The MSME Credit Black Hole: Failure of the Magna Carta

 

The end cannot justify the means for the simple and obvious reason that the means employed determine the nature of the ends produced—Aldous Huxley 

In this issue:

The MSME Credit Black Hole: Failure of the Magna Carta

I. The Magna Carta: The Policy and Its Promise

II. The Empirical Test

III. Why MSME Lending Became Relatively Less Attractive

IV. When The State Makes The Intended Borrower Less Bankable

V. Where Did the Bank’s Capacity Go?

VI. Why The Architecture Keeps Reproducing Itself

VII. Where The 2026 BSP Relief Cascade Fits

VIII. Conclusion: Three Symptoms, One Structure

The MSME Credit Black Hole: Failure of the Magna Carta 

How a Credit Quota Failed to Change the Architecture of Financial Concentration 

I. The Magna Carta: The Policy and Its Promise 

Enacted in 1991 through Republic Act 6977, the Magna Carta for Small Enterprises was built around a simple structural diagnosis: banks naturally preferred larger, more established borrowers, leaving smaller businesses chronically short of formal credit. Congress tried to override that bias by mandating that banks devote a share of their lending to small enterprises. 

The framework was strengthened in 1997 and expanded again through RA 9501 in 2008, which established the familiar 8% allocation for micro and small enterprises and 2% for medium enterprises, for a combined 10% mandate, backed by penalties for noncompliance. 

The law is the anchor. Whether it worked is an empirical question. 

The data has been answering it for sixteen years. 

II. The Empirical Test

Figure 1

MSMEs account for roughly 99.6% of businesses and about 67% of employment, yet bank lending to the sector has remained stubbornly below the share Congress intended to force into the system. (Figure 1)

Figure 2

MSME lending's share of the banking system's loan portfolio peaked near 8.4% in Q1 2010. It then fell in an almost uninterrupted decline. It kept falling after the quota expired in 2018 and MSME lending ceased to be subject to a mandatory allocation. (Figure 2) 

By Q2 2026, lending to the MSMEs stood at 4.48% of the banking system's portfolio — the second-lowest share on record for the combined micro-small segment — while the medium-enterprise share was at its lowest recorded level. 

The law was intended to redirect bank credit toward the productive base. 

Instead, the banking system progressively moved away from the mandate. 

That matters because it eliminates the easiest explanation for the failure: enforcement. 

Two different enforcement regimes, spanning four presidential administrations, produced essentially the same underlying trajectory. The quota was mandatory and backed by penalties; then the quota expired and compliance became voluntary. Neither regime reversed the decline. 

That consistency is the tell. 

A law that produces the same disappointing outcome under both a penalty-backed mandate and a voluntary regime is not primarily failing because regulators forgot to enforce it. It is failing because the policy is asking legislation to override an incentive structure that keeps making the targeted lending relatively unattractive. 

There is a Goodhart's Law problem here: once the state turns a desired outcome into a compliance target, the target can become the object of the exercise rather than the underlying objective. The Magna Carta could measure whether banks allocated a prescribed share of their portfolio to MSMEs. It could penalize them when they did not. What it could not do was make MSME lending economically as attractive as the alternatives competing for the same balance sheet. 

It measured the allocation. It never changed the incentives producing the allocation. 

And once the quota became the policy instrument, compliance could substitute for reform. The system could satisfy, evade, minimize or eventually abandon the target without resolving the underlying reason banks preferred other borrowers. 

That is why the sixteen-year trajectory matters more than any individual compliance rate. The quota was aimed at the symptom — the share of credit going to MSMEs — while the incentive structure determining that share remained largely intact. 

The question, then, is not why banks ignored the Magna Carta. 

It is why lending to MSMEs kept becoming a worse proposition. 

III. Why MSME Lending Became Relatively Less Attractive 

The banking system's bias against MSMEs did not happen in a vacuum. The risk-adjusted cost of serving them has been shaped by several forces operating simultaneously, and the direction of travel has been remarkably consistent. 

The first is monetary — and inflation is central to it. 

Sustained periods of easy money expand the nominal pool of money and credit moving through the banking system. But nominal credit growth is not the same thing as an expansion of real productive capacity capable of absorbing higher-risk lending. 

For MSMEs, the more immediate problem is volatility. 

Inflation does not simply raise prices. It makes the relationship between costs, revenues and cash flow less predictable. Input costs can move faster than a small business can adjust prices. Working-capital requirements rise. Real purchasing power falls. Customers become more price-sensitive. Margins that were already thin become harder to forecast. 

Large corporations can absorb some of this through scale, purchasing power, pricing power, diversified revenue streams and easier access to financing. 

The typical MSME cannot. 

A bank does not lend against an entrepreneur's intentions. It lends against the probability that future cash flow will be sufficient to service the debt. When inflation makes that cash flow more volatile, the borrower becomes harder to underwrite even if the business remains viable in the long run. 

So what looks like a growing credit system in peso terms can coexist with a shrinking pool of borrowers whose real cash flows are stable enough to absorb bank debt. 

This is particularly damaging to MSMEs because they are already cash-flow-thin, collateral-poor and less able to hedge against purchasing-power shocks. Inflation therefore does not merely increase their costs. It increases the uncertainty surrounding their ability to repay. 

That uncertainty has a price. 

The second force is the structure of bank pricing itself. 

Large corporations with established balance sheets, collateral, audited accounts and long credit histories can borrow more cheaply than smaller firms. That cheap financing is not merely a passive advantage. It can become a competitive moat: the largest firms can finance expansion, acquire competitors and consolidate market share at a cost of capital that smaller firms cannot match. 

I wrote about one version of this in 2019, when Jollibee's expansion strategy illustrated the Pac-Man financing logic: use financial capacity to swallow competitors and reinforce an already dominant position. 

This is what preferential access to cheap credit looks like when it meets market concentration. 

The third force is regulatory and sits in the banking system's plumbing rather than in any single law or circular. 

Risk-based capital rules and provisioning requirements make the characteristics of the borrower matter to the bank's economics. An opaque, thinly capitalized, informally collateralized and poorly documented small enterprise is a fundamentally different credit exposure from a sovereign security or a large investment-grade corporation with a long financial history. 

A peso lent to a top-tier corporate borrower or placed in sovereign paper does not impose the same capital, monitoring and information costs as a peso lent to an unlisted small enterprise.

That distinction matters enormously when a bank is deciding where to put scarce balance-sheet capacity. 

Then there is the compliance burden. 

AMLC and KYC requirements, licensing, registration, reporting, taxation, labor rules, inspections and the ordinary friction of operating formally all impose fixed or semi-fixed costs. 

For a large corporation, those costs can be distributed across enormous revenues and dedicated administrative departments. For a small business, they consume a much larger share of the resources available to keep the business operating. 

Even wage increases can have asymmetric effects. A higher minimum wage raises labor costs immediately; a small enterprise with thin margins has far less room to absorb that increase than a large corporation with scale, pricing power and easier access to financing. 

None of these regulations individually targets MSMEs. 

That is precisely the point. 

Their combined effect is to make the typical MSME a more expensive and more difficult credit proposition while the alternative available to banks — paying the Magna Carta penalty — remained relatively cheap and predictable. 

Put the channels together and the sixteen-year decline stops looking like simple negligence. It looks increasingly like a rational response to a system in which MSME lending carries higher volatility, higher underwriting costs, higher capital costs and greater uncertainty than lending to the borrowers with the strongest balance sheets. 

IV. When The State Makes The Intended Borrower Less Bankable 

This creates a feedback loop that the Magna Carta itself could not solve. 

But the loop is larger than compliance alone: 

inflation and input-cost volatility → weaker and less predictable cash flow → higher perceived credit risk 

plus 

more compliance costs → higher fixed operating costs → thinner margins → weaker cash flow 

together producing

higher risk and underwriting costs → less attractive MSME borrowers → weaker bank lending → greater dependence on informal or more expensive financing. 

This is the policy contradiction. 

The state mandates banks to lend to MSMEs while simultaneously maintaining conditions that can make those same enterprises more volatile, less liquid and more expensive to underwrite. 

Inflation is particularly important because it can amplify the entire loop. A business operating with thin margins has little room between revenue and costs. When prices, wages, inventory and working-capital requirements become more volatile, that margin becomes harder to defend. A borrower that was marginally bankable in a stable environment can become unbankable when the same business is subjected to repeated cost and cash-flow shocks. 

The bank sees the final balance sheet. 

It does not care that the original policy objective was noble. 

And this is where the Magna Carta's basic design runs into reality. It treats the shortage of MSME credit as if the problem were primarily a bank's willingness to lend. But willingness is downstream of risk, return, capital requirements, transaction costs and the quality and stability of the borrower being presented to the bank. 

This is the old Bastiat problem of the seen and the unseen. 

The quota makes the seen effect obvious: a mandated peso of MSME lending can be counted, reported and celebrated as evidence that the policy is working. What disappears from view is the unseen opportunity cost — what that peso would otherwise have financed, and whether forcing it into a higher-risk borrower actually creates more productive capacity than the alternative use of the bank's balance sheet. 

The same logic sits behind Bastiat's broken-window fallacy. The broken window creates visible spending for the glazier; what remains unseen is what the shopkeeper would have done with the money had he not been forced to replace the glass. 

The Magna Carta creates its own version of the fallacy. 

It counts the credit it forces into MSMEs. It does not count the allocation it displaces.

That does not mean MSME lending is unproductive. It means that mandating an allocation is not the same thing as demonstrating that the allocation is economically efficient. 

Legislation can change the first-order incentive. 

It cannot repeal the balance sheet. 

V. Where Did the Bank’s Capacity Go? 

The failure becomes more interesting when we stop looking only at what banks did not lend to MSMEs and ask what they did with the capacity instead. 

The answer is visible in the structure of the financial system.

Figure 3

Universal and commercial banks held roughly 93% of the Php 31.3 trillion in total bank resources as of May 2026, while banks themselves accounted for about 83% of the Php 37.64 trillion financial-system total. (Figure 3, upper graph) 

The most recent comparable international measure, the World Bank's five-bank asset concentration ratio, put the top five Philippine banks at 67.3% of total banking assets (as of 2021—this should be larger today). (Figure 3, lower chart) 

This is not a decentralized credit market searching for deserving small borrowers. 

It is a highly concentrated financial system deciding where scarce balance-sheet capacity earns the best risk-adjusted return. 

And a substantial portion has gone into government and large corporate balance sheets.

Figure 4 

Banks' claims on the public sector sit near 30% of M2 and M3 and have grown faster than private credit, while large conglomerates — many operating within ownership structures intertwined with the financial system — absorb another substantial share of bank financing. (Figure 4, upper diagram) 

That produces a sovereign-financial feedback loop: 

government borrowing expands → banks absorb more sovereign exposure → financial institutions become more exposed to fiscal conditions → preserving liquidity and refinancing capacity becomes more important → financial stability and sovereign-market functioning become increasingly important to the system itself. 

This is the sovereign doom loop in domestic form. 

The BSP's 2025 Financial Stability Report puts a number on the other side of this concentration: roughly Php 1.6 trillion, or 22.7% of total conglomerate debt, comes due between 2027 and 2029, while dollar-denominated debt averages 37.6% of that load over the following five years. That is a wall of maturities approaching the same financial system that holds much of the exposure. (Figure 4, lower image) 

Read in isolation, it is a refinancing-risk warning. Read alongside the MSME data, it shows why the system has a powerful institutional preference for preserving the liquidity and refinancing capacity of the large borrowers already embedded in it. 

And it competes for the same financial resources that the Magna Carta was supposed to direct toward smaller productive enterprises. 

The important point is that MSMEs are not simply being denied a fixed quantity of credit. 

They are being denied relative access to a financial system in which other borrowers have structural advantages: greater scale, better collateral, more predictable cash flows, lower transaction costs and, in many cases, greater access to cheap financing. 

Inflation worsens that relative disadvantage because it magnifies the very cash-flow uncertainty that already makes MSMEs harder to lend to. 

That is why the issue is not merely whether banks have enough liquidity. 

It is where the system finds that liquidity easiest and safest to deploy. 

VI. Why The Architecture Keeps Reproducing Itself 

A framework this consistently biased against MSME lending, across four administrations and two enforcement regimes, does not persist by accident. It persists because the institutions responsible for revising it are embedded in the financial system it regulates. 

The BSP Monetary Board's seven seats have been populated by appointees whose careers include senior positions at banks, multinational lenders and major conglomerates. None of this is evidence of wrongdoing; many were appointed precisely for the expertise those careers provide. 

But expertise is not institutionally neutral. 

A regulator whose personnel move between private finance and public regulation brings with them professional networks, assumptions and risk frameworks formed inside the financial system. From a public-choice perspective, those experiences can shape not only what policymakers know, but which problems they perceive as requiring intervention. 

That matters when the same system has spent sixteen years directing capital toward sovereign and large corporate borrowers while MSME lending steadily loses ground. 

This is regulatory capture in its least conspiratorial form. No corruption is required. A revolving door dynamic can reproduce a policy bias simply because the people designing the rules share much of the same institutional worldview as the institutions operating under them. 

And that is before accounting for the influence of the executive branch and broader political incentives. 

VII. Where The 2026 BSP Relief Cascade Fits 

The BSP's five relief measures since April — NPL grace periods, the intragroup credit-risk reform, the pre-positioned CCyB release, the salary-loan maturity extension and the mark-to-market waiver — did not create this problem. (See our Stagflation Part 11 for details) 

They reinforce it. 

The MSME credit decline predates all five measures by more than a decade. What the cascade does is free additional balance-sheet capacity without attaching an MSME condition to it, inside a financial system already structured to favor sovereign and large corporate exposure. 

The measures are therefore an aggravating factor, not the cause. 

That distinction matters because blaming the latest relief package would turn a sixteen-year structural failure into a story about five recent policy decisions. The evidence says otherwise: the same allocation bias was operating long before the current relief cycle existed. 

VIII. Conclusion: Three Symptoms, One Structure 

Declining MSME lending, banking-system concentration and rising financial fragility are not separate failures. 

They are symptoms of the same architecture. 

The Magna Carta tried to force banks to allocate more credit toward the country's 1.24 million MSMEs. But the monetary, regulatory and institutional structure surrounding the banking system kept making sovereign and large-corporate lending more attractive. 

The law could impose a quota. 

It could not repeal the incentives determining where banks wanted to put their balance sheets. 

For sixteen years, those incentives won. 

That is why the Magna Carta did not merely fail to achieve its target. 

It created the appearance of a financial system deliberately making room for the small productive economy while leaving the underlying allocation of capital largely untouched. 

The quota could be measured. Compliance has been reported. The policy could point to a statutory commitment to MSMEs. 

But underneath the paperwork, the balance sheet kept moving in the other direction. 

The result was not a redistribution of financial power toward the many. It was a regulatory façade over an increasingly concentrated allocation of credit. 

And that is the deeper failure of the Magna Carta: It did not change the architecture that favored the few. It gave that architecture a quota, and called it reform.

US Capital Markets: Dominance Erode as Investors Shift Overseas

In the world capital markets, the US appears to be losing its leadership

Reports the New York Times (bold highlights mine)

Reva Medical did what a small but increasing number of young American companies are doing — it looked abroad for money, in Reva’s case the Australian stock exchange.

After an eight-month road show, meeting investors and pitching the prospects of a biodegradable stent, the 12-year-old company sold 25 percent of its stock for $85 million in an initial public offering in December.

“There are so many companies that require capital like our company, and they don’t have access to the capital markets in the United States,” said Robert Stockman, Reva’s chief executive. “People are looking at any option to stay alive, which is what we did.”

Reva’s example shows that nearly three years since the financial crisis began, markets in the United States are barely open to many companies, leading them to turn to investors abroad. Denied a chance to list their stock and go public here, they are finding ready buyers of their shares on foreign markets.

Nearly one in 10 American companies that went public last year did so outside the United States. Besides Australia, they turned to stock markets in Britain, Taiwan, South Korea and Canada, according to data from the consulting firm Grant Thornton and Dealogic.

The 10 companies that went public abroad in 2010 — and 75 from 2000 to 2009 — compares with only two United States companies choosing foreign exchanges from 1991 to 1999.

The trend reflects a decidedly global outlook toward stocks, just as the number of public companies in the United States is shrinking.

From a peak of more than 8,800 American companies at the end of 1997, that number fell to about 5,100 by the end of 2009, a 40 percent decline, according to the World Federation of Exchanges.

The drop comes as some companies have merged, or gone out of business, or been taken private by private equity firms. Other young businesses have chosen to sell themselves to bigger companies rather than go public.

Here’s why...

Again from the New York Times, (bold emphasis mine)

A variety of factors explain each company’s decision to list on a foreign exchange, like the increased regulatory costs of going public in the United States. Underwriting, legal and other costs are typically lower in foreign markets, companies say.

The Alternative Investment Market, or AIM, a part of the London Stock Exchange intended for small company listings, is a popular destination for some American companies. The cost of an initial public offering there is about 10 to 12 percent of total capital raised, compared with 13 to 15 percent on Nasdaq, according to Mark McGowan of AIM Advisers, which helps American companies list on AIM.

In addition, the extra annual cost of maintaining a public listing, including complying with Sarbanes-Oxley rules, can be typically much higher in the United States: $2 million to $3 million each year depending on the size of a company compared with a cost as low as $320,000 on AIM or $100,000 to $300,000 in a market like Taiwan, according to advisers.

There are concerns that some foreign exchanges attract companies because their oversight may be less stringent. But companies insist standards are high.

A more important factor than cost, said Sanjay Subhedar, managing director of Storm Ventures, a California venture capital firm, is that investors in the United States who traditionally participate in I.P.O.’s and the banks that underwrite the offerings are no longer interested in share sales by small companies.

Institutional investors like mutual funds want the liquidity of larger offerings with abundant buyers and sellers, he said; bank underwriters want to focus on the more lucrative fees that bigger deals generate.

So fundamentally the article cites compliance cost, cost of listing and maintenance and liquidity as direct costs for the erosion of the dominance of the US.

True, direct compliance costs have been a major hurdle.

Many see that the cost-benefit trade off of the Sarbanes Oxley act (SOX) has been weighted towards costs. In short, the law has been economically unviable and has prompted for unforeseen consequences.

Companies have been spending billions of dollars a year to comply with the SOX with little benefit in return.

Richard Karlgaard of Forbes magazine exhorts for the repeal of SOX

Dump Sarbanes-Oxley. Enacted in 2002 to prevent the next Enron scandal, Sarbox has thrown sand into the gears of entrepreneurship. It has severely slowed the U.S. market for IPOs, since companies earning less than $200 million in revenue can't afford the legal and accounting costs of being a public company today. Deprived of capital, young companies not named Facebook or Twitter prematurely stagnate or sell out. Investors are deprived of opportunity, and the nation is deprived of independent companies that surpass the $1-billion-in-revenue mark.

But there are other indirect factors that also contributes to such dynamic

There is the expanding risk of changing the rules of the game midway or “regime uncertainty” as government intrusions adds onus to the business climate by the contorting expectations and upsetting the balance of risk-reward tradeoffs. This penalizes existing firms and provides disincentives for prospective ventures.

Part of which have been policies that push for boom bust cycles which engenders widespread malinvestments or misdirection of resource allocation.

Another is the effects of policies to devalue. Eroding value of the US dollar may have prompted US companies to go overseas and tap (or arbitrage on) savings denominated in foreign currencies.

There is also the crowding out effect where companies spend money on lobbying to protect their political interests than for expansion.

The Business Insider gives an example of how tech companies have been spending to placate the political deities of Washington.

All these interventions add up to the intensive diversion of productive resources, raise the cost of doing business and consequently reduce the public’s appetite to invest, thereby adding to pressure on jobs creation.

It doesn’t stop here. Taxes have also been a significant part of these growing costs.

Tax Laws have been mounting as government intervention increases.

Chart from Taxes for expats

Also US government’s social spending will likely mean higher taxes.

From Heritage Foundation

And this has already been hurting small businesses which makes up the biggest share of jobs creation.

From Small Business Trends

Total compliance cost for the US economy on current regulations has been estimated at $380 billion per year

So much money has been lost to politics.

As supply-side economist Art Laffer writes at the Wall Street Journal in June of last year

On or about Jan. 1, 2011, federal, state and local tax rates are scheduled to rise quite sharply. President George W. Bush's tax cuts expire on that date, meaning that the highest federal personal income tax rate will go 39.6% from 35%, the highest federal dividend tax rate pops up to 39.6% from 15%, the capital gains tax rate to 20% from 15%, and the estate tax rate to 55% from zero. Lots and lots of other changes will also occur as a result of the sunset provision in the Bush tax cuts.

Tax rates have been and will be raised on income earned from off-shore investments. Payroll taxes are already scheduled to rise in 2013 and the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) will be digging deeper and deeper into middle-income taxpayers. And there's always the celebrated tax increase on Cadillac health care plans. State and local tax rates are also going up in 2011 as they did in 2010. Tax rate increases next year are everywhere.

So with the prospects of tax increases, capital investments are likely to be constrained (manifested by declining number of public companies) or will shift outside (raising capital overseas).

Bottom line: The eroding dominance of the US capital markets signifies a symptom of an underlying disease- government interventionism (mostly via inflationism)

Sand Castles From US Regulatory Reforms

“Any fool can make a rule. And any fool will mind it.” - Henry David Thoreau

Among the popular misconceptions about resolving today’s social and institutional problems is the issue of regulation.

For many (particularly for the left), the recent Financial Crisis had been a product of “free markets” or “market fundamentalism”. This notion is totally absurd.(there can be no pure free market in a world of central banking)

For instance many hold that the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act via the Gramm-Leach Bliley as responsible for today’s crisis.

Economist and Professor Luigi Zingales argues otherwise[1], ``In 1984, the top five U.S. banks controlled only 9% of the total deposits in the banking sector. By 2001, this percentage had increased to 21%, and by the end of 2008, close to 40%. The apex of this process was the 1999 passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed the restrictions imposed by Glass-Steagall. Gramm-Leach-Bliley has been wrongly accused of playing a major role in the current financial crisis; in fact, it had little to nothing to do with it. The major institutions that failed or were bailed out in the last two years were pure investment banks — such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch — that did not take advantage of the repeal of Glass-Steagall; or they were pure commercial banks, like Wachovia and Washington Mutual. The only exception is Citigroup, which had merged its commercial and investment operations even before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, thanks to a special exemption.” (bold emphasis)

On the other hand, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), whose regulations forced financial institutions to accept risky borrowers have also been held responsible.

According to Peter J. Wallison of the American Enterprise Institute[2], ``In 1995, the regulators created new rules that sought to establish objective criteria for determining whether a bank was meeting CRA standards. Examiners no longer had the discretion they once had. For banks, simply proving that they were looking for qualified buyers wasn’t enough. Banks now had to show that they had actually made a requisite number of loans to low- and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers. The new regulations also required the use of “innovative or flexible” lending practices to address credit needs of LMI borrowers and neighborhoods. Thus, a law that was originally intended to encourage banks to use safe and sound practices in lending now required them to be “innovative” and “flexible.” In other words, it called for the relaxation of lending standards, and it was the bank regulators who were expected to enforce these relaxed standards.”

Meanwhile, the Cleveland Fed downplays the role of the CRA in this crisis[3].

There has been “no consensus” as to which of the two laws had truly an adverse impact on the markets. Since there has been no perfect correlation, the ensuing tit-for-tat in the media had been reduced into a debate based on ideological slant.

In addition, we also said that the impact of laws tend to be divergent and ‘time sensitive’, where some laws could have positive interim term effects but with negative long term impact, and vice versa.

As caveat, while correlations may not appear to be outright linear, as the debate above holds; it would be misguided to attribute the lack of correlation to a single variable or to one law considering that there are many other laws or variables that also combine and or compete to expand or diminish the effects of a particular law.

Here the underlying general principles or theory will be more dependable than simply relying on statistics or math. Murray Rothard notes of the observation of John Say in distinguishing these[4],

``Interestingly enough, Say at that early date saw the rise of the statistical and mathematical methods, and rebutted them from what can be described as a praxeological point of view. The difference between political economy and statistics is precisely the difference between political economy (or economic theory) and history. The former is based with certainty on universally observed and acknowledged general principles; therefore, “a perfect knowledge of the principles of political economy may be obtained, inasmuch as all the general facts which compose this science may be discovered.” Upon these “undeniable general facts,” “rigorous deductions” are built, and to that extent political economy “rests upon an immovable foundation.” Statistics, on the other hand, only records the ever changing pattern of particular facts, statistics “like history, being a recital of facts, more or less uncertain and necessarily incomplete.” (underscore mine)

In short, trying to pinpoint the effects of one law based on oversimplified statistics to the political economy can be tricky. And this is where the left has used statistics or math to obfuscate evidences.

More of John Say from Murray Rothbard, ``The study of statistics may gratify curiosity, but it can never be productive of advantage when it does not indicate the origin and consequences of the facts it has collected; and by indicating their origin and consequences, it at once becomes the science of political economy.” (underscore mine)

Regulatory Arbitrage And Fighting The Last War

And as we earlier pointed out to the contrary, where laws are lengthy, ambiguous, partisan and subject to political discretion, they tend to be distortive and create imbalances in the system. And the impact of some of these laws indubitably accentuated the crisis.

Nevertheless there had been some policies or regulations that had relatively more material impact among the others (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Bank of International Settlements: Ingredients of the Crisis

The apodictic evidence from last crisis had been the surfacing of the “shadow banking system” (see right window).

As pointed out earlier above, one of the unintended consequences of bad laws or overregulation is to have regulatory arbitrages, where markets look for regulatory loopholes from which it exploits. These are parallel to the emergence or existence of black markets over economies that operate heavily under price controls[5].

So even the multilateral government agency as the UN via its subsidiary the UNCTAD had to admit this[6], ``Recent United States banking regulations, for example, were designed to control risk through the measured capital ratio used by commercial banks, the report says. This attempt backfired because bank managers circumvented the rules either by hiding risk or by moving some leverage outside the banks. This shift in leverage created a "shadow banking system" which replicated the maturity transformation role of banks while escaping normal bank regulation. At its peak, the US shadow banking system held assets of approximately $16 trillion, about $4 trillion more than regulated deposit-taking banks. While the regulation focused on banks, it was the collapse of the shadow banking system which kick-started the crisis.”

The lesson of which clearly is that politics, no matter how heavy handed, can hardly control the fundamental laws of economics.

Another problem with regulation is that it fights the last war.

For instance during the last bubble, the issue of prominence had been the accounting fraud from Enron, Tyco International, Worldcom, Adelphia and others that gave rise to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act[7].

Obviously, from a hindsight bias the regulation failed to make any headway to stop the recent crisis. Again that’s because markets are dynamic and seizes the next loopholes as opportunity to expand.

Nonetheless some has argued that the Sarbox law itself has been a drag to the recovery of the US. An example is this commentary from Wall Street Journal’s James Freeman[8],

``Is Sarbox to blame? Many financial pundits say no, but the SEC survey results point in the other direction. When public companies are asked whether Section 404 has motivated them to consider going private, a full 70% of smaller firms say yes, and 44% of all public companies also say yes.

``Has Sarbox driven businesses out of the country? Among foreign companies, a majority in the survey say that Section 404 has motivated them to consider de-listing from U.S. exchanges, and a staggering 77% of smaller foreign firms say that the law has motivated them to consider abandoning their American listings.”

In short, another unintended consequence of having more regulation is to raise the cost of compliance.

In a globalized market, investors can arbitrage away regulatory burden or the cost of compliance by simply transferring to where there is less onus or costs.

Figure 4 IMF: Sovereign Debt to GDP in the G-7

Yet fighting the last war means attacking past problems which may not be the source of the next crisis.

Another factor that is seemingly ignored is that the leverage, which is now a “prominent” factor, acknowledged by the mainstream seems to be building not in the previous sectors, which suffered from a bust, but instead in government debt.

As in the earlier chart (figure 3 left window) from the speech of Hervé Hannoun[9] Deputy General Manager of the BIS, low interest rates which has allowed for the chasing of yields, low volatility and high risk appetite, were outstanding features of the last crisis. However, practically the same ingredients in the past we are seeing today.

And governments are in a tight fix because, as we have been saying[10], “ governments will opt to sustain low interest rates (even if it means manipulating them-e.g. quantitative easing) as a policy because ``governments through central banks always find low interest rates as an attractive way to finance their spending through borrowing instead of taxation, thereby favor (or would be biased for) extended period of low interest rates”

So governments are operating in a policy paradox.

They pretend to know the main sources of the crisis yet are addicted to it for political reasons. An addict can hardly refuse what’s keeping them going. It’s simply path dependency from what we call as policy “triumphalism”. According to the G-20, ``The global recovery has progressed better than previously anticipated largely due to the G20’s unprecedented and concerted policy effort.”[11]

Again we are being validated.

Agency Problem And Socializing Losses While Privatizing Profits

There is another problematic aspect in regulation; it’s called the agency problem or the principal agent problem.

It’s a problem which emanates from different incentives or goals by those operating within the industry.

For instance during the last crisis, risk monitoring was fundamentally outsourced by risk buyers to the ratings agencies (yes in spite of the army of professionals). On the other hand, originators of risk securities or risk sellers tied fees due the credit ratings agencies on the credit ratings they issued which were then sold to “sophisticated” financial institutions.

Said differently, the job of credit appraisals were delegated to the ratings agencies which incidentally derived its income from the issuers of securities, and not from the buyers. Whereas buyers of securities fully delegated the role of due diligence to the ratings agencies.

So credit risks had been ignored in the assumption that someone else would do it for them. As Charles Calomiris Columbia University recently said in an interview[12], “Agency problem...Ratings agencies were a coordination device for plausible deniability."

Figure 5: The Economist: Reforming Banking

Perhaps the ultimate source of ‘plausible deniability’ comes with attendant with the current structure of the banking system-it’s basically called the fractional reserve based banking platform (see figure 5).

Bank equity as % of assets is now nearly at the lowest level since the introduction of central banking and deposit insurance.

In a BIS paper from Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England[13] writes, ``Over the course of the past 800 years, the terms of trade between the state and the banks have first swung decisively one way and then the other. For the majority of this period, the state was reliant on the deep pockets of the banks to finance periodic fiscal crises. But for at least the past century the pendulum has swung back, with the state often needing to dig deep to keep crisis-prone banks afloat. Events of the past two years have tested even the deep pockets of many states. In so doing, they have added momentum to the century-long pendulum swing.”

This means that the banking system’s ability to take more risks comes under the broadening premise of “privatizing profits and socializing losses” as the guiding policy.

This means that aside from central banking, deposit insurance is another means to “privatizing profits and socializing losses” which allows the banking system to absorb more risks, while on the hand tolerates the expansion of regulatory powers by the central bank.

As Murray N. Rothbard wrote[14], `Under a fiat money standard, governments (or their central banks) may obligate themselves to bail out, with increased issues of standard money, any bank or any major bank in distress. In the late nineteenth century, the principle became accepted that the central bank must act as the “lender of last resort,” which will lend money freely to banks threatened with failure.

``Another recent American device to abolish the confidence limitation on bank credit is “deposit insurance,” whereby the government guarantees to furnish paper money to redeem the banks’ demand liabilities. These and similar devices remove the market brakes on rampant credit expansion.”

So moral hazard and the agency problem seem to be significant factors that had been transforming the developed world banking system.

Of course there are other potential sources of regulatory problems, such as economics and behavioural aspects of enforcement, conflicting laws, a multitude of arcane laws which the public can’t comprehend, Arnold Kling’s legamoron (laws that could not stand up under widespread enforcement) and others, but due to time constraints we will be limited to the above.

At the end of the day, those building up the expectations for more regulations as elixir to the current problem would likely fail them. Why? Because there will be a new crisis down the road and hardly any of the current reforms will stop it.

Until they deal with roots of the problem, bubbles like the game called whack-a-mole will keep reappearing. Yet history says that all paper money is bound to go back to its intrinsic value-zero.

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[1] Zingales, Luigi Capitalism After the Crisis, National Affairs

[2] Wallison, Peter J. The True Origins of This Financial Crisis, American Spectator

[3] Nelson, Lisa Little Evidence that CRA Caused the Financial Crisis, Cleveland Fed

[4] Rothbard, Murray N. Praxeology as the Method of the Social Sciences

[5] An example of this is North Korea, which recently massively devalued her currency to fight the black markets. But unlike before where policies where met with passive resistance, riots broke out from which tempered Kim’s political approach. See Will North Korea's Version Of The 'Berlin Wall' Fall In 2010?

[6] UNCTAD, Shadow banking system that escaped regulation, faith in ´wisdom´ of markets led to meltdown, study says

[7] Wikipedia.org, Sarbanes-Oxley

[8] Freeman, James The Supreme Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley, Wall Street Journal

[9] Hannoun, Hervé Financial deepening without financial excesses, Bank of International Settlements, 43rd SEACEN Governors’ Conference, Jakarta

[10] See How Myths As Market Guide Can Lead To Catastrophe

[11] Wall Street Journal Blog, Text Of G-20 Finance Ministers, Central Bankers’ Statement

[12] Calomiris Charles, Econolog David Henderson: Calomiris on the Financial Crisis

[13] Haldane, Andrew Banking on the state Bank Of International Settlements

[14] Rothbard, Murray N., The Economics of Violent Intervention, Man, Economy and State