. 5.8% in 2024) dragged overall revenues down. 

III. Quietly Moving the Goalposts, Budget Gaps: Enacted vs. Revised 

July’s Php 491.2 billion in expenditures also fell sharply below the Php 561 billion monthly average needed to meet the Php 6.326 trillion enacted budget. 


Figure 2

Compounding this, the Bureau of the Treasury reported that 2025 fiscal targets had been revised downward (by the DBCC) for both revenue and spending, now pegged at Php 6.08 trillion. [Figure 2, upper table] 

Authorities attributed the adjustment to "heightened global uncertainties," but the subtext is clear: the government is quietly recalibrating expectations to preserve its 5.5% deficit ceiling, even as structural weaknesses deepen. The headline may offer comfort, but the underlying trajectory points to fragility, not fiscal strength. 

The enacted budget sets the ceiling—what government aims to spend—while the revised budget marks the floor, revealing what it can realistically afford as conditions shift. 

Yet the jury is still out on whether the current administration will break its six-year trend of exceeding the enacted budget—or whether this implicit admission of slower growth will instead spur even more spending in the second half of the year. 

IV. Interventionist Mindset: The Root of the Fiscal Imbalance 

Of course, the fiscal imbalance is merely a symptom. 

As previously discussed, it is driven by behavioral factors—such as the heuristics of recency bias and overconfidence—combined with an overreliance on a technocratic bureaucracy fixated on flawed econometrics as the fountainhead of interventions. (see reference on our previous post dealing with the rising risks of a Fiscal Shock) 

Most importantly, it is fueled by a populace increasingly dependent on social democracy’s "free lunch" politics, anchored in a deepening interventionist mindset. 

As Mises Institute’s Joshua Mawhorter lucidly describes, "by living under a modern, highly interventionist modern nation-state, the default paradigm of political elites and the general public is that, whenever a problem arises, the government must do something, that not doing something would be irresponsible and disastrous, that it can only help, and that the worst possible option would be doing nothing. This might be called the interventionist mindset or interventionist paradigm." (bold added)

V. The Economics of "Free Lunch" Politics: The Law of Scarcity Meets the Welfare State 

This mindset lays the policy framework for trickle-down Keynesian spending programs financed by the BSP’s easy money. 

Public spending on an ever-widening scope of social services—including the proposed "universal healthcare" for all Filipinos—illustrates this. [Figure 2, lower left image] 

In simple terms, while such programs may appear ideal, the law of scarcity dictates that there must be sufficient savings to sustain a welfare state. 

If the rate of redistribution exceeds the growth of savings, funding must come from elsewhere—either by borrowing from future taxpayers or through the inflation tax, via financial repression and fiscal dominance enabled and facilitated by central bank accommodation. 

Yet a persistent reliance on borrowing or inflation is not sustainable. Both are subject to ‘reversion to the mean’ and will eventually face a reckoning through crisis.

VI. Debt Dynamics and the Savings–Investment Gap 

The thing is, while some authorities acknowledge the burden of public debt—"every Filipino now owes P142,000"—most attribute it to "corruption," a convenient strawman. [Figure 2, lower right picture]


Figure 3

Alongside rising expenditures, public debt surged to a record Php 17.56 trillion last July, sustaining its upward trajectory and accelerating in both scale and velocity! MoM changes depict this uptrend. [Figure 3, topmost and center graphs] 

All told, the Philippines suffers from a record savings–investment gap, which hit a new high in Q2 2025. [Figure 3, lowest chart] 

But "savings" in national accounts is a residual GDP-derived figure that is deeply flawed; it even includes government "savings" such as retained surpluses and depreciation, when in reality, the fiscal deficit reflects dissaving (as discussed during CMEPA last July; see reference). 

With public debt up Php 296.2 billion month-on-month, Php 1.873 trillion year-on-year, and Php 1.512 trillion year-to-date, the government is suggesting a forthcoming decline in public debt by the end of 2025. 

Technically, while a ‘slowdown’ may occur, this is a red herring—it omits the fact that soaring deficit spending inevitably translates into higher debt, higher inflation, or both.

VII Corruption as Symptom, Not Cause 

Social democrats fail to heed the lessons of EDSA I and EDSA II: corruption is a legacy of big government. 

What is often forgotten is that corruption is not the disease but a symptom of vote-buying politics—of a system built on free-lunch populism, where political spending buys loyalty, entrenches dependence, transfers wealth, consumes savings, and simultaneously erodes institutions through ever-deepening interventions. 

Per the great Frédéric Bastiat, 

"When plunder has become a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal system that authorizes it and a moral code that glorifies it." (Bastiat, 1848) 

Still, social democrats cling to the illusion that electing an "angel" leader can deliver an ideal command-and-control economy. They overlook that forced redistribution—or legalized plunder—breeds societal tensions and unintended consequences, triggering a vicious cycle of interventions and power concentration —exactly what Tocqueville warned against when he said absolute power corrupts absolutely. 

Again, Bastiat reminds us: 

"legal plunder may be exercised in an infinite multitude of ways. Hence come an infinite multitude of plans for organization; tariffs, protection, perquisites, gratuities, encouragements, progressive taxation, free public education, right to work, right to profit, right to wages, right to assistance, right to instruments of labor, gratuity of credit, etc., etc. And it is all these plans, taken as a whole, with what they have in common, legal plunder, that takes the name of socialism." (Bastiat, 1850) 

The bigger the government, the greater the corruption. 

VIII. Public Spending at Historic Highs and the DPWH Flood Control Scandal


Figure 4

Today, public spending as a share of GDP is at its highest level (!!) compared to pre-EDSA I and pre-EDSA II—and that’s counting only direct public expenditures, excluding construction and private sector participation in government projects such as PPPs and other ancillary ventures. [Figure 4, upper diagram] 

From this perspective, the ongoing flood control scandal is merely the tip of the iceberg, with contractors and select authorities in the “hot chair” serving as convenient fall guys for a much larger, systemic issue. 

IX. The DPWH Scandal: A Systemic Threat 

These X.com headlines provide a stark clue as to how public spending and GDP might be affected: [Figure 4, lower images]

The unfolding DPWH scandal threatens more than reputational damage—it risks triggering a contractionary spiral that could expose the fragility of the Philippine top-down heavy economic development model. 

With Php 1.033 trillion allotted to DPWH alone (16.3% of the 2025 budget)—which was lowered to Php 900 billion (14.2% of total budget)—and Php 1.507 trillion for infrastructure overall (23.8% and estimated 5.2% of the GDP), any slowdown in disbursements could reverberate across sectors. 

Many large firms are structurally tied to public projects, and the economy’s current momentum leans heavily on credit-fueled activity rather than organic productivity. 

Curtailing infrastructure outlays, even temporarily, risks puncturing GDP optics and exposing the private sector’s underlying weakness. 

Or if infrastructure spending is curtailed or delayed, growth slows and tax revenues fall—VAT, corporate, and income tax collections all weaken when economic activity contracts. 

This means the deficit doesn’t necessarily shrink despite spending restraint; the “fiscal hole” may, in fact, widen—imperiling fiscal stability and setting the stage for a potential fiscal shock. 

The irony is stark: efforts to contain corruption by tightening spending could deepen the very gap they aim to close.

To be clear, this is not a defense of corruption but rather a reminder of how dependent GDP growth has become on public spending, leaving it vulnerable to the vagaries of political oscillation—including the ongoing flood control corruption scandal.

X. A Policy Dilemma: The Impossible Choice


Figure 5

With debt servicing already absorbing a growing share of the budget (7-month interest payment accounted for 14.8% share of expenditure), and revenue buoyancy dependent on infra-led growth, the administration faces a dilemma—either sustain spending through a compromised political pipeline or risk a broader economic and fiscal unraveling. 

The lesson is, the real danger lies not in the scandal itself, but in the systemic exposure it threatens to reveal: 

  • A growth model overly reliant on state-led spending
  • A fiscal framework vulnerable to both political shocks and bureaucratic paralysis
  • A debt trajectory that leaves little room for error when revenues falter 

In short, the interventionist mindset at the core of social democracy’s "free lunch" political economy entrenches structural fragility, as shown by the mounting fiscal imbalance. 

The DPWH scandal crystallizes a deeper tension—forcing the political economy to weigh popular demands for ‘good governance’ against the imperatives of a development model structurally reliant on public spending. 

As Roman historian Tacitus warned (The Annals of Imperial Rome): 

"The more corrupt the state, the more numerous the laws."

____

References 

Vibhu Vikramaditya How Democratic Socialism Inverts the Logic of Civil Society Mises.org, September 3, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Philippine Government’s July Deficit "Narrowed" from Changes in VAT Reporting Schedule, Raised USD 2.5 Billion Plus $500 Million Climate Financing September 1, 2024 Substack 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock, August 3, 2025 Substack 

Joshua Mawhorter Interventionist Non-Interventionism Mises.org, September 5, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The CMEPA Delusion: How Fallacious Arguments Conceal the Risk of Systemic Blowback, July 27, 2025 Substack 

Frédéric Bastiat Economic sophisms, 2nd series (1848), ch. 1 Physiology of plunder ("Sophismes économiques", 2ème série (1848), chap. 1 "Physiologie de la spoliation"). Econolib 

Frédéric Bastiat, The Law (1850), Ludwig von Mises Institute 2007 Mises.org

 

Sunday, September 10, 2023

The PSE’s Proposed Capital Controls, Metro Pacific’s Mounting Liquidity Challenges: Is the GSIS Providing an Implicit Backstop?

 

All crises have involved debt that, in one fashion or another, has become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. – John Kenneth Galbraith, A Short History of Financial Euphoria 

 

In this issue 

The PSE’s Proposed Capital Controls, Metro Pacific’s Mounting Liquidity Challenges: Is the GSIS Providing an Implicit Backstop? 

I. The PSE Proposes its Version of Capital Controls: Raise the Barriers of Exit for Listed Firms 

II. Two Perspectives from MPI’s GSIS Transactions 

III. Public Financial Institutions as the Core Driver of the PSE’s Liquidity 

IV. Possible Reason for Delisting? Metro Pacific’s Intensifying Liquidity Challenges 

V. GSIS Expanded Holdings of MPI: A Bailout? An Implicit Backstop? 

 

The PSE’s Proposed Capital Controls, Metro Pacific’s Mounting Liquidity Challenges: Is the GSIS Providing an Implicit Backstop? 

 

The Philippine PSE wants to stanch the "wave of companies" delisting with more rules.  Is the GSIS providing a tacit backstop to the liquidity-challenged Metro Pacific? Are public financial firms the core of PSE's liquidity? 


I. The PSE Proposes its Version of Capital Controls: Raise the Barriers of Exit for Listed Firms 

 

Inquirer.net, September 4: The Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) is tightening the rules on voluntary delistings amid a wave of companies going private during the market slump. The PSE is revisiting the guidelines anew after amending the rules in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic in December 2020. This came as principals of large firms such as infrastructure-focused Metro Pacific Investments Corp. and cement giant Holcim Philippines announced plans to go private at relatively cheaper valuations, frustrating minority stockholders. One of the key features is the scrapping of the 95-percent ownership threshold to successfully complete a voluntary delisting. This also means the bourse’s proposed revisions could make delisting buyouts more costly in certain cases to protect small investors. 


A company decides to delist when the cost overshadows the benefits of being a publicly listed company.  Those costs include financial, political (regulatory, etc.), economic, a combination of, and even psychic.  

 

The reaction of the PSE manifests the public's mood, reflexively influenced by market actions described hereinto as a "slump," which should be unsurprising. 

 

That is to say, while different reasons may have prompted the "wave of companies" to exit, the bear market could be their common denominator. 

 

Since mainstream institutions have programmed the public's perception of the stock market as an "entitlement," its parallelism in expectations is that speculations deliver "prosperity." 

 

In turn, aside from amplifying volatility, the ramifications of the overriding sentiment—driven by high-time preference or short-term orientation—have been to consume capital.   

 

Turning the stock market into a "casino" has led to material shrinkages in peso volume, which are symptomatic of decreased savings/capital.  

 

Ergo, in response to popular pressures, the PSE proposes to increase the cost of "barriers to exit" to discourage delisting.  In essence, it is the PSE's version of capital controls.  

 

If the PSE does that, high "barriers to exit" will likely transform into high "barriers to entry."  

 

Goodbye to those IPO goals. 

 

Worse, it could also motivate other listed companies to head for the exit doors before its enforcement.  

 

Nonetheless, these collective "denials" reinforce the symptoms of a bear market.  

 

II. Two Perspectives from MPI’s GSIS Transactions 

 

One of the week's prominent developments has been the positioning for Metro Pacific's delisting, which may have culminated with the GSIS's increased exposure to the firm last September 4th.   

 

Inquirer.net, September 5: State pension fund Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) delivered a surprise on Tuesday as it announced an increase in its stake in Manuel V. Pangilinan-led Metro Pacific Investment Corp. by nearly four times to about 12 percent days before the conclusion of the company’s P55-billion privatization bid…GSIS’ upsized stake, worth about P17.8 billion at the tender offer price of P5.20 per share, gives the pension fund enough boardroom sway to block the delisting plan…But several market observers said GSIS was likely strengthening its position to negotiate better buyout terms from the bidding consortium—composed of Indonesian tycoon Anthoni Salim’s First Pacific Group, the Ty family conglomerate GT Capital Holdings, Japan’s Mitsui Group and Manuel V. Pangilinan, chair and CEO of Metro Pacific…Then through a letter to Metro Pacific on Sept. 4, it was revealed that GSIS was aggressively buying the company’s shares from Aug. 23 through Sept. 4, acquiring 2.49 billion shares during this period to arrive at its present stake of 11.98 percent. GSIS shares are classified as public shareholdings, meaning the bidding consortium would need to purchase these to reach the required 95 percent ownership threshold before proceeding with the voluntary delisting. GSIS’ stake would be considered nonpublic once it obtains a board seat in the company, based on a series of revisions being proposed by the PSE. 

 

PSE, September 5: Metro Pacific Investments Corporation (MPIC) received a letter from GSIS dated September 4, 2023 informing MPIC that during the period from August 23,2023 to September 4,2023, GSIS purchased 2,490,509,574 common shares of MPIC. GSIS also mentioned that as a result of these purchases, GSIS owns 3,438,549,038 common shares which represents approximately 11.98% of the total outstanding common shares of MPIC. 

 

Here are two perspectives from last week's event. 

 

First, Public financial institutions may be dominating the trading activities at the PSE. 

 

Two, the increased MPI shareholdings of GSIS may represent insurance against the financial risk.   

 

III. Public Financial Institutions as the Core Driver of the PSE’s Liquidity 

 

Monday's trading could be one for the books. 

 

The Php 9.011 billion volume of Metro Pacific [PSE: MPI] accounted for 81.96% and 79.6% of the Php 10.995 billion main board (MB) and Php 11.322 billion total turnover.   

 

Cross trades of MPI shares accounted for over Php 4 billion.  As such, the top 10 brokers shanghaied 74.7% share of the mainboard trading volume.  

 

Alternatively, ex-MPI shares, the MB, and the total volume shrunk to an incredible Php 1.984 billion and Php 2.311 billion, respectively. 

 

This means that while the attention shifted to MPI, liquidity in the broader market dissipated. 

Figure 1 


As evidence, the volume in pesos and % share of the Sy group of companies (SM, SMPH, and BDO) representing the top 3 PSEi 30 heavyweights plummeted to 2.9%, a multi-year low.  Meanwhile, cumulative peso volume receded to a mere Php 318 million! 

 

To this point, institutional investors, most likely represented by public financial firms like GSIS, could be the core source of the PSE's liquidity. 

 

In any case, the increased exposure by the GSIS on MPI could further reduce the market's liquidity should the (tender offer) sellers of MPI opt not to plow back the sales proceeds to the PSE.  

 

Since the GSIS announcement, MB trading volume has averaged less than Php 3.5 billion daily! 

 

IV. Possible Reason for Delisting? Metro Pacific’s Intensifying Liquidity Challenges 

 

Departing from the Overtone Window on MPI's delisting, as propounded last May, deteriorating liquidity conditions could signify a critical factor in the company's decision. 

 

I could be wrong; however, does the unrecognized/unappreciated "intrinsic value" constitute the outgrowth of debt over income in the face of falling cash reserves? 

 

Could taking MPI into the private indicate its undertaking remedial liquidity measures through ownership restructuring—post-delisting? That's a guess, though. (Prudent Investor, May 2023) 

 

MPI's Q2 17-Q provides us an overview.  

 

Figure 2 


The downward sloping trend of MPI's cash reserves has more than halved since Q1 2020.  

 

For the first time, short-term debt of Php 35.64 billion surpassed its cash reserves of Php 29.10 billion.  MPI's current ratio was .68 for the period.  

 

Nominal debt has been outpacing gross revenues.   

Figure 3 

 

In marginal net peso changes, sales increased by Php 2.8 billion in Q2 YoY, while debt expanded by Php 22 billion.  Net income?  Php 1.694 billion.  So MPI borrowed Php 10.6 pesos for every Php 1 of sales growth and Php 13 for every peso of net income increase.   

 

Interest expense?  Php 899 million increase in Q2 YoY.  Interest expense has mirrored the surge in BSP rates, which has been gnawing at the profit margins.  

 

Clearly, the liquidity-challenged position by MPI has had a crucial role in its decision to delist. 

 

All these assume the accuracy of the published 17Q. 

 

V. GSIS Expanded Holdings of MPI: A Bailout? An Implicit Backstop? 

 

Now, to the expanded exposure of GSIS (in my humble opinion). 

 

If this tender offer event tacked in sales of some treasury shares, this represents a partial bailout by the GSIS of MPI. 

 

Nevertheless, the expanded exposure of GSIS provides an implicit backstop on MPI.  Should MPI encounter financial turbulence, GSIS could appeal to the BSP and DoF (or even the Office of the President) for a bailout on the pretext that the latter's beneficiaries could be at stake.  

 

In any case, the surge of GSIS exposure as the liquidity-challenged MPI undergoes a delisting process looks like a political maneuver rather than merely about "investments"—as presented by the consensus. 

 

If anything, MPI's episode showcases why the BSP has been dithering over its policies.  The BSP's "trickle-down" effect is in jeopardy, demonstrated by the debt-to-eyeballs firms of the elites, which are on the precipice. 


___ 

references 


Prudent Investor, Is the Delisting of Metro Pacific a Bullish or Bearish Sign for the Philippine PSE? May 3, 2023: SubstackBlogger