Federal Reserve Watching has become a Practice of Semiotics

Will the Fed be "Tapering"? Not from the latest announcement by the FOMC which reveals of the continued dovish non-tapering stance.

From Bloomberg: 

The Federal Reserve said persistently low inflation could hamper the economic expansion and pledged to keep buying $85 billion in bonds every month.

“The committee recognizes that inflation persistently below its 2 percent objective could pose risks to economic performance, but it anticipates that inflation will move back toward its objective over the medium term,” the Federal Open Market Committee said today after a two-day meeting in Washington. Growth will “pick up from its recent pace.”

The Fed continues to use evasive language which has led the markets to second guess their prospective policy actions. Such seem as signs of the Fed’s deepening confusion (or looking to justify further easing)

Fed officials seem to acknowledge how the financial markets have become acutely or deeply dependent on them. 

During the recent selloffs which had the markets focusing on the ‘taper’ aspect of the Fed communiqué (while ignoring the dovish part), central bankers immediately acted to rectify what seems as a policy communications blunder.  

Such has even prompted concerted actions by ex-US central bankers as the BoE’s Mark Carney and the ECB’s Mario Draghi to introduce “forward guidance” policies which assures of the lower levels of interest rates “for an period of time extended period of time”, as part of the damage control on the Fed's communications. 

Just a week back Dr. Bernanke laid the cards with “If we were to tighten policy, the economy would tank.”

Still the consensus position has been that the Fed will taper in September. 

So central bank assurances has once again fired up the Pavlovian or the stimulus addicted equity markets. Most of Asian markets have been in green, as of this writing (Bloomberg).

The odd thing is that despite the FOMC’s dovishness, these has hardly made a significant dent on the US 10 year UST note yields. Yes, last night yields of 10 year UST fell from a high of 27 and closed the session down by .38%, yet the interim trend has been a rising one.

Assurances of central bankers of low interest rate environment may have partly stabilized bond markets of major economies such as 10 year UK bonds, 10 year German bonds, 10 year French bonds or 10 year Japanese Government Bonds, but they remain elevated. Immediate trend of these bond yields, like the US counterpart, have even been creeping upwards during the last week.

So the bond markets seem hardly convinced of the efficacy of the Fed’s or other central banker's position of maintaining an extended low interest rate environment.

And as I have been saying, the Fed has only repackaged “exit” communication strategies since 2010 as du jour “tapering”. This for me looks like the Fed's serial ‘Poker Bluffs’. And should there be any possible realization of “tapering” such will signify as tokenism, as these would partially be designed to realign monetary policy direction with actions in the bond markets in order to safeguard the central bank’s “credibility”. QE will continue and may even be broadened when financial markets suffer another bout of convulsion.

Fed watching has become a practice of semiotics or (dictionary.com) “study of signs and symbols as elements of communicative behavior”. 

Unfortunately, such dependency on the Fed and central banks, reveals of how broken financial markets have been.

ECB Says Bitcoin’s Origin is from the Austrian School

The information age has really began to affect even the state of money.

Digital money outside the ambit of government through the Bitcoin system has been on the rise.

chart from the Economist

The proliferation of Bitcoin has even gotten the attention of the European Central Bank (ECB)

Bitcoin represents a decentralized web based Peer to Peer (P2P) currency system or as defined by Wikipedia.org 

decentralized digital currency created by the pseudonymous entity Satoshi Nakamoto. It is subdivided into 100-million smaller units called satoshis.

It is the most widely used alternative currency, with the total money supply valued at over 100 million US dollars.

Bitcoin has no central issuer; instead, the peer-to-peer network regulates Bitcoins' balances, transactions and issuance according to consensus in network software. Bitcoins are issued to various nodes that verify transactions through computing power; it is established that there will be a limited and scheduled release of no more than 21 million coins, which will be fully issued by the year 2140.

Internationally, Bitcoins can be exchanged and managed through various websites and software along with physical banknotes and coins.

A short video explaining the bitcoin system below:

While skeptics allude to “anonymity” which comes with the innuendo of “illegal” transactions, as attraction to Bitcoins, the ECB in the following paper counters that the genesis of Bitcoins has been from the framework of the Austrian school of economics

Two influences on the Bitcoin says the ECB (See Virtual Currency Schemes October 2012).

First the Austrian Business Cycle.

The theoretical roots of Bitcoin can be found in the Austrian school of economics and its criticism of the current fiat money system and interventions undertaken by governments and other agencies, which, in their view, result in exacerbated business cycles and massive inflation.

One of the topics upon which the Austrian School of economics, led by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek, has focused is business cycles.

In short, according to the Austrian theory, business cycles are the inevitable consequence of monetary interventions in the market, whereby an excessive expansion of bank credit causes an increase in the supply of money through the money creation process in a fractional-reserve banking system, which in turn leads to artificially low interest rates.

In this situation, the entrepreneurs, guided by distorted interest rate signals, embark on overly ambitious investment projects that do not match consumers’ preferences at that time relating to intertemporal consumption (i.e. their decisions regarding near-term and future consumption). Sooner or later, this widespread imbalance can no longer be sustained and leads to a recession, during which firms need to liquidate any failed investment projects and readapt (restructure) their production structures in line with consumers’ intertemporal preferences. As a result, many Austrian School economists call for this process to be  abandoned by abolishing the fractional-reserve banking system and returning to money based on the gold standard, which cannot be easily manipulated by any authority.

Second is the Austrian concept of depoliticization of money through competitive free markets

Another related area in which Austrian economists have been very active is monetary theory.  One of the foremost names in this field is Friedrich A. Hayek. He wrote some very influential publications, such as Denationalisation of Money (1976), in which he posits that governments should not have a monopoly over the issuance of money. He instead suggests that private banks should be allowed to issue non-interest-bearing certificates based on their own registered trademarks. These certificates (i.e. currencies) should be open to competition and would be traded at variable exchange rates. Any currencies able to guarantee a stable purchasing power would eliminate other less stable currencies from the market.

The result of this process of competition and profit maximisation would be a highly efficient monetary system where only stable currencies would coexist.

The following ideas are generally shared by Bitcoin and its supporters:

– They see Bitcoin as a good starting point to end the monopoly central banks have in the issuance of money.

– They strongly criticise the current fractional-reserve banking system whereby banks can extend their credit supply above their actual reserves and, simultaneously, depositors can withdraw their funds in their current accounts at any time.

– The scheme is inspired by the former gold standard.

But Austrians have objected to a complete connection for other theoretical reasons.

Although    the    theoretical    roots    of    the    scheme can   be    found    in    the    Austrian    School of   economics,    Bitcoin    has raised serious   concerns among    some    of    today’s    Austrian    economists.  Their    criticism    covers   two     general     aspects:

a)    Bitcoins     have     no    intrinsic     value    like gold;    they     are   mere     bits    stored    in    a computer; and  

b)    the    system    fails    to   satisfy the    “Misean  Regression   Theorem”,    which explains    that    money    becomes    accepted    not because    of    a   government    decree    or    social convention,  but because    it    has    its    roots    in a    commodity    expressing    a certain    purchasing    power.

The world does not exist in a vacuum.

The information age will provide alternatives not only to capital markets (e.g. P2P Lending and Crowd Funding) but to money as well.

Bitcoin or not, the incumbent political system’s sustained policies of debasement will only accelerate and intensify the search for currency alternatives premised on the burgeoning forces of “decentralization”.

Video: Steve Forbes says Ron Paul should be the Chairman of the US Federal Reserve

Steve Forbes of the Forbes magazine agrees with Ron Paul's view of the monetary system and endorses Mr. Paul as chairman for the US Federal Reserves (hat tip Bob Wenzel).

Wow. Ron Paul has been "rocking the boat" of the establishment.

Phisix-ASEAN Market Volatility: Politically Induced Boom Bust Cycles

It’s hard enough for politicians to face the music, to dispense bad news, to make hard choices, allocate pain to constituencies whether it’s spending cut or tax increase. But when the Fed destroys the bond market, which is the benchmark for the whole capital market, and tells the Congress that you can borrow money for two years at eighteen basis points, which is -- as far as Washington’s concerned -- that’s a rounding error. It’s the same as free. When you’re giving that kind of signal, then there is no incentive, there’s no motivation for people to walk the plank and face down this monster of a fiscal deficit and imbalance that we have. Washington thinks you can kick the can down the road, the debt is more or less free, and we’ll get around to solving the problem. But today, let’s not make any tough choices. That’s where we are. - David Stockman

It’s the Boom Bust Cycle, Stupid

Why would global markets fall in sync in September 22^nd?

It would appear an idiotic idea to suggest that most people woke up on the wrong side of the bed and thus abruptly decided to dump equity holdings en masse.

It would also seem myopic to suggest that this has been a byproduct of liquidity trap[1], where monetary stimulus—low interest rates and an increase in money supply—had been the cause of this.

The chart above of the ASEAN markets has been emblematic of what I have been repeatedly saying long ago—the message of which has been encapsulated from my earlier remarks[2] during the bear market embers of November 2008, (bold highlights original)

The other important matter is that of the understanding of the mutually reinforcing dynamics of inflation and deflation. Deflation and inflation is like assessing the virtues of right and wrong- an ex-post measure of a previous action taken. An action and an attendant reaction. Yet, you can’t have deflation when there have been no preceding inflation. At present times, the reason government has been massively inflating is because they have been attempting to combat perceived threats of equally intense debt deflation…

Thus, reading political tea leaves seem likely a better gauge in determining how to invest in the stock markets.

Since 2009, ASEAN markets had climbed on the back of the intensive inflationism employed by global central banks mostly led by the US Federal Reserve, through its zero bound rates and asset purchases or Quantitative Easing (see black arrow).

If this has been about a global liquidity trap then obviously there would have been no antecedent boom in ASEAN or global market equities during the stated period (2009-2010).

Yet during the past quarter where the Eurozone debt crisis has escalated, exacerbated by visible signs of an economic slowdown in the US and parts of the global economy, global financial markets has been strained.

Yet financial market expectations, whom have been deeply addicted towards bailout policies, have increasingly embedded expectations of another US Federal Reserve rescue.

Such expectation had not been realized.

The Liquidity Trap Canard

Before proceeding, it is important to point out that despite the current financial market turmoil, the Eurozone has not been suffering from ‘deflation’ as a result of lack of ‘aggregate demand’.

On the contrary, the EU has exhibited symptoms of stagflation[3].

In the US, aside from exploding money supply, consumer and business loans have been materially improving.

5 year chart of Business Loans from St. Louis Federal Reserve

5 year chart of Consumer Loans from St. Louis Federal Reserve

Both charts depict that the current problem or market meltdown hasn’t been about liquidity traps.

Importantly consumer spending in the US has remained robust.

To quote Angel Martin [4]

real personal consumption expenditures have recovered from pre-recession levels. This recovery can be clearly seen in this graph, which shows quarterly data from the first quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2011.

So the recent downdraft seen in the financial markets has NOT been about liquidity traps, which has been fallaciously and deceptively peddled by some.

Politically Induced Monetary Paralysis

So what has been the market ruckus all about?

In a September speech prior to the Federal Open Meeting Committee[5] (FOMC) meeting, which decides on the setting of monetary policy, Federal Reserve chief Ben Bernanke hinted that he would consider the lengthening the duration of bond purchases and possibly include further Quantitative Easing as part of the measures to further ease credit conditions[6].

Apparently going into the FOMC meeting on September 22^nd, opponents of Bernanke’s asset purchasing program mounted a publicity assault which included several Republican legislators[7], and most importantly, even Mr. Bernanke’s predecessor Mr. Paul Volker at the New York Times[8].

Even the outcome of the FOMC meeting, where Mr. Bernanke’s telegraphed policy of manipulating the yield curve via “Operation Twist” had been formalized or announced, the decision arrived at had not been unanimous and reflected internal political divisions.

Except for the inattentive or those blinded by bias, it has been obvious that only half of what had been impliedly promised by the Mr. Bernanke became a reality.

The net result has been a global financial market jilted by Mr. Bernanke[9].

Lately, even Federal Reserve of the Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher acknowledged that their institution has been under siege “from both ends of the political spectrum”[10].

Such political impasse is not only seen in the US Federal Reserve, but also over fiscal policies in Washington, as well as, the schisms over prospective measures required to deal with debt crisis in the Eurozone. A good example has been the rebuff US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner received from the German Finance Minister[11].

This has been coined by some as ‘political paralysis’ which continues to plague the markets[12].

As proof of politically driven markets, this week’s furious rally in global markets has been bolstered by renewed expectations of bailouts, as the German parliament overwhelmingly voted to beef up their contributions to the European Financial Stability Facility bailout fund. There are still 6 of the 17 euro zone countries[13] whom will need to pass the agreement reached in July 21^st.

Rumors have also floated that IMF might expand her exposure towards Euro’s bailout to a whopping tune of $3.5 trillion[14], which means the world, including the Philippines, will be part of the rescue team to uphold and preserve the privileged status of Euro and US bankers as well as the Euro and US political class.

Yet all these seem to have helped market sentiment and partly reversed earlier losses.

The point of all of the above is to exhibit in essence, how global financial markets have been substantially dependent on policy steroids. In other words, markets have been mainly driven by politics than by economic forces or that the current state of financial markets has been highly politicized and whose price signals has been vastly distorted.

And most importantly, the latest financial market meltdown represents as convulsions over failed embedded expectations from the apparent withholding of the expansion of rescue programs from which the financial markets have been operating on.

To analogize, today’s jittery volatile markets are manifestations of what is usually called as ‘withdrawal syndromes’ or symptoms of distress or discomfort from a discontinuation of a frequented or regularized activity.

In addition, financial markets appear to be blasé on merely promises, and seem to be craving for concrete actions accompanied by “big package approach[15]” from global policymakers. In short, policymakers will have to positively surprise the markets with even larger dosages of bailouts.

Non-Recession Bear Markets

I would like to further point out that it is not a necessary condition where recessions presage bear markets.

While some global equity indices have broken into bear market territory[16], the US and ASEAN markets have not yet reached the 20% loss threshold levels enough to be classified as bear markets.

Bear markets occur mainly because of political actions that creates boom bust conditions. This has been the case of China and Bangladesh[17].

The US has also experienced TWO non-recession bear markets.

The first instance was in 1962 which was known as the Kennedy Slide[18] where the S&P fell 22.5%.

Ironically the Kennedy Slide coincided with the failed original experiment of Operation Twist in 1961, as Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack wrote in a 2004 paper[19],

Operation Twist does not seem to provide strong evidence in either direction as to the possible effects of changes in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet.

Except that the authors thought that the limits to the size had been responsible for this policy inadequacy, and Ben Bernanke today is conducting this experiment in a very large scale.

The Kennedy Slide’s boom phase appears to be triggered by the dramatic lowering of interest rates following the recession of 1960-61.

The bear market turned out to be short lived as the S & P 500 had fully recovered in a about a year later.

The second non-recession bear market is the notorious Black Monday Crash of October 1987.

The expansionary policies of the Plaza Accord[20] which represented coordinated moves by major developed economies to depreciate the US dollar, fuelled a boom bust cycle which eventually paved way for the lurid global one day crash.

As the great Murray N. Rothbard wrote[21],

To put it simply: the reason for the crash was the credit boom generated by the double-digit monetary expansion engineered by the Fed in the last several years. For a few years, as always happens in Phase I of an inflation, prices went up less than the monetary inflation. This, the typical euphoric phase of inflation, was the "Reagan miracle" of cheap and abundant money, accompanied by moderate price increases.

By 1986, the main factors that had offset the monetary inflation and kept prices relatively low (the unusually high dollar and the OPEC collapse) had worked their way through the price system and disappeared. The next inevitable step was the return and acceleration of price inflation; inflation rose from about 1% in 1986 to about 5 % in 1987.

As a result, with the market sensitive to and expecting eventual reacceleration of inflation, interest rates began to rise sharply in 1987. Once interest rates rose (which had little or nothing to do with the budget deficit), a stock market crash was inevitable. The previous stock market boom had been built on the shaky foundation of the low interest rates from 1982 on.

The crash had been a worldwide phenomenon according to the Wikipedia.org[22]

By the end of October, stock markets in Hong Kong had fallen 45.5%, Australia 41.8%, Spain 31%, the United Kingdom 26.45%, the United States 22.68%, and Canada 22.5%. New Zealand's market was hit especially hard, falling about 60% from its 1987 peak, and taking several years to recover. (The terms Black Monday and Black Tuesday are also applied to October 28 and 29, 1929, which occurred after Black Thursday on October 24, which started the Stock Market Crash of 1929. In Australia and New Zealand the 1987 crash is also referred to as Black Tuesday because of the timezone difference.) The Black Monday decline was the largest one-day percentage decline in the Dow Jones. (Saturday, December 12, 1914, is sometimes erroneously cited as the largest one-day percentage decline of the DJIA. In reality, the ostensible decline of 24.39% was created retroactively by a redefinition of the DJIA in 1916.)

Yet many experts had been misled by the false signal from the flash crash to predict a recession, again from the same Wikipedia article,

Following the stock market crash, a group of 33 eminent economists from various nations met in Washington, D.C. in December 1987, and collectively predicted that “the next few years could be the most troubled since the 1930s”. However, the DJIA was positive for the 1987 calendar year. It opened on January 2, 1987, at 1,897 points and would close on December 31, 1987, at 1,939 points. The DJIA did not regain its August 25, 1987 closing high of 2,722 points until almost two years later.

And in typical fashion, central banks intuitively reacted to crash by pumping mass amounts of liquidity into the system[23].

It took 2 years for the S&P to return to its pre-crash level.

The non-recession bear markets reveal that in the case of the US, such an occurrence would likely be shallow and the recovery could be swift.

But it would different story in China as the Chinese government continues to battle with the unintended effects of their policies which has spilled over to the real estate or property markets. Apparently, China’s tightening policy drove money away from the stock market, which continues to drift near at September 2009 lows, but shifted them into the real estate sector.

In short, like the crisis afflicted West, the current depressed state of China’s stock market signifies as an extension of the bubble bust saga which crested in October 2007, a year ahead of the Lehman episode. China’s cycle remains unresolved.

Should the US equity markets suffer from a technical bear market arising from the current stalemate in Federal Reserve policies, but for as long as a recession won’t transpire from the current market distress, then the downside may be mitigated.

So far, the risk for a US recession has not been that strong and convincing as shown by the above recovery in lending.

Conclusion: Navigating Turbulent Waters Prudently

And as I concluded two weeks ago[24],

I would certainly watch the US Federal Reserve’s announcement and the ensuing market response.

If team Bernake will commence on a third series of QE (dependent on the size) or a cut in the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER), I would be aggressively bullish with the equity markets, not because of conventional fundamentals, but because massive doses of money injections will have to flow somewhere. Equity markets—particulary in Asia and the commodity markets will likely be major beneficiaries.

As a caveat, with markets being sustained by policy steroids, expect sharp volatilities in both directions.

The point of the above was that my expectations had conditionally been aligned to the clues presented by Ben Bernanke of putting into action further bailouts which apparently did not occur.

And since Mr. Ben Bernanke appears to be politically constrained to institute his preferred policies, it is my impression that he would be holding the financial markets hostage until political opposition to his policies would diminish that should pave way for QE3.0. This means that the balance of risks, in my view, have now been tilted towards the downside unless proven otherwise.

Remember, it has been a dogma of his that the elixir to US economy emanates from asset value determined ‘wealth effect’ spending via the transmission mechanism which he calls the Financial Accelerator[25]

To quote the BCA Research[26],

But until QE3 is credibly articulated by Bernanke, there could be more downside for risky assets and further upside for the dollar.

And converse to my abovestated condition or premises, and because I practice what I preach, I materially decreased exposure in the local markets, as I await further guidance from the actions of policymakers.

Although I still maintain a bullish bias, in order to play safe, I would presume a worst case scenario—current global bear markets are signifying a recession—as the dominant forces in operation.

It’s easy to falsify the worst case scenario with incoming policy actions, data and unfolding market events.

Alternatively, this means that for as long as a non-recession scenario becomes evident then it would be easy to position incrementally, hopefully with limited downside risks.

In other words, for as long as there remains no clarity in the policy stance, I see heightened uncertainty as governing the markets. Thus I would need to see the blanc de l'oeil or the French idiom for seeing ‘the white of their eyes’ before taking my shots.

Bottom line: In the understanding that incumbent markets have been driven by politics, reading political tea leaves or the causal realist approach will remain as my principal fundamental analytical methodology in ascertaining my degree of market level risk-reward exposure.

---

[1] Wikipedia.org Liquidity trap

[2] See Stock Market Investing: Will Reading Political Tea Leaves Be A Better Gauge?, November 30, 2008

[3] See Stagflation, NOT DEFLATION, in the Eurozone, October 1, 2011

[4] Martin Angel The Stagnant U.S. Economy: A Graphical Complement to Higgs’s Contributions, Independent.org, September 23, 2011

[5] US Federal Reserve Federal Open Market Committee

[6] See US Mulls ‘official’ QE 3.0, Operation Twist AND Fiscal Stimulus, September 9, 2011

[7] Yahoo News Republican lawmakers warn Federal Reserve against action on economy, September 21, 2011

[8] See Paul Volker Swings at Ben Bernanke on Inflationism, September 20, 2011

[9] See Bernanke Jilts Markets on Steroids, Suffers Violent Withdrawal Symptoms, September 22, 2011

[10] Bloomberg.com Fisher Says Central Bank Is Under Attack From Ron Paul, Barney Frank, September 28, 2011

[11] See German Minister Calls Tim Geithner’s Bailout Plan ‘Stupid’, September 28, 2011

[12] New York Times, Stocks Decline a Day After Fed Sets Latest Stimulus Measure, September 23, 2011

[13] New York Times, Germany Approves Bailout Expansion, Leaving Slovakia as Main Hurdle, September 29, 2011

[14] See Will IMF’s bailout of Euro Reach $ 3.5 trillion? September 30, 2011

[15] Johnson Simon What Would It Take to Save Europe?, New York Times September 29, 2011

[16] Bloomberg.com Global Stocks Drop 20% Into Bear Market as Debt Crisis Outweighs Profits, September 23, 2011

[17] See Can Bear Markets happen outside a Recession? China’s Shanghai and Bangladesh’s Dhaka Indices October 1, 2011

[18] Wikipedia.org Kennedy Slide of 1962

[19]Bernanke Ben S., Reinhart Vincent R., and Sack Brian P. Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment, 2004 US Federal Reserve

[20] Wikipedia.org Plaza Accord

[21] Rothbard, Murray N. Nine Myths About The Crash, Making Economic Sense Mises.org

[22] Wikipedia.org Black Monday (1987)

[23] Lyons Gerard, Discovering if we learnt the lessons of Black Monday, thetimesonline.co.uk, October 19, 2009

[24] See Definitely Not a Reprise of 2008, Phisix-ASEAN Equities Still in Consolidation, September 18, 2011

[25] Bernanke Ben S. The Financial Accelerator and the Credit Channel, June 15, 2007 US Federal Reserve

[26] BCA Research U.S. Dollar: Waiting For More Policy Action, September 27, 2011

Ben Bernanke: Falling Markets will Justify QE 3.0

From Ben Bernanke’s public appearance last night [source: Reuters] (bold highlights added)

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said on Wednesday the central bank might need to ease monetary policy further if inflation or inflation expectations fall significantly.

In his first public remarks since the Fed launched a fresh measure aimed at keeping down long-term borrowing costs, Bernanke indicated a willingness to push deeper into the realm of unconventional policy if economic growth remains anemic.

"It is something that we're going to be watching very carefully," Bernanke said in response to questions from the audience at a forum sponsored by the Cleveland Fed.

"If inflation falls too low or inflation expectations fall too low, that would be something we have to respond to because we do not want deflation," Bernanke said.

My deciphering or translation of the above: ‘Despite the vocal protestations of my critics, a continuous decline of markets should validate my imposition of QE 3.0, which will absolve my position.’

The above statements serve as more evidence that Mr. Bernanke’s current policy actions appear to be constrained by politics. Global markets have already substantially fallen, with MSCI All- Country World Index of 45 nations breaking into the bear market territory last week, yet Chairman Bernanke’s favorite instrument has been in absentia.

Additionally, these statements can be construed as more indications that markets are being used as negotiation leverage or manipulated for political goals.

Could Mr. Bernanke, then, be wishing for the markets to endure further strains?

Bernanke Jilts Markets on Steroids, Suffers Violent Withdrawal Symptoms

Despite my current circumstances, I felt the compulsion to offer a reaction on today’s market meltdown.

Here is what I recently wrote,

I would certainly watch the US Federal Reserve’s announcement and the ensuing market response.

If team Bernake will commence on a third series of QE (dependent on the size) or a cut in the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER), I would be aggressively bullish with the equity markets, not because of conventional fundamentals, but because massive doses of money injections will have to flow somewhere. Equity markets—particulary in Asia and the commodity markets will likely be major beneficiaries.

As a caveat, with markets being sustained by policy steroids, expect sharp volatilities in both directions.

Obviously the market’s response on team Bernanke’s failure to deliver on what had been expected has apparently been violent.

The Philippine Phisix (chart from technistock.net), as well as ASEAN equity markets, has basically suffered the same degree of bloodbath relative to her developed economy equity market peers

This reaction from a market participant captures the underlying sentiment. From a Bloomberg article

“This is not likely to provide any significant stimulus,” said Jason Schenker, president of Prestige Economics LLC in Austin, Texas. “The market really needed a boost of confidence. There is no confidence from this.”

So what did the Mr. Bernanke deliver?

Again from the same article at Bloomberg

The Federal Reserve will replace $400 billion of short-term debt in its portfolio with longer- term Treasuries in an effort to reduce borrowing costs further and counter rising risks of a recession.

The central bank will buy securities with maturities of six to 30 years through June while selling an equal amount of debt maturing in three years or less, the Federal Open Market Committee said today in Washington after a two-day meeting. The action “should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative,” the FOMC said.

Chairman Ben S. Bernanke expanded use of unconventional monetary tools for a second straight meeting after job gains stalled and the government lowered its estimate of second- quarter growth. Yields on 30-year Treasuries fell below 3 percent for the first time since 2009 and U.S. stocks had their biggest drop in a month on the Fed’s plan, dubbed “Operation Twist” after a similar Fed action in 1961.

The twist, as earlier stated, has been telegraphed. What was not expected has been the non-appearance of Bernanke’s QE which resulted to today’s convulsions.

The ‘twist’ which essentially attempts to flatten the yield curve basically reduces the banking system’s profitability from the borrow short and lend long (maturity transformation) platform that has partly catalyzed these selloffs.

From the Wall Street Journal

But for bankers, who are already struggling with low interest rates on loans and tepid loan demand, the twist option could further dent already-weakened profits. That is because lower long-term interest rates would result in contracting net interest margins for banks—essentially, the profit margin in the lending business—at a time when their revenue is growing slowly, if at all. Banks would earn less on loans and investments, and might end up making fewer loans as well.

"Ouch" is how one executive at a big retail bank described the prospect of Operation Twist. (Bankers typically don't publicly comment on Fed policy given the central bank's role as a bank regulator.)

Austrian Economist Bob Wenzel says that Operation Twist represents a failed experiment…

So how did the original Operation Twist turn out? Three Federal Reserve economists in 2004 completed a study which, in part, examined the 1960's Operation Twist. Their conclusion (My bold):

“A second well-known historical episode involving the attempted manipulation of the term structure was so-called Operation Twist. Launched in early 1961 by the incoming Kennedy Administration, Operation Twist was intended to raise short-term rates (thereby promoting capital inflows and supporting the dollar) while lowering, or at least not raising, long-term rates. (Modigliani and Sutch 1966).... The two main actions of Operation Twist were the use of Federal Reserve open market operations and Treasury debt management operations.. Operation Twist is widely viewed today as having been a failure, largely due to classic work by Modigliani and Sutch.”

The economists go on to state that the size of Operation Twist was relatively small, possibly too small to determine if such an operation could be successful if carried out at on a larger scale. That experiment is now being conducted on the economy of the United States with the $400 billion Operation Twist announced today. How big was the original Operation Twist? $8.8 billion.

The three Fed economists, who seem to concur that the first Operation Twist was a failure, are sure going to get an experiment on the United States economy on a much grander scale to see if this time it will work different than it did the first time. So who are these three lucky Fed economists who are now going to be able to witness Operation Twist on a grander scale? Vincent R. Reinhart, Brian P. Sack and BEN S. BERNANKE.

So part of the market’s virulent reaction signifies a revolt on Bernanke’s experimental policy. This is an example of how interventionist measures prompts for heightened uncertainties.

The Fed also promised to support mortgage markets by keeping the interest low. Again from the same Bloomberg article,

The central bank said today it will also reinvest maturing housing debt into mortgage-backed securities instead of Treasuries “to help support conditions in mortgage markets.”

Yields on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage securities that guide U.S. home-loan rates tumbled the most in more than two years relative to Treasuries. The average rate on a typical 30-year fixed loan fell to a record low 4.09 percent last week.

So why has Bernanke failed to live up with the expectations for more QE?

Like in the Eurozone, there has been mounting opposition to Bernanke’s inflationist bailout policies as seen by a divided FOMC… (same Bloomberg article)

The FOMC vote was 7-3. Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota and Charles Plosser of the Philadelphia Fed voted against the FOMC decision for a second consecutive meeting. They “did not support additional policy accommodation at this time,” the Fed statement said today.

…and from some Republicans who mostly recently who made public representations against further QEs.

Republican lawmakers including Boehner and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell urged Bernanke in a letter this week to refrain from additional monetary easing to avoid “further harm” to the economy.

This is aside from political pressures applied by his predecessor, Paul Volker

In my view, Chairman Ben Bernanke could be:

-trying to lay the blame of policy restraints at the foot of his opponents in the recognition that markets would behave viciously from a stimulus dependent ‘withdrawal syndrome’, or

-that his penchant for grand experiments made him deliberately withhold QE to see how the markets would respond to his innovative ‘delusion of grandeur’ measures.

By withdrawal, I don’t mean a reduction of the Fed’s balance sheet, which the Fed aims to maintain (which probably would incrementally expand on a less evident scale) but from further specifically targeted asset purchases. The ‘twist’ essentially sterilizes the operation which means no money supply growth.

Today’s brutal reaction in global financial markets essentially validates my view that the contemporaneous market has been built on boom bust policies such that NOT even gold prices has been spared.

The tight correlations in the collapsing prices of equities and commodities as well as the rising dollar (falling global currencies) are manifestations of a bust process at work.

The primary issue here is that in absence of government’s backing via assorted stimulus, mostly via monetary injections, artificially established price structures from government stimulus or from credit expansion unravels.

Only when the tide goes out, to paraphrase Warren Buffett, do we know who has been swimming naked.

Or as Austrian economist George Reisman writes,

A fundamental fact is that our present monetary system is characterized both by irredeemable paper money, i.e., fiat money, and by credit expansion. There is no limit to the quantity of fiat money that can be created. This is the foundation for potentially limitless inflation and the ultimate destruction of the paper money, when the point is reached that it loses value so fast that no one will accept it any longer. The fact that our monetary system is also characterized by credit expansion is what creates the potential for massive deflation — for deflation to the point of wiping out the far greater part of the money supply, which in the conditions of the last centuries has been brought into existence through the mechanism of credit expansion

Grading Ben Bernanke: Fail!

The great Murray N. Rothbard have presciently warned on this long time ago,

It is little known, however, that there is a federal agency that tops the others in secrecy by a country mile. The Federal Reserve System is accountable to no one; it has no budget; it is subject to no audit; and no Congressional committee knows of, or can truly supervise, its operations. The Federal Reserve, virtually in total control of the nation's vital monetary system, is accountable to nobody — and this strange situation, if acknowledged at all, is invariably trumpeted as a virtue.

Now, Professor Rothbard’s vindication as seen from the Daily Bail’s enumeration of Ben Bernanke’s failures

As you will hear in the collection of videos and stories linked below:

• B-52 failed to recognize asset bubbles of all types, and even encouraged irresponsible 2/28 mortgages and low teaser rates in 2007 at the start of the sub-prime implosion.

• Failed to shut off the free-money spigot still gushing from the Greenspan years.

• Failed to provide a framework for adequate regulatory oversight of Wall Street (yet Obama now wants to give the Fed more oversight and regulatory authority).

• Failed to control or even understand the build-up of risk within the system caused by derivatives and securitization.

• Failed to reform the inherently conflicted credit-rating structure that perpetuated the risk and securitization build-up.

• Failed to understand the nature of the crisis when it first broke in the Spring of 2007 (Bear Stearns sub-prime, hedge fund implosion). The famous meltdown clip from Cramer on Bernanke sums this failure up rather nicely.

• Failed to understand that housing prices might actually decline in value after such a dramatic rise (seriously, even my mother knew that banks providing new mortgages on massively-inflated housing was not going to turn out well)

• Failed to negotiate with AIG counterparties; instead choosing to pay all claims at 100 cents on the dollar without asking for any compensation (preferred shares) in return.

• Failed the American people with his decision to support and reward the failed banks and the bankers for their malfeasance, excessive risk-taking and criminality.

• Failed to protect taxpayer's interests in deals with AIG, JPM, and Bear Stearns, (withMaiden Lane I, II and III) and the still un-detailed asset guarantees given to Citigroup and Bank of America.

• Ultimately Benjamin Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve failed by choosing to reward failure in others.

We can sum it up to: POLITICS—being accountable to no one, arbitrarily choosing winners and losers by using and exposing taxpayer money to unnecessary risks and the presumption of superior knowledge (fatal conceit) from which enables experimentation of untested policies that imposes unmeasured externality risks to the global economy.

The sham of independence.

I further include Bernanke’s policies of expanding the Fed’s balance sheets: (both charts from St. Louis Federal Reserve chart which ironically is under Bernanke’s umbrella)

has led to this:

which has done little to the economy.

chart from Money and Markets

But to bolster commodity prices…

and elevate inflation risks…

chart from tradingeconomics.com

…and of course, fueling worldwide excess speculation in financial markets which should bring about the imminence of another crisis.

Again to close with Mr. Rothbard,

It was not enough, however, for the new statist alliance of Big Business and Big Intellectuals to be formed; they had to agree, propound, and push for a common ideological line, a line that would persuade the majority of the public to adopt the new program and even greet it with enthusiasm. The new line was brilliantly successful if deceptive: that the new Progressive measures and regulations were necessary to save the public interest from sinister and exploitative Big Business monopoly, which business was achieving on the free market. Government policy, led by intellectuals, academics and disinterested experts in behalf of the public weal, was to "save" capitalism, and correct the faults and failures of the free market by establishing government control and planning in the public interest.

And thus the (big) banking industry, the US Federal Reserve and the government cartelized system.