Showing posts with label bank bailouts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bank bailouts. Show all posts

Monday, August 15, 2011

Confiscatory Deflation and Gold Prices

This is a reply to an objection

Gold’s rise represents:

1. fear of bank failure.

My reply

With all the money being sunk into the banking system of major economies, such observation omits the current evidences that abounds (from ECB’s $1 Trilion QE, Fed’s explicit guarantee and rollover of principal payments, SNB’s and Japan’s currency interventions and bans on short sales by 4 European nations plus Turkey and South Korea)

This of course doesn’t even include the money spent for the bailouts during the 2008 crisis where the Federal Reserve audit revealed $16 trillion issued to foreign banks and or previous estimates of $23.7 trillion exposure of US taxpayer money to save the systemically important or ‘too big to fail’ banks and other politically privileged companies.

As one would note, people stuck with an ideology will tend to dismiss evidences even if these have been blatantly “staring at their faces’.

2. concerns of the "Pesofication" of hard currency accounts

My reply

Assumptions that government’s may confiscate deposits or prevent withdrawals like the Argentina crisis (1999-2002) does not translate to an increase of demand for gold, for the simple reason that such government policies promote deflation.

Austrian Economist Joseph Salerno calls this ‘Confiscatory Deflation’

Mr. Salerno explains (bold emphasis mine)

As a result, Argentina's money supply (M1) increased at an average rate of 60 percent per year from 1991 through 1994. After declining to less than 5 percent for 1995, the growth rate of the money supply shot up to over 15 percent in 1996 and nearly 20 percent in 1997. In 1998, with the peso overvalued as a result of inflated domestic product prices and foreign investors rapidly losing confidence that the peso would not be devalued, the influx of dollars ceased and the inflationary boom came to a screeching halt as the money supply increased by about 1 percent and the economy went into recession. Money growth turned slightly negative in 1999, while in 2000, the money supply contracted by almost 20 percent.

The money supply continued to contract at a double-digit annual rate through June 2001. In 2001, domestic depositors began to lose confidence in the banking system, and a bank credit deflation began in earnest as the system lost 17 percent, or $14.5 billion worth, of deposits.

On Friday, November 30, alone, between $700 million and $2 billion of deposits--reports vary--were withdrawn from Argentine banks. Even before that Friday bank run, the central bank possessed only $5.5 billion of reserves ultimately backing $70 billion worth of dollar and convertible peso deposits. President Fernando de la Rua and his economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, responded to this situation on Saturday, December 1, announcing a policy that amounted to confiscatory deflation to protect the financial system and maintain the fixed peg to the dollar.

Specifically, cash withdrawals from banks were to be limited to $250 per depositor per week for the next ninety days, and all overseas cash transfers exceeding $1,000 were to be strictly regulated. Anyone attempting to carry cash out of the country by ship or by plane was to be interdicted.

Finally, banks were no longer permitted to issue loans in pesos, only in dollars, which were exceedingly scarce. Depositors were still able to access their bank deposits by check or debit card in order to make payments. Still, this policy was a crushing blow to poorer Argentines, who do not possess debit or credit cards and who mainly hold bank deposits not accessible by check.

Predictably, Cavallo's cruel and malign confiscatory deflation dealt a severe blow to cash businesses and, according to one report, "brought retail trade to a standstill." This worsened the recession, and riots and looting soon broke out that ultimately cost 27 lives and millions of dollars in damage to private businesses. These events caused a state of siege to be declared and eventually forced President de la Rua to resign from his position two years early.

By January 6, the Argentine government, now under President Eduardo Duhalde and Economy Minister Jorge Remes Lenicov, conceded that it could no longer keep the inflated and overvalued peso pegged to the dollar at the rate of 1 to 1, and it devalued the peso by 30 percent, to a rate of 1.40 pesos per dollar. Even at this official rate of exchange, however, it appeared the peso was still overvalued because pesos were trading for dollars on the black market at far higher rates.

The Argentine government recognized this, and instead of permitting the exchange rate to depreciate to a realistic level reflecting the past inflation and current lack of confidence in the peso, it intensified the confiscatory deflation imposed on the economy earlier. It froze all savings accounts above $3,000 for a year, a measure that affected at least one-third of the $67 billion of deposits remaining in the banking system, $43.5 billion in dollars and the remainder in pesos.

Depositors who held dollar accounts not exceeding $5,000 would be able to withdraw their cash in twelve monthly installments starting one year from now, while those maintaining larger deposits would not be able to begin cashing out until September 2003, and then only in installments spread over two years. Peso deposits, which had already lost one-third of their dollar value since the first freeze had been mandated and faced possible further devaluation, would be treated more liberally. They would be paid out to their owners starting in two months, but this repayment would also proceed in installments. In the meantime, as one observer put it, "bank transactions as simple as cashing a paycheck or paying a credit card bill remained out of reach of ordinary Argentines."

Mr. Lenicov openly admitted that this latest round of confiscatory deflation was a device for protecting the inherently bankrupt fractional reserve system, declaring, "If the banks go bust nobody gets their deposits back. The money on hand is not enough to pay back all depositors." Unlike the bank credit deflation that Lenicov is so eager to prevent, which permits monetary exchange to proceed with a smaller number of more valuable pesos, confiscatory deflation tends to abolish monetary exchange and propel the economy back to grossly inefficient and primitive conditions of barter and self-sufficient production that undermine the social division of labor…

Unfortunately, things were to get even worse for hapless Argentine bank depositors. After solemnly pledging when he took office on January 1 that banks would be obliged to honor their contractual commitments to pay out dollars to those who held dollar-denominated deposits, President Duhalde announced in late January that the banks would be permitted to redeem all deposits in pesos. Since the peso had already depreciated by 40 percent against the dollar on the free market in the interim, this meant that about $16 billion of purchasing power had already been transferred from dollar depositors to the banks.

Prices of gold vis-à-vis the Argentinean Peso only surged after the Argentine government allowed the Peso to be devalued.

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Chart from Nowandfutures.com

Devaluation had been the outcome of an explosion of money supply

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Chart from Nowandfutures.com

As the bust cycle of the imploding bubble culminated (explained above by Dr. Salerno above) inflation fell (see red ellipse below).

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Chart from tradingeconomics.com

More of the Argentine Crisis from Wikipedia,(bold emphasis mine)

After much deliberation, Duhalde abandoned in January 2002 the fixed 1-to-1 peso–dollar parity that had been in place for ten years. In a matter of days, the peso lost a large part of its value in the unregulated market. A provisional "official" exchange rate was set at 1.4 pesos per dollar.

In addition to the corralito, the Ministry of Economy dictated the pesificación ("peso-ification"), by which all bank accounts denominated in dollars would be converted to pesos at official rate. This measure angered most savings holders and appeals were made by many citizens to declare it unconstitutional.

After a few months, the exchange rate was left to float more or less freely. The peso suffered a huge depreciation, which in turn prompted inflation (since Argentina depended heavily on imports, and had no means to replace them locally at the time).

The economic situation became steadily worse with regards to inflation and unemployment during 2002. By that time the original 1-to-1 rate had skyrocketed to nearly 4 pesos per dollar, while the accumulated inflation since the devaluation was about 80%; these figures were considerably lower than those foretold by most orthodox economists at the time. The quality of life of the average Argentine was lowered proportionally; many businesses closed or went bankrupt, many imported products became virtually inaccessible, and salaries were left as they were before the crisis.

Since the volume of pesos did not fit the demand for cash (even after the devaluation) huge quantities of a wide spectrum of complementary currency kept circulating alongside them. Fears of hyperinflation as a consequence of devaluation quickly eroded the attractiveness of their associated revenue, originally stated in convertible pesos. Their acceptability now ultimately depended on the State's willingness to take them as payment of taxes and other charges, consequently becoming very irregular. Very often they were taken at less than their nominal value—while the Patacón was frequently accepted at the same value as peso, Entre Ríos's Federal was among the worst-faring, at an average 30% as the provincial government that had issued them was reluctant to take them back. There were also frequent rumors that the Government would simply banish complementary currency overnight (instead of redeeming them, even at disadvantageous rates), leaving their holders with useless printed paper.

Bottom line:

The above experience from Argentina’s crisis shows that when government adapts policies to confiscate private property through the banking system, demand for gold does NOT increase or gold prices don’t rise.

It is when the Argentine government decided to devalue and inflate the system where gold prices skyrocketed.

Both confiscatory deflation and the succeeding inflation lowered the standard of living of the Argentines. The antecedent to the above events had been a prior boom.

In short, policies that promote boom-bust or bubble cycles represent as net negative to a society and even promotes more interventionist policies that worsens the prevailing social predicaments.

Lastly record gold prices today points to inflationism NOT confiscatory deflation.

Tuesday, July 26, 2011

Fed Audit Reveals US Federal Reserves’ $16 Trillion Bailouts of Foreign Banks

A staggering $16 trillion of bailout money had been extended to foreign banks by the US Federal Reserve during the last crisis!

That’s the finding from the audit commissioned by US Congress through the GAO

From New American

During a 2½ year period starting at the end of 2007, the Federal Reserve provided more than $16 trillion in secret bailouts to banks and other companies around the world, according to a government audit of some of the U.S. central bank’s operations.

Much of the Fed's largesse was lavished on banks in Europe (such as Barclays, left) and Asia, the audit revealed. More than $3 trillion, for example, went to financial institutions in just five European countries. Trillions more flowed toward some of the biggest banks in America. Institutions from Brazil and Mexico to South Korea and Canada also benefited.
The 266-page report, produced by Congress’s non-partisan investigative service known as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), has already sparked intense outrage since its release on July 21. Fed apologists, however, have been quick to defend the actions, saying they were “necessary” to “save” the economy and justified under the Federal Reserve Act.

“The scale and nature of this assistance amounted to an unprecedented expansion of the Federal Reserve System’s traditional role as lender-of-last-resort to depository institutions,” the report stated.

And the crisis had been also used to extend financial privileges by the politically connected. Again from the same article,

According to the analysis, more than 80 percent of the Fed’s largest contracts to manage the programs were awarded without bidding.

Many of the companies that received the contracts were also being showered with central-bank bailouts at the same time. And more than a few insiders were granted “waivers” to hold investments in companies that were being rescued by the Fed.

This serves as more evidence that governments only work to protect powerful vested interest groups and would mainly act to preserve the current central bank-banking system-government cartelized political arrangement.

With the US Federal Reserve’s implicit role as the lender of last resort (aside from other financing roles as guarantor, liquidity provider, buyer, market maker and etc…) for most of the ‘too big to fail’ banking system and central banks worldwide, which has been funded mostly by inflationism, the decadence of the US dollar standard is almost assured.

Sunday, July 03, 2011

I Just Can’t Get Enough: Philippine Phisix Emits Intensely Bullish Signals

And when it rains

You`re shining down for me

I just can`t get enough

I just can`t get enough

Just like a rainbow

You know you set me free

I just can`t get enough

I just can`t get enough

-I Just Can’t Get Enough, Depeche Mode

Last week I pointed out that signs of market divergences in the global markets and a seeming convergence of many local indicators pointed to a possible sustained momentum for a rally.

I wrote[1]

All these factors, particularly chart formation, rallying peso, improving market breadth, bullish local investors, appears to have converged to signify possibly as a significant tailwind in favor of the bulls.

With lady luck seemingly smiling at me, events have proven this short term observation to be stunningly accurate.

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The Phisix (black candle) makes an all important watershed with a rousing breakout (light blue circle) from the massive 8-month reverse and shoulder formation (orange arcs).

In Bullmarkets, Everyone is a Genius

Before I proceed, I’d like to make additional comments on what I think will be forthcoming mindset that will dominate the equity markets as the bullmarket flourishes.

Bullmarkets create the impression of infallibility, smugness, invincibility and expansive risk appetite. That’s because erroneous or defective reasoning, beliefs and or strategies will be validated by prices actions regardless of the soundness of the imputed causal relationship. In short, luck determines most of successes.

Yet most will get immersed with self-attribution bias[2], particularly self-serving bias[3], where people attribute successful outcomes to their own skill, but blame unsuccessful outcomes on bad luck.

In convention, many will argue that ‘fundamentals’ will reflect on price actions. Others will argue that chart trends will serve as the critical factors in establishing fundamentals.

Both these groups essentially argue from the perspective of historical determinism, where past performances have been assumed to determine future outcomes.

Black Swan author Nassim Nicolas Taleb exposes the shortcomings of such presumptions; Mr. Taleb writes[4], (emphasis added)

When you look at the past, the past will always be deterministic, since only one single observation took place. Our mind will interpret most events not with the preceding ones in mind, but the following ones. Imagine taking a test knowing the answer. While we know history flows forward, it is difficult to realize that we envision it backwards.

Their fundamental mistake is to overestimate causality and oversimplify market’s actions as easily explainable from superficial perspectives.

Further, these groups will also fall captive to the reflexivity theory where expectations and outcomes would play a critical self-reinforcing feedback mechanism

The aspect where I agree with Mr. George Soros[5] is this theory, (bold emphasis mine)

The structure of events that have no thinking participants is simple: one fact follows another ending in an unending casual chain. The presence of thinking participants complicates the structure of events enormously: the participants thinking affects the course of action and the course of action affects the participants thinking. To make matters worst, participants influence and affect each other. If the participants’ thinking bore some determinate relationship to the facts there would be no problem: the scientific observer could ignore the participants’ thinking and focus on the facts. But the relationship cannot be accurately determined for the simple reason that the participants’ thinking does not relate to facts; it relates to events in which they participate, and these events become facts only after the participants’ thinking has made its impact on them. Thus the causal chain does not lead directly from fact to fact, but from fact to perception and from perception to fact with all kinds of additional connections between participants that are not reflected fully in the facts.

In short, hardly anyone understands that such reflexive feedback loop process, which functions as the psychological backbone or stepping stones for boom bust cycles, are shaped by actions of policymakers whose political goal has been to sustain perpetual quasi booms.

As the great Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises writes[6], (bold highlights added)

Nothing harmed the cause of liberalism more than the almost regular return of feverish booms and of the dramatic breakdown of bull markets followed by lingering slumps. Public opinion has become convinced that such happenings are inevitable in the unhampered market economy. People did not conceive that what they lamented was the necessary outcome of policies directed toward a lowering of the rate of interest by means of credit expansion. They stubbornly kept to these policies and tried in vain to fight their undesired consequences by more and more government interference

The effect of inflationism is to distort economic or business calculations. This will further cause massive misallocation of capital or an inducement to excessive speculations which subsequently gets manifested on the marketplace, including the stock markets via a boom bust cycle.

Bottom line: Bull market geniuses will fall short of the recognition and comprehension of the true drivers of the marketplace. They would continue to latch on cognitive biases backed by technical gobbledygook (‘macro-micro fundamentals’, political-economic ideology, mechanical charting) to argue for their cases. When the bubble pops all these arguments evaporates.

‘I Told You So’ Moment on Divergences

This leads us back to the significant chart breakout by the Phisix above.

An important reminder is that while charts are representative of past actions of the market, patterns alone do not suggest of the reliability of statistical precision of repetitive occurrences for reasons cited above, such as analytics tenuously derived from historical determinism.

That’s why charts must work in consonance with other indicators. Importantly, charts must be grounded on theory as basis for such prognosis. In short, charts should only play the role of guidepost in measuring theory. It would serve as a grave mistake to interpret charts as the foundation for theory.

Friday’s upside pop (green circle) beyond the reverse head and shoulders resistance levels may have signaled the second wind or the next significant upside leg which may bring the Phisix to the 4,900-5000 level (this implies returns of 12-15%) to the yearend.

Of course, returns will vary according to the actions of specific issues but the returns of the Phisix would essentially reflect on the average of the returns from the 30 elite issues included in the local basket bellwether.

Unfortunately, the Philippine Stock Exchange does not have an Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) listed locally that may reflect on the actions of the Phisix. Nevertheless for residence abroad, the first Philippine Exchange Traded Fund, the iShares MSCI Philippines Investable Market Index Fund (EPHE) has been listed since September of last year[7] One can take advantage of the possible Phisix rally through the EPHE.

The breakout of the Phisix appears to be validated by the actions of the Philippine Peso (red candle) where the USD-Peso chart echoed on an equally sharp downside move (green circle) for the US dollar. The Peso closed at 43.175 on Friday for a .6% gain over the week.

One would note that while the Phisix exudes a bullish backdrop, the Peso’s chart has exhibits what chartists call as a “whipsaw” or a chart pattern failure or in stockcharts.com’s definition “when a buy or sell signal is reversed in a short time”[8]

Early this month, the US dollar broke to the upside against the Peso, but this breakout was essentially expunged by this week’s rally in the Peso (light blue circle).

This should be a good example how charts can’t be used as a standalone metric.

The tight Peso-Phisix correlation suggest that for the time being, the Phisix appears to lead the price actions of the Peso, as I previously noted[9]

currency traders must take heed of the activities in the PSE as part of their studies from which to derive their predictions

Again this has been premised mostly on the favorable relative demand for Peso assets, aside from the lesser inflationary path by the Peso based on the supply side.

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This Phisix-Peso correlation appears as being bolstered by a spike in Foreign buying which turned positive this week (red circle).

Net foreign buying accounted for 44.46% of this week’s peso volume traded at the Philippine Stock Exchange.

Divergent external policies are likely to continue to drive foreign funds into local shores.

Market Internals Swings To Positive Zone

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As an idiom goes, ‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating’.

All sectors posted gains this week with Industrials and Financials taking the leadership from the mining sector (see graphic above).

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Even from the midterm basis, All sectors have been on an uptrend (Financials, Industrials and Holdings-left column; Property, Services and Mining and Oil-right column) despite the recent corrections.

What Friday’s sprightly activities did was to magnify on these gains.

Said differently, while Friday’s rally may have hallmarked a significant and symbolical turnaround, in reality, most of the sectors have already been on an upside creep way before Friday, most notably coming from the troughs in mid June.

Further, this interim rally seems to reinforce the medium term trend dynamics.

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“I just can’t get enough” is a song by new wave band called Depeche Mode during the early 1980s. To borrow from Depeche Mode, I just can’t seem to get enough to further show how markets have been validating our expectations.

The advance-decline ratio (left window) has oscillated to favor of the bulls, while issues traded daily has turned to the upside backed by a seeming double bottom (red) and an interim ascendant trend.

A rising Phisix will induce more trades that will be reflected on volume expansion. That’s how reflexivity theory incentivizes people: As prices go higher more people will start chasing prices and higher prices will be read as improvements on economic and corporate output which will further lead to rationalizing of price chasing dynamics, hence, the feedback loop.

Also, an ascendant Phisix will tilt the balance of ‘frequency’ of the advance-decline differentials mostly to the positive or advancing side. So the advance decline chart would show denser on the positive column where advancing issues dominate.

From Divergence to Convergence

The current divergent phenomenon should not be misread as decoupling. We may see another series of re-convergence in global stock markets.

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The US S&P 500 (SPX), Europe’s Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 (STOX5E), Asia’s Dow Jones Asia/Pacific Index (P1DOW) and the Emerging Markets’ (MSEMF) MSCI Emerging Markets Free Index (EOD) have all bounced strongly from last week (green arrows).

With global equity markets on a heady upside explosion following the ratification of the Greece austerity vote which paves way for the Greece Bailout 2.0 (estimated at 85 billion Euros[10]), we should expect the previously divergent international signals to transition towards re-convergence.

Global markets are being flushed with liquidity once more. This time the flow will not only be coming from the Greece bailout 2.0, but likewise from the proposed bailout by Japan of the embattled nuclear industry, which would signify as an indirect bailout of her Banking industry which has massive loan exposure on the former[11].

The wave of bailouts appears as being intensified by increasing expectations for the reinstitution of asset purchases or Quantitative Easing by the Bank of England[12] (BoE)[13]. Guess who would be next?

Again the serial bailouts, divergent monetary policies by developed and emerging markets, negative real interest rates (here and abroad) and artificially low interest rates represent as key contributors to the prospective extension of the bullish momentum.

Of course, momentum won’t go straight forward, there will be interim or intermediate corrections. Yet these corrections should be seen as windows of opportunities to position.


[1] See Phisix: Divergences Point to a Bullish Momentum, June 26, 2011

[2] self-attribution-bias.behaviouralfinance.net, Self Attribution bias

[3] Wikipedia.org Self-serving bias

[4] Taleb Nassim Nicolas Fooled by Randomness, The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets Random House 2005, p.56

[5] Soros George The Alchemy of Finance, John Wiley and Sons, p. 318

[6] Mises, Ludwig von, Free Banking and Contract Law, Chapter 17 Human Action, Mises.org

[7] Rowland Ron iShares Gives U.S. Investors Their First Philippines ETF, October 1, 2010, Seeking Alpha

[8] Stockcharts.com Glossary - W

[9] See ASEAN’s Equity Divergence, Foreign Fund Flows and Politically Driven Markets, June 5, 2011

[10] Bloomberg.com Euro Area Backs Greek Aid, Looks to New Bailout, July 03, 2011

[11] See Japan Mulls More Bailouts for the Nuclear Industry (and Mega Banks) June 28, 2011

[12] Express.co.uk SOFT PATCH CLOUDS OUTLOOK, July 3, 2011

[13] Bloomberg.com BIS Says Central Banks Need to Start Increasing Rates to Contain Inflation, June 27, 2011

Monday, June 20, 2011

Philippine Banking System: “Most Heavily Fortified Bastion of Privilege and Profit”

The unholy trinity of banking-central banking and government patronage system operates even in the Philippines as well.

From Joe Studwell Asian Godfathers, Money and Power in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia [p.105], (bold emphasis mine)

Such antics caught up with the Philippines in the early 1980s, when the debt-laden regime defaulted on its foreign on its foreign borrowings and several banks failed. After the departure of Marcos in 1986, however, the government of Cory Aquino bailed out the banking system by issuing high-yielding government bonds and providing additional, cheap government deposits. The cost of this action became apparent in 1993 when the old central bank was closed down with a US$12-billion write-off to be born by the treasury, and hence taxpayers. The annual cost of servicing this debt in the mid 1990s was more than the Philippines’ health budget. Those tycoons who did not, like Benedicto and Disini, flee with Marcos, and survived the Philippine Commission on Good Government, found their banks revived with public money and able to enforce cartel pricing that in the late 1990s gave them the best banking margins in Asia. Despite all the trading and production cartels and monopolies sanctioned by Marcos and others in the Philippines, Paul Hutchcroft concludes that the banking sector has always been the ‘the country’s most heavily fortified bastion of privilege and profits’.

That’s the Philippine version of ‘Financial Repression’.

Also, here lies the political "dirty laundry" which have largely been unseen by the public. Good government? Bah!

Saturday, February 12, 2011

Warren Buffett: Embracing Crony Capitalism

Warren Buffett used to be the person I wanted to emulate. Not anymore.

This is because Warren Buffett’s investment approach has radically changed. He has undergone dramatic transformation from a Graham-Dodd modeled value investor to a political entrepreneur-crony capitalist.

The Huffington Post writes, (bold highlights mine)

No matter what the government does, taxpayer bailouts of the financial sector will sometimes be necessary, according to the nation's second richest man.

As markets crashed in the fall of 2008, government officials feared that if certain financial institutions failed, the entire financial system -- or perhaps even the entire economy -- would come down with them. In the months after the government extended a $700 billion bailout to the financial sector, lawmakers have striven to ensure that no institution poses such a systemic risk that it would be too big, or too interconnected, to be allowed to fail.

But famed investor Warren Buffett, whose own firm profited handsomely from the bailout, said bailouts are an inevitable feature of finance, Bloomberg reports.

Buffett, who is personally worth at least $45 billion, told the government panel charged with investigating the causes of the financial crisis that its work would not prevent the phenomenon of "too big to fail."

Reading last night’s very timely article at Mises.org, Frank Chodorov wrote of how some capitalists have contributed to the advancement of socialism.

Mr. Chodorov wrote, (bold highlights mine)

The task of producing goods and services for exchange was accepted as a necessity, but the summum bonum was the acquisition from the king of grants, patents and subsidies that would yield them monopoly profits, that is, profits over and above what might be garnered in a competitive market. Their aim was to live like nobles who rendered no service for the rents they collected from their tenants.

It appears that such “rent seeking paradigm” seems to be Mr. Buffett’s newfound specialty.

Warren Buffett’s perceived “bailout-as-a-necessity” is due to the fact that he or his company profits from these. Yet, what is beneficial for him comes at the expense of ordinary people. Bailouts are basically redistribution of wealth from the average Americans to Mr. Buffett, his company and shareholders.

Nonetheless bailouts are not inevitable. Eventually a political economic system that persists in doing so will only degenerate. And this will likewise affect his company’s profits overtime.

Besides, bailouts or political concessions depend on patronage. Once Mr. Buffett’s political network has gone out of the loop then such privilege goes out of the window as well.

So instead of looking for economic opportunities to exploit on, Mr. Buffett and his executives will be focusing on lobbying.

This only goes to show how Mr. Buffett’s the time horizon has substantially narrowed. Maybe it’s because of age.

But Mr. Buffett has certainly been a disappointment, unlike his libertarian father, a staunch defender of the “old right”, Howard Buffett.

Monday, December 06, 2010

Why EURO Skeptics Are Wrong

The big culprit in all of this is short-term debt. There would be no crises if governments had issued long-term debt to match long-term plans to repay that debt. If investors become gloomy about long-term debt, bond prices go down temporarily—but that's it. A crisis happens when there is bad news and governments need to borrow new money to pay off old debts. Only in this way do guesses about a government's solvency many years in the future translate to a crisis today. There are two lessons from this insight. First, given that the Europeans will not let governments default, they must insist on long-term financing of government debt. Debt and deficit limits will not be enough. Second, the way to handle a refinancing crisis is with a big forced swap of maturing short-term debt for long-term debt. This is what "default" or "restructuring" really means, and it is not the end of the world.- Professor John Cochrane 'Contagion' and Other Euro Myths

Since political developments have weighed heavily on the marketplace, it would a mistake to isolate politics or interpret the marketplace outside of the political dimensions. That’s because governments, which are socio-political institutions, are made up of human beings. And as human beings, their actions are driven by incentives and purposeful behaviour premised on their respective operating environments.

Additionally, as regulating bodies or agencies, they likewise interact with participants of the marketplace. Thus, any useful analysis must incorporate the role of the political economy.

Current Government Actions Validate Our Call

I am glad to say that it’s not only in the markets where our outlook appears to get substantial validation but likewise in our predictions of the political economy.

We have repeatedly argued that faced with a crisis, the predisposition or mechanical response or path dependency of today’s global political leaders is to inflate the system (or throw money at the problem). And these actions are primarily channelled through central banks.

As we declared last week[1],

And like the US dollar, the Euro will be used as an instrument to achieve political goals but coursed through the central bank (ECB).

Here are some recent evidences which corroborates on our call.

Central banks appear to surreptitiously encroach on the fiscal aspects of democratic governments in developed economies.

From Bloomberg[2], (bold highlights mine)

``European Central Bank officials tried to force Ireland to seek a bailout earlier this month and European officials are now trying to do the same to Portugal, Irish Justice Minister Dermot Ahern said.

“Clearly there were people from outside this country who were trying to bounce us in as a sovereign state, into making an application, throwing in the towel before we had even considered it as a government,” he told Irish state broadcaster RTE in an interview today. “And if you notice, they are doing the same with Portugal now.”

``Asked about who was pressuring Ireland, he said “quite obviously people from within the ECB.”

Markets do not only make opinion, importantly they affect policymaking.

Yet in a world where the morbid fear of deflation has been instilled by mainstream economics, governments would use to the hilt its inflationary magic wand.

Another news report from Bloomberg[3], (bold emphasis mine)

``The European Central Bank delayed its withdrawal of emergency liquidity measures and bought more government bonds as President Jean-Claude Trichet pledged to fight “acute” financial market tensions.

``Under pressure from investors to lead the charge against the spreading sovereign debt crisis, Trichet said the ECB will keep offering banks as much cash as they want through the first quarter over periods of up to three months at a fixed interest rate. As he spoke, ECB staff embarked upon a new wave of purchases, triggering a surge in Irish and Portuguese bonds.”

And bailouts of the privileged political class will never end until forced by the markets.

From Bloomberg[4],

``Belgian Finance Minister Didier Reynders said the euro region could increase the size of its 750 billion-euro ($1 trillion) bailout fund, breaking ranks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s Nicolas Sarkozy.

``Reynders told reporters in Brussels yesterday that the current cash pool could be increased if governments decide to create a larger fund as part of a permanent crisis mechanism in 2013. “If we decide this in the next weeks or months, why not apply it immediately to the current facility?”

``European officials are under pressure to find new ways to stop contagion spreading from Greece and Ireland amid concern the bailout package may not be large enough to rescue Spain if needed. While Sarkozy and Merkel rejected expanding the fund on Nov. 25, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet on Dec. 3 indicated governments should consider just such a move.”

A popular analyst misleadingly labelled the Euro a political currency[5] in the assumption that US dollar epitomizes as more of an “economic currency”.

Yet in contrast to such false claim, the recent disclosure by the US Federal Reserve on recipients of bailout money during the 2008 crisis suggests otherwise.

According to the Wall Street Journal Editorial[6],

``We learn, for example, that the cream of Wall Street received even more multibillion-dollar assistance than previously advertised by either the banks or the Fed. Goldman Sachs used the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 85 times to the tune of nearly $600 billion. Even in Washington, that's still a lot of money. Morgan Stanley used the same overnight lending program 212 times from March 2008 to March 2009. This news makes it impossible to argue that either bank would have survived the storm without the Fed's cash.

``The same goes for General Electric, which from late October to late November 2008 tapped the Fed's Commercial Paper Funding Facility 12 times for more than $15 billion. Thanks to the FDIC's debt-guarantee program, GE also sold $60 billion of government-guaranteed debt (with a balance left of $55 billion). The company finished a close second to Citigroup as the heaviest user of that program from November 2008 to July 2009. GE is lucky it was too big to fail, or it might have failed as smaller business lender CIT did.

``The blogosphere was hurling pitchforks yesterday because some foreign banks also took the Fed's money, including such prominent names as UBS, Barclays and BNP Paribas, and even names like Dexia and Natixis that most Americans might confuse with pharmaceuticals marketed on TV. But this was inevitable given the interconnectedness of the global financial system, and the fact that these foreign banks had U.S. subsidiaries. The Fed could not have quelled the panic by offering only U.S. banks access to these loan facilities.”

As seen above, the Fed bailouts were extended heavily to the banking system in the US and abroad, which shows of the immense reach of the political redistribution process, apparently designed to save the system or the status quo.

In effect, the US Federal Reserve can be said to have been transformed as lender of the last resort of the world[7].

Let me further clarify that instead of the whole banking system, the bailouts had been concentrated to the politically connected elite or the “too big to fail” banking behemoths.

This means the US dollar is even more representative of a political currency than the Euro (As a caveat all paper money are political in nature)

Bailouts Equals Crony Capitalism

For Euro bears, it is also a fatal mistake to imply of the political correctness of bailouts when done or executed geographically or within borders. To argue that Germans are unlikely to agree to a bailout of Greece or that Texans are unlikely to agree to a bailout of the Illinois seems like a strawman.

Bailouts, as shown above, hardly represent geographical boundaries. For instance in the case of the Euro, none EU members such as Sweden, United Kingdom and Denmark have even participated in the recent Irish bailout[8] while Norway[9] have offered to join the non-EU consortium. In other words, taxpayers of these non-EU nations have been exposed to credit risks.

Instead, bailouts function as a redistributive process in support of a politically favoured class regardless of territorial boundaries.

Bailouts, in principle, equates to crony capitalism. As Cato’s Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr. explains[10]

(bold emphasis mine)

Distorted prices and interest rates no longer serve as accurate indicators of the relative importance of goods. Crony capitalism ensures the special access of protected firms and industries to capital. Businesses that stumble in the process of doing what is politically favored are bailed out. That leads to moral hazard and more bailouts in the future. And those losing money may be enabled to hide it by accounting chicanery.

In short, bailouts signify a form of protectionism that only benefits the politically connected or the “insiders” at the expense of the public.

The act itself is condemnable, where boundaries do not mitigate its iniquities.

And apparently, as the Irish bailout and the Fed bailout of 2008 demonstrate, the global banking class has been the privileged insider.

The Endowment Effect And The Euro’s Regional Political Imperatives

Moreover, Euro bears seem to be afflicted by a cognitive bias known as the endowment effect. Such bias, according to wikipeida.org[11], is “where people place a higher value on objects they own than objects that they do not”.

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Figure 6: Euro Zone Members as U.S. States[12] (Wall Street Journal Blog)

In other words, Euro bears could possibly be underestimating the deficiencies of the US dollar, while on the other hand, overestimating on the omissions of the Euro simply because many of these Euro bears are domiciled in the US.

Another way to vet such behaviour is to see such bias in the light of nationalism.

Yet in measuring the relative scale of problems (as shown in Figure 6), one would note that the problematic states of the US today[13], according to their pecking order: Illinois, California, New York and New Jersey, which ranks in terms of US GDP[14] 5th, 1st, 3rd, and 8th respectively, would dwarf the PIIGS of the Eurozone.

Seen in a different light, when ranked according to world GDP[15], Illinois is 21st, California 8th, New York 15th and New Jersey 25th compared to Portugal (58th), Ireland (47th), Italy (7th), Greece (40th) and Spain (8th).

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Figure 7: US Troubled States: Calm Before The Storm? (chart from Bespoke Invest[16])

Fortunately, the focus of credit quality concerns has yet shifted to the PIIGS rather than to these problematic states. Otherwise, whatever disintegration blarney that has been bruited by the Euro bears should also apply to the US.

Lastly, Euro bears seem to forget that the Euro or the EU was NOT forged overnight. The Euro was founded on the premise of the avoidance to indulge in repeated wars which has tormented her for last centuries as earlier discussed[17]. Thus, a free trading zone operating under a hybrid[18] of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, was established to reduce tensions from nationalistic tendencies.

While we don’t see the Euro as an ideal currency, as she falls into the same “power inducing” trap that intrinsically haunts paper based currencies, the Euro ultimately will share the same fate of their forbears as with the US dollar.

However, at present the Euro has been less inflationary than the US, which serves as the main bullish argument for the Euro.

Moreover, these regional politics imperatives postulate that domestic politics will be subordinated, as reflected even by the actions of the non-EU members in facilitating for the Irish bailout.

Bottom line: Aggregate demand, deflation (whatever this means, that’s because for Euro bears deflation has many definitions which makes the term amorphous) and the inability to devalue a currency don’t make a strong case for the disintegration of EU.


[1] See Ireland’s Bailout Will Be Financed By Monetary Inflation, November 28, 2010

[2] Bloomberg.com ECB Tried to Force Ireland Into Bailout, Minister Says, November 30, 2010

[3] Bloomberg.com ECB Delays Exit, Buys Bonds to Fight ‘Acute’ Tensions, December 2, 2010

[4] Bloomberg.com, Reynders Says Bailout Fund May Be Boosted in Break With Merkel, December 5, 2010

[5] See Paper Money Is Political Money, December 4, 2010

[6] Wall Street Journal Editorial, The Fed's Bailout Files, December 2, 2010

[7] Bloomberg.com Fed May Be ‘Central Bank of the World’ After UBS, Barclays Aid, December 2, 2010

[8] Guardian.co.uk, Ireland bailout: full Irish government statement, November 28, 2010

[9] Reuters.com Oil-rich Norway may lend direct to Ireland, November 29, 2010

[10] O'Driscoll Gerald P. Jr. An Economy of Liars, Cato Institute, April 20, 2010

[11] Wikipedia.org Endowment effect

[12] Wall Street Journal Blog, Euro Zone Members as U.S. States, December 1, 2010

[13] See Global Debt Concerns Overwhelmed by Liquidity, October 15, 2010

[14] Wikepedia.org List of U.S. states by GDP

[15] Wikepedia.org Comparison between U.S. states and countries nominal GDP

[16] Bespoke Invest, State Default Risk Levels, December 2, 2010

[17] See Inflationism And The Bailout Of Greece, May 02, 2010

[18] Wikipedia.org European Union

Sunday, November 28, 2010

Ireland’s Bailout Will Be Financed By Monetary Inflation

``This is what the phrase "lender of last resort" really means: the creation of fiat money by the central bank. It means breaking the normal rules of the fiat money game. It means bailouts.”- Gary North

A short note on Ireland financial crisis.

This from the Bloomberg[1],

European finance ministers are racing to conclude an international rescue package for Ireland before markets open to stop the country’s financial crisis from spreading to the rest of the euro region.

Prime Minister Brian Cowen’s government is finalizing a bailout agreement that may amount to 85 billion euros ($113 billion) after more than 50,000 people took to the streets of Dublin yesterday to protest budget cuts. As Ireland’s crisis spreads to Portugal and Spain, investors are looking for details on the interest rate Ireland will pay on its loans and the fate of senior bondholders in the country’s banks.

It is quite nonsensical to believe that the Euro will be sacrificed for the misguided notion that austerity will compel for its disintegration as previously argued[2]. As shown in the said article, Eurozone governments have been using market actions to justify interventionism via bailouts.

I am reminded of the institutional incentives borne out of government’s control of the monetary and banking system, as the great Professor Ludwig von Mises wrote[3], (bold emphasis mine)

But today credit expansion is an exclusive prerogative of government. As far as private banks and bankers are instrumental in issuing fiduciary media, their role is merely ancillary and concerns only technicalities. The governments alone direct the course of affairs. They have attained full supremacy in all matters concerning the size of circulation credit. While the size of the credit expansion that private banks and bankers are able to engineer on an unhampered market is strictly limited, the governments aim at the greatest possible amount of credit expansion. Credit expansion is the government's foremost tool in their struggle against the market economy. In their hands it is the magic wand designed to conjure away the scarcity of capital goods, to lower the rate of interest or to abolish it altogether, to finance lavish government spending, to expropriate the capitalists, to contrive everlasting booms, and to make-everybody prosperous.

However this time we are dealing with the bailout on claims on sovereign assets, mostly for the benefit of the creditors or bondholders, which apparently are mostly held by the Euro banking system (see figure 3).

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Figure 3 Bank of International Settlements: Exposures to PIIGS

According to the BIS[4], (bold highlights mine)

The integration of European bond markets after the advent of the euro has resulted in a much greater diversification of risk in the euro area. As of 31 December 2009, banks headquartered in the euro zone accounted for almost two thirds (62%) of all internationally active banks’ exposures to the residents of the euro area countries facing market pressures (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). Together, they had $727 billion of exposures to Spain, $402 billion to Ireland, $244 billion to Portugal and $206 billion to Greece.

French and German banks were particularly exposed to the residents of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. At the end of the 2009, they had $958 billion of combined exposures ($493 billion and $465 billion, respectively) to the residents of these countries. This amounted to 61% of all reported euro area banks’ exposures to those economies.

As repeatedly argued here, redistributive policies have always been meant protect certain powerful interest groups. But they are camouflaged by the use of social welfare as cover and by the captured intelligentsia class in the provision of the technical rationalization.

Central banks, to quote Murray Rothbard[5], are ``governmentally created and sanctioned cartel device to enable the nation’s banks to inflate the money supply in a coordinated fashion, without suffering quick retribution from depositors or noteholders demanding cash. Recent researchers, however, have also highlighted the vital supporting role of the growing number of technocratic experts and academics, who were happy to lend the patina of their allegedly scientific expertise to the elite’s drive for a central bank. To achieve a regime of big government and government control, power elites cannot achieve their goal of privilege through statism without the vital legitimizing support of the supposedly disinterested experts and the professoriat. To achieve the Leviathan State, interests seeking special privilege, and intellectuals offering scholarship and ideology, must work hand in hand.”

The quote actually referred to the US Federal Reserve but can be applied universally.

Of course, the next question is how will these large scale sovereign bailouts be financed? The obvious answer by monetary inflation.

Again from Professor Rothbard[6], (bold highlights mine)

The Central Banks enjoy a monopoly on the printing of paper money, and through this money they control and encourage an inflationary fractional reserve banking system which pyramids deposits on top of a total of reserves determined by the Central Banks. Government fiat paper has replaced commodity money, and central banking has taken the place of free banking. Hence our chronic, permanent inflation problem, a problem which, if un checked, is bound to accelerate eventually into the fearful destruction of the currency known as runaway inflation.

So what we are basically seeing is a validation of the perspectives of these great Austrian economists which seem to be playing out or unfolding today in both the Euro and the US.

In short, what the mainstream mostly ignores is the political role played by the central banks on our global economy.

By the way, it would seem that I have been validated anew. I earlier said that the risks at the US housing markets could weigh on the balance sheets of the US banking system which has prompted the US Federal Reserve to pursue QE 2.0[7] despite tepid signs of economic recovery.

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Figure 4: Federal Housing Finance Agency: Falling Home Prices

US home prices are reportedly falling anew[8].

Like in the US, inflating the monetary system have been designed to rescue the respective banking systems.

Austerity, hence, is a farce. US and European governments (and even Japan) will continue to inflate the system.

And like the US dollar, the Euro will be used as an instrument to achieve political goals but coursed through the central bank (ECB).


[1] Bloomberg, EU Ministers Meet to Find Agreement on Irish Bailout November 28, 2010

[2] See Ireland’s Woes Won’t Stop The Global Inflation Shindig, November 22, 2010

[3] Mises, Ludwig von Currency and Credit Manipulation, Chapter 31 Section 5 p.788

[4] Bank of International Settlements International banking and financial market developments BIS Quarterly Review June 2010

[5] Rothbard, Murray N The Origins of the Federal Reserve, Mises.org

[6] Rothbard, Murray N Central Banking: The Process of Bank Credit Expansion Chapter 11 Mystery of Banking p.176

[7] See The Possible Implications Of The Next Phase Of US Monetary Easing, October 17, 2010

[8] Bloomberg.com U.S. Home Prices Fell 3.2% in Third Quarter, FHFA Says, November 24, 2010