Debts
have continued to build up over the last eight years and they have
reached such levels in every part of the world that they have become
a potent cause for mischief…It will become obvious in the next
recession that many of these debts will never be serviced or repaid,
and this will be uncomfortable for a lot of people who think they own
assets that are worth something…The situation is worse than it was
in 2007. Our macroeconomic ammunition to fight downturns is
essentially all used up…The only question is whether we are able to
look reality in the eye and face what is coming in an orderly
fashion, or whether it will be disorderly.—William White OECD
chairman of the Economic and Development Review Committee (EDRC) and
ex-BIS Chief Economist, in
a recent speech at
Davos
In
this issue
Phisix
6,200: Imploding Real Estate Bubble: Gradually
And Then Suddenly?
-Developed
Economy Governments Panic over Stock Market Meltdown: Mounts Rescue
Campaign
-Phisix
6,200: Will the Taper Tantrum Levels be Tested Soon?
-The
2016 Bear Market Represents an Offspring of the Past Bear Markets
-The
Real Economic and Social Consequences of Bear Markets
-Oversold
Conditions: Sectoral Performance and Market Breadth
-Divergence
to Convergence: Price Levels, Market Breadth, Volume and the Peso
-Imploding
Real Estate Bubble: Gradually
And Then Suddenly
-Debunking
Objections of Overdone Selling and the China Bogeyman
Phisix 6,200: Imploding Real Estate Bubble: Gradually And Then Suddenly?
Developed
Economy Governments Panic over Stock Market Meltdown: Mounts Rescue
Campaign
Following
a violent return of risk OFF conditions, authorities rushed to rescue
of global stock markets at the last half of the week with dovish
statements anchored on promises of more easing (redistribution or
subsidies to stock markets).
In
what seemed as a coordinated signaling by global authorities, ECB’s
Mario Draghi opened the stock market bailout campaign with an
assurance that policy rates would “stay
at present or lower levels for an extended period", that
there would be "no limits" to reflate the Eurozone and
seduced the markets with “review - and possibly reconsider -
monetary policy at the next meeting in early March”. In
a meeting the press, Mr. Draghi’s encore slogan was
“We don’t give up”. This only meant
of the possibility of the implementation of moar and moar of the
failed inflationist policies. Yes, despite ongoing QEs (LTROs,
Covered
bonds and Asset Backed Securities) and negative rates, European
markets have been sinking, inflation
numbers has been way below the ECB target, and importantly, there
has hardly been any meaningful improvements in bank
lending to the economy. As a side note, Europe’s major equity
bellwethers have
recently entered the bear market but the Draghi put has lifted
them away from the bears
Meanwhile,
in a media interview, the Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao asserted
that the government is “willing to keep intervening in the
stock market to make sure a few speculators don’t benefit at the
expense of regular investors”. Yes their sustained interventions
has led Chinese
stocks into a second major bear market in less than a year! And
words turned into deeds, last week, the
Chinese
government injected 400
billion yuan ($61 billion) into the financial system the largest
in 3 years via repos.
The
Bank of Japan, which will hold this meeting this week, has reportedly
been under pressure to expand its current
easing programs, in spite of growing
internal opposition or division within the BoJ’s ranks to present
policies.
Yet
like the ECB, hardly any of the objectives by the BOJ has been met.
Even stocks have lately been under sustained selling strains. The
Nikkei and the broader benchmark the Topix fell
into bear markets this week. But promises of rescue have only
pushed the Nikkei off the bear market with Friday’s magnificent
5.88% pump. As I have
noted here, even the more astounding 7.7% surge in September 9th
2015 has not prevented the Nikkei from tumbling back to test the
recent bear market. And much like in 1989-1992, increasing frequency
of market volatility (sharp upsides and downsides) have likely been
symptoms of a ‘topping’ market.
US
stock markets have also been under severe pressure, with some of the
benchmarks trading at (S&P
500, Dow
Industrials and NASDAQ)
or below the August lows (Russell
2000, Dow
Transports, and NYSE
Composite). Hence, expectations have been weighted towards a
dovish Fed during next week’s meeting (January 26 to 27) to sustain
recent gains.
So
with central banks behind their backs, and provided that the central
bank magic can be sustained, then
this should be a big week for the bulls.
Yet
since whatever gains today will only compound on the imbalances, this
means that over the longer term, present gains will only be
temporary, and eventually, bears will likely retake command.
Phisix
6,200: Will the Taper Tantrum Levels be Tested Soon?
For
the third consecutive week of losses, the PSEi stumbled by another
huge 3.74% this week. Since 2016 started, the index has now accrued a
stunning 10.74% deficit.
At
6,200, the PSEi has plumbed to its lowest level seen in early 2014 or
during the post taper tantrum shock. At 5,762.53, the taper tantrum
low now serves as the most critical support. And this level has now
been just 7.2% away.
A
breach of this crucial level would mean a transition from a technical
bear market to a full scale or full blown bear market.
And
on an historical basis, the odds are low for the PSEi to recover from
here. Only once in half a century has the PSEi bounced back from such
level (that was in 1995).
And
speaking of bear market, as of Friday’s close, the PSEi was off
23.62% from the April record at 8,127.48. Friday’s 2.03% rebound
mitigated the PSEi’s bearish predicament, which found a momentary
climax last Thursday on a depth of 25.65%
Over
the interim, given the FOUR consecutive weeks of decline (this
includes the last week of December 2015), the PSEi has dramatically
been oversold, so a technical bounce may be on the immediate horizon.
Friday’s 2.03% gain may herald on such a bounce.
Besides,
speculation on 4Q GDP and 2015 GDP, which is slated to be announced
next week, may provide rationalizations to the rally.
That’s
aside from the sudden appearance of RISK ON conditions around the
world sparked by the jawboning of central bankers.
As
an aside, any downside print by the GDP numbers could be an obstacle
to the rally. But given that the government has ensured that such
critical statistical number has aligned more or less with the
consensus expectations for the past three quarters, there will
unlikely be a substantial deviance for the coming announcement. As I
have pointed out here, 3Q GDP was a RECORD, or a first ever,
surge of constant (real) GDP over current (nominal) GDP. The
anomalous constant GDP pump came from the base effect of price
deflators. This has little to do with the real economy.
Or
simply said, any significant downside surprises will barely be the
outcome. GDP signifies principally a political construct more than it
represents the state of the economy. And since it is election season,
the likelihood is an upside print, or at least a number that falls
within the range of consensus expectations. The last time
presidential national elections were held in 2010, GDP printed an
incredible 8.4%
and 8.9% (constant based) in Q1 and Q2. But this hasn’t
entirely been due to elections as the BSP’s
pivot towards enhancing ‘domestic demand’ via monetary
accommodation in 2009, fired up the initial boom phase of the
Philippine credit bubble.
Will
the PSEi tumble to test the taper tantrum levels in the coming
months? We shall see.
The
2016 Bear Market Represents an Offspring of the Past Bear Markets
As
I have repeatedly been saying here, the PSEi bear market will have
real consequences to domestic financial conditions and the economy.
To
help understand this, allow me a short narrative of the past and
present conditions, its linkages, as well as, identify the
differences between them.
The
present is a product of the past.
The
incipient boom phase in stocks (2004-7) came mostly in response to a
7 year post Asian crisis drought (1997-2003). Then the Philippine
economy had little balance sheet imbalances. Debt levels were
relatively substantially low.
Then
the Great Financial Crisis came. The domestic bear market of
2007-2009 was largely in response to the capital outflows from the US
financial crisis. Although the Phisix bear market of 2007-9, which
constituted a 54% loss peak to trough, dragged down with it the
statistical GDP, the Philippines escaped recession. Statistical GDP
bottomed at .5% (constant GDP) or 1.4% (NGDP) in 3Q of 2009.
With
relatively clean books, the economy was warmly receptive to the BSP’s
adaption of the US FED’s easy money policies. Hence, the quick
recovery and the ensuing headline boom of the coming years.
BSP’s
2009 bailout resulted to the 2013 bear market
From
2009, the principal conduit of the BSP’s trickle down policies via
negative real rates had been the asset markets. This means that
subsidies to creditors inflated asset prices like stocks, bonds and
properties that percolated to the real economy in the form of
inflated profits/earnings, incomes, investments, wages, and
consumption. This boom benefited primarily those few with access to
bank credit and or to capital markets.
This
also marks the year where the BSP inflated corporate earnings became
the staging point for the current stock market boom bust cycle.
The
initial effects of the zero bound had been an asset-economy boom.
And
given the extra loose financial conditions, the reflexive feedback
loop of soaring prices and bullish expectations and actions sent the
Phisix to a record in May of 2013. During the same year, the
Philippines had been gifted by major credit ratings agencies with
credit rating upgrades.
Additionally,
easy money policies represented indirect and direct subsidies to the
government via soaring tax receipts, lower debt payments (via
subsidized interest rates) and inflated GDP. The credit rating
upgrades virtually amplified such dynamic, which then, had been
manifested via record low interest rates. Philippine interest rates
even fell lower than her ASEAN peers and interest spreads relative to
many developed economy nations have narrowed to record levels. I
called this then the convergence
trade.
2013
bear market as forebear to 2016
In
May 2013, the Phisix suffered its first bear market since the GFC.
Like
the GFC, the bear market has been triggered by external anxieties,
primarily, the FED’s proposal to taper her monetary easing
subsidies. Unlike the GFC, Philippine balance sheets were bloating to
excessive levels.
Nonetheless
those
RECORD low interest rates, which were likewise reflected on
record low yields at 3.48% (April) of 10 year bonds in 2013, inflamed
on the 10 successive months of an astounding 30%+++ in M3 growth that
virtually saved the Phisix from a full blown bear market!
Differently
put,
along with skyrocketing M3, sizzling bank credit growth stopped the
bear market dead in its tracks! (see
upper window)
But
the reversal of the bear market with M3 growth came with an enormous
cost or a tradeoff.
CPI soared! And the upsurge in CPI became a political
event. As such, the Philippine central bank, the BSP, panicked.
The BSP ordered twice
increases in reserve requirements, SDA
rates, and interest rates. The BSP also mandated a stress test on
the banking system, as well as, to require
banks to raise capital, using the ASEAN integration as a smoke
screen.
The
combination of high inflation and mild tightening efforts by the BSP
eroded on the disposable income of consumers, put pressure on profit
margins, narrowed yield spreads which subsequently began to chip away
on bank credit growth. And
since GDP had largely been inflated by credit growth, the slowdown in
credit growth eventually reflected on the government’s GDP. This
became evident by 2015.
Also
in 2015, as bank credit growth fell, M3 growth collapsed.
The effects of the M3 crash had been manifested on money prices in
the real economy. The various price measures of the BSP (producers
prices, wholesale and retail prices, construction wholesale and
retail prices) were ALL headed downhill. Some even posted DEFLATION,
some registered sharp slowdowns. For instance, the BSP’s CPI (see
lower window) plummeted to a record low .4% in September and October
before its sharp upswing in November.
Moreover,
manufacturing went into a contraction mode in April to October. As
seminal signs of recession, loans
to the manufacturing sector even contracted in September.
Manufacturing showed partial
recovery only last November. Additionally, populist fire safety
mandates on manufacturing firms added to the industry’s woes.
Meanwhile,
the PSE reported a sharp slowing
of 1H profits and a downturn in the NGDP of listed companies. The
PSE censored
2Q performance because 1H activities had mainly been due to 2Q’s
material deterioration.
On
the real estate sector, despite the media’s campaign to whitewash
deteriorating performance, signs of fissures on the sector emerged in
3Q.
So
the collapse in M3 resonated in the real economy.
Yet
one of the lagged effects from the M3 inflation has surfaced via a
record Phisix high last April 2015. Aside from M3, the Phisix record
had been a product of a manipulated pump. Phisix raced to record
highs even when fundamentals were in corrosion. Now events at the
PSEi have turned to align with reality.
Another
legacy sign of M3 inflation has still been raging property prices.
Despite signs of slowdown, frenzied property speculation has resulted
to 3 bdr condo units in Makati soaring by 5.41% in Q3 2015 year on
year according to Global
Property Guide. This is a sign of widening divergence which, like
stocks, is about to converge. (see below)
Ostensibly
the 2016 bear market has signified an offspring of the 2013 bailout
of the Phisix through record low interest rates that was manifested
in the surge in credit activities. The
extension of imbalances, through the postponement of the market
clearing process, had led to its worsening. Now the violent response.
In
addition, the policy response by the BSP to the 2007-2009 bear market
mainly caused both the bear markets of 2013 and 2016. Deflating
bubbles are products of previous policy induced inflationary booms.
No phony booms, no economic bust.
The
Real Economic and Social Consequences of Bear Markets
Unlike
in 2007 were bear markets had been cyclical, the
2016 bear market looks secular.
That’s because the latter represents the surfacing, the gradual to
accelerated recognition and the eventual agonizing market clearing
phase of the malinvestments accumulated from the BSP’s zero bound
rates.
Since
this looks likely a secular bear market, then it entails real economy
consequences through intertwined factors of balance sheet losses,
debt liquidations, loss of confidence, and the narrowing, if not
reversal of the invisible redistribution platform from the BSP’s
policies.
Since
many
firms have used the boom phase to generate earnings/profits or cash
flows through rampant yield chasing activities, then the bust phase
would translate to balance sheet losses as well as reduced cash flows
for the same firms.
And sustained balance sheet losses would entail possible write downs
on impaired
assets, thus leading to balance sheet compression.
For
buy side institutions that had anchored their liability
matching process with asset chasing through stocks,
the
bear market will translate to growing balance sheet deficits that may
lead to negative
equity.
This increases the risk of failure to comply with outstanding
liability schedules.
For
loan or margin portfolios collateralized by stocks or equities, bear
markets translates to lower value of collaterals.
Such may prompt creditors to demand additional collateral
requirements. If the latter can’t be complied with, then margin
calls will lead to forced liquidations, thereby amplifying downside
volatility.
This
I suspect could be one major reason behind the latest brutal unwind
In
terms of psychology,
bear markets represents a loss of confidence.
Since markets can be characterized as operating under reflexive
feedback loops, where prices influence expectations and thereby
actions and vice versa, bear
markets extrapolates to magnified risk aversion
and
its ramifications.
To be specific, risk aversion will lead to heightened demand for cash
at the expense of economic activities. Risk aversion may also lead to
reduced credit exposure or require higher interest rates to
compensate for increasing perception of risks (or a risk
premium)
Such
will eventually get reflected on the headlines
as lesser investments, reduced capital expansion, job layoffs,
reduced earnings and consumption that will be manifested on headline
GDP.
Additionally,
the BSP’s artificially fueled bullmarket has previously enabled and
facilitated the transfer of resources and risks from listed companies
to the public through various fund raising activities (equity
placements, IPOs, bond issuance and etc.). The
reversal of which essentially reduces or takes away such resource
transfer process.
And
with smaller access to funds, listed firms will have to pay higher
yields to attract financing, or depend on banks for access to money
or downscale on economic activities. Given that balance sheet
pressures compounded by heightened risk aversion will likely spur a
constriction of credit conditions (via reduced supply of credit) even
in the banking system, higher interest rates will also put a squeeze
on profits, investments, earnings and curtail consumption activities
In
summary, increased
risk aversion, ballooning balance sheet deficits, tighter credit
conditions and reduced access to financing except through
substantially higher rates will likely lead to escalating losses,
intense debt liquidations, compression of economic activities and
exposure of excess capacities in bubble industries.
And
the government may not be able to conceal via its statistical
mirages.
As
author Bill Bonner wrote in a recent essay1
In
a bull market, investors are content with hope, hype and earnings
tomorrow. They are patient and don’t ask too many questions. But in
bear market, hope goes into hiding, patience fades… and the
question marks come out in the open.
And
once the bear markets spreads to real economic activities, then this
will likewise permeate into amplified social frictions or even
political tensions.
Finally,
since the elites have greatly benefited from the BSP inflationary
boom, then I expect some of them to try to put up a passionate last
stand to prop up the sham boom.
Oversold
Conditions: Sectoral Performance and Market Breadth
Last
week’s activities have been quite revealing.
Outside
the mining sector, among major industries, the property sector was
once again the object of the selling carnage this week (see upper
pane).
The
property sector has been accompanied by the holding sector to drag
the benchmark to its substantial weekly loss.
The
service sector defied the gloomy mood with the remarkably oversold
PLDT (+4.56%), GLOBE (+1.36%) and BLOOM (+11.04%) providing most of
the bounce or a booster to the benchmark.
On
a year to date basis, among the major industries, aside from the
mining sector, the property sector has led the losses, followed
closely by the holding sector. (lower pane)
It’s
been interesting to observe that last year’s two industry
outperformers or the two industries which has flouted on the bears
have now become the selling fixation.
The
commercial-industrial (blue) and the services (black) were the two
industries that peaked out first from the record highs.
Interestingly, both industries inflected on February or ahead of the
PSEi’s April record high.
The
other three, the property (red) holdings (orange) and banking &
finance (green) climaxed along with the PSEi’s milestone.
The
components of sectoral indices include both PSEi heavyweights and
non-PSEi issues. Albeit the PSEi heavyweights, which constitute the
largest market cap share of the sectoral basket, basically dictate on
the direction of the index. As example, when the PSEi, along with the
banking index, soared to record highs, 9
out of 13 issues in the banking index were in bear markets! So
the index had been pushed up even as the general issues had been
weighed down. Such divergence eventually dragged the outperformers to
join the majority.
The
above charts tell us of the contagion process. The service and
commercial indices deteriorated first, which means major caps of
these issues were the first affected, then the decay spread to the
darlings which constituted the bubble industries. In 2016, the
darlings have more than caught up with the early decliners as they
profusely hemorrhaged.
Now
to the general markets.
Among
the 30 PSEi issues, for the week, 7 advanced, 21 declined while 1 was
unchanged (SMC).
And
there had been NO reprieve yet to the bloodletting as declining
issues swamped advancing issues by an enormous margin of 155 this
week.
The
3 consecutive weeks of severe broad market losses may be a record of
sorts. And they likewise could be indicative of the substantially
oversold conditions.
Realize
that no trend goes in a straight line. The question is whether the
coming bounce would be tradeable or not. Or will attempts to trade
them become equivalent to catching falling knives.
Divergence
to Convergence: Price Levels, Market Breadth, Volume and the Peso
With
the intensity of the selloff in sectoral performance and market
breadth almost on the extremes, there have been little signs of any
reversal to the positive even in the context of volumes.
Peso
trading volume remains lackluster. And worst, volume builds on the
selling side as against the buying side.
For
instance, in two days where the PSEi gained January
19 (+.34%; Php 3.693 billion) and January
22 (+2.03%; Php 6.167 billion), peso volume had been
significantly less
than days where the PSEi slumped January
18 (-1.77%; Php 5.579 billion), January
20 (-1.53%; Php 5.33 billion) and January
21 (-2.8%; Php 7.4 billion).
Seen
from the average, the up days posted Php 4.93 billion as against the
down days at Php 6.103 billion. Or there had been 24% more volume
during the downside or during the selloffs. And this is why the
selloffs have happened: There has been little volume or bids
in support of prices levels during the previous week and or weeks.
Peso
volume, market internals (breadth) and price actions have to show
massive improvements. Otherwise any increase in the index, but
unaccompanied by volume and market breadth should likely indicate of
a ‘bull trap’. In other words, the markets have remained
unconvinced that the selling pressures have abated.
And
I believe that they will not only remain unconvinced but ultimately
join in the transition towards fear and depression or a full scale
bear market.
The
conspicuous divergence during the April record highs was a fantastic
harbinger to the current activities. The PSEi rose to a record
alright, but this emerged in the face of declining volume and
deteriorating market breadth which had been generally in favor of
decliners and where half of the listed issues were slumping into bear
markets.
And
the important lesson: the current developments have only converged
with the previous divergent trends. Or simply put, the previous
internal frictions within the market have been unified or harmonized.
Unfortunately the result has been the bear market.
And
it is not just peso volume, market internals (breadth) and price
actions, for the PSE to improve, the domestic currency the peso must
rally.
Thanks
to the promises of more stimulus from ECB’s Mario Draghi and
speculations that the BoJ will compliment the ECB and the Fed’s
coming two day meeting January 26-27, the pesos’ plight has been
partly eased.
The
USD-Php increased by only .13% to Php 47.805 from last week’s Php
47.74.
Nonetheless
the central bank risk ON will likely spillover to as an ephemeral
firming of the peso.
This
should be a buying window for the US dollar or USDPHP.
Imploding
Real Estate Bubble: Gradually
And Then Suddenly
As
noted above over the past three weeks or since 2016, the property
sector has been in the forefront or the raison
d'etre
for the present bear market.
The
holding sector has heavy exposure on the property sector which is why
they have been equally slammed. Many of the listed property firms
signify as subsidiaries to their similarly listed parent holding
companies. And this includes holding firms with unlisted property
subsidiaries such as GTCAP with unlisted subsidiary Federal Land and
Property Company of Friends.
As
of Friday, the property sector represents 16.57% share of in terms of
market cap while the holding sector has 37.31% or the largest market
cap share. Combined, these industries command over half 53.88% of the
market cap. So when both got toast, both brought down the index and
most of the PSE universe with them.
While
current developments have been worrisome, they have been moving in
the direction as I have been anticipating.
This
week’s selloffs have not only been dramatic but widespread.
Importantly
its been a succession of the violent or intense selling or a wave of
selling: 16.15% of Property sector's market cap dissipated in THREE weeks!
All
major property components of the PSEi and the Property index have
been severely buffeted.
Friday’s
2.03% ramp only eased some of their benighted conditions.
The
coming rally should help alleviate present conditions but these may
not be enough to amend or restore the major damages seen from the
recent underlying price actions of the said stocks.
The
PSE’s property issues reveals of an asymmetric topping phase.
Megaworld (violet) has been the first to reach a zenith in April. ALI
(green) followed suit in May 2015. Both have been on an incremental
downside path, until the August meltdown. Both rallied fiercely off
the August lows. Unfortunately their rallies lost momentum. And from
November, both issues lost altitude fast…real fast!
Curiously,
Robinsons Land (red) reached a peak in late October even as both MEG
and ALI had long flipped over. RLC then joined MEG and ALI in late
November with a stunning crash!
And
the most eye catching of them all, SMPH (blue).
SMPH’s
equity prices pinnacled last December 14, and was principally shaped
by a last minute or marking the close pump. During
that day, 58.2% of the incredulous 8.25% pump to the record Php 22.95
came from marking the close. Fascinatingly, the December 14 acme
was etched even as all her three contemporaries (ALI, MEG, RLC) were
already in the process of crashing!
Gosh.
Perhaps an entity or some entities must have been so desperate as to
push up the headline index or just wanted to show the markets that
SMPH was beyond the force of gravity.
And
I wonder whatever happened to those who deliberately spiked SMPH to
Php 22.95? Are they still long or have they cut losses?
The
ALI-MEG story has echoed on the price actions or price trends of the
other major issues of the property index. VLL (red) topped out just a
few days before the PSEi record in April, while FLI (blue), which
failed to surpass the May 2013 record, likewise climaxed a month
after the PSEi record. On the other hand, BEL (green) inflected as
early as September 2014 when casino stocks began their torturous
march towards hades. Bel owns Premier Leisure Corp which in
partnership with Melco operates the City of Dreams.
Current
price actions represent a demolition of the one way trade. If
everyone thinks the same, then NO ONE is thinking.
As
I recently
noted, panics are created by reality overwhelming embedded or
entrenched misimpressions, misperceptions and deceptions.
Realize
that the property sector represents the most interest rate sensitive
non-finance industry. That’s because the property sector’s
business model from the frontend (sales via vendor financing) to the
backend (construction of inventories for sale or for rent) have been
heavily dependent on leverage or credit.
Based
on BSP’s data, the property sector accounts for a 19.63% share of
banking loans to the production industry, as of November.
I
believe that the reported banking loans to the property sector has
been grossly understated because banks have surely gone around, the
BSP’s regulatory ‘macroprudential’ limits, through manifold
loopholes or regulatory arbitrage. You can add to possible
regulatory capture dynamics to circumventing regulations.
Yet
for now, the markets seem to have overlooked the important link
between banks and the property sector through such loan exposure.
Considering
that bond yields have been rising (which implies interest rates has
been rising), that has led to the intense flattening of bond spreads
(with sporadic accounts of inversion or negative yield) the
consequence has been a decline in banking credit growth. Such decline
in bank credit activities has been mirrored through the collapse of
(money supply) liquidity growth from the 10 straight months of 30%+++
to just the current range of 8-9%.
And
the crash of M3 has percolated to the general economy, which have
been falling for most of the year (as noted above) as reported by the
BSP
All
these suggest that liquidity or leverage conditions, which the real
estate industry breathes on, has been significantly tightening.
BSP
surveys don’t reveal of actual financial conditions. Prices do.
And
the tightening of liquidity would be baneful for the symbolic
property industry. I say 'symbolic' because the property sector has
epitomized and has been sold by the establishment as the mythical domestic
demand story which has underpinned the phony boom.
And
such fable has been crumbling right before our very eyes!
Real
world signs of such tightening have emerged. ALI cut capex by 20% in
the 3Q
of 2015 to supposedly implement “tighter cash management”.
Security
Bank sold its property arm in the 4Q. Despite a two
week media blitz to camouflage property weakness in late October
there were crashes in sales for some property issues during the 3Q:
Philippine
Realty, Rockwell Land and Century
Properties. Some
industry people have admitted that sales on the property sector have
slowed in the 4Q.
The
recent crashes have only opened the Pandora’s Box of
malinvestments.
Such
malinvestments will be exposed in an interlocking feedback mechanism
of declining equity prices, financial losses, excess capacity, cash
flow shrinkages, debt problems and restrictive access to credit and
vice versa.
And
despite popular conviction of the boom, which became a politically
correct theme, and consequently the vehemence to any opposition of
the boom…
I
predicted the casino
bubble in April 2013, the collapse began in late 2014
I
predicted the shopping
mall and property
bubble in January and October 2013 respectively, the implosions
have begun in late 2015.
Pieces
of the jigsaw puzzle have been falling into place.
In
a conversation between two characters in Ernest Hemingway’s The
Sun Also Rises.
One
asked 'How
did you go bankrupt?'
The
other replied 'Two
ways. Gradually and then suddenly.'
Applied
to the imploding Philippine real estate bubble: Gradually
and then suddenly
Debunking
Objections of Overdone Selling and the China Bogeyman
My
terse comments on two popular objections on the current stock market
crash: the selling have been ‘overdone’ or ‘excessive’ and
the China bogeyman.
Selling
Overdone.
Even
at current 6,200 level, many of the top 15 issues of the PSEi remain
ridiculously overpriced (see above).
And
we are talking of PAST performance where the E in the PER was valued
in a still economically strong environment. How about when the E in
the PER falters as the economy stumble? Won’t happen?
And
what has led to ‘excessive’ selling? Do these people know? Has it
not been from excessive mispricing? What has led to excessive
mispricing? Has it not been to because of excessive buying?
So
excessive buying or greed is rational while fear or excessive selling
is irrational? Or could it be instead that excessive buying (greed)
leads to excessive selling (fear)? Or that both are causally linked
to signify boom bust cycles?
Let
it be understood that in boom bust cycles, the economic bust will
almost be in the same the proportion to the imbalances acquired from
the inflationary boom
As
the great Dean of the Austrian School of Economics, Murry N. Rothbard
explained2.(bold
mine)
The
recession or depression is then seen as an inevitable re-adjustment
of the production system, by which the market liquidates the unsound
“over-investments” of the inflationary boom and returns
to the consumption/investment proportion preferred by the consumers.
In
stock market lingo, the obverse side of every mania is a crash!
Next,
China.
Unless
Chinese nationals have been the key buyers of the inventories of
major domestic property developers, just what has China got to do
with crashing property stocks?
Has
it not been popularly held that robust domestic demand has pillared
the Philippine boom? So where have such domestic demand been now to
support fundamentals and prices of the property sector? And if true,
should this not serve as a shield or a cushion to any negative impact
from China? Or could domestic demand really have come from Chinese
consumers?
Or
could distortions, brought about by the farcical boom, have been
uncovered by some market participants to have sparked a stampede but
opted blame China instead?
If
bull markets create geniuses, apparently bear markets spawn clowns.
___
1
Bill
Bonner Beware…
This Tech Darling Is Due a Big Fall
2
Murray
N. Rothbard Mises’s
Contribution to Understanding Business Cycles Mises Institute
September 29, 2014
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