Showing posts with label JGB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JGB. Show all posts

Saturday, March 26, 2016

Bloomberg Warns: Japan's Bond Market Is Close to Breaking Point

It's a curiosity to see some of mainstream media, whom were once cheerleaders for Abenomics, panic over growing dislocations at the JGB market.

While stocks have been surging, the Bloomberg recently warned on growing signs of instability in Japan's government debt (JGB) bubble: (bold mine)
Signs of stress are multiplying in Japan’s government bond market, which is crumbling under pressure from the central bank’s unprecedented asset-purchase program and negative interest rates.

Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda has repeatedly said his policies are having the desired effect on markets, including suppressing JGB yields. His success is driving frenzied demand for longer-dated notes as investors avoid the negative yields offered on maturities up to 10 years. And as buyers hang on to debt offering interest returns, the BOJ is finding it harder to press on with bond purchases of as much as 12 trillion yen ($106 billion) a month, sparking sudden price swings leading to yield curve inversions that have nothing to do with economic fundamentals.

“We hold a lot, and we’re not selling,” said Yoshiyuki Suzuki, the head of fixed income in Tokyo at Fukoku Mutual Life Insurance, which has $59 billion in assets. “We can get interest income. If we sell, there are no good alternatives.” The following charts show signs of stress in the market:

Yields on 40-year JGBs dipped below those on 30-year securities Tuesday, and a BOJ operation to buy long-term notes last week met the lowest investor participation on record. Bond market functionality has deteriorated, with 41 percent of respondents last month rating it as “low,” the highest proportion since the BOJ began the quarterly survey more than a year ago.

“It wouldn’t be surprising to see some BOJ operations fail,” said Yusuke Ikawa, a salesperson at UBS Group AG’s Knowledge Network in Tokyo. “The biggest risk of that is in superlong bonds.”

A dearth of liquidity has driven a measure of bond-market fluctuations to levels unseen since 1999.

“The market has gone from having extremely high liquidity previously, to the point where trading by investors can easily show up as volatility in yields,” said Tatsuya Higuchi, chief fund manager in the fixed income investment division at Mitsubishi UFJ Kokusai Asset Management Co. “There is a negative side to the BOJ’s bond buying.”

Demand for JGBs has increased so much since the start of negative-rate policy that it’s flipped the market for repurchase agreements on its head: Dealers who in normal circumstances would pay to borrow overnight cash in the repo market -- offering debt as surety of repayment -- are instead willing to pay to get access to the collateral.

Distortions in the market are poised to become even more pronounced, with almost 90 percent of analysts in Bloomberg’s most-recent survey predicting additional stimulus by the end of July.

The BOJ has already cornered close to a third of the JGB market, more than any other class of investor. That proportion will grow as asset purchases continue -- even without an expansion of easing.

The central bank is also buying negative-yielding bonds in the market, which has an overwhelming majority of the world’s sub-zero debt. The benchmark 10-year JGB yielded minus 0.09 percent on Thursday, after plunging to a record low of minus 0.135 percent on March 18. Positive yields on 40- and 30-year debt jumped about 10 basis points after the BOJ reduced the size of an operation to buy long-term bonds.

The market disruptions raise concerns that the BOJ is nearing the limits of its stimulus, even as Kuroda has said the central bank can do more. There are also questions over whether, if the central bank is forced to exit prematurely, the market can withstand the potential shock.

“How can the BOJ head for the exit?” Dan Fuss, vice chairman of Loomis Sayles & Co., said at an event in Tokyo last week. “If they open the exit door, there’s a fire on the other side.”
Truly awesome developments!!!
 
Typical political actions have been designed to address short term issues while disregarding long term consequences, so the mainstream only discovers now that "there is a negative side to the BoJ's buying". Duh!


The mainstream is surprised to see people's different or opposite reactions from desperate government policies.

Of course, there is practically no limit to the BoJ's or any central bankers to employ 'stimulus'. If JGBs run out, then the BoJ's buying can spread to directly own equities (rather than just ETFs), corporate bonds, properties (home commercial) or even Ketchup (discussed here)! 

The BoJ can embrace Wall Street Journal's recommendation to "buy oil"

They can even use the nuclear option, instead of helicopter money, they can borrow US B-52s bombers to drop yen from the sky! But since cash will be disallowed, then the BoJ can send yen via postal mail (if no bank accounts) or credit every individual's bank accounts. In essence, the BoJ can create the yen at will!

It is not what the BoJ can do, but the effects of their actions that truly matters. 

In the economic spectrum, despite the deepening use of magic from monetarism, Japan has had FIVE recessions in the last SEVEN years

But for Japan's politicians, the real economy seems not the real concern. The BoJ appears to prioritize the financial markets, specifically, the JGB market and the stock market. And that's because they realize that once the 'animal spirits' dissipate, the government's access to credit will become hard to come by. 

And to consider Japan's debt position (as per 2016 budget) where about 25% of total budget is allocated for debt service and that debt service accounts for 41% of tax revenues--the loss of animal spirits will most likely translate to a debt-currency crisis!

So the BoJ wants to own most of the JGBs to prevent any volatility from overindebtedness. But in doing so, their actions have incited the current upsurge in volatility.

In the political spectrum, the BoJ's increasing ownership of the factors of production simply means nationalization of assets or increased embrace of or the slippery slope to socialism.

In the financial markets, the ongoing dislocations at the JGBs have spilled over to corporate bonds where default risks premiums have been surging as previously discussed here

The untoward effects from interventions only begets more interventions that leads to more unintended and increasingly more complicated consequences. And the mainstream gets surprised for unexpected outcomes.

Understand that these are not just technical issues, rather these are technical dynamics in reaction to the political response on Japan's structural political-economic problems. 

And rising stocks won't be able to conceal what has been going on (or the erosion of economic-financial foundations) for long. 

And if Japan's fixed income market unravels, global financial markets will suffer from a contagion.
 


Thursday, March 10, 2016

Boomeranging BoJ’s NIRP: JGB Circuit Breaker, Corporate Bonds and Bank Lending Slows as Cash Hoarding Accelerates!

In this terse post, I’d like to only discuss two things: one, the immediate unintended side effects of the Bank of Japan's (BoJ) NIRP, and second, the growing political divide over the imposition of NIRP.

Yields of Japan’s Government Bonds (JGB) shockingly collapsed yesterday to have forced the government to implement a circuit breaker or the suspension of trading activities for JGBs.


From Bloomberg:
Trading of Japan’s government bond futures for delivery this month was halted for less than a minute after the price of the contracts dropped as much as 0.6 percent.

The so-called dynamic circuit breaker started at 12:32 p.m. in Tokyo and only applied to March contracts for about 30 seconds Wednesday, according to Masaki Takahashi, who works in the market management department at the Osaka Securities Exchange.

The underlying benchmark 10-year bond tumbled Wednesday, pushing yields up eight basis points to minus 0.015 percent as of 2:51 p.m., according to Japan Bond Trading Co., the nation’s largest inter-dealer debt broker. Yields rebounded after dropping more than five basis points to a record minus 0.1 percent Tuesday.

Wednesday’s slide was partly driven by the results of the Bank of Japan’s bond buying operation, according to Takenobu Nakashima, a quantitative strategist at Nomura Securities Co. in Tokyo. Its bid-to-cover ratio for debt with 10 to 20 years to maturity rose to 3.58 from 2.93 last week, indicating stronger investor demand to sell.
It is important to highlight that with the BOJ holding 34% of the JGB market as of January 2016, shrinking market liquidity PLUS NIRP has been contributing to the current increase in JGB market volatility


Yields of Japan's 30 year bonds also crashed

Of course, the aim of the BoJ's previous Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP) has been to bolster credit growth.

For the private sector this hasn’t been happening. To the contrary, credit growth has been materially slowing, notes the Japan Macro Advisors: (bold added)

In February 2016, the growth in the total bank lending in Japan slowed slightly to 2.2% year on year, down from 2.4% in January. The bank lending growth seemed to be on a deceleration path, having peaked in August 2015 at 2.7%.  

The sign of a slowdown is even sharper in bank deposits. It has decelerated from the peak of 4.6% in May 2015 to 3.1% in February 2016. The slowdown in deposits growth could be a reflection of a slowdown in the economy. In the quarterly published statistics, we see that the housing loan lending has been slowing since last summer. In the October-December quarter, new housing loans has grown negatively by -6.4% year on year.

With ZIRP being unable to fulfill what it had been designed for, the BoJ has doubled down to merge ZIRP with NIRP.

Unfortunately, stagnation in bank credit growth seems to be the initial outcome, since the NIRP took effect on mid February.

The corporate sector seem to be reluctant to issue bonds. Worst, credit risk has been rising on corporate bonds.


From Nikkei Asia (bold mine)

The Bank of Japan's negative rate policy is beginning to distort the way corporate bond rates are set.

Default risk premiums are rising even though the creditworthiness of issuing companies remain unchanged. This is because many companies prioritize keeping interest rates positive to rope in buyers.

With some companies becoming less willing to issue bonds, some market insiders are wondering if the corporate bond market will shrink

However, the BOJ's negative rate policy has caused JGB yields to significantly decline, affecting corporate bond rates, too. In some cases, total interest rates are negative even if default risk premiums are added, making it difficult to attract buyers.

And more signs of distortions on Japan’s corporate bond market.

Interest rates on logistics company Nippon Express's five-year bonds and on seasoning maker Ajinomoto's seven-year bonds were decided based on an absolute level of interest rates. This method has become the norm when issuing bonds with maturities of less than 10 years now that yields on 10-year JGBs are negative.

That said, there is a problem in adopting an absolute level of interest rates. The corporate bond market's system of assessing a company's creditworthiness based on risk premiums could become dysfunctional

In the secondary market, a strange phenomenon is taking place: The risk premium tends to be larger for corporate bonds with higher creditworthiness. That's because, with JGB yields tumbling, creditworthy companies are forced to set much higher premiums to keep their already-low bond rates positive.

As a result, the spread between premiums on higher-rated issues and lower-rated issues has narrowed, causing "creditworthiness-based yardsticks" to collapse and making it difficult for some investors to manage their portfolios.

More signs of NIRP backfire…credit growth diminishing not only in Japan but also in Europe:

Rising default risk premiums are making some companies less willing to issue bonds. One financial officer of a company listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is worried that an increase in premiums could deteriorate his company's loan terms. Default risk premiums on corporate bonds are an important factor when coming up with borrowing rates. Therefore, higher risk premiums could work to the disadvantage of companies when taking out loans in the future.

Bond issuances are on the decline in Europe, which adopted a negative rate policy ahead of Japan. The amount of corporate bonds issued in 2015 tumbled 20% from 2013, before the negative rate policy was adopted, according to U.S. market research company Dealogic.

With NIRP providing less income for financial services firms, as well as, security for depositors, the initial ramification has been for the both parties to withdraw from the system.

Money market funds, mutual funds and insurance pullback from providing services to consumers.

First money market funds, from another Nikkei Asia report: (bold added)

With negative interest rates making stable returns impossible to achieve, all 11 Japanese asset managers running money market funds plan to close them and return assets to investors, effectively ending a once-flourishing market.

Money market funds invest mainly in short-term instruments such as commercial paper and government debt carrying maturities of less than a year. Though principal is not guaranteed, these investment trusts have been considered safe. Japanese money market funds held 1.37 trillion yen ($12 billion) in assets Friday…

Money market funds were introduced in Japan in May 1992. Retail investors were drawn to their safety and higher returns compared with bank deposits. Total assets in money market funds peaked at 21 trillion yen in May 2000. But their popularity waned after the 2001 collapse of U.S. energy company Enron, which caused the money market funds holding its debt to drop below par value.

Next, mutual funds and insurance.

The impact of negative interest rates is spreading to other financial products. Returns have sunk below 0.02% for money reserve funds, mutual funds similar to money market funds with assets totaling more than 10 trillion yen. Because these funds serve as settlement accounts used in stock and mutual fund trading, returning customers' assets is difficult. Asset management companies can cover losses to keep their value above par but bear the cost of doing so.

Some life insurers are halting sales of products aimed at savers. T&D Financial Life Insurance will suspend sales of some single-premium whole-life policies March 16.

NIRP appears to be on path to destroy Japan’s financial system

Instead of ‘financial inclusion’, Japan financial system could be headed for atavism where unbanked people will swell. And by widening the chasm between savings and investments, the retrogression in Japan’s banking and capital markets will lead to lower standards of living which will likely be highlighted by a massive crisis (which will likely spread elsewhere)

And as the BoJ increases their share of JGBs, it means lesser private sector participation on the JGB market. 

From another Nikkei Asia article:

Because Japanese interest rates keep falling amid the BOJ's incremental monetary easing, foreign pension funds, as well as Japanese banks and pension funds, have been reducing their JGB holdings. This has increased the relative proportion of speculators in the market, making bond yields more susceptible to volatility.

This only means that the price function of JGBs has been rendered materially broken, thus the enhanced volatility. Yet the BoJ hopes to ingest a larger segment JGBs in order inflate away such unsustainable debt levels via the NIRP.

And as noted above, depositors have been withdrawing from the system

From another Nikkei Asia article

Japan's cash in circulation is growing at the fastest rate in 13 years as ripples from the Bank of Japan's negative interest rates push consumers' money out of savings accounts and into safes and other at-home repositories.

Japan had 6.7% more currency in circulation in February than a year earlier, the BOJ reported. That increase is the largest since February 2003, when consumers withdrew cash following changes to Japan's deposit insurance system. Particularly popular now are 10,000-yen ($88.25) bills, with circulating stock surging nearly 7%, the central bank said. The 5,000-yen and 1,000-yen bills have seen upticks of less than 2%.

The consumer shift from banks to home safes

Consumers increasingly find that keeping money in the bank is simply not worth the trouble. Large banks are paying a mere 0.001% interest on deposits -- 10 yen per year for an account holding 1 million yen. ATM fees and other charges would put many savers at a loss.

Instead, many are looking to safes to protect their money at home.

"Safes have really taken off since the negative-rate policy was announced," a worker at a major Tokyo home electronics retailer said. Fireproof models selling for around 50,000 yen are especially popular. Shimachu, a home goods chain based in Saitama Prefecture, reported twice as many safe sales now as a year ago. Commercial security provider Kumahira noted growing interest in safes from businesses as well.

Keeping cash in the home entails a higher risk of burglary. Sohgo Security Services said that requests for information on home security systems have risen 10-20% since the BOJ's negative interest rates took effect in mid-February, though the company admitted the cause of the increase is unclear.

The articles conclusion:

The central bank's negative rates are intended to push funds into consumption and investment -- not safes and mattresses, where they do nothing to stimulate the economy. Switzerland, a pioneer of negative-rate policy, apparently experienced similar unintended consequences: printing of 1,000-franc ($1,003) bills, the largest available, surged when rates dipped below zero.

Notice that much of the adverse reports came from Nikkei Asia, a mainstream media outfit that used to be the administration’s megaphone? Now the same firm appears to be pushing back hard on the BOJ’s NIRP as I have earlier noted here.

It’s a sign of a growing divide on NIRP by Japan’s establishment. It won’t be long where the BOJ may not just be kiboshed by the marketplace but by politicians as well. Such are growing signs of inherent barriers to the BoJ’s rampant inflationism. 
 

So far Japan’s stocks have partly recovered since the BoJ’s NIRP’s announcement.

The Nikkei was up 1.26% today, as part of the ongoing counter trend (bear market) rally.

The Nikkei has, so far, been short of reaching January highs when NIRP was announced. But volatility should be expected given the severe real world dislocations brought about by NIRP.

Nevertheless, people pulling their money out of the financial system will serve as a nasty headwind for Japan’s assets. That’s unless the average citizens will see stocks as a refuge. But if they do so, then NIRP will just blow another huge bubble from which will eventually implode and send even more people to scamper outside the financial system.

Yet the BoJ has positioned itself where there seems NO way out.

It’s sad to see how desperate central bank policies will lead to MORE societal hardships.

Sunday, February 07, 2016

Phisix 6,800: Global Central Banks Lose Control! Chart Porn of Fast and Furious PSEi Bear Market Rallies

the turning of a financial cycle can be quite abrupt due to another feature of debt: its close link with risk-taking and the amplification of market dynamics. During boom times, when asset prices are rising and financial markets are tranquil, borrowers may be lulled into a false sense of security. We could dub this the “illusion of sustainability” whereby even large debt levels appear sustainable when credit conditions are easy and asset prices soar. The illusion of sustainability blinds both borrowers and lenders. But as the cycle turns, the combination of falling asset prices and more turbulent markets means that what was viewed previously as sustainable levels of debt begins to look much more challenging. The decline of profitability, mentioned before, is particularly relevant here. This realisation may elicit deleveraging and outflows that amplify the downward cycle. Policymakers can try to stem the decline in asset prices by loosening monetary policy to turn back the tide, but the already large stock of debt means that monetary policy becomes less effective.—Jaime Caruana General Manager, Bank for International Settlements

I recently wrote that due to my computer predicament I might not be writing this week. But current events have been so compelling for me to miss out. Nevertheless a condensed outlook

In this issue

Phisix 6,800: Global Central Banks Lose Control! Chart Porn of Fast and Furious PSEi Bear Market Rallies

-Central Banks Lose Control as Developed Economy Stocks Nosedive!
-NIRP has Failed; Why NIRP will Crash the Markets!
-Chart Porn: Fast and Furious Bear Market Rallies (1994-2016)

Phisix 6,800: Global Central Banks Lose Control! Chart Porn of Fast and Furious PSEi Bear Market Rallies

Central Banks Lose Control as Developed Economy Stocks Nosedive!

Unlike most of the establishment, at the least one of the highest official of the central bank of central banks, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Mr Carauana1, understands: Balance sheets matter!

This means that regardless of central bank’s sustained ramming down into the public’s throats of its credit easing policies, for entities that have been hocked to its eyeballs, you can lead the horse to the water, but you cannot make it drink. In short, credit expansion is limited by the capacity of an entity to earn and pay for such liabilities.

Yet private sector balance sheet expansion through excessive leveraging embodies a major symptom of unproductive activities or the misallocation of resources. And for as long as real savings remain enough to fund the capital consumption or the wealth transfer process, the “boom” phase will account for as the “illusion of sustainability” that masks on the progressing entropy of malinvestments or the almost wholesale blinding of borrowers and lenders. The blinding from the “illusion of stability” includes regulators, politicians and media as well.

However, if something can’t go on forever, it will stop. The laws of economics will force such uneconomic activities to surface. Real savings will be consumed. And the reversal of the “illusion of sustainability” will be evident in the character of self-reinforcing “turbulent markets”, particularly the feedback mechanism of financial losses, deleveraging or liquidations, outflows, and credit strains.

Recent attempts by central banks to subsidize stock markets through negative interest rates appear to have hit a wall

Last week I wrote2, (italics original)

My point is that these central bank policies to subsidize the stock markets via monetary policies, as shown by the experiences of Japan, China and Germany, have conspicuously been increasingly afflicted by the laws of diminishing returns.

The narrowing windows of gains only punctuate on the risk of severe or dramatic downside ‘flight’ actions overtime. Yet central banks refuse to heed reality. But they continue to focus instead on the short term. The result should be the worsening of the unintended consequences from present day ‘rescue’ actions…

While there may be residual vestiges of the BoJ NIRP’s honeymoon effect, given this week’s asymmetric responses, signs are that last two week’s central bank panacea may not last. Perhaps not even a month.

If so, in the next transition from fight to flight, then this would mean that the ensuing cascade should be sharp and fast as central banks have effectively lost control!

Just what happened to the much ballyhooed magic of central bank intervention last week?

Equity markets of nations under NIRP were in a funk! Much of the year to date losses came from last week’s amazing meltdown.

And most importantly, the deficits incurred by Japan’s Nikkei 225 emerged even prior to the announcement of the dismal US jobs report.

Recall that the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has been the latest developed economy to embrace Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP). It did so in response to its crashing stock markets.

Yet part of the BoJ’s stock market rescue mission has been implicitly directed at the world’s largest pension fund, the Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF). As noted before, the Abe administration nudged or pressured the GPIF to makeover its portfolio by selling its JGBs or government bond holdings in order to replace them with domestic and global equities.

And because of the GPIF’s accommodation of the Abe administration, its portfolio switch has caused the pension fund to report a quarterly loss of 5.59% in the second quarter as equities underperformed. This according to the Japan Times accounts for “its worst quarterly result since at least 2008”.

Yet lower equity prices mean more losses for the pension fund to come. And more losses imperil funds for Japan’s retirees.

Moreover, the opportunity cost for such portfolio switch has been to give up on significant gains in bonds as the NIRP adaption has spurred Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) from the shortest end up to 9 years into sub-zero yields! As of last week, nearly $6 trillion of Japanese and European sovereign bonds have traded at sub-zero yields!

So as stock markets wilt, financial market participants gravitated to treasuries for safehaven. And don’t forget gold’s surge!

Additionally, by reversing its stance from an earlier denial to employ such policy, the BOJ intended to deliver a “shock and awe” to risk assets, as well as, to the USDJPY (yen).

Talk about the law of unintended consequences.

The Nikkei’s honeymoon period from the NIRP turned out to be just a three day tryst!

As of Friday, the Nikkei traded lower than when the NIRP was announced (middle window). Yet Nikkei 225 futures point to a 3% meltdown on Monday’s opening.

Yet last week’s jawboning by the BoJ last week “to expand stimulus further and is prepared to cut interest rates deeper into negative territory, signalling a readiness to act again to hit his ambitious inflation target”, as well as, by the ECB’s Mario Draghi who said anew that the ECB “will not surrender to low inflation” and vowed to ease further in March, apparently fell into deaf ears as stock markets went into a selling binge.

Financials markets have apparently grown weary of these central bank elixirs!

And as with the Nikkei, the USDJPY was dumped (upper window).

I warned thatJapan’s aging pensioners will serve as the ‘greater fool’ when stock market collapses”. And this may soon come true as sustained stock market losses will likely widen on the GPIF’s deficits.


NIRP has Failed; Why NIRP will Crash the Markets!

And here’s more. When central bank magic fails, its repercussions will spread throughout the global financial markets.

One of the unintended consequences of ZIRP-NIRP activist monetarism has been to put tremendous pressure on banking industry.

Last week, the banking index of Japan’s Topix bank, the US BKX and the Euro Stoxx 600 Bank index profusely bled! The indices shed a shocking -13.74%, -3.9% and -6.2% respectively! The three indices are now in bear markets.

Yet a furtherance of such dynamic entails further tightening in the global financial system. And yes this, in spite of the NIRP!

NIRP will not only crimp on bank margins, it massively skews on the pricing signals of the credit and risk markets, distort on the functionality of payment and settlements (such policies would encourage early payments, excess payments and deferred collection as warned by the NY FED), increase administrative cost of maintaining bank accounts as banks looks for alternative fees to make up for lost income from interest rate arbitrages (e.g. higher fees on ATM and etc…), disrupt on wholesale financing (e.g. repos, money markets) or banking system’s liquidity and compel the public to eventually hold cash. This comes even if governments impose cash controls. Last week the German goverment proposes to limit cash transaction to €5,000 (USD 5,450) while the EU also plans to expand cash controls.

Worst, NIRP attempts to destroy the essential financial concept of “time value of money” or as Investopedia defines “money available at the present time is worth more than the same amount in the future” or present discounted value.

In the context of Austrian economics, “time value of money” is equivalent to orginary interest or the “discount of future goods as against present goods” which accounts for the tradeoff between “want-satisfaction in the immediate future and the value assigned to want-satisfaction in remote periods of the future”

And this is why NIRP will fail. As the great Ludwig von Mises presciently warned3.(bold mine)

If there were no originary interest, capital goods would not be devoted to immediate consumption and capital would not be consumed. On the contrary, under such an unthinkable and unimaginable state of affairs there would be no consumption at all, but only saving, accumulation of capital, and investment. Not the impossible disappearance of originary interest, but the abolition of payment of interest to the owners of capital, would result in capital consumption. The capitalists would consume their capital goods and their capital precisely because there is originary interest and present want-satisfaction is preferred to later satisfaction.

Therefore there cannot be any question of abolishing interest by any institutions, laws, or devices of bank manipulation. He who wants to "abolish" interest will have to induce people to value an apple available in a hundred years no less than a present apple. What can be abolished by laws and decrees is merely the right of the capitalists to receive interest. But such decrees would bring about capital consumption and would very soon throw mankind back into the original state of natural poverty.

Now you see the truth behind the push for ‘financial inclusion’ in emerging markets like the India or the Philippines?

First, bring the majority into the formal banking system. Next, impose ZIRP and NIRP. Then Ban cash. Also, impose all forms of capital controls.

The end result (or the ultimate goal) is the (full) CONTROL by the establishment of private sector’s savings! Authorities and their establishment agencies can charge myriad fees at will, monitor every movement of funds of the account holder, eventually they will direct monetary flows (control transactions or everyone’s business), they will garnish accounts which they see as acting against their mandates or rules, and or simply confiscate or tax private sector’s resources during times of distress.

Events at the developing world have been showing the way!

Yet the basic laws of economics ensure that financial totalitarianism will be met by mountains of obstacles.

Proof? The global banking system’s dilemma in the face of ZIRP-NIRP has been spotlighted by this news report from the Financial Times4. (bold mine)

Share prices of major banks have plunged this week, with Credit Suisse hitting a 24-year low and Deutsche falling to 2009 prices. Santander, BBVA and UniCredit also traded at levels last seen during the eurozone crisis.

Bank weakness is truly global. US banks were downbeat on fourth-quarter earnings and the S&P financials are down more than 12 per cent in 2016. Indices for European and Japanese banks have lost nearly a quarter of their value this year.

Ultra-loose monetary policy, including the adoption of negative rate policy in Japan and expectations of further easing in Europe, has heightened fears for global economic growth. Lower long-term interest rates also reduce the earning power of banks. US financials have been hit hard by a lower net interest margin outlook while investors worry that the commodity plunge will intensify credit losses for the sector.

“This is totally linked to the rates environment,” said Lloyd Harris, a credit analyst at Old Mutual Global Investors. “At the end of last year, you were positioned for a rising rate environment. The equity market this year reflects that those expectations around higher rates have diminished.”

Bradley Golding, managing director at Christofferson, Robb & Co, highlighted that bank profitability is reduced as leverage and capital constraints leave lenders competing for the same business opportunities.

“The yield curve used to steepen in a recession and spreads used to widen, so even if you lost money on your existing book, new loans were done at a profitable level. Quantitative easing really hasn’t allowed that to happen,” said Mr Golding.

In mid-January, Italy provided an early indicator of the trauma ahead for bank investors, with Monte dei Paschi hitting a record low on the back of concerns about non-performing loans.

Weakness in equity prices has extended to the riskiest bank bonds. The €95bn market for so-called additional tier 1 bonds, which convert to equity or are written down when a bank’s capital falls, has endured dramatic losses this year.

Policies from panicking central banks have now caused disorder, distress and a tizzy at the financial markets. Curiously, these policies have been designed to protect them. Now it appears to have backfired.

And stock market anxiety has now spread. In the US, the once crowd or momentum favorites or the index drivers, the FANG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google) has likewise fallen to the strains from recent wave of selling. Linkedin crashed an astounding 44% last Friday! [there is more to discuss but I’m short of time]

And interestingly, all these have been occurring even as the USD has weakened. The USD sank by a hefty 2.6% this week.

Of course, the USD has signified today’s most crowded trade. And any reversal from a crowded trade will imply extended and amplified volatility.


And with massive shorts against EM currencies, the unwinding of the crowded trade positions (short EM) translated to big rallies. Asian currencies rallied strongly. And part of the rallying Asian currencies got reflected on stocks. Indonesian JKSE soared 3.98%, Philippine Phisix jumped 1.16% and the Thai Set added .41%. Meanwhile the Malaysian KLSE lost -.32% this week.

The Indonesian rupiah gained 1.12%, the Philippine peso .14% and the Thai baht +.29%. On the other hand the Malaysian ringgit slid .13%.



Aside from the intense pushbacks by financial markets on NIRP and on assurances by central banks of Japan and the EU, the much tempered expectations that the FED will further raise rates, the massive short covering on EM currencies, the Chinese government made sure that they celebrate this week’s New Year Spring Festival by stinging offshore yuan (CNH) shorts.

Many high profile hedge funds have announced short positions on the yuan. Billionaire crony George Soros have engaged China’s president Xi Jinping in a public debate as the former declared a short position against the Chinese currency at the year’s start.
The PBoC reported a massive decline to its foreign currency hoard to the tune of $118 billion last January. This brings the Chinese government’s forex reserves to just $3.2 trillion from a pinnacle of nearly $4 trillion in early 2014.

So the likelihood that last week’s state intervention on the CNH market would redound to even lower reserves in February as the Chinese government desperately puts on a façade on her financial assets, stocks, bonds, and the currency.

Chinese financial markets will be closed for the week in celebration of the Chinese New Year, so they will hardly be a factor.

Yet despite her absence, with central banks appears to effectively been losing control! This only means that the selling pressures on risk asset will likely crescendo!

To repeat my warning last week,

If so, in the next transition from fight to flight, then this would mean that the ensuing cascade should be sharp and fast as central banks have effectively lost control!

Decoupling anyone?

Chart Porn: Fast and Furious Bear Market Rallies (1994-2016)

Below is the table that highlights all the bear market rallies from 1994-2016.

The oversold bounce of the previous two weeks has signified as one of the most intense bear market rallies since 1994. In 11 days, the average daily % gains totaled 1.02%!

Yet the most powerful and the swiftest bear market rallies, aside from the most incidences which had the two traits, occurred in 2007-2008.

Since no two bear markets are the same, it would be futile to report on statistical correlation.

What matters are the causal linkages that led to them.


There had been 3 bear market strikes in 1994-95.

The 3 bear markets were a natural response to the blistering 179% skyrocketing of the PSEi in 1993! The bear markets wanted to profit take, yet the easy money environment prevented this from happening. So from the deferment of the market clearing process, imbalances mounted.

During the 3 bear market strikes, bulls feverishly and violently pushed the PSEi back up 24.46%, 24.5% and 31.57%, respectively, in very short periods of time. Thus the W shaped activities.

It was in the fourth attempt that bulls managed to prevail…for a limited period: 1 year and 2 months. However, the 1996 rally marked the last before the expiration of the 1986-1997 11 year secular bull market cycle.



The 1997-8 Asian crisis bear market saw two massive bull market rebellions or fierce countercyclical rallies during its first wave down, 18.64% and 52.2% correspondingly.

Yet those bear market rallies accounted for as false positives in terms of the return of the bull market.

The bear market cycle that started in 1997 had four major cyclical rallies on the path to its culmination. Aside from the above, the spurned rallies of 1998-1999, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002. Rallies during these cycles declined in scale and duration.


The GFC inspired 5 fast and furious countercyclical rallies that all went down the drain.

All 5 eventually surrendered to the bears.

However, the 2009 return of the bulls, mainly due to BSP easy money policies led to the bull market which was rattled by 2013 taper tantrum chapter.


The rally from taper tantrum bear market resonated with 1994-1995 cycle. But unlike 1994-95 which responded to a fantastic one year 179% spurt, the 2013 episode came in response to the 320% return in 3 years and 2 months.

Nonetheless the rate cut by the BSP in October 2012, which combusted a 10 month 30%+++ money supply growth from massive credit expansion, salvaged the PSEi taper tantrum away from bear market and back into the fold of the bulls.


Most events do not happen out of random, as they represent consequences of previous actions.

And this is why we have a 2016 bear market.

And the 2016 bear market will unmask “the illusions of stability”. 

As history shows, the most recent vicious rally only reinforces the denial phase that foreshadows the demise of the 2003-2015 bullmarket.

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1 Jaime Caruana General Manager Bank for International Settlements, Credit, commodities and currencies Lecture at the London School of Economics and Political Science February 5, 2016

3 Ludwig von Mises Originary Interest, Part Four: Catallactics or Economics of the Market Society, Chapter XIX. The Rate of Interest, Human Action Mises Institute


4 Financial Times Global financial stocks slide to new lows February 5, 2016