Politics produces lots of words that can mean very different things, if you stop and think about them. But politicians depend on the fact that many people don’t bother to stop and think about them.—Thomas Sowell Political Translations
In this issue
Phisix 6,900: Smoking Gun Evidence: PSE Listed Firm’s 2Q NGDP Drops By 3%, as Income Dives 7.5%!
-Smoking Gun Evidence: PSE Listed Firm’s 2Q NGDP Drops By 3%, as Income Dives 7.5%!
-Philippine Interest Rates: No, the US Fed Isn’t the Problem, Domestic Balance Sheets Are!
-Circumstantial Evidence: Nominal Debt Growing Faster than NGDP!
-Philippine Bonds: Inversion Dynamic Spreads and Intensifies!
-Desperate Banks Seek Volume In Place of Thinning Margins!
-On Ayala Land’s Php 50 Billion Proposed Borrowing in 2016
-Hall of Mirrors? Toyota Motor’s 3Q Data Contradicts CAMPI’s Numbers
-Phisix 6,900: Running in Circles, Despite Down 14% PBVs Remain Mispriced!
Phisix 6,900: Smoking Gun Evidence: PSE Listed Firm’s 2Q NGDP Drops By 3%, as Income Dives 7.5%!
Smoking Gun Evidence: PSE Listed Firm’s 2Q NGDP Drops By 3%, as Income Dives 7.5%!
Below is the missing picture from last week’s discussion on the performance of the universe of listed companies at the Philippine Stock Exchange.
Look at the 2Q numbers at the uppermost window.
From revenues to income of BOTH PSE and PSEi companies the figures had ALL been in red!
Yes read my lips, CONTRACTION or LOSSES! 2Q was not about G-R-O-W-T-H but about L-O-S-S or D-E-F-I-C-I-Ts!
Most importantly, income changes from 1Q to the 2Q for PSE listed firms and for the PSEi members had been DRAMATICALLY downcast: from POSITIVE 13.9% and 9.21% to NEGATIVE 7.46% (lower than my estimates at 10%) and NEGATIVE 4.73%!
In short, a COLLAPSE! Striking isn’t it?
The 2Q income crash JUST didn’t occur out of nowhere. 1Q performance already provided clues for this.
In interpreting 1Q data, I wrote[1],
With PSEi firms signifying 70.4% share of overall listed income which grew by just 9.2% as against the 13.9% for the entire PSE listed firms, this means some firms outside the PSEi index delivered the kernel of the 25.08% gains!The PSE specified them in their release, in particular telcos (that’s specifically Globe), airlines (mostly CEBU Pacific and secondarily PAL) and some in the property sector which included non-recurring gains. In other words, the bulk of the 13.9% income growth emanated from select companies and not from the broad markets!
In short, the few firms that lifted 1Q performance not only failed to carryover in 2Q, but big losses by the minority negated the outperformers!
And this is why 1H profits growth plummeted to merely 1.97% for listed firms and 1.63% for the PSEi, as I wrote last week[2],
while the PSE reported that 29 companies as having registered profits during the 1H, only 20 companies (two-third) reported improvements as against ten companies (one-third) which reported decreases.Apparently, again, the underperformance of the minority has grown substantially enough to impact and encumber the overall conditions as manifested through headline numbers. This is also means improvements have been less than deterioration to account for the headline corrosion or the net decline.
And there’s more.
While costs side improvements help improve profit conditions, it is the topline that matters most. This means that the crucial link between the 2Q income crash and the divergent 1Q performance can be seen via changes in their respective revenues.
And subsequent to this, the lackluster 1Q topline revenue growth of ONLY 1.62% and .14% of listed firms and PSEi firms eventually paved way for 2Q’s growth SHRINKAGES of -3.05% and -3.89%!
And 2Q REDUCTIONS led to 1H DEFICITS of NEGATIVE .85% and NEGATIVE 1.97% respectively!
Revenue deterioration eventually transmitted to profit degradation!
And mind you, topline revenues are the STREET-level equivalent of current priced (nominal) GDP (spending on goods and services) of listed companies, via reported accounting performance of the stated period.
The government reported 2Q current price GDP or nominal GDP (NGDP) at 5.4% (constant 2000 at 5.8%) even as PSE’s NGDP was at -3.05%.
Considering that PSE’s NGDP accounted for about HALF of the government’s NGDP, this means UNLISTED companies brought about the meat of 2Q G-R-O-W-T-H.
And given the negative 3.05%, to hit 5.4% NGDP means unlisted firms MUST PROVIDE G-R-O-W-T-H figures that should be materially above 10%!
First of all, just which set of unlisted companies/industries have acquired the size of business transactions (volume) and income that matches or exceeds those of listed firms that DELIVERED over 10% growth in 2Q????!!!!
Second, even seen from the government’s current priced numbers or NGDP breakdown in both industry and expenditure templates, only the construction segment provided G-R-O-W-T-H figures that vastly surpassed 10% in 2Q! All the rest UNDERACHIEVED!
The construction sector (industry NGDP) grew by 16.7% in 2Q, but accounted for a paltry 8% share of the GDP.
Meanwhile, construction investments (expenditure NGDP) expanded by 15.1%, but again represented only 13.31% slice of the NGDP pie.
The crux: The performance of the construction component would NOT be enough to provide for the substance or the required numbers to negate the losses by PSE NGDP!
And this also demonstrates why statistical GDP has basically little relevance with actual economic conditions!
Instead of Gross Domestic Products, GDP should be called Grossly Deceptive Politics
And yet those 2Q unpleasant numbers signify as the smoking gun revelation of the hissing bubble ‘smoke and mirrors’ economy. The 2Q data essentially DEFIES the politically constructed one way consensus expectations.
And this shocking reality may have incited the Philippine Stock Exchange to exorcise, purge, exclude or censor such figures out of existence! Such that when the PSE reported 1H 2015 performance, 2Q seemed to have almost existed in a black hole.
But the PSE forgot that there is such a math tool called arithmetic, where 1H data plus 1Q data will produce 2Q numbers. And that not all readers have been either too obtuse to know basic math, or will just take their word for it.
Most importantly, when the presentation of economic conditions become subjected to media and industry perversions, predicated on political slant expressed as political correctness or incorrectness channeled through misinformation, disinformation, mendacity, deceit, economic sophistry, brainwashing and propaganda, this is NOT only a sign of DENIAL, it is portentous of forthcoming troubles.
As British author Aldous Leonard Huxley warned in Proper Studies (1927):
Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.
Philippine Interest Rates: No, the US Fed Isn’t the Problem, Domestic Balance Sheets Are!
As I have been saying here the purpose of GDP has been hardly about measuring the economy but for the government to secure access to cheap money for political objectives.
And high GDP provides government the license to borrow with ease.
According to the media, the Philippine government may be pressured to issue more treasury papers in 2016 to pay existing liabilities. In addition, to fund the budget deficit from “proposed P3.002-trillion outlay”, the government intends to borrow P747.8 billion in 2016.
Media’s worry has been about rising rates. But of course, media (and their quoted experts) always takes on the self-attribution bias/fallacies to impute external causes to internal problems. For instance, domestic interest rate pressures have been popularly blamed on the potential December US Fed hike.
Yet like the PSE’s 16% earnings growth for 2015, such attributions have been part of the popular misperceptions, and or even deceptions. And such misappraisal of the conditions will lead to fateful and ruinous decisions and outcomes…unfortunately to anyone who heeds on their reading of the proverbial tea leaves.
The reality is that there is NO such thing as free lunches forever.
What has been misinterpreted as Fed influenced is in fact a problem of domestic balance sheets!
The suppression or low interest rates regime has represented a subsidy to political and politically attached economic agents that come with economic and financial costs.
And because all actions have consequences, subsidies will have to be paid for by someone.
In this case, the cost of the artificial boom (borrowing from the future from everyone to the benefit of borrowers—government and cronies), will be a credit bubble bust: economic contraction, falling peso, stagflation, and at worst, a crisis.
And the costs from such subsidy or invisible redistribution will be revealed as a process.
And this progression can be seen through the following set of ex-post events:
First, 10 months of 30%++ money supply growth in 2013-2014. Next, the 2014 surge in inflation.
Succeeding events in 2015 also exhibits the unfolding reversal (bubble bust) process: falling real economy prices, the 2Q and 1H PSE NGDP contraction or a downturn in economic activities (evidenced by the 3Q slowdown in the erstwhile credit fueled sizzling hot property sector) and mounting balance sheet strains as ventilated through interest rate pressures AND the flattening to the inversion of the yield curve (which is manifestation of increased demand for short term funding relative to the long term).
And yet once the economic slowdown becomes too evident to ignore and whitewash, the ensuing developments will extrapolate to a feedback mechanism between economic slack and credit strains. This would be the most likely ex-ante sequence.
Also based on the above reports, the issuance of more government debt papers means that the government will be in COMPETITION with the private sector for funds.
This competition or the ‘crowding out effect’ will entail of liquidity drainage in the financial system. This consequently means higher interest rate pressures. So increase in funding demands by the private sector PLUS the government will further augment pressures on interest rates. That’s unless government funding will be counterbalanced by credit expansion (money from thin air). Yet an unfettered credit expansion will increase prices in the real economy which should lead to a slump of the currency, the peso and to an increase in interest rates
Think of what an economic slowdown would do. It will reduce tax collection even as political spending continues to rise. This means deficit spending will increase which will be financed mainly by an expansion of government borrowings (and secondarily through inflation). Yet such increase in government borrowing will also crowd out the private sector, which means the latter’s reduced access to credit and resources. Consequently this implies slower economic activities.
And all these should extrapolate to HIGHER interests rates brought about by market-economic forces. And market’s reaction would essentially upend on the political transfers coursed through incumbent monetary policies.
As one would note, the US FEDERAL Reserve has hardly been a factor in domestic interest rates. Instead, the FED only serves as aggravating factor.
Circumstantial Evidence: Nominal Debt Growing Faster than NGDP!
Yet the implied evidence of balance sheet problems.
Credit uptake by the formal sector of the economy has been growing faster relative to the GDP current prices (NGDP) which have been in a material decline since Q2 2014.
To put in perspective, 3Q 2015 NGDP grew by 24.59% compared to 3Q 2012. On the other hand, bank credit growth to the economic sector expanded by 54.86% from end September 2015 relative to September 2012 (left window).
In short, bank credit, which has been only available to the few with access to the formal banking system (Findex estimates bank borrowers at 12% of the population based on 2014), has advanced by a stunning 123% more than NGDP over the past THREE years. And as reminder, NGDP has been boasted by bank credit expansion. This means in absence of credit subsidies, NGDP would have been a lot smaller.
This also only implies that with private sector demand for credit growing substantially faster than the income/savings generated, where the latter underpins the supply of credit, then interest rates MUST rise.
Yet a back of the napkin calculation tells us that the (plus or minus) 12% of the population have been aggressively borrowing to boost aggregate bank credit growth significantly more than the NGDP. Such skewed distribution of access to credit or its concentration not only implies why inequality has been widening, but more importantly the concentration of credit which poses as systemic risks.
And this is why mainstream aggregate numbers won’t capture the embedded risk: that’s because their numbers assumes credit has been equally distributed among the population.
One would notice further that the gap between NGDP and nominal bank lending growth has only widened in 2014-2015. This means additional bank lending has produced less and less NGDP or the diminishing marginal productivity or the bank credit’s law of diminishing marginal returns.
Question is, where has most of the growth from credit issuance-money supply been flowing into?
My guess is that a greater amount of credit expansion is being used for debt repayment.
Finally, any serial slowdown in statistical GDP numbers will raise the perception of risk on the Philippine economy and thus the government’s credit profile or standing. This should entail of higher cost of funding, or bigger risk premium to hold and or finance Philippine government.
At the end of the day, domestic forces of demand and supply of credit principally determines the direction of interest rates.
Philippine Bonds: Inversion Dynamic Spreads and Intensifies!
This brings us to the next phase of the cost of monetary policies: flattening to the inversion of the yield curve
The slope of the yield curve have also been indicative of balance sheet conditions.
Last week I noted of the 10yr 3yr spread inversion[3]
This week, the spread of the 10 year 3 year spreads have phenomenally inverted! Such inversions are signs of intensifying tightening in the financial system. And such tightening has most likely been brought by balance sheet constraints.The inverted yield curve has signified as a reliable leading indicator of recessions. While one week doesn’t a trend make, it’s interesting to see if this inversion will last, and if other parts of the curve will experience the same phenomenon.
Curiously, Friday’s actions seems to have provided additional clues on the inversion process which appears to have spread to the other parts of the curve
Based on differentials, coupon yields of 1 and 2 year government papers significantly rose on a weekly basis (see blue bars) with 4,5 and 7 years showing modest gains. (data from investing.com)
However on a monthly basis (red bars), coupon yields have risen across the curve, with the exception of the 3 month bills. The increases have been spectacular with 1 year (due to this week’s action), 1 month, 2, 3 and 7 years papers. This shows that while yields rose across curve, the biggest increases occurred at the short end.
Furthermore, the increases in yields imply that Philippine debt papers have been a losing proposition to its holders/investors. Yes Philippine bonds have been held by a limited-exclusive spectrum of investors/institutions, most of them banks and government agencies. [chart above from Asian Bonds Online-November Issue]
Yet as the recent DBP white wash or market manipulation incident reveals, many ‘profits’ or ‘income’ by financial institutions may be due to accounting ‘hold to maturity’ treatment (e.g. ‘hold to maturity’).
More importantly, this week’s action appears to confirm my suspicions.
The spread between the 10 and 3 year papers remain INVERTED! (This means manipulators either were absent or were repelled by the markets). [see upmost charts]
The spread between the 10 and 2 year papers have narrowed to a mere 11 basis points! And any further higher move by the 2 year yield relative to the 10 year would mean an inversion!
If both 2 and 3 year inverts then this would serve as an ill-boding sign for the economy and for asset markets.
The spread between the 10 and 1 year notes and 6 months bills have materially flattened which likewise raises the risks of inversion!
Notice that current inversion and flattening dynamics hasn’t been a onetime event but an ACCELERATING trend since November 2014!
The difference is that the sporadic volatility from April to November 2015 has been due to the interventions by unidentified price fixers/manipulators. These forces have been attempting to compel for a widening of the bond spreads.
Apparently those manipulations just didn’t work out as desired.
More importantly, the above exhibits why the US Fed isn’t the problem, but domestic balance sheets are. The FED has ONLY exacerbated an EXISTING condition!
Now if the current incidences of inversion spreads and or will be prolonged, then eventually no prestidigitation of the statistics will mask a coming economic contraction.
And PSE’s NGDP has already been manifesting these!
Desperate Banks Seek Volume In Place of Thinning Margins!
Yet more risks to be concerned with.
The BSP reported that domestic liquidity (M3) growth perked up last October to 9.5% from 8.7% last September. And the BSP notes that this has been due to sustained demand for credit.
Meanwhile, bank lending growth picked up last October to expand by 14.4% in October from 13.2% in September.
Remarkably, with the intensifying compression of net interest margin, this means the banking system must be substituting spreads for volume.
If BSP statistics have been accurate, then this means that the banking system has been immensely lowering or sacrificing its credit standards to issue more debt to offset the ongoing retrenchment in spreads. So the banking system must be so desperate as to seek margins by gambling away depositor and equity holder’s resources through the assimilation of more credit risks by lending to entities with poor or subprime credit ratings.
An even more interesting development has been that the BSP announced that November CPI growth jumped to 1.1% from October’s .4%. November’s CPI growth mainly comes from food prices, and secondarily, from non-food items such as clothing, education, health and household furnishing.
Yet the BSP didn’t say how much of November’s CPI strength had been a product of the weak peso. The USD-peso rose by .7% last November.
And with the shift in CPI winds, will the BSP change the way they generate statistical growth from current base effect from zero bound price deflators to the money illusion from price inflation?
Has the BSP been fearful that their statistical alchemy will be discovered?
Finally, the above represents the changes in bank lending for October.
Growth in bank loans to the manufacturing sector remains stagnant at 2.99% following September’s credit collapse or deflation (red rectangle upper window).
As for 3Q GDP, consumer banking loans and bank loans to the retail sector has BOTH been trending down. (see red rectangle). So it’s another irony to see a sizeable jump in consumer and retail GDP even when growth in bank loans to these sectors has been going down!
In today’s bubble world, down is UP, low is HIGH, less is MORE.
Meanwhile, real estate loans continue to soar even as the industry has admitted to the ongoing slowdown by the sector (see blue line lower window). Such slowdown has prompted for a blitz in media space, last October, via simultaneous press releases masqueraded as news reports, in order to boost sagging sales.
The intense growth in bank loans to the property sector implies for increased leveraging to mainly finance inventory accumulation or to bridge cash flow shortfalls. Consumer loans or loans by developers to finance receivables could be subsidiary factors.
The degree of leveraging by bubble sectors has reached an alarming stage.
Unfortunately, the BSP either remains blind to this or publicly denies this or relies on the hope that their macroprudential elixirs will work.
My bet is that they won’t.
On Ayala Land’s Php 50 Billion Proposed Borrowing in 2016
It’s intriguing to see Ayala Land announce a proposed P 50 billion borrowing program for 2016. The program consists of a mixture of corporate bonds, commercial papers and bank loans. The announcement comes even when ALI officials have not made any official capital expansion plans. Although the interviewed official says that Php 85 to Php 90 billion could be the numbers, which is a little more than the reduced current or 2015 CAPEX level.
ALI has raised a total of Php 42.13 billion as of the 3Q. In the 1Q via equity placement, the company obtained Php 16.14 billion. In the 2Q and 3Q, the company acquired Php 10.51 billion and 15.48 billion respectively through most likely bank loans. It is not clear whether ALI will tap bank loans for the 4Q or not. Given the pace of borrowing for the previous three quarters, they seem likely to do so. A slower sales number or collection problems will likely reinforce the need for additional access to credit.
Nonetheless, the initial financing plans by ALI represent a 19% increase from 2015 funding as of the 3Q.
Yet Php 50 billion accounts for 66.62% of the company’s 3Q sales at Php 75.05 billion and 329% of its 3Q 2015 net income of Php 15.21 billion. In other words, ALI has become increasingly dependent on debt for its financing needs. It has been borrowing more than it has been earning. And those profit numbers are mirages without the elemental cash flows.
Of course, Php 50 billion for 2016 is just the initial number. It could go higher.
Yet if ALI maintains current capex level but increases its debt load, then this should highlight on the company’s “tighter cash management” which was the given reason for the 20% capex cut for 2015 or this year. ALI’s supposed ‘tighter cash management’ has really been about her ongoing cash flow strains as the company gets increasingly levered through the frontend (collectibles) and the backend (inventories).
But if the company pares down on its 2016 capex, then this would signal a ‘battening of the hatches’. And this would be ominous for an industry acutely addicted to debt.
Hall of Mirrors? Toyota Motor’s 3Q Data Contradicts CAMPI’s Numbers
In todays’ hall of mirrors, one has to scrutinize on numbers issued by the government and also by the cheerleaders of the quack boom from the private sector.
And one factor which accidentally appeared on my radar: car sales.
There seems to be a conflict in the reports of car sales performance between those declared by the industry’s association and financial numbers of a major car producer as seen via a company’s disclosure
I stumbled upon this when I looked at GTCAP’s data on real estate.
In 3Q, GTCAP’s subsidiary, Toyota Motor Philippines (TMP) reported a topline sales growth of ONLY 2%!
So I assembled on the data from the previous disclosures to discover this…
TMP’s growth rate for the first 3q in 2014 had been absolutely marvelous! The numbers according to the quarterly order: 79.41%, 38.21% and 42.31%! Wow!
In 9 months of 2014, recorded growth was an eye-popping 50.11%!!!
For the same period in 2015, the growth numbers according to the quarterly order: 16.82%, 10.73% and 2.31%!
In 9 months, recorded growth horrifyingly shrunk to just 9.41%! From 50.11% to 9.41%!
And to repeat, revenue growth CRASHED from 16.82% in 1Q 2015 to 2.31% in 3Q 2015! And the government says 4.5% NGDP (6% 2000 constant).
The 2015 9 month data was buoyed by Q1 performance. Yet if the momentum persist TMP’s topline numbers will fall to negative.
I would say that these numbers are most likely representative of the law of diminishing returns.
But TMP’s numbers seem in a galaxy far far far away from those reported by the Chamber of Automotive Manufacturers of the Philippines (CAMPI)
Bizarrely TMP is a member of CAMPI.
I maybe talking of apples and oranges here, because CAMPI reports on units sold, while TMP reports on revenues or TMP’s NGDP.
To consider according to CAMPI, TMP has been the market leader with a 43.28% share as of October where auto sales sizzled by 29% year on year.
But notice on the right how TMP’s NGDP have blown apart with CAMPI’s growth based unit sold! This has been most pronounced during the 3Q.
I can see three possible insights from such glaring discrepancy.
One, competition effect. TMP’s slump in the growth rate of revenue sales had been vastly exceeded by sales growth of competitors.
But this would entail a drop in TMP’s market share. Unfortunately this is something which didn’t happen in 3Q 2015.
TMP’s market share in 3Q 2015: July 43.8%, August 44.6% and September 40.6%.
TMP’s market share in 3Q 2014: July 45.2%, August 45.1% and September 45.2%
In 3Q of 2014 and 2015, TMP’s market share has been at +/- 45%.
Two price effect. TMP’s selling prices must have significantly crashed to have skyrocketed unit volume sales. But this should imply a surge in TMP’s market share which apparently hasn’t been true
Three misreported data. Perhaps I may be missing something but one of the two data may have been misreported. Considering that corporate disclosures via financial statements are audited, then this leaves CAMPI’s data as the possible weak link.
Nonetheless consumer auto loans continue to dazzle: up 28.9% July, 28.6% August, 29.88% September and 29.52% October 2015.
Again unless I am missing something, these numbers tell of two different worlds.
Phisix 6,900: Running in Circles, Despite Down 14% PBVs Remain Mispriced!
The Phisix appears to be running in circles during the past two weeks.
By circles, I mean that after meandering to the upside, the benchmark keeps returning to its default point at the week’s close. The default point represents the closing price three weeks ago at 6,930. The last two Friday’s have closed within a very tight ambit from such number.
Yet the roundtrips over the past two weeks seem to characterize a pattern: strong opening, weak closing.
Two weeks back, in anticipation of the 3Q GDP announcement, the PSEi soared during the pre-announcement days. However, the bids were unable to maintain such advances. A day after the GDP report was announced, unfortunately all of the accumulated big gains of the week evaporated during in a single day or during Friday’s dump. So by the end of the week, the Phisix ended up where it started.
Except for the intensity of the moves, it’s almost the same story this week.
Even in absence of major developments, volatility continues to hound domestic stocks.
For a holiday shortened week, bids powered the PSEi anew to another strong opening. But this week was a mirror image of the previous week.
The week’s session opened with Tuesday’s one day remarkable pump which virtually negated the other Friday’s dump. But again, bids appeared to have lost energy to secure its gains. So for the next three days, the PSEi drifted lower to close the week again where it all started—a level established three Friday’s ago at 6,930.
The PSEi was almost unchanged (-.07%) on a weekly basis and remains -4.27% down year to date.
The two roundtrips can be seen in the above chart via a very tight trading range (rightmost red square).
Fascinatingly, considering that US stock markets roared during Friday, such aggressive bidding sentiment may once again diffuse globally and may likely be carried over to the Phisix, where the pattern of strong opening may repeat this coming week.
Although it’s a question of ‘will the bids be able to keep those gains or not?’
As a side note, ECB Draghi’s seeming redress for a perceived shortcoming incited the US market’s panic bidding reaction last Friday. That’s because Thursday’s policy action by the ECB, which failed to satisfy market’s expectations, provoked a market tantrum. In addition the US November jobs report, which exceeded the consensus expectations, escalated the US stock market’s response.
Rangebound trading translates to a mixed showing of the major issues.
Seen from a sectoral basis, advancers edged out decliners this week. The Service sector, Financials and the Mining industy closed with modest gains. On the other hand, the Industrial sector, led by URC (-8.27%), suffered a steep drop and was accompanied by the property sector which recorded slight declines.
Of the 30 index issues, advancing issues were the majority with a 16 to 13 lead. One issue, GTCAP, closed unchanged this week
Meanwhile, the universe of the publicly listed companies closed the week slightly in favor of sellers (with a margin of 27), although the daily distribution was evenly split at 2 days a piece.
Of course, it is important to stress that the rangebound action has been pillared by sluggish volume. This means that the bids have manifested the lack of staying power through a paucity of volume to maintain price levels above 6,900. So any advances would require sustained improvements in volume.
From the record 8,127 carved last April 10, the Phisix has been down by about 14.7% as of Friday.
But curiously, the substantial decline has hardly dented on the exceedingly high PBVs (Book Value as of 2Q 2015) of a vast majority of PSEi issues as shown below (ranked according to December 4 closing).
[1] See Phisix 7,600: China’s Stock Market Crash; Crashing Casino Stocks Influence Changes in Headlines and Opinions; PSE Revenues Expose Smaller 1Q GDP! June 28, 2015
[2] See Phisix 6,900: 3Q GDP Shocking Divergence: The Official and Untold Story! GDP of PSE’s Listed Firms Turn NEGATIVE in 1H! November 29, 2015
[3] ibid
