Sunday, August 13, 2017

PSEi 1H Net Income Performance LOWER than CPI Rates! Will There Be GDP Week Pumps? Huge Decay in Market Internals!


After the Frantic Pumping, 14 PSEi Firms Show Net Income Performance Below CPI Rates!

FOURTEEN of the PSEi 30 firms published their financial performance for both the second quarter and the first half of this year.


What makes the series of disclosures remarkable has been the sharp contrast between actions at the PSEi and the financial performance of its composite issues.

Based on Earnings Per Share (eps), SIX of 14 issues or 43% posted earnings CONTRACTION. Three recorded less than 10% growth while 5 had over 10% growth.

So far, eps shrinkages have edged out the outperformers.

What’s more, accounting issues and nonrecurring income were mainly behind some the issues which shined.

About 72% of TEL’s gains were from other income.

ICTSI likewise registered significant “one-time gain from reimbursement of costs” from a sub-concession agreement which had been terminated and from the recognition of income tax credit.

In short, nonrecurring and non-core revenues have partly magnified the overall earnings output, so far.

The average earnings per share (EPS) growth of these 14 issues has only been 5%, yet the average equity return had been a striking 16.28% or more than twice the average earnings growth!!!

Amazing.

Such is the reason why the Phisix has been one of the priciest equity benchmarks in the world – practically there has been little relevance between output and returns!

And the average PER based on 1H annualized eps is 19!

It is more than just the current set of numbers. How these numbers have been shaped represents the crux of a company’s business paradigm. Like SMPH, current revenues and earnings growth principally depend on debt financed capacity expansion. Such debt driven paradigm is simply unsustainable.


 
EPS is computed from the net income attributable to shareholders divided by the outstanding shares. So other factors such as stock rights offering (e.g. BDO) and profits from discontinued operations (e.g. GTCAP) influence eps and thus may register differences with net income.

Based on net income alone, the cumulative growth for the 14 firms has been at a paltry 2.2%! Considering that the average CPI for the said period was 3.1%, then real net income actually signified a LOSS - a negative (-.9%)!

Mass pumping in the face of NEGATIVE real net income! Just awesome!

Nevertheless, such signifies more evidence of the brewing disconnect between prices and the real economy.

And the curious thing here is that given banking loans grew at a monthly average of 18% interest income of PSEi listed banks have failed to match the velocity of the banking system’s credit expansion.

As such, eps growth has been marginal. For instance, BPI’s net interest income was insufficient to neutralize the huge hole in its trading performance such that the company endured an eps deficit in the 1H.

Have PSEi 30 banks been responding to the flattening yield curve? Or have such banks been more defensive in dishing out loans to the public perhaps due to rising credit concerns?

But if you look at shares of banks, they have mostly been rocketing! Along with the properties, the bank financial index has been at a landmark high. Year-to-date returns for the same index as of Friday had been at 20.09%! So what gives? Speculative juices? Turbocharged greed?

I expect that the remainder of the PSEi 30 to report by next week.

GDP Week: Will There Be Wild Pumps Ahead? 2Q GDP Could Have Slowed

And it’s not just earnings; the coming week is the much-touted GDP week.

Extensive volatility has usually accompanied GDP week.

Two to three days or sometimes a week before the announcement, the Phisix encounters massive pumping. So unless insider tips or expectations will be for lower GDP, then I expect the same dynamic to take hold.

Of course, other issues such as North Korea may counterbalance the forces behind the GDP week.

So far since 2015, eight of 10 GDP pre-announcements had been accompanied by pumps, one had a dump, and there was little change in one occasion.
 
Nevertheless, some clues on the possible outcome of 2Q GDP.

Government revenue growth has been down sharply (Tax and Non-tax 2Q: +3.54%; BIR + BoC 2Q: +5.51%).

Based on the performance of major cement manufacturers - HLCM, CHP and Eagle which topline were significantly lower – extrapolates to slower construction activities.

Net income, EPS and gross revenues of listed firms have lagged previous performances.

Car sales have materially slowed in the 2Q (although this jumped back to 23.3% last July).

2Q external trade grew by 7.18% about half the rate in 2016 at 15.19%. In line with exports, manufacturing conditionshave substantially cooled.

With General Retail Prices and the CPI in considerable deceleration, perhaps consumer spending could be lower.

Most importantly, money supply growth has been moderating. 2Q M3 growth was at 11.9% down from 12.03% in 1Q and 12.73% in the 4Q of 2016. M3 has coincided with real GDP (RGDP).

So GDP should be mostly lower, if not at the current rate.

But remember, GDP is a government construct mostly anchored on surveys. So political considerations may have a hand in determining the GDP. The government can produce whatever numbers they wish for the public to see, since hardly anyone would question the validity of the numbers. And or surveys can be vastly optimistic.

As the SY Group Saved the Phisix, Huge Deterioration Has Surfaced in the Market’s Breadth!

Here’s a final note on the developments behind the headline index.

The Phisix was little change (-.06%) this week. But that was largely a result of the incredible thrust to elevate the major bellwether.
 
Once again, mass pumping on SM group of companies fundamentally neutralized declines of the other issues.

SM Investments closed the week at a fresh record. Friday’s magnificent +1.16% mark-on-close pump contributed to a third of SM’s fabulous weekly (+3.69%) gains!

SM’s BDO also carved a new high this week. Despite the decline in 1H eps and a stagnant net income, BDO ended the week steeply up or by a fascinating 2.0%!

Considering that the two Sy owned issues accounted for 18.35% share of the PSEi, the substantial weekly gains had been enough to counteract on losses by the others. Nevertheless, TEL (+6.75%) and SECB (+9.75%) provided flanking support to the two Sy companies.

What’s interesting has been the deterioration of breadth in the broader markets.

While the PSEi had a narrower differential (advancers 12: decliners 18), decliners led the broader market by the largest margin (decliners 589 vis-a-vis advancers 358; margin -231) since the middle of December of 2015.

An enormous decay in market breadth usually occurs during steep selloffs. In contrast, the corrosive effects have transpired at market highs. And faltering volume and trade turnover has accompanied this.

Current developments have been very interesting because of the escalating divergence. Apparently, such discrepancies embody the unnatural effects of gaming of the market or from artificial props on the Phisix.

We have come to the point where many have come to think that the fundamental laws of economics have been vaporized to suit their conveniences and personal interests.

SM Prime’s Growth Model: In 1H 2017, Every Peso of Growth Was Funded By SIX Pesos of DEBT! SMPH Bought Php 4.9 Billion of Related Party Shares!

In this issue
SM Prime’s Growth Model: In 1H 2017, Every Peso of Growth Was Funded By SIX Pesos of DEBT! SMPH Bought Php 4.9 Billion of Related Party Shares!
-SMPH’s Intensive Borrowing To Generate Growth Model
-SMPH’s Leveraged Model is a Product of BSP’s Zero Bound Policies
-SMPH Bought Php 4.9 Billion of Related Party Shares!

SM Prime’s Growth Model: In 1H 2017, Every Peso of Growth Was Funded By SIX Pesos of DEBT! SMPH Bought Php 4.9 Billion of Related Party Shares!

SM Prime released its 1H 2017 quarterly report last week.

SMPH’s Intensive Borrowing To Generate Growth Model

As of Friday’s close, SM Prime’s annualized PER based on the 1H 2017 eps remains at a staggering 33.92!!!

Let me first start by exhibiting the subtle but highly significant changes in SM Prime’s Management’s Discussion and Analysis in their 17-Q.

2013: “This is largely due to rentals from new SM Supermalls opened in 2012 and 2013, namely SM City Olongapo, SM City Consolacion, SM City San Fernando, SM City General Santos, SM Lanang Premier and SM Aura Premier, with a total gross floor area of 698,000 square meters. Excluding the new malls and expansions, same-store rental growth is at 7%.”

2014: “The increase in rental revenue was primarily due to the new malls opened in 2013 and 2014, namely, SM Aura Premier, SM City BF Parañaque and SM City Cauayan, with a total gross floor area of 421,000 square meters. Excluding the new malls and expansions, same-store rental growth is at 7%.”

2015: “The increase in rental revenue was primarily due to the new malls and expansions opened in 2013 and 2014, namely, SM Aura Premier, SM City BF Parañaque, Mega Fashion Hall in SM Megamall, SM City Cauayan, SM Center Angono and SM City Bacolod Expansion, with a total gross floor area of 652,000 square meters. Excluding the new malls and expansions, same-store rental growth is at 7%.”

2016: “The increase in rental revenue was primarily due to the new malls and expansion opened in 2015 and 2016,namely, SM Seaside City Cebu, SM City Cabanatuan, SM City San Mateo, SM Center Sangandaan, SM San Jose Del Monte, SM Trece Martires and SM City Iloilo Expansion with a total gross floor area of 941,368 square meters In addition, retail podiums of Light, Shine, Shell and Green Residences also opened in 2015 and 2016. Out of the total rental revenues, 91% is contributed by the malls and the rest from office and hotels and convention centers. Excluding the new malls and expansions, same-store rental growth is at 7%.”

2017: “The increase in rental revenue was primarily due to the new malls and expansions opened in 2015, 2016 and 2017 namely, SM Seaside City Cebu, SM City Cabanatuan, SM City San Jose Del Monte, SM City East Ortigas, SM City Trece Martires, SM CDO Downtown Premier, S Maison, SM City Iloilo Expansion and SM Center Molino Expansion with a total gross floor area of 1.1 million square meters. Out of the total rental revenues, 88% is contributed by the malls and the rest from office and hotels and convention centers. Excluding the new malls and expansions, same-store rental growth is at 7%.


 
There appears to be an implicit rule of thumb for the company’s analysis:

One, current growth signifies largely a function of the recently installed capacity or inventory additions during the last two years.

Two, same store sales have accounted for a fixed number: 7%

As shown in the upper chart, SM Prime has embarked on an aggressive capacity expansion over the last two years.

For malls in the Philippines and in China, gross floor area has grown at 13.5% (1 million sqm.) and at 9.5% (.8 million sqm.) in 2016 and 2017, respectively.

Moreover, SMPH opened at a rate of 12.28% (7 malls) and at 9.375% (6 malls) over the same period. These growth numbers have been MORE than DOUBLE the previous years.

So if added inventory of the past year (2016) should signify this year’s growth numbers, including the growth rate of same store sales, then SM core revenues should register 20% and above!

But SM’s rental revenues only registered 12.38% yoy in 1H 2017, slightly lower than 12.93% in 2016! To add real estate sales, which grew by 4.62% this year and 6.11% in 2016, SM’s core revenues moderated to 9.49% (2017) and 10.29% (2016). That would be less than half of the ideal rates.

It was the “other income” segment (+38%) that provided the gravy or which filled the gap between the core and the overall gross revenues. The other income category mostly came from sponsorship income and hotels’ food and beverages income due to the opening of Conrad Manila”

Interestingly, SM’s cinemas posted a contraction of .91% in the 1H. (I know, part of this could be about NETFLIX on online movies)

Embedded fragility has appeared even in the management’s analysis.

Prior to 2017, revenue growth stemmed from two years of supply side expansion. In 2017, revenue growth expanded to include THREE years of supply, in particular, “due to the new malls and expansions opened in 2015, 2016 and 2017”.

So this represents an implied admission that SM has hardly filled the capacity additions of 2015!

As for same store sales, obviously given its fixity, such number seems hardly relevant to SM’s financial position.

Now the question is: how has such massive supply side growth been funded?

SM Prime’s posted nominal earnings of Php 19 billion in 2015, Php 12.9 billion in 2016 and Php 14.71 billion in 2017. The year on year difference in nominal context are negative Php 6.06 billion in 2016 and Php 1.82 billion in 2017.
 
Since these earnings numbers would be insufficient, the company resorted to mass borrowings for expansion. In 1H 2016, SM Prime added an incredible Php 43.3 billion to its long term debt! In 1H 2017, an astounding Php 11.4 billion of long term debt incorporated to its books.

Hence, FOR every peso of earnings generated by SM Prime in 2017, it borrowed Php 6.3 cents! And for every peso of revenue growth, the company borrowed Php 2.85! And these growth-debt dynamic has signified as SMPH’s tradition.

As a side note, the above represents only long-term debt which excludes loans payable and the current portion of long term debt.  And US dollar liabilities account for about 35% of long-term debt.

SMPH’s Leveraged Model is a Product of BSP’s Zero Bound Policies

To repeat, SM Prime’s core business model hardly depends on same store sales but from AGGRESSIVE supply side (market share) expansion.

And as the above evidence reveals, the company’s marginal sales growth, which has been derived mainly from newly installed capacity, has been financed by the company’s deepening exposure to leverage.

And in order to maintain current growth rates, SMPH would need to DOUBLE DOWN on its debt financed capacity expansion.

Thus, unless it changes the current dynamic, SM Prime’s business model ultimately leads to a “debt trap”. Such fragility will become apparent once occupancy rates fall, especially from systemic overcapacity. SM’s numbers have already begun to manifest these; three years of inventory to generate present revenue rate levels!

SM Prime’s current operating model represents an example of the redistributive effects of the BSP’s zero bound policies. SMPH have been a MAJOR beneficiary of such policy induced invisible transfers in favor of borrowers.

And many companies from the industry or related to the industry have massively borrowed to chase returns.

And such race to build supply, which has now become evident in the increasing share of the industry’s exposure to GDP, signifies misallocation of resources. Growing incidences of vacancies are manifestations of such systemic misdirection of resources.

SMPH Bought Php 4.9 Billion of Related Party Shares!

Finally, equity shares have “moneyness” functions. Aside from collateral, shares can be used for payments in mergers and or in acquisitions. Hence, many companies undertake measures to keep share prices up.

And perhaps for the upkeep of SM Group’s share status, we find this as part of 1H actions of SMPH.


Perhaps the string of record runs of parent SM and subsidiaries, SMPH and BDO can be traced to internal or group buying: SMPH bought an astounding Php 4.9 billion of related party shares which it categorized as Available For Sales (AFS) Investments!!! Wow!

Could it have been part of the “marking the close” consortium???

As of Friday, SM group now controls a stunning 26.63% of the PSEi 30’s market share. SM and SMPH have about 19.91% share.

So the company’s borrowing binge has not been directed at misdirection of resources in the real economy but also on misallocations to manage share prices of its interests.

Now, what happens when markets experience a severe downturn? Would these not add to SMPH’s increasingly fragile state?

Perhaps the SM group may have assimilated the notion that they own the market!