Monday, November 17, 2014

Phisix: Will Kuroda’s QE 2.0 Trigger a Global Financial Market Earthquake?

It is a sobering fact that the prominence of central banks in this century has coincided with a general tendency towards more inflation, not less. [I]f the overriding objective is price stability, we did better with the nineteenth-century gold standard and passive central banks, with currency boards, or even with 'free banking.' The truly unique power of a central bank, after all, is the power to create money, and ultimately the power to create is the power to destroy. -- Paul Volcker former Federal Reserve chairman

In this issue

Phisix: Will Kuroda’s QE 2.0 Trigger a Global Financial Market Earthquake?
-Kuroda’s QE 2.0: The Nikkei’s Historical Compass
-BoJ Kuroda’s QE 2.0: Boost Return of Equity or Wealth Inequality?
-Abenomics: Mounting Political Pressures from Hope Based Policies
-Will Kuroda’s QE 2.0 Trigger a Global Financial Market Earthquake?
-Philippine Peso Vulnerable to the USD Yen Reversal!
-Chinese Government Intends to Replace Property Bubble with a Stock Market Bubble!
-Phisix: Signs of a Top: Success Stories based on Misperceptions?

Phisix: Will Kuroda’s QE 2.0 Trigger a Global Financial Market Earthquake?

When Bank of Japan Governor’s Haruhiko Kuroda shot the first monetary arrow of Abenomics[1] in April 2013 with the announcement of the doubling of Japan’s monetary base, I warned that this would trigger a global financial earthquake[2].

In a month’s period, tremors jolted global financial markets which found its trigger when former US Federal Reserve chief Ben Bernanke floated the trial balloon to taper QE 3.0.

Kuroda’s QE 2.0: The Nikkei’s Historical Compass

History is likely to function as a compass or a roadmap to the future.


First the fabulous mini boom bust cycle.

When the BoJ unleashed QE 1.0, the Japan’s equity benchmark, the Nikkei 225, skyrocketed to a breathtaking 30.18% ramp to its peak in a span of only about a month and a half. (chart from Yahoo Finance).

Unfortunately the BoJ’s honeymoon came to an abrupt halt when the Taper tantrum jarred global financial markets. The Nikkei crashed faster than its boom to stumble 20.36% into the doorsteps of the bear market in only about 3 weeks. From early April to the troughs of mid-June the fantastic roundtrip netted the Nikkei only 3.7% in nominal terms.

Next, the effect of BoJ’s QE 1.0 on Japan’s stock market.

Because the consensus thinks mostly in terms of ticker tape actions, many bear the impression that Japan’s QE benefited the real economy via the stock markets. Hardly has there been any questions on why the need for QE 2.0 if indeed the QE 1.0 delivered its targets.

Following the June 2013 nadir, the Nikkei found itself in sporadic volatility which eventually favored the bulls. By December 2013, the Japanese benchmark crept back to regain its previous high plus a premium to reward stock market participants with 35.72% returns at its climax from the onset of QE 1.0.

Yet the culmination of the Nikkei coincided with the pinnacle of JGB purchases by the BoJ which was also reflected on the deceleration of money supply growth. When money supply turned down, the Nikkei’s glory likewise faded.

So for most of 2014 the Nikkei found itself rangebound where much of the support on the stock markets came from rumors and expectations of more BoJ bailout as stream of economic data revealed more and more weaknesses.

This of course is aside from direct interventions from the BoJ (which has set record levels of stock market buying as of August[3]) and where traders say that the BoJ has an informal 1% rule—the BoJ intervenes each time domestic stocks fall by 1% or more[4].

The reemergence of the risk OFF last October 2014 weighed again on the Nikkei. This has prompted the BoJ to launch its version of “shock and awe”— ¥80 trillion yen of JGB purchases plus ¥ 3 trillion to support the stock market via ETFs and the real estate REITs complimented by Japan’s pension fund the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) rebalancing of its portfolio in favor of stocks intended to accommodate PM Abe’s importunes.

From the commencement of QE 1.0 until the fleeting risk OFF October 2014 lows, the Nikkei has returned a paltry nominal one year and 6 month return of 12.11% or 8.07% per annum for domestic participants. If Japan’s statistical inflation rate averaged at 2% over the same period then real returns would have been at 6%.

The yen lost 10.34% against the US dollar during the same time frame. This means that for unhedged exposure by foreign participants, losses from the yen exceeded gains from the Nikkei, where unhedged position on the Nikkei would have translated to a 2.3% loss.

As one would note, impressions are not as they seem.

BoJ Kuroda’s QE 2.0: Boost Return of Equity or Wealth Inequality?

One of the expressed purposes of Abenomics has been to increase rewards to shareholders by improving Japan’s relatively low return on equity via an improvement in corporate governance code (aside from the monetary pump). Japan’s ROE has reportedly been lagging global peers for years which has been about half the global average says a Bloomberg report[5].

So for the Japanese government, manipulation of the markets aside from imposing superficial rules will improve returns.

How has such measures fared? So far from April to half of September, stock market buybacks according to Nikkei Asia[6] have “reached the highest level in six years, as many businesses work to step up investor rewards and return on equity”. 

So instead of investing in business opportunities to generate organic returns and improve real fundamentals, Japanese corporations have been depleting on their cash reserves or acquiring debt or in essence eroding their balance sheets in order to gain supposedly improved return on equity TODAY. Forget tomorrow. Anyway in the long run, according to the political faithful, we are all dead.

Japanese firms have likewise attained record earnings over the same period…but but but only for the 1%!!! Again from the Nikkei Asia[7] (bold): Amid fears that the economy might struggle after the April 1 consumption tax hike, the nation's publicly traded companies as a whole reported double-digit earnings growth for the April-September half, although only a handful of export-oriented winners were a driving force…But a closer look reveals a widening disparity between winners and losers. The top 10 companies reporting the largest profit gains raked in a huge portion of the country's corporate profit growth. SoftBank, Toyota, Nissan, Hitachi and six others together booked a combined gain of 1.1 trillion yen, suggesting that just 1% of companies generated around 80% of all profit increases for the half.


Add to this I pointed out previously that the equity share of financial assets of Japanese households have been at about 9.1% as of June 2014. 


Numbers can be deceiving. This doesn’t mean all households have equity exposure. This doesn’t also mean that 9% share has been equally distributed to the households. That’s the problem with statistical aggregates: they impress upon public the idea of a one-size–fits-all dimension.

Based on Tokyo Stock Exchange’s 2012 Fact Book[8], individual investors account for only 20.3% in 2011. Since 1999, the share of individual shareholdings has been in the range of a low of 18% to a high of 21.3%. In short, current boom bust cycle will unlikely boost significantly domestic exposure on the stock market. The above numbers squares with Japan Security Dealers Association (JSDA), which has updated figures as of 2012[9]. (Note: I chose the TSE table for its historical perspective.)

Yet the segment with the biggest stock market exposure has been the financial sector, business corporations and most importantly foreign funds which has reached record highs as of April 2014 (right window). Yet not all 20% of the individuals have the same breadth of exposure. The likely distribution is weighted towards the wealthy or those whom has high income.

So essentially when the Japanese government throws money in support of the stocks, they are inflating the assets of the 20% of mostly moneyed individuals, who are likely to be part of the financial sector or business corporations coming at the expense of (or charged to) the yen holders and the 80% who are not involved in the stock markets.

And this is why despite all the arrows thrown, the picking of winners—20% individuals, finance industry, business and foreign stock market participants and the 1% corporations (who commands 80% of the record profits)—has led to an economic spasm: household spending and industrial production has recently collapsed.

The other form of redistribution is through foreigners which is why PM Abe gets high rating in the international financial world. Foreigners are benefiting from the miseries of the average Japanese. Isn’t inflationism beggar thy neighbor?

Abenomics: Mounting Political Pressures from Hope Based Policies

Destabilization of the market price mechanism from government’s massive monetary infusions and from various interventions will hardly help improve fundamentals. Why? Because such distortions undermine the entrepreneur’s economic calculation process from which leads to economic dis-coordination or misallocation of resources.[10] The subsequent or secondary outcome of which has been to consume capital.

Think of it; if price volatility will prompt the average entrepreneur to overestimate on profits or underestimate on costs, the most likely result in the deployment of resources based on such expectations will be losses.

Yet inflationism has never been a standalone policy, problems created by failed interventions will beget more demand for interventions. So QE 1.0 leads to QE 2.0 and then more… Even in the US where QE 3.0 had been technically phased out (except for the rollovers of debt acquired from the previous program), reemergence of turbulence last October has prompted some monetary policymakers to float the idea of delaying the end of QE. This goes to show anytime that turbulence will surface, the mechanical crisis resolution mechanism will be put in place—throw central bank money at the problem.

And assorted interventions will come in the many facets of the economic sphere: taxes are just part of them. So Abe’s dangling of corporate tax cuts will be symbolical as this will replaced by other taxes (presently sales tax)

Yet current interventions will pile up on the web of functionary regulations; Japan’s Tea Party founder Marc Abela gives a clue on Japan’s tax and regulatory regime[11]: The rate is 50 percent for inheritance and death taxes; corporate taxes hit 40 percent very rapidly for almost all businesses; any decent individual income will put you in the 40 percent bracket; and then you have municipal taxes, prefectural taxes, property, vehicle, liquor, tobacco, gasoline, and others taxes. The list is nearly endless. Numerous and cumbersome government regulations prevent new entries to industry and being able to compete with the archaic corporate mammoths known as “zaibatsu” (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and a few others) who control and own most of the industries, and make changes at a glacial pace. In fact, since government regulations are so exceedingly high, it can be argued that most businesses and most industries are defacto “nationalized” and behave like state-owned enterprises.

This shows that for as long as Japan’s political economic structure will sustain its current arrangement in support of “zombie banks”—unhealthy financial institutions laden with Nonperforming Loans[12]—and “zombie companies”—outdated industrial companies[13] where both have been secured by the interlocking corporate structures known as “Keiretsu”, which has worked to protect their interests from competition through political influence, there will unlikely be substantial fundamental improvements.

Thus the Japanese government’s contingent recourse for desperate solutions such as QE 2.0, which I noted in the past, represents the “Hail Mary Pass” or relying on HOPE as the only remaining strategy for the Japan’s pressured officials.

Another sign of hope which investors use as an excuse to push up stocks of late has been the reported delay on the tax hike as the Abe regime will gamble to shore up political capital by calling for snap elections.

A caption from this Bloomberg article captures Japan PM Abe’s conundrum[14]: While Abe’s support has slipped in recent weeks, the dip hasn’t lifted the opposition and opinion polls indicate his ruling coalition would return to power in a new vote. With the economy struggling to gain momentum and the government considering unpopular measures to contain the world’s biggest debt burden, Abe may be seeking to strike before his support softens further.

The BoJ’s QE 2.0 has been passed by a SPLIT (5-4) decision. This means that the impact from the capsizing yen will further destabilize mostly small companies and the households. This is certainly going to cost him popularity.

Adding insult to injury will be to compound consumer burdens with an increase in sales tax from 8% to 10%. Even if the sales tax hikes will be deferred, the price volatility from the falling yen will be enough to injure the said groups.

So PM Abe thinks that a December snap election may win him the reprieve to enforce his measures. So this trial balloon snap election gambit must have been based on overconfidence, but what if he overestimates his chances?

Yet even if he wins what are the chances where a surge in unpopularity will costs him his eventual ouster and be replaced by a new leadership who may overturn current policies?

Will Kuroda’s QE 2.0 Trigger a Global Financial Market Earthquake?

Will events following QE 1.0 rhyme?

Since the bottom of mid-October, the Nikkei has been furiously on the rise. The Japanese benchmark has soared for four consecutive weeks which has racked up a magnificent 20.35% in advances. The Nikkei’s ascent has been almost vertical echoing 2013.

As noted above, after the initial announcement of QE 1.0 in April 2013, the Nikkei rocketed by 30.18% in 1 and a half months.

In today’s context, Japanese stocks have surged even prior to the BoJ’s actions, as the markets heavily anticipated the GPIFs fund reallocation if not also the BoJ’s interventions. The difference is that scale of the BoJ intervention surprised the markets which electrified the upside spurt.

The upsurge in the Nikkei came along with a crashing yen, both of which have been symptoms of monetary inflationism or effects from the anticipation of the BoJ’s implementation of asset purchases.


The baptism of fire of the Nikkei during the BoJ’s QE 1.0 in 2013 resulted to a 6.2% surge in USD-yen (see top chart from yahoo) from the QE 1.0 originating reference point. Yet the ensuing Taper tantrum almost erased the entire advances from the USD-yen which had been similar to the fate of the Nikkei.

And along with the Nikkei, the USD-yen peaked at 8.7% vis-à-vis QE 1.0 during December 2013.

In the latest October risk OFF the USD-yen went to a low of 106.41 which still commanded a premium of 10.34%.

During the latest risk ON moment, which has been accentuated by the BoJ-GPIF interventions, the Nikkei’s spectacular 20.35% flight comes along with an even more sensational USD-yen spike of 8.8% from the lows of October.

This shows that the USD-yen has outperformed the 2013 version while the Nikkei has underperformed the currency counterpart so far.

I am not here to suggest that history will repeat exactly, as it won’t. Nonetheless unless the BoJ will continue to add to the current panoply of stimulus, given the truism that NO trend goes in a straight line, I suspect that sometime soon the soaring USD-yen will hit a wall.

And since the USD-yen’s ferocious climb has been nearly parabolic, I expect the roundtrip to be as steep as the predecessor. This also suggests that if the USD-yen reverses so will the Nikkei—sharply to the downside.

In short, history suggests that Japan’s financial markets will experience another (mini) boom bust cycle. As for how this will be triggered is beyond me. Will this be due to domestic politics? Will it be from a relapse in European or US stock markets? Will there be a contagion from a possible collapse in the emerging market oil producing economies or markets? Will it be volatility from China? Will it be from military skirmishes between Russia and NATO? Or will it be a meltdown from extremely overbought conditions premised on the excuse of poor economic data—say a recession?

It is also unclear how the internally based meltdown will impact global markets. Will it be confined or isolated? (I doubt) Or will there be a domino effect based on soured yen carry trades?

If the origins of the trigger emanates from external forces, what would be the depth and scale of contagion to Japan’s Nikkei or to other markets as the Philippines?

Will there be another post-crash recovery as with June 2013? Or will the USD yen roundtrip serve as the final nail to the coffin to the booming risk assets?

Philippine Peso Vulnerable to the USD Yen Reversal!

I also noted that the collapsing yen previously percolated to ASEAN currencies overtime[15]

History gives us a clue.

Applied to the Philippines, the peso (see lower window, chart from yahoo) weakness emerged a month after the BoJ’s QE 1.0. 

The taper tantrum hallmarked by the reversal of the USD-yen sent the US dollar-Php 9.4% up.

The peso showed signs of recovery in September but faltered anew after a month. The USD-php rose to its highest point in January 2014. The USD-php fell again as risk ON prevailed from January to September. The peso’s 2014 rally came to an end as the US dollar soared.

The plight of the Philippine currency has both domestic and international component; internally, because of the ballooning credit and inflating stock market and property bubbles, and externally because of “short dollar” or foreign debt exposures.

If the past were to rhyme, a risk OFF moment based on the reversal of the USD-yen would send the USD-peso to 47+. Should this come true, many listed firms with huge foreign debt exposure will agonize. In addition, requiring more peso to acquire foreign goods will imply inflation pressure.

This won’t be an isolated dilemma as this would be shared by most of Asia.

I know Philippine exports have been strong during the last 5 months. Nominally speaking September exports have been at record highs.

Exports, as well as, the domestic inflation data has been a curiosity for me. Where exactly has the Philippine exporters and the domestic supply side been getting their products to sell? Import growth has been sluggish. Industrial production growth has been on a steady decline for 5 months and significantly lower this year compared to 2013 which seem to reflect on the investment decline as shown by the 2Q 2014 GDP[16]. Has there been much surpluses on inventory to draw from? (If so why the recent spike in inflation which the BSP says has been a supply side problem even when contrastingly they applied monetary and bank balance sheet therapies?) Has supplies been falling from heaven? Or has government statistics been vastly underreporting imports (due to rampant smuggling?) or industrial production (due to the rise of informal economy?)?

Another interest development has been the strength of exports in the face of the BSP chief’s declaration that the Philippine economy “must boost domestic consumption and end its dependence on exports”, thus implementing aggregate demand bubble blowing policies[17]

So will the BSP chief change his tune?


And even more interesting has been that while overall banking loans for September remains vigorous, banking loan growth to the real estate and construction industry has substantially decelerated in September[18] (see left window). Have these sectors been tapping overseas financing or have they been masking loan availments through other loan categories (say intercompany loans ala China)? Has BSP regulations began to bite? Or has there been an emergent slowdown on these sectors?

Manufacturing loans have likewise slowed. Why? Have these been manifestations of slowing investments or even consumption? If export demand continues to swell, where will exporters get products to ship overseas?

Will these get reflected on 3Q GDP which will be released on the last week of November?

Nonetheless the emerging slack in the real estate and construction industry loans have been offset by sharp gains in financial intermediation (borrowing to pump up stocks?), and the hotel (more casino loans?).

And given the increasing signs of lackluster economic performance of Japan, Euro, China, many emerging markets, it’s hard to see sustained increase in domestic export growth.

While world trade has been at near record highs, signs of developing slack can be seen in year on year and quarter on quarter changes in world trade as of August based on Netherland’s CPB data[19].

At the end of the day, domestic bubbles aside from external developments—such as the coming unwinding of the USD-yen makes the peso and Philippine financial assets vulnerable.

Chinese Government Intends to Replace Property Bubble with a Stock Market Bubble!

The Chinese government appears to be desperately attempting to pump up a stock market bubble in order to camouflage her economic infirmities

The Chinese government has launched “targeted easing” last June, has resorted to selective bailouts of firms which almost defaulted last July, imposed price controls on stock market IPOs last August, injected $125 billion over the last two months and announced the schedule of the Hong Kong-Shanghai stock market link on November 17, 2014[20]

The Chinese government has ensured that foreign flow of money from Hong Kong to China will run smoothly by scrapping the yuan conversion limit[21].

Theoretically I am in FAVOR of cross listings. That’s because this allows savings to finance investments regardless of state defined boundaries, or simply, cross listings connects capital with economic opportunities around the world channeled through the stock markets.

But in today’s world where central banks across the globe has been distorting capital markets, cross listings has become conduits of bubbles. Therefore I am suspicious of the timing of the Hong Kong-Shanghai connect or liberalization.

For instance, China’s liberalization has whipped up a frenzy for US fund managers to register Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in order to tap China’s $9 trillion stock and bond markets[22]. So the highly leveraged stretch for yields phenomenon by US financial institutions may target Chinese assets for an asset pump. This will only compound on China’s massive malinvestments manifested through a deflating property bubble financed by excess leverage.

And even worse, when bubbles blow up, liberalization becomes a convenient excuse or scapegoat for anti-market forces.

The Shanghai index soared by 2.51% this week, has returned 17.15% for the year, and trades at three year highs.

This comes as Chinese economy continues to exhibit a substantial downdraft.


As the Zero hedge notes (bold original)[23]: Fixed Asset Investment (lowest growth since Dec 2001) and Retail Sales (lowest growth since Feb 2006) missed expectations, but it was the re-slump in Industrial Production (after a small 'huge-credit-injection-driven' bounce in September) that is most worrisome as China's 2014 output is growing at its slowest since at least 2005.

Add to this the sharp decline in credit growth, as the Financial Times reported[24]: Local-currency bank loans increased by Rmb548bn ($89bn) in October from the previous month, the third-lowest monthly rise since 2012… Meanwhile, trust loans and bank acceptance bills, forms of off-balance-sheet credit associated with shadow banking, both fell for the fourth consecutive month. A series of regulations released earlier this year aimed at curbing shadow-bank activity has sharply curtailed the practice, bankers say…Total credit growth is now down Rmb1.24tn through the first 10 months of the year compared with the same period in 2013, according to central bank data.

As one would note misperceptions govern the markets—financial markets has departed from fundamentals where traditional concept of assessing markets have really gone awry.

And part of the Chinese government’s selective bailout on the economy has been to use State Owned Enterprises to take on the slack abandoned by private developers, take for instance current developments in Guangzhou, where “China's state-backed developers are making unprecedented investments in Guangzhou, as the private firms that have dominated the wealthy southern city for decades grapple with tight liquidity and Beijing's corruption crackdown. The waning fortunes of the "Guangzhou Five Tigers" - the city's big private developers - are giving state-owned enterprises the chance to muscle in on one of China's most prestigious property markets for the first time.”[25]

So the Chinese government will continue to build on inventories funded by debt, even when there have already been massive oversupplies.

Again the Chinese government validates my theory of the politics of monetary easing policies: I recognize the problem of addiction but a withdrawal syndrome would even be more cataclysmic.

Going back to pumping the market with the lure of foreign money flows, Saudi Arabia’s government did the same technique—they announced the liberalization of their stock markets last July—except that this will be implemented in 2015. Unfortunately the one month plus boom made a fascinating roundtrip—every gain from the stock market ramp has been surrendered.

The lesson here is that replacing property bubbles with a stock market bubble signify as two wrongs that won’t make things right.

Phisix: Signs of a Top: Success Stories based on Misperceptions?

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It’s a sign of a market top when tycoons give their success story based on seeming misperceptions

Here’s the recipe on how to succeed in Asia's fast-growing markets from revered San Miguel chief

From Nikkei Asia[26]:
First, maximize the "power of business intelligence." Companies need to know how to "mine the right data." They also need to consult and hire local experts.

Second, "choose the right partner." Ang stressed the value of finding a local ally that has "a good track record" and is "transparent, bold and socially responsible."

Third, "invest in building goodwill." In the Philippines in particular, Ang said, "relationships mean a lot." Know who your "key stakeholders" are and make the effort to connect with them.

Fourth, "learn how to adjust" to new markets and find the proper balance between quality and price.

Finally, "take calculated risks."
I am in total agreement with all of the above, but they seem more theoretical than actually applied by SMC.

But let me add to the real trade secret of SMC which has been unstated by the venerable chieftain: Be a political entrepreneur, and most importantly don’t forget to borrow tons and tons of money.

Next the august SM’s Teresita Sy-Coson on the same topic…

From Nikkei Asia[27]
Boosted by $25 billion in remittances from Filipino expats and a million mostly young people employed in the business process outsourcing sector, the Southeast Asian nation managed to grow 7.2% last year. That was the second-fastest rate in the region after China. In the last four years, growth has exceeded 6%; gross domestic product per capita is nearing $3,000.

The average Filipino household income is on the rise, driven by the steady growth of the business process outsourcing industry and overseas workers' remittances," Sy-Coson said. "These have led to the growth in the consumer and property sectors."

Sy-Coson noted that there is strong demand for housing in the Philippines -- in fact, a housing shortage -- and said that "with a low-interest environment, many Filipinos are able to purchase property."
I understand that the esteemed Ms. Sy-Coson employs lots of economists in her firms. They should inform her that based on government numbers, BPOs and remittances are only about 20% of the economy. The next question is where does the 80% of income growth come from? Let me give Ms. Sy a hint, her companies have been part of the 80%. 

Next question is how has the growth by the 80% been financed? Well the same advices she gives on consumer property purchases: by credit.

I love those descriptions: housing shortages, low interest rates and able to purchase property. But there is one very significant and elementary thing that has been missing: prices.

How do prices affect demand and supply under low interest rates? How has credit affected the demand-supply balance of properties as expressed through prices? What happens if property prices rise faster than income growth? Will it increase or decrease demand or will shortages come from supply or demand?

Somebody previously whispered the answer to the BSP chief who recently said[28]:
While we have not seen broad-based asset mis-valuations, the BSP remains cognizant that keeping rates low for too long could result in mis-appreciation of risks in certain segments of the market, including the real estate sector and the stock market as markets search for yield.
The next question: how sustainable is a low interest rate regime? Did the Philippines not experience a surge of inflation of late?

How has inflation impacted interest rates? And how has interest rates affected the financial system?

Here’s a clue from the BSP which reported a ‘solid performance’ in the financial system[29]…(bold mine)
Net profit stood at P63.7 billion though affected by moderate upward movement of domestic interest rates which resulted in revaluation and mark-to-market losses in banks’ trading books.
That’s yet for a small increase in rates.

Finally, Housing shortages? One bullish international property company, Global Property Guide (GPG), admitted that the Philippines have “ghost cities” in the mid-tier markets[30] a segment which her companies cater to. The last time I checked the GPG haven’t changed their story. 

Who may have been misreading the housing markets?


[1] Incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic program popularly known as ‘Abenomics’ has been anchored on three arrows which aside from the monetary aspect includes fiscal stimulus and structural reforms







[8] Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book 2012 p .90 TSE.or.jp

[9] Japan Security Dealers Association Fact Book 2013 JSDA.or.jp


[11] Marc Abela Austrian Economics and Interventionism in Japan Mises.org January 3, 2014







[18] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Bank Lending Expands in September October 31, 2014

[19] CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis CPB World Trade Monitor August 2014 October 24, 2014





[24] Financial Times China credit growth slows as regulatory curbs bite November 14, 2014





[29] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Philippine Financial System Registers Solid Performance in H12014 November 4, 2014

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