Wow, Warren Buffett’s (Berkshire Hathaway) Cash Position Rockets by an Astounding 34%! Bullish in Words, Bearish in Action

Wow, Warren Buffett’s (Berkshire Hathaway) Cash Position Rockets by an Astounding 34%! Bullish in Words, Bearish in Action

The world’s most successful and revered stock market investor Warren Buffett has been an inveterate bull. In his 2015 letter to his flagship’s Berkshire Hathaway, Mr. Buffett asserted betting against America would be a losing proposition, “For 240 years it's been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start.”

In September of 2017, he made a bold and controversial claim that the Dow Jones Industrials, which was then at 22,400, would hit 1,000,000 in 100 years. However, even the mainstream media smelled the dissimulation from the Sage of Omaha’s prediction. The CAGR for the 100 year period would tally to only 3.87% compared to the CAGR of 10.7% since 2008! Mr. Buffett essentially framed the public to believe in his optimism while concealing his dampened expectations on returns!

Yet, because of his popularity, a countless number of followers has turned every Berkshire Hathaway’s shareholders meeting into the “Woodstock for capitalists”.

Mentored by the great value investing guru Benjamin Graham, the folksy Mr. Buffett has been renowned for his value investing approach

However, Mr. Buffet’s investing approach has long evolved. It has metastasized from value investing towards taking advantage of the political environment, through insider privilege and as a “champion of bailouts”, the establishment “investment moats” from politically bestowed monopolies and from the Federal Reserve’s insidious transfer policies to generate outsized profits. These practice defined in two words, political entrepreneurship.

And cronyism has reverberated on Mr. Buffett’s brand of politics. Mr. Buffet has repeatedly called on fellow billionaires to pay higher taxes. Paradoxically, Mr. Buffett’s companies have not only squared off with the IRS, they have used loopholes and accounting tricks to skirt tax payments.

Now to the heart of the story.

Striking self-contradicting insights seem to encompass Mr. Buffett’s latest bonfire for investors.

As Mr. Buffett has harped on higher taxes for the rich, he attributed the significant jump in the company’s book-value growth to Mr. Trump’s tax reform, “The $65 billion gain is nonetheless real – rest assured of that. But only $36 billion came from Berkshire’s operations. The remaining $29 billion was delivered to us in December when Congress rewrote the U.S. Tax Code” Berkshire Hathaway 2017 Annual Report p.7 

And instead of putting his words into action, Berkshire Hathaway amassed the biggest cash and cash equivalent position ever! (bold mine)

Charlie and I never will operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers – or even that of friends who may be facing liquidity problems of their own. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having Treasury Bills – loads of Treasury Bills – that protected us from having to rely on funding sources such as bank lines or commercial paper. We have intentionally constructed Berkshire in a manner that will allow it to comfortably withstand economic discontinuities, including such extremes as extended market closures. (P.7)

Berkshire’s goal is to substantially increase the earnings of its non-insurance group. For that to happen, we will need to make one or more huge acquisitions. We certainly have the resources to do so. At yearend Berkshire held $116.0 billion in cash and U.S. Treasury Bills (whose average maturity was 88 days), up from $86.4 billion at yearend 2016. This extraordinary liquidity earns only a pittance and is far beyond the level Charlie and I wish Berkshire to have. Our smiles will broaden when we have redeployed Berkshire’s excess funds into more productive assets (p.9)

Wow, that’s a whopping 34% surge in liquidity that “earns only a pittance”!!!

Why? Because “economic discontinuities” may be an obstacle to Dow Jones 1 Million????

For every USD invested in stocks, Berkshire has .68 cents in cash. Or, the ratio of stocks-cash is 60-40. Total equity position as of 2017 was USD 170 billion. That’s hardly a staunchly bullish position!

And if you should notice, this hasn’t been an anomaly. Berkshire’s cash hoard has vaulted in the past 3 years, growing by 20.4% and 13.4% in 2016 and 2015, respectively.

Note from the above data, I tabulated only the cash and cash equivalent segment of the insurance business sans the rail and financials.

Given the way the market has behaved, lack of opportunities can hardly explain Berkshire’s swelling cash pile.

Shouldn’t this hoarding of cash, coming at the expense of stocks, be discerned as “betting against America”?

Or has the lessons of the Great Recession sank into Mr. Buffett? Berkshire has had little elbow room to use during the ensuing fire sale triggered by the Lehman collapse. (see above)

And interestingly, while Mr. Buffett told the public that the Dow would hit 1M, he was silently amassing cash!

Warren Buffett’s saying one thing and doing another serves as a noteworthy example of DEMONSTRATED PREFERENCE.

Warren Buffett: Do as I say, Not as I Do: No Bubble, but Berkshire Hathaway’s Cash Hoard Soars

At a CNN interview, US President Obama crony Warren Buffett denies a bubble in US stocks: Buffett said stocks "might be a little on the high side now, but they've not gone into bubble territory."

Yet he further stated that:  "I don't find cheap stocks to buy either," he said, adding after follow-up questions that there were "very little" and "very few" bargains out there right now.

For Mr. Buffett, the framing of bubble in the context of portfolio management matters. 

In Berkshire’s 2014 annual report, Mr. Buffett wrote: (bold mine)

There is an important message for investors in that disparate performance between stocks and dollars. Think back to our 2011 annual report, in which we defined investing as “the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power – after taxes have been paid on nominal gains – in the future.”

The unconventional, but inescapable, conclusion to be drawn from the past fifty years is that it has been far safer to invest in a diversified collection of American businesses than to invest in securities – Treasuries, for example – whose values have been tied to American currency. That was also true in the preceding half-century, a period including the Great Depression and two world wars. Investors should heed this history. To one degree or another it is almost certain to be repeated during the next century. 

Stock prices will always be far more volatile than cash-equivalent holdings. Over the long term, however, currency-denominated instruments are riskier investments – far riskier investments – than widely-diversified stock portfolios that are bought over time and that are owned in a manner invoking only token fees and commissions. That lesson has not customarily been taught in business schools, where volatility is almost universally used as a proxy for risk. Though this pedagogic assumption makes for easy teaching, it is dead wrong: Volatility is far from synonymous with risk. Popular formulas that equate the two terms lead students, investors and CEOs astray. 

It is true, of course, that owning equities for a day or a week or a year is far riskier (in both nominal and purchasing-power terms) than leaving funds in cash-equivalents. That is relevant to certain investors – say, investment banks – whose viability can be threatened by declines in asset prices and which might be forced to sell securities during depressed markets. Additionally, any party that might have meaningful near-term needs for funds should keep appropriate sums in Treasuries or insured bank deposits. 

For the great majority of investors, however, who can – and should – invest with a multi-decade horizon, quotational declines are unimportant. Their focus should remain fixed on attaining significant gains in purchasing power over their investing lifetime. For them, a diversified equity portfolio, bought over time, will prove far less risky than dollar-based securities

Yet action speak louder than words.

Berkshire Cash and Cash Equivalents since 1995

Berkshire cash at US$ 60.98 billion or 17% of market cap as of yesterday (based on Yahoo Finance).

The cash holdings of Mr. Buffett’s flagship Berkshire Hathaway has been skyrocketing.

From an annualized basis, Berkshire’s biggest gain in cash equivalent has been in 2014. Yet since 2008, Berkshire has been stockpiling cash reserves.

And the crux has been, Berkshire has done little to use those cash hoard!

While it may be true that “a multi-decade horizon, quotational declines are unimportant”, buying at a elevated prices will have an impact on portfolio returns even at the long run. 

And what Mr. Buffett didn’t say has been that most of Berkshire’s holdings has been from long term positions, rather than from current investments.

It’s true that Berkshire Hathaway recently bought $560 million in the automotive sector through Axalta Coating System, a 145-year old seller of coatings for cars, SUV’s and commercial vehicles, but this hardly signifies a dent on the $60 billion stash.

At least Mr. Buffett has been candid to admit that he is just human and has been subject to miscalculations and losses.

In the same annual report he shares the sad experience of Berkshire’s position with Tesco.

Attentive readers will notice that Tesco, which last year appeared in the list of our largest common stock investments, is now absent. An attentive investor, I’m embarrassed to report, would have sold Tesco shares earlier. I made a big mistake with this investment by dawdling.

At the end of 2012 we owned 415 million shares of Tesco, then and now the leading food retailer in the U.K. and an important grocer in other countries as well. Our cost for this investment was $2.3 billion, and the market value was a similar amount.

In 2013, I soured somewhat on the company’s then-management and sold 114 million shares, realizing a profit of $43 million. My leisurely pace in making sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of behavior “thumb-sucking.” (Considering what my delay cost us, he is being kind.)

During 2014, Tesco’s problems worsened by the month. The company’s market share fell, its margins contracted and accounting problems surfaced. In the world of business, bad news often surfaces serially: You see a cockroach in your kitchen; as the days go by, you meet his relatives.

We sold Tesco shares throughout the year and are now out of the position. (The company, we should mention, has hired new management, and we wish them well.) Our after-tax loss from this investment was $444 million, about 1/5 of 1% of Berkshire’s net worth. In the past 50 years, we have only once realized an investment loss that at the time of sale cost us 2% of our net worth. Twice, we experienced 1% losses. All three of these losses occurred in the 1974-1975 period, when we sold stocks that were very cheap in order to buy others we believed to be even cheaper

Finally, yet some very useful advise from the annual report (bold italics mine)

If the investor, instead, fears price volatility, erroneously viewing it as a measure of risk, he may, ironically, end up doing some very risky things. Recall, if you will, the pundits who six years ago bemoaned falling stock prices and advised investing in “safe” Treasury bills or bank certificates of deposit. People who heeded this sermon are now earning a pittance on sums they had previously expected would finance a pleasant retirement. (The S&P 500 was then below 700; now it is about 2,100.) If not for their fear of meaningless price volatility, these investors could have assured themselves of a good income for life by simply buying a very low-cost index fund whose dividends would trend upward over the years and whose principal would grow as well (with many ups and downs, to be sure).

Investors, of course, can, by their own behavior, make stock ownership highly risky. And many do. Active trading, attempts to “time” market movements, inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary fees to managers and advisors, and the use of borrowed money can destroy the decent returns that a life-long owner of equities would otherwise enjoy. Indeed, borrowed money has no place in the investor’s tool kit: Anything can happen anytime in markets. And no advisor, economist, or TV commentator – and definitely not Charlie nor I – can tell you when chaos will occur. Market forecasters will fill your ear but will never fill your wallet.

The commission of the investment sins listed above is not limited to “the little guy.” Huge institutional investors, viewed as a group, have long underperformed the unsophisticated index-fund investor who simply sits tight for decades. A major reason has been fees: Many institutions pay substantial sums to consultants who, in turn, recommend high-fee managers. And that is a fool’s game

Well, the above insight brings us back to Mr. Buffett’s old adage: 'You want to be greedy when others are fearful. You want to be fearful when others are greedy. It's that simple.'

So there you have it, for Mr. Buffett the term "bubble" seems as a political sensitive word. So he fudges this by framing the market over the long term versus the short term. 

Updated to add: Of course uttering the word 'bubble' may just deflate Mr. Buffett's glory, prestige and esteem, as the investing public would refrain from pushing up Berkshire Hathaway or assets held by Berkshire.

Yet in his 2014 annual report Mr. Buffett made lots of caveats in citing "borrowing has no place in the investor's tool kit" when US non-financial companies has been in a borrowing splurge, that makes markets susceptible to "anything can happen anytime in the markets".

And if one looks at Mr. Buffett's Berkshire’s Hathaway cash stash, they seemed positioned for a coming fat pitch…

So do as I say, not as I do.

The Natural Limits of Profit Growth: Berkshire Hathaway Edition

A year back, I explained that profit growth are constrained by natural economic forces: in particular, the law of compounding, competition, changes in  the risk environment, changes in the production process (lengthening or shortening), boom bust cycles, and government interventions (e.g.taxation and deficit spending).

Warren Buffett's flagship Berkshire Hathaway should serve as a great example.

In terms of prices, while Berkshire Hathaway had, in the past, outclassed the S&P by a wide margin especially during its maiden years, that magic appears to be ebbing.

Since 1999, Berkshire returns appears to be growing at a rate similar to that of the S&P. In conventional perspective, this makes Mr. Buffett's company a seeming proxy for the S&P.

The crux is that natural economic barriers to profit growth has been eroding on the foundations of Berkshire’s profit growth rates as reflected by stock prices as shown by the chart above from Businessinsider

Now the growth aspect. Agora publishing’s Bill Bonner at the Daily Reckoning says that in realization of this phenomenon, Mr. Buffett seems to be moving his goal post to in order to embellish his social position : (bold mine, italics original)

This focus on quality over price is what turned Berkshire Hathaway into such a money machine for Buffett and his partner, Charlie Munger. For 36 years, the duo tossed their coins and got heads every year.

But in 2000, the tails began to appear. You may say that Buffett and Munger “changed their strategy.” Or they “made a mistake.” But if their success were based on skill, why would they suddenly forget how to make money?

“Berkshire’s investment portfolio performance has been extremely poor for at least the last 14 years,” writes colleague Porter Stansberry.

Between 1970 and 2000, the lowest 10-year annualized return on Berkshire’s investment portfolio was 20.5%.

Starting in 2000, however, the wheels come off. Between 2000 and 2010, the annualized return was 6.6%. And, after never recording an annual decrease in book value, Buffett lost money twice in the 10-year period (2001 and 2008).

note here of the effect of boom bust cycles on Berkshire's balance sheets…

Relative to the S&P 500, these numbers haven’t gotten better since 2010.

In 2011, Berkshire’s portfolio return was 4%. (The S&P 500 was up 2.1%.) In 2012, Berkshire’s portfolio return was 15.7%. (The S&P 500 was up 16%.) In 2013, Berkshire’s portfolio was up 13.6%. (The S&P 500 was up 32.4%.) In 2014, Berkshire’s portfolio was up 8.4%. (The S&P 500 was up 13.7%.)

Last week, Buffett moved the goalposts. Instead of reporting Berkshire’s results in terms of book value only, he showed how well the company did in terms of share price.

Why he did this is a matter of some controversy.

Did he do it, as he claimed, because book value no longer gives an accurate picture of the value of his “sprawling conglomerate”?

Or did he do it because the gods have turned against him; his book value increases have underperformed the S&P 500 for the last 14 years and it is becoming embarrassing?

Barron’s offers an opinion:

Buffett probably can be faulted for not being forthright in the letter about the disappointing performance of the Berkshire equity portfolio that he oversees.

Of the company’s big four holdings, American Express, IBM, Coca-Cola and Wells Fargo, only Wells Fargo has been a notable winner in recent years. […]

Buffett tends to manage the portfolio’s largest and longest-standing investments. Two managers who help run the rest, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, have outperformed Buffett in the past few years.

If the law of economics has affected the world's greatest investor, why do you think others will be immune?  

In the Philippine context, those stratospheric valuations justified on supposedly perpetual headline G-R-O-W-T-H will be faced with reality soon.

Contra Warren Buffett, America’s best days exists for a tiny elite

Sovereign Man’s Simon Black points out why Warren Buffett is wrong with the latter’s sanguine view of America. (bold mine) 

In his most recent annual report just released yesterday, Mr. Buffet lauds the United States of America, writing:

“Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 237 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. And the dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. America’s best days lie ahead.”

Such language is typical for Mr. Buffett, he is one of America’s biggest cheerleaders. Again, with good reason.

For one, the unprecedented monetary expansion over the last decades has created a major boon for Mr. Buffet and his net worth. 

His company Berkshire Hathaway has a balance sheet worth $485 billion. 25% of that is simply invested in the stock market with big chunks of Coca Cola and American Express. 

These stock prices have boomed in an era of unprecedented money printing, adding billions to Mr. Buffett’s net worth.

Second, it’s important to note that over 75% of Berkshire’s revenue comes from highly regulated, absurdly profitable, tax advantageous businesses that are simply not accessible to the average guy. 

For example, Mr. Buffett gleefully writes about the $77 billion ‘float’ from his insurance businesses.

This is money that is collected from insurance customers. And while he might have to pay out insurance claims someday, for now he gets to borrow from that kitty at 0% and generate higher returns elsewhere.

On top of this, Mr. Buffett has been able to defer a full $57 billion in tax, indefinitely kicking the can down the road on his IRS bill thanks to industry-specific tax rules.

Again, you and I couldn’t do this because we don’t have access to these special privileges. Warren Buffett does.

Warren Buffett also has special access to lawmakers in the US who clamor to be in his favor.

During the early days of the financial crisis in 2008, for example, Buffett was getting desperate phone calls from the Treasury begging him to make investments in the financial system.

And as a result, he was able to arrange sweetheart deals, brokered by the US government.

It also may just be a wild coincidence that the US government has rejected the Keystone XL pipeline… and Mr. Buffett’s railways just -happen- to be among the prime beneficiaries.

Yes, I think if we all had the special privilege, access, and benefit that Warren Buffett enjoys, we too would all be jumping for joy about America.

But Uncle Warren lives in a different America– the America of the past.

With due deference to his investment acumen, Mr. Buffett should know that no nation in history has been able to -permanently- stand atop the world’s economic mountain. 

Like human beings ourselves, nations also rise, peak, and decline. It is their own life cycle. 

And the America that Mr. Buffett doesn’t acknowledge is the one that is in debt past its eyeballs. 

It is the America that spies on its citizens and threatens people with imprisonment for victimless crimes and administrative transgressions.

It is the America that conjures trillions of paper dollars out of thin air in total desperation, sending the labor force participation rate to multi-decade lows.

It is the new America that exists for a tiny elite at the expense of everyone else.

The above article exposes on what I call as “people up talking their industry” or a prime example of the the agency (principal agent) problem or the invisible conflict of interests between industry participants and their clients and or the public. [I should know I am a part of Mr. Buffett's industry but based on the Philippines.]

The cheerleading of Mr. Buffett on the economy has been designed to bolster Berkshire's financial interests (through implied advertisement) by encouraging the unwitting public to patronize the businesses offered by his companies via the "economy".

The other ramification is that the average investors pile into Berkshire’s stocks thereby pumping up share values and therefore magnify Berkshire's "returns" which will eventually reflect on Mr. Buffett's wealth status.

Of course what Mr. Buffett didn’t say too, which has been lucidly explained by Mr. Black, has been that Berkshire’s “economic moat” or competitive advantage has hardly been due to Ben Graham’s “value investing” but rather to “value” provided by political privileges via rent seeking political entrepreneurship, which meant special access to politicians and their regulations or exemptions in order to protect Berkshire’s interests. In terms of proportionality, 25% in stocks and 75% in rent privileges hardly speaks of value investing. 

In addition, some of the 25% of Berkshire's portfolio also benefits from political cover, as noted above.

The point is that what benefits Mr. Buffett’s Berkshire isn’t largely shared by the public. But Mr. Buffett makes it appear otherwise.

I’d like to add that Berkshire Hathaway is just one of the major recipients of government subsidies. According to a report by Philip Mattera of the taxpayer watch group Good Job First over the last two decades: 

…subsidy awards worth more than $1billion have been given to Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway by way of its holdings such as Geico, NetJets, Nebraska Furniture Mart, General Re Corporation, Lubrizol Advanced Materials, and Webb Wheel Products.

It’s not just Mr. Buffett though. An increasing number of US companies have become welfare recipients of the US government. About 75% of cumulative disclosed subsidy dollars to the tune of a whopping $110 billion notes PandoDaily.com have gone to 965 large companies where Fortune 500 firms have received receive more than 16,000 subsidies at a total cost of $63 billion. And more US government subsidies have also covered foreign firms. The 10 largest welfare corporate beneficiaries include Boeing, Alcoa, Intel, General Motors, Ford, Fiat, Royal Dutch, Nike, Nissan and Cemer. Mr. Buffett's Berkshire ranks 15th.

Bottom line: Be careful of what industry promoters say. In today’s world where politics has increasingly become a dominant force whether in the US, Asia, Europe, Latam and even in the Philippines, the rose colored-Pollyannaish outlook may all be about promoting the interests of the “tiny elite at the expense of everyone else".

Will an ASEAN Black Swan Event Occur in 2014?

Mainstream talking heads also continue to dismiss how interest rates may affect security prices and the economy. The prevalent belief is that interest rates will remain either perpetually low and that an increase in interest rates will hardly impact on the stock markets.

Even the former value investor Mr. Warren Buffett understands the sine qua non role played interest rates to investments. At CNN Money, in 199 Mr. Buffett wrote[1], (bold mine)

To understand why that happened, we need first to look at one of the two important variables that affect investment results: interest rates. These act on financial valuations the way gravity acts on matter: The higher the rate, the greater the downward pull. That's because the rates of return that investors need from any kind of investment are directly tied to the risk-free rate that they can earn from government securities. So if the government rate rises, the prices of all other investments must adjust downward, to a level that brings their expected rates of return into line. Conversely, if government interest rates fall, the move pushes the prices of all other investments upward. The basic proposition is this: What an investor should pay today for a dollar to be received tomorrow can only be determined by first looking at the risk-free interest rate.

Consequently, every time the risk-free rate moves by one basis point--by 0.01%--the value of every investment in the country changes. People can see this easily in the case of bonds, whose value is normally affected only by interest rates. In the case of equities or real estate or farms or whatever, other very important variables are almost always at work, and that means the effect of interest rate changes is usually obscured. Nonetheless, the effect--like the invisible pull of gravity--is constantly there.

Mr Buffett goes on to cite 1964-1981 where rising interest rates depressed investments, and reversed from 1981 onwards.

As I previously pointed out Discounted Cash Flow analysis of any investments are heavily interest rate sensitive[2] and so as with the debt and interest payments affecting these. 

Last week the Philippine government raised $ 1.5 billion at record low rates via the global markets[3]. Indonesia, despite the financial market pressures equally raised $4 billion but at much higher rates[4]. Indonesia’s foray into the global debt market has been part of the record Rp 357.96 trillion ($29.2 billion) the government plans to raise this year. Both Indonesian and Philippine bonds were reportedly oversubscribed.

Bizarrely, yields across the Philippine treasury curve jumped significantly higher after the successful bond offering.

Stunningly yields of short term one month (upper left) and six month (upper right) treasuries soared by about (TWO HUNDERED) 200 and over (ONE HUNDRED) 100 basis points! Last week’s spike in short term yields has even breached past June levels!

Meanwhile yields of long term 10 year (lower left) and 25 year bonds (lower right) rose by much less but still has risen significantly to reach the June levels.

To me, this raises many questions. Why hasn’t the bullishness of foreigners spilled over to the largely closed Philippine sovereign bond markets which had been in tight control by the banking and government? Could this be that some major local financial institutions appear to be feeling the heat from the recent market pressures? Which institutions may have been affected by the recent spurt of yields? Will the damage be contained?

And…will this be like June a knee jerk reaction or will this represent a new trend? Or will last week’s action serve as portent to the culmination of the convergence trade[5]—the grotesque mispricing of domestic bond markets that has underpinned the current bubble?

If last week’s trend persists then we will see a flattening of the yield curve, which means lesser motives for banks to lend.

Philippine treasuries remained as the only financial markets unscathed by the recent strains; apparently, not anymore.

Getting to be a lot interesting, no?

Unlike the Philippines, Indonesia’s $ 4 billion bond sales did push 10 year local currency bond yields down by about 16 basis points over the last few days.

But all three ASEAN majors, has seen rising yields be it Thailand and Malaysia or even Singapore (down by about 26 basis points from August 2013 highs) and the South Korean counterparts (also down by 12 bps from August 2013 highs)

ASEAN currencies continue to exhibit sustained signs of deterioration. While the USD-Indonesian rupiah (upper left) had an interim late week decline perhaps due to the dollar bond sale, the weak rupiah vis-à-vis the USD remains at a one year high.

Meanwhile, US Dollar continues to strengthen relative to the Thailand baht (upper right) and the Philippines peso (lower left). The US dollar has already broken beyond the September in terms of the rupiah and the baht. The US dollar is also at the verge of a breakout against the peso from the September levels.

The USD-Malaysian ringgit has also staged a weekly decline, nonetheless general trend remains in favor of the USD. The same holds true for the USD-Singapore Dollar but not the USD-South Korean won which has been rallying through the year.

In sum, currency conditions of most ASEAN majors have likewise been exhibiting symptoms of sustained market stress.

This chart by the Philippine Phisix and Thailand’s SET continues to fascinate me. The reason is that both seem as a mirror image of the other. I thought last week that the correlation might break since the SET greeted the New Year or the first day of the year with a 5.23% quasi-crash while the Phisix continued to struggle her way up.

But I guess following this week’s performance, where the Phisix has once again revealed signs of weakness, these two benchmarks may re-converge soon.

Among ASEAN majors it has been Malaysian stocks as measured by the KLCI that have remained defiant of the regional weakness as the KLCI continue to drift at near record highs. Although Indonesian and Singaporean stocks as measured by JCI and STI respectively has regained some grounds they largely remain in doldrums. Meanwhile despite the rising won, the South Korean KOSPI has been sharply deteriorating over the last month.

Whether ASEAN’s market strains are being induced by the Fed’s tapering or not, or from the recent tremors in China’s bond and stock markets or from domestic politics, rising interest rates will put ASEAN’s debt conditions under the spotlight.

And it’s not just bonds, currencies and the stocks. ASEAN’s credit worthiness has been under scrutiny, as measured by Credit Default Swaps (CDS) where the probability of default has been on the rise.

As a recent Bloomberg report puts it last Wednesday, “cost of insuring Malaysia’s sovereign debt climbed to a two-month high” while for “Thailand, the contracts climbed to a four-month high and in the Philippines they reached a level not seen since October.”[6]

Will I recommend buying Philippine or ASEAN stocks under current environment? Generally no but with a possible conditionality based exception: the mining industry.

As for the general markets, I will recommend refraining from catching falling knives and heed the sage of Omaha, Mr. Warren Buffett’s judicious advice, “if the government rate rises, the prices of all other investments must adjust downward, to a level that brings their expected rates of return into line.”

[update: I adjusted for the font size]

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[1] Warren Buffett Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market The most celebrated of investors says stocks can't possibly meet the public's expectations. CNN Money November 22, 1999

[2] See Phisix: BSP’s Tetangco Catches Taper Talk Fever July 29, 2013

[3] Wall Street Journal Philippines Raises $1.5 Billion Via Global Bond January 5, 2014

[4] Jakarta Globe Indonesia Sells $4 Billion of Global Bonds for Dollar Supply, January 8, 2014

[5] See Phisix: The Convergence Trade in the Eyes of a Prospective Foreign Investor November 11, 2013

[6] Bloomberg.com Malaysia Default Risk at 2-Month High on China Slowdown Concern January 8, 2014