Historically the shift from deposits to banknotes was associated with the fear of commercial bank insolvency or illiquidity. That was called a bank run. Today a bank run is the natural consequence of forcing too much central bank liquidity (bank reserves) onto a system which simply does not want them. A banker does not want to accept this short-term funding if he cannot lend the proceeds at a profit. The only way for the banking system in aggregate to repel such funding is to offer interest rates on deposits (bank liabilities) which force investors into banknotes (someone else’s liability). Tighter regulation and collapsing long-term interest rates mean that profits from lending for Euroland bankers are increasingly illusory. Banks are keen to repel deposits given the lack of opportunity to use them. If QE reduces the banks’ ability to lend money and also creates an arbitrage from bank deposits into banknotes, will it reflate the economy? If you think the answer is ‘no’ then European QE will have to stop with fairly negative consequences for the equity market and positive implications for the Euro exchange rate. Evidence of selling of government debt securities with negative yields is thus not necessarily a sign of inflation. A move to bank deposits or banknotes from government debt securities can instead indicate that the limits for QE have been reached.-Russell Napier
In this issue:
The Philippine Potemkin Stock Market: Record Highs Outside, Bear Markets Inside!
-Examining the PSE: Face Value (Seen) Versus Broader Context (Unseen)
-Bears Are The Rule, And Record Highs Are The Exception!
-Reasons for Divergences: Rotation, Deteriorating Market Conditions and Index Rigging
-Philippine Treasury Market in Turmoil: The BSP Dabbles with Fed’s Bailout Tool called Term Auction Facility (TAF)!
-Statistical Growth Pumps in OFW and Industrial Production? Price Deflation in a Credit Finance Construction Boom?
The Philippine Potemkin Stock Market: Record Highs Outside, Bear Markets Inside!
Examining the PSE: Face Value (Seen) Versus Broader Context (Unseen)
For starters, in this outlook, I’d like to abide by the BSP Chief’s gem of an advice (in a recent speech to journalists[1])
Economic numbers rarely tell the complete story when taken at face value. Therefore, a responsible journalist who seeks to offer readers a fuller appreciation of the information will examine the figures within a broader context or against an array of other relevant indicators.
The context of the above seems to paraphrase or may have been a restatement of French classical liberal economist Frederic Bastiat’s “That Which is Seen and that Which is Unseen”[2].
In the department of economy, an act, a habit, an institution, a law, gives birth not only to an effect, but to a series of effects. Of these effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests itself simultaneously with its cause - it is seen. The others unfold in succession - they are not seen: it is well for us, if they are foreseen. Between a good and a bad economist this constitutes the whole difference - the one takes account of the visible effect; the other takes account both of the effects which are seen, and also of those which it is necessary to foresee. Now this difference is enormous, for it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favourable, the ultimate consequences are fatal, and the converse. Hence it follows that the bad economist pursues a small present good, which will be followed by a great evil to come, while the true economist pursues a great good to come, - at the risk of a small present evil.
Since in an April 2009 speech, the BSP chief cited an excerpt of Bastiat’s work, particularly the difference between the good and bad economist, my impression is that Bastiat’s poignant quote may have stuck into his mind and may have been used as basis for his counsel to journalist audiences.
Yet I’m not sure if he has read Bastiat’s masterpiece.
But signs are he hasn’t. For if he has, certainly Bastiat has had no influence on him—except for the intellectually stirring excerpt. That’s because his policies runs in sharp contrast to Bastiat’s advocacy.
Of course, if he has read Bastiat, then I hope the BSP governor not only preaches, but ardently practice them. But that would be wishful thinking.
Essentially, the BSP governor then warned journalists of falling for the ‘face value’ trap, or giving heavy emphasis on the interpretation of the headline (seen) as against broad developments (unseen).
[As a side note, yet in that speech, ironically, the BSP chief wanted journalists to focus on ‘deflation’ risks which has also been a ‘visible’ component of an ‘unseen’ economic disorder]
So here I apply such outstanding wisdom (the difference between seen and unseen) in the perspective of Philippine stocks.
Bears Are The Rule, And Record Highs Are The Exception!
Technically, despite the recent selloffs, the Phisix still is in record territory. Technically.
But how about the ‘broader context’?
To take a cue from the legendary trader Jesse Livermore who described the conditions of general stock market trends[3] (bold mine)
I have found that experience is apt to be steady dividend payer in this game and that observation gives you the best tips of all. The behaviour of a certain stock is all you need at times. You observe it. Then experience shows you how to profit by variations from the usual, that is, from the probable. For example, we know that all stocks do not move one way together but that all the stocks of a group will move up in a bull market and down in a bear market. This is a commonplace of speculation
In short, a bull or bear market can be characterized by the general performance trends of most of the stocks.
So in the ‘broad context’, a bull market should feature MOST stocks as going UP, while a bear market would reveal MOST stocks as going DOWN!
Now let us walk through how Phisix has been attained the recent RECORD milestone in the lens of market breadth—in specific, the advance-decline spread.
Market breadth conditions should demonstrate if record stocks have chimed with the broader markets.
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Last April 7th, the Philippine Stock Exchange tallied “26 record finishes” since it broke through the previous May 2013 highs this year.
Two days after, or after one trading session which was followed by a holiday, the April 10th feat of 8,127.48 was etched. This makes 27 record days.
That represented the ‘face value’.
Now for the broader context.
What the PSE didn’t say was that en route to 8,127.48, the broader market was hardly participating from the serial setting of record after record.
In numerical perspective, in NINE out of the 14 weeks or 64.3% of the weekly advance decline spread revealed the domination of sellers. In cumulative nominal numbers, weeks where decliners led advancers tallied 498 as against only 216 for the advancers. In short, declining issues whipped advancing issues by a stunning 2.3 to 1!
And again this has been happening as the index vaulted to records!
And following last week’s astounding discovery that a staggering 69% of firms from the banking and financial index had been in bear markets, I pursued on examining the entire PSE population of listed stocks.
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And guess what? The banking and financial sector’s predicament has NOT been in isolation, but instead has been representative of general Philippine stock market conditions!
Bears are the rule, and record highs are the exception!
Nota Bene: Definition, scope and limitations (on the table above)-Bear Market: Defined as 20% decline from recent, referenced from 2012-15 highs-Record highs: Stock prices at all-time highs-Uptrend: stock price on an uptrend but at non record highs-Sideways: neither a bear market nor an uptrend/record higha) These are based on May 12 and May 13 close. b) Excluded from tabulation: suspended issues, foreign or ‘B’ shares, ETF and Small & Medium enterprises c) I included Bloom and AGI as sideways even if they fell into bear market grounds over the week.
In the prism of INDEX issues, aside from finance, bears overwhelmingly prevailed over bulls at record high prices in the property sector 47% versus 27%, holding 43% as against 29%, service 33% vis-à-vis 22%, industrial 52% relative to 35%, and finally, mining 86% compared with 7%.
In general, 51.1% of all sectoral INDEX issues have been enduring bear markets!!! This is against a measly 25.6% share at record highs!
Importantly, many of the bears experienced landmark highs during the 1H of 2013. Unfortunately since the taper tantrum, stock prices for the SILENT Majority have either been in stagnation or has even been fathoming to new depths!
To have a view of the representative charts from each sector, I pre-posted them at my blog[4] (with the exception of the mines).
Even if we exclude the mining index because of the industry’s microscopic share in the key composite benchmark, and because the mining sector’s quandary has mostly been influenced by external forces, specifically collapsing commodity prices, the bear markets representing the mainstream domestic economy remains authoritative: 45% as against only 29% for record stocks!
Well how about in the viewpoint of ALL issues listed per industry? Has smaller firms performed better?
This is where it gets even more interesting.
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The answer is NO.
The bears have imposed an overpowering supremacy on ALL the MAJOR sectors or industries!
In banking-finance, bears rule 69% versus 15%, in property 52%-26%, in the holding industry 55%-23%, in service 49%-15%, in industrial-commercial 64%-20% and finally in the mining sector 88%-8%!
Overall, the grizzly bears REIGN over stocks in record highs (or even combined with uptrend stocks) with a commanding 60% share as against stocks at record highs with only 19% and stocks on an uptrend at only 8%.
To exclude the mining issues, bears govern with 56% share relative to 20% and 15%!
Have these numbers been suggesting a bear market or a bull market?
This lead us back to the Phisix.
Of the 30 component issues, stunningly stock prices of SEVEN firms have been in BEAR Markets!
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Despite a short rebound, Alliance Global (AGI) and Bloomberry Resorts (BLOOM) reverted to the bear market zone this week.
Record highs have failed to significantly inspire rallies in Emperador (EMP), LTG Group (LTG), Metro Pacific (MPI) and Petron (PCOR)
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Add to that list San Miguel Corporation (SMC), and a potential bear market recruit, the second largest market cap, the largest telecom company PLDT. The breakdown from PLDT’s long term trend could be portentous of a shift towards the bears.
As a side note, PLDT’s market cap has been slipping fast. It won’t be far when PLDT’s market cap ranking falls below the second spot with Ayala Land breathing on its neck. As of Friday, the market cap share of the top three firms comprising the Phisix: SM, PLDT and ALI have been at 9.65%, 8.84% and 8.57% respectively.
In short, at 23%, Phisix stocks in bear markets have now accounted for MORE than ONE-FIFTH or almost ONE-QUARTER of the index!
What kind of record bull market has this been?
Reasons for Divergences: Rotation, Deteriorating Market Conditions and Index Rigging
What likely accounts for the deepening massive divergences between record headline numbers and the bear markets plaguing most of the listed PSE firms?
I see three factors.
One. Rotation.
Active stock market participants, or mainly the punters, have jumped on the bandwagon to pump select big market caps on the Phisix. The herding effect pump has most likely been financed by dumping broader market issue holdings.
There has been circumstantial evidence in support of this. As I have recently pointed out, peso trading volume has been gravitating towards the Phisix, particularly to the top 10 best performing issues at the expense of the broader market.
These may also be signs that despite headline record highs and intense media bombardment by major institutions to promote and solicit public participation in equities (directly or indirectly via mutual funds, etfs, uitfs), growth in equity investments from the public have most likely been dismal. Record headlines may have most likely failed to draw in significant depositors to enable a broad market push.
Another possible circumstantial proof? Last week, the PSE implicitly warned about soliciting accounts by undercutting commissions[5]: “Investors are likewise asked not to be swayed by unauthorized discounted pricing schemes offered to attract people to buy shares.”
The dearth of public demand (via customers or clients) for equities seems to have incited price wars among the sellside for market share!
Simply awesome!
Furthermore, those touted or highly publicized big gains supposedly generated by mainstream funds have most likely emanated from momentum or performance chasing on key overpriced or overvalued index issues.
The broad based bear market only shows that any exposure on them will most likely lead to dramatic underperformances or a severe departure from the benchmark. Thus, equity fund ALPHA growth can only be attained by mostly chasing winners which have mostly been through index issues!
So if you want a job from the mainstream, chasing yields is the answer for acceptance!
And I have been stunned to discover of the huge management fees being remunerated on these funds (e.g. 1.5% of Net Asset Value, double digit cut from premiums on initial account openings on some of the mainstream funds). The supply side people are being highly compensated to just chase prices by dismissing risks!
And this signifies the ethical dilemma called the the agency problem in action. The agency problem had been dramatically crystalized in cinema by Mark Hanna’s ‘fugazi’ lecture on the neophyte and soon to be Wolf of Wall Street Jonathan Belfort.
No wonder, the perpetual cheerleading!
Two. Deteriorating Market Conditions.
The negative advance decline spread that accompanied the path to 8,100 demonstrates of such entropy operating within the Phisix.
Even with last week’s pump 1.53% which on the surface would look broad based due to broad industry gain, advance decline spread has marginally been positive (7). [please see first chart above]
And this comes even as the entire week had been a perfect slate for the bulls; specifically the PSEi gained in May 11 +.19% , in May 12 +.21%, in May 13 +.18%, in May 14 +.3% and in May 15 +.64%.
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Additionally while this week’s pump makes the appearance of broad market based gains, the 1.53% has been a product of surges in a few index stocks; specifically, a shocking 16.76% for Globe Telecoms, another stunning 9.05% for GT Capital, an incredible 4.26% for Universal Robina, 3.42% for BDO Unibank and 3.42% for DMC Holdings. In short, 3 of the best performing issues have been from the top 15 weightings of the Phisix.
And the gains of these issues have been prominently reflected on their respective industries; services, holdings and industrials.
The fantastic pump on GLO was attributed to a reported 43% jump in earnings in 1Q 2015 even when top line grew by only 15% suggests of mostly accounting profits.
Yet the PSE posted Thursday’s PER for GLO at a whopping 68.46! Year to date GLO has surged 47.4% as of Friday, this means that whatever gains in headline earnings has been more than offset by frenetic price pumps!
This means even more multiple expansions!
Such overvalued issues will suffer what I call as Price Earnings Trap. This means that such extreme level of overvaluations will eventually lead to even higher levels of PERs, whether earnings go up or down
On an earnings upside, speculative pumps will only lead to more outrageous valuations. On the other hand, on an earnings decline, a slowdown will initially bloat the PERs, prior to the market’s digestion and re-pricing of this.
At the end of the day, excessively overvalued issues will face economic reality.
Furthermore, this week’s substantial gains by the domestic benchmark have been accompanied by the LOWEST weekly volume for the year.
Yet this week’s volume has even been padded up by Wednesday’s Php 3.3 billion special block sales mostly from Century Pacific Food.
Also Monday’s Php 5.73 billion trading volume marks the LOWEST daily volume since November 10, 2014 at Php 5.510 billion.
Yet those domestic pumps have been kept in kibosh by foreign selling. Since the presidential visit to the PSE, where fawning officials acclaimed record stocks from foreign buying as C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-C-E from the incumbent’s policies, foreign selling has accounted for four of the past 5 weeks!
Yet for the broader market, foreign participation which has broadly been positive for 2014 has hardly contributed to the upliftment of broad market performance.
To wit, the broad based bear market (mostly from 2013) has little been about foreign participation.
Third. Index Manipulation.
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As I have been saying here, there will be NO record Phisix without the serial index pumping especially from the ‘marking the close’ sessions.
The gravitation of trading volume skewed towards Phisix composite members particularly the top 15 issues, the grotesque index overvaluations—specifically tilted towards Phisix issues that has been objects of repeated pumps, the growing massive divergence between headline index (seen) and broader market performance (unseen), as well as, the daily intraday actions—all converge to exhibit what looks likely as signs of the brazen rigging of the Philippine stock market.
Puzzlingly, marking the close only occurred in only one session of the week. Have these guys been tapped at on the shoulders by officials?
Nonetheless, a reduction of index pump has led to more panic buying day pumps combined with the afternoon delight pushes.
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Oh as for those 69% in bear markets in banking stocks, based on 3Q declared earnings at the PSE since 2011-2014, only SECB has challenged the trend. Then why the massive pump only on the banking Phisix heavyweights?
Because these firms has important representation on the financial index and on the Phisix?
Additionally have all these pumps been about the coming national presidential elections? To have a supposed legacy of economic feat via record bubbles that would work favorably for the incumbent's anointed in the elections?
The intent seems as to propagandize the economy based on record stocks which in reality has been gamed.
And what of the sloganeering that record stocks equate to C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-C-E based on G-R-O-W-T-H? How should this apply to the broader market dominated by the bears? Has general markets failed to grow?
Such massive divergence implies that Philippine record stocks have nothing been but a Potemkin Village: Record Outside, Bear Market Inside
And finally just how can record Phisix sustain a run when the bears appear to be getting more recruits than the bulls?
Remember 7 of the 30 issues or 23.3% are in bear markets. This means that index managers would have to do more than the 15-20 issue rotational pumps. Question is do they have the sufficient resources?
Perhaps they need more advertisements.
Philippine Treasury Market in Turmoil: The BSP Dabbles with Fed’s Bailout Tool called Term Auction Facility (TAF)!
Media reports that the Philippine central bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has been considering to adapt the US Federal Reserve’s tool called Term Auction Facility (TAF) to manage “liquidity”.
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The TAF is a technical euphemism for bailout measures targeted at rescuing troubled banks. That was how it was used by the FED in 2007.
Under the TAF, central bank lending to banks will be coursed through, other than the discount window, but through an auction designed to shield the identity of the distressed borrowers.
The TAF, according to James Felkerson of the Levy Economics Institute in a 2011 study, represented one of the major bailout instruments (13% share of the horrific $29 trillion of bailout funds!) used to rescue the banking system NOT only on US banks, but more importantly, foreign banks which constituted the bulk of borrowers, mostly from the Eurozone.
Here is Mr. Felkerson’s description of the TAF[6] (bold mine)
The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was announced on December 12, 2007. The TAF was authorized under Section 10B of the FRA and was “designed to address elevated pressures in short-term funding markets” (Federal Reserve 2007). Historically, depository institutions have obtained short-term liquidity during times of market dislocation by borrowing from the discount window or borrowing from other financial institutions. However, the “stigma” associated with borrowing from the discount window led many depository institutions to seek funding in financial markets. Given pervasive concern regarding liquidity risk and credit risk, institutions resorting to private markets were met with increasing borrowing costs, shortened terms, or credit rationing. To address this situation, the TAF provided liquidity to depository institutions via an auction format. The adoption of an auction format allowed banks to borrow as a group and pledge a wider range of collateral than generally accepted at the discount window, thus removing the resistance to borrowing associated with the “stigma problem.” Each auction was for a fixed amount of funds with the rate determined by the auction process (Federal Reserve 2008a, p. 219). Initially, the auctions offered a total of $20 billion for 28-day terms. On July 30, 2008, the Fed began to alternate auctions on a biweekly basis between $75 billion, 28-day term loans and $25 billion, 84-day credit. The TAF ran from December 20, 2007 to March 11, 2010. Both foreign and domestic depository institutions participated in the program. A total of 416 unique banks borrowed from this facility. Table 1 presents the five largest borrowers in the TAF. As for aggregate totals, 19 of the 25 largest borrowers were headquartered in foreign countries. The top 25 banks, all of which borrowed in excess of $47 billion, comprised 72 percent of total TAF borrowing. Of the 416 unique participants, 92 percent borrowed more than $10 billion. Of the $2,767 billion borrowed by the largest 25 participants, 69 percent ($1,909.3 billion) was borrowed by foreign institutions. The Fed loaned $3,818 billion in total over the run of this program.
Since there is no such thing as a free lunch, government rescue or loans to politically preferred institutions carry both opportunity costs and unintended consequences.
When government spends on loans to banking system, the opportunity costs for such government action will be resources that could have been spent on other government programs. So the opportunity costs of rescuing banks are political spending on welfare, infrastructure, military, bureaucracy and other political concerns.
But the most important opportunity cost is that of the market place. Resources used to bailout banks for political purposes means resources that should have been used productively by the marketplace, other than the messed up politically privileged banks.
In short, political spending means a transfer of resources from high value to low value goods or services.
In layman’s terms, bailouts signify an invisible transfer from the average citizen in support of zombie politically privileged institutions.
Of course bailouts do not only signify transfer of resource, they entail transfers of risk. Despite the bailout, should the borrowers fail and defaults on such loans, the losses will reflect on government’s balance sheet as deficits, and therefore, deficits eventually fall on the shoulders of taxpayers (via higher debts first then higher taxes) and of currency holders (via inflation).
The unintended effects will be transmitted—as the BSP chief introductory quote above, who channels a Bastiat—in the ‘broader context’ as unseen long-term consequence, rather in ‘face value’ or immediate visible ramifications.
So only those who believe in the fantasy that the world thrives in abundance will see government loans to any institutions as free lunches or will have no bearing on society.
Of course as noted above, TAF is just one of the many tools employed by the FED. And for the BSP to contemplate on TAF may imply a slippery slope towards more copying or adaption of more of the FED’s bailout tools.
Now the Php 64 trillion peso question: why mull over liquidity measures?
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As I have been saying here, the battle arena between the bulls and the bears have been waged, hardly at the domestic stock markets, but at the tightly held Philippine treasury markets. Yes the stock market will be the last to know.
Since yield curve has been rapidly flattening since December, there have been feverish attempts to quash the treasury selloffs. From the 1 month treasury, I highlight the considerable pumps to rein on the dumps over the past two weeks.
The result of such interventions has been a whack-a-mole effect—interventions in one maturity have led to yield surges in other maturities, thus a sharp increase in treasury market volatility!
As noted at the preceding paragraph, the one month bill has been subjected to repeated pumps. Apparently, the interventionists forgot to look at the gauges or their computer monitors as to permit the temporary emancipation of bond bears.
Last Friday based on the investing.com data, coupon yields of one month bills EXPLODED by a whopping 126 bps to mark the highest level since 2012 (right window)!
Since treasuries have mostly been held by the government and banks, then it must be banks which must be experiencing strains.
So who has been dumping 1 month bills? And importantly why? Have they been doing this out of evaporating liquidity? From funding pressures out of the growing balance sheet mismatches perhaps?
This week, 3 and 6 months have been under pumps, but maturities of 1, 2 and 3 year papers have vaulted higher. The yield of the 1 year note has reached 3 year highs, while the 2 and 3 year equivalents have posted 2 year highs. There have been minor yield curve inversions even within 1-7 year papers!
Yes these are striking signs of bedlam at the domestic treasury markets!
The BSP repeatedly tells us, like an incantation, that in terms of statistics the banking system has been liquid and sound. Yet if so why then the colossal pushback being expressed in terms of the frantic selloff at the treasury markets? Because the nasty side effects from the ‘broader context’ have begun to assert their strengths?
Here is what I wrote last December[7]
Current developments in the Philippine bond markets suggest that yields have been rising across the curve but the pressure of increases has been in the short (bills) maturities than the longer bonds…thus the flattening. The flattening of the yield curve thereby signals the ongoing tightening of monetary conditions. Rising short term yields are symptoms of emergent strains in the Philippine financial system.Let me further add that if the current ruckus in the bond markets will be sustained, the BSP will be forced to intervene. They may inject funds into pressured financial institutions, they may cut interest rates (contra mainstream expectations of higher rates), or at worst, if the problem spirals out of control, they may resort to bailouts.
And so has the BSP’s TAF talk signified a trial balloon (signaling channel) to mitigate pressures at domestic treasuries? So bailout has now been in the cards?
Yet hasn’t it been contradictory if not satirical to hear of discussions of the use of bailout tools (rationalized as macroprudential tools) in the midst of what has been popularly perceived an endless boom?
Will the TAF be followed by other Lending of Last Resort (LOLR) bailout tools that eventually end up with deposit haircuts?
Yes I do expect some heavy interventions in the coming the week.
But if the current volatility has manifested an outlet valve from balance sheet impairments, then the impact from day on day market interventions will be short-lived.
The next measures will be the cutting of rates and more macroprudential (bailout) instruments.
Statistical Growth Pumps in OFW and Industrial Production? Price Deflation in a Credit Finance Construction Boom?
The Philippine government released last week some GDP sensitive economic data that shows—all of a sudden—of strong rebounds.
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The BSP proudly headlined that OFW Personal Remittances posted “stronger growth” in March 2015 which they say represents the “highest monthly growth registered in 15 months”.
Remittances rebounded sharply after three in four months of near stagnation.
Paradoxically, this comes as the World Bank warned of a sharp slowdown of remittance growth in 2015 due to ongoing deterioration of external economic conditions.
Also, the Philippine industrial production amazingly leapt by 7.4% in March. Ironically too, such gains have been preceded by two months of negative growth.
Has the recent slumps in OFW remittances and Industrial production been a product of statistical quirks from which current gains has smoothened out?
Or has the current data been another statistical pump to justify the end of May release of 1Q 2015 GDP of 6+% and above?
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Oh, construction wholesale prices continue to post DEFLATION or price contraction for the month of April.
This marks the FIFTH successive month of falling prices (year on year; see left) in the face of a supposed construction boom! Construction prices grew by Z-E-R-O (month on month) in April (middle)!
If prices represents the balance of demand and supply then falling prices must mean faltering demand (amidst a boom??!!) or a deluge in supply (coming from where—manna from heaven??)! Or a combo.
Given the still hefty rate of bank loan growth by the industry in March at 24.27%, but far or about half from the 50-60% in 2013-2014, price deflation should theoretically NOT be happening.
That’s unless those issued bank loans have been used for other means—rollover of existing loans (manifested by falling money supply) or speculate on property (land, condos, etc…) or on stock markets instead—than to finance construction projects.
It’s one of statistics that DEFIES the ‘face value’ numbers imprinted on the national income statistics called the GDP. And both statistics shows that prices hardly play a meaningful role in the economic coordination balancing process. And yet the government and their mainstream lackeys still call these numbers economic data!
Deflation in the face of credit financed construction boom?
Interesting.
[1] See Phisix 7,800: Record Phisix as the BSP Continues with Deflation Spiel! March 9, 2015
[2] Frederic Bastiat, That Which is Seen, and That Which is Not Seen Bastiat.org
[3] Edwin Lefevre Reminiscences of a Stock Operator Chapter 17 p.185 nowandfutures.com
[4] - See Record Philippine Stocks? Bear Markets Prevail Over the Industrial Commercial Sector! (52% of index and 64% of the industry!) May 15, 2015;
- See Record Phisix? Bear Markets Dominate the Service Sector! (33% of index, and 49% of all industry) May 14, 2015
- See Record Phisix? Bear Markets Rule the Holding Sector!!! (43% of Index issues and 55% of the Overall Sector) May 13, 2015
- See Record Philippine Property Stocks? Bear Markets in 47% of Index Firms and in 53% of Firms in the Entire Property Sector!!! May 12, 2015
- See Charts of Non Index Bank and Financial Stocks: Bear Markets Rule! May 11, 2015
[5] Philippine Stock Exchange PSE warns public of investment scams May 12, 2015
[6] James Felkerson $29,000,000,000,000: A Detailed Look at the Fed’s Bailout by Funding Facility and Recipient Levy Institute of Economics December 2011
[7] See Philippine Bonds Close the Year with a Rally; Flattening Yield Curve as Business Cycle Indicator December 29, 2014
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