Showing posts with label Pork Barrel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pork Barrel. Show all posts

Sunday, August 03, 2014

Phisix: PNOY’s 5th SONA: Desperately Seeking The Return of Boom Time Conditions

I love agitation and investigation and glory in defending unpopular truth against popular error.-- James A. Garfield (1831-1881) 20th President of the United States (1881)

In this issue

Phisix: PNOY’s 5th SONA: Desperately Seeking The Return of Boom Time Conditions

-How to Combat Decline in Popular Ratings? Appeal to the Public’s Emotions
-Self-Rated Poverty Increases on Mounting Stagflation
-Does Pork Barrel Scandals Translate to Good Fiscal Management?
-How Financial Repression Masks Debt-to-GDP Ratio: Blowing Bubbles
-How Financial Repression Masks Debt-to-GDP Ratio: Peso Loss of Purchasing Power
-The BSP’s Ambiguous and Non Transparent Signalling Channel
-How Financial Repression Masks Debt-to-GDP Ratio: The Other Factors
-Global Property Guide says Philippines has Ghost Cities!
-Tail Pieces: On the US Economy and Foundering Stocks….
-Tail Pieces: On China’s New Quasi QE

Phisix: PNOY’s 5th SONA: Desperately Seeking The Return of Boom Time Conditions

How to Combat Decline in Popular Ratings? Appeal to the Public’s Emotions

So the beleaguered Philippine President faced Congress in his State of the Nation Address (SONA) with a different but conventional political tack: appeal to emotions.

The President’s speech was supposedly more than conciliatory to the Supreme Court which he had recently censured for the latter’s ruling against the Disbursement Allocation Program (DAP); the President reportedly even shed tears in a segment of his speech!

This incredible excerpt from the speech[1]: “To my bosses: You gave me the chance to lead our country’s transformation. If I refused the challenge you laid before me, it is like saying I will help prolong your agony and my conscience cannot take that. If I turned my back on the chance given to me, it is like turning my back on my father and mother, and everything that they sacrificed for us. That will never happen,” the President said in Filipino. And then his voice cracked. Regaining his composure, the President continued: “As we tread on the straight path, you chose what is good and what is right; you remained true to me—and I remain true to you.” Some of the people in the audience stood up in one of the most loudly applauded parts of his 91-minute speech. “The transformation we are enjoying now can become permanent with the help of the Lord. As long as our faith and trust is complete, and as long as we become each other’s strengths, we will continue to prove that ‘the Filipino is worth dying for,” “the Filipino is worth living for,” and I will add: ‘The Filipino is worth fighting for,’” Aquino said.

Pardon my translation (or interpretation) of the speech: To my bosses (winks at the cronies and to political allies), the transformation we are enjoying now can become permanent, if the people won’t come into their senses to react adversely to our current (aggregate demand) policies which represents the “process of continuing inflation” as seen by the culminating 9 successive months of 30++% money supply growth rates that confiscates, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of the citizenry, whereby “while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some” (to borrow from John Maynard Keynes[2])

The Philippine President graduated with a Bachelor’s degree in economics at the Ateneo De Manila in 1981, so unless he was absent during the lecture sessions and on exams on the coverage of inflation or has been blinded by politics or by sheer vainglory, he or any economist worth one’s salt, should know what such money supply inflation “transformation” means.

And as for the maudlin speech, economic professor and blogger Don Boudreaux best describes this genre of political salesmanship[3]: Applause today, as loud as possible: that's pretty much all that matters to the thespians we call "government officials."

The article goes on to enumerate his accomplishments which can be summed up as basically populist politics of forcibly taking from Juan (via taxes) to give to Pedro with the rest spent by the government machinery through the following projects: cash transfers, weapons purchases, infrastructure projects and others.

The list adds “2.5 million Filipinos now above the poverty line” and “Good fiscal management has led to lower debt-to-GDP ratio” which I question below.

The President reportedly[4] also cited at six measures in his SONA, which included the uniformed personnel pension reform bill, supplemental budget for 2014, national budget bill and a joint resolution to clarify certain “definitions and concepts” in the Supreme Court decision against his Disbursement Acceleration Program.

Here is the litany of many other priority bills that haven’t included in the SONA: amend the build-operate-transfer law, cabotage law, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas charter, Human Security Act, Ombudsman Act and the Anti-Enforced Disappearance Act, amendments to the law facilitating the “acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for national government infrastructure projects”, remove “investment restrictions in specific laws cited in the Foreign Investment Negative List”, freedom of information (FOI), Tax Incentives Management and Transparency Act, competition law, whistle-blowers act, revision of the criminal code, delineation of the Philippine maritime zone, act instituting reforms in land administration, national land use act, delineation of specific forest limits of public domain and the water sector reform act, likewise, civil service reform bill, a proposed magna carta of the poor, a proposed act protecting the rights of internally displaced persons and a strategic trade management bill.

I discussed the cabotage law—deregulation of the shipping industry—which was also raised in last year’s SONA as a welcome development[5]. Unfortunately seemingly good measures look only worth its intent. Given entrenched (politically connected) interests involved, such measures may hardly transform into reality.

The removal of restrictions in Foreign Investment Negative list seems also an economic plus, if this would be broadbased and not selective.

I have not parsed on the others enough to make additional comments. But some proposed legislation looks suspiciously protectionist like “competition law” and “strategic trade management bill”. Realize that all it takes for competition and trade to naturally emerge and flourish is to remove all legal barriers. Alternatively this means that to legislate or regulate competition and trade is to put barriers or prevent or limit its occurrence. And in doing so, such legal actions protect the interests of groups as so designated by political authorities. This similarly applies with “strategic trade management”.

Others like “magna carta of the poor” and a “proposed act protecting the rights of internally displaced persons” seems more like populist redistribution schemes which represents additional yoke to the productive sector of the economy and to the peso holders.

So like contemporary politics, the recourse to the “appeal to the emotion” has been intended only to defer on the ongoing erosion of political capital derived from the ramifications from invisible transfer policies.

And orthodox populist politics deals strictly with the symptoms and fixates on the short term rather than the disease—again the unintended consequences from incumbent policies. If you haven’t noticed populist politics has been all about (look good, feel good) Showbiz!

German’s Nazi chief Adolf Hitler gave a good account of how to manipulate public opinion through politics[6] (italics mine): “All propaganda must be so popular and on such an intellectual level, that even the most stupid of those towards whom it is directed will understand it. Therefore, the intellectual level of the propaganda must be lower the larger the number of people who are to be influenced by it…Through clever and constant application of propaganda, people can be made to see paradise as hell, and also the other way around, to consider the most wretched sort of life as paradise.”

Self-Rated Poverty Increases on Mounting Stagflation

As mentioned above, the SONA achievements included “2.5 million Filipinos now above the poverty line”. 

Last week I noted[7] that during the past year, there has been a dramatic deterioration of perceptions of Philippine residents who rated themselves as becoming “poorer”. Such self-diagnosed poverty has sown the seeds or has paved way for the drastic shift in political sentiment against the once popular government. So aside from a dive in popularity ratings, three impeachment proceedings have been filed in just a week.

One of the major pollster who published surveys of self-proclaimed poor, the Social Weather Stations (SWS) has updated their findings during the SONA day[8]: “OVER HALF a million Filipino households have been added to the ranks of the poor, according to a new Social Weather Stations (SWS) report that estimated the number of families rating themselves as mahirap at 12.1 million. The SWS said a June 27-30 nationwide survey had 55% of the respondents claiming to be poor, up from the 53% (equivalent to an estimated 11.5 million families) recorded three months earlier.”

The self-rated poverty was up mostly in Mindanao, Visayas and Metro Manila but fell in Luzon. Paradoxically, the median poverty threshold in terms of household peso budget fell in Metro Manila by 20% to Php 12,000 while remaining unchanged for the rest of the nation.

The self-proclaimed poverty survey resembles the international measure called the Misery Index (developed by economist Arthur Okun) which combines unemployment rate and inflation rate to gauge society’s wellbeing.

The implication is that price inflation pressure may be down in Metro Manila but still elevated elsewhere. Importantly, the slackening of inflation in the Metropolis may have likely been accompanied by a dearth of jobs or sources of income, which have prompted more people see themselves as poorer. 

image

The SWS chart has been revealingly insightful. Note: I superimpose my metrics.

First of all, please notice of the fantastic disconnect between the government or the NSCB’s “unrefined” and “refined” poverty data (blue line) with that of the SWS. Since 2009/10 both have been going in opposite directions. Government declared poverty rates has been trending down whereas SWS rates have been trending up!

And this looks like one superb example why one should rely less on empirical data, especially government statistics.

So the President’s claim runs contrary to the numbers shown by the SWS.

Let me clarify that I’m not endorsing the SWS but rather I am applying economic analysis from their data

This instead serves as a splendid demonstration of how statistics can produce different outcomes (deliberately or through errors). Therefore to obsess over empirical data without economic theory is to get lost in interpretation.

Another good example is the difference between how inflation is seen by the public and by “experts”. In a survey conducted by US economist Robert Shiller[9], the public generally sees inflation as purchasing power of money (what money can buy) as against experts who define them differently. Since experts has more influence on policymakers, then the public pays the price for the mistakes made by these “experts” whose prescriptions have been implemented by political authorities.

As the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises preached[10]: (bold mine)
There is economics and there is economic history. The two must never be confused. All theorems of economics are necessarily valid in every instance in which all the assumptions presupposed are given. Of course, they have no practical significance in situations where these conditions are not present
Unfortunately the mainstream confuses one with the other.

Second, which is relevant to the first, is that the SWS self-rated poverty has been on an UPTREND since the grand BSP’s PIROUETTE of 2009/10 or what I show above as the Tetangco PUT. 

The shift from external trade to domestic growth dynamics via inflating a credit bubble is a wonderful depiction of the redistribution process by which inflation “confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some”

The so-called “transformational boom” has been prompting for an UPWARD trending self-diagnosed poverty. The implication from the above chart is that a large segment of the Philippine society has been paying the price for the benefit of a few. It would be misguided to say these groups have been “excluded” from growth, because it is precisely their resources that have been funneled to subsidize industries from financial repression policies or facilitated through the “continuing process of inflation”.

Third the current uptrend in the poor self-perception has been the longest since 1992. The biggest rise came in from 1986-1992 which eventually paved way for the Asian Crisis in 1997. This is aside from the Marcos era 1983 period.

There were signs of some uptick in the pre-Lehman crisis boom, but apparently the global crisis nipped this in the bud.

Fourth, post bubble busts such as 1984 (recession) and post Asian Crisis 2000-2003 have shown a meaningful decline in self-perceived poverty. This implies that when the invisible political redistribution eases, the general public’s economic yoke diminishes. This represents the period where real productive growth surfaces!

Fifth, the survey suggests price inflation may be subsiding (perhaps confirming the decline in domestic liquidity growth rates), but this has been accompanied by signs of rising joblessness (declining investments). Such hardly provides for an optimistic view to the coming statistical economic growth which media and their apologists continue to tout.

So if there may be some degree of accuracy in the SWS survey, then the one sided trade or political outlook of 6-7% growth will be faced with more nasty surprises.

Does Pork Barrel Scandals Translate to Good Fiscal Management?

The President also averred “Good fiscal management has led to lower debt-to-GDP ratio” as one of his accomplishments

I call this the Talisman effect, where politicians and the consensus cherry pick on statistics to justify or promote a bias in the hope to “ward off evil spirits” or the negative aspects of the actions which they are defending.

If the claim of “Good fiscal management” is true, then the President’s popularity ratings won’t be in a sharp swoon and there won’t be two impeachment proceedings against him based on Pork Barrel. Remember Pork barrels are essentially about government spending which falls into the category of fiscal management. This exposes the post hoc fallacy from the said claim.

While the claim “lower debt-to-GDP ratio” is true for now, the escalating Philippine budget, which has been anchored on 7-8% growth rates IS bound for a magnificent reversal.

I am not going to tackle with the Pork Barrel aspect of the proposed budget. Nevertheless here is what media says on fiscal management circa 2015[11]: “The proposed budget is up 15 percent from last year’s budget of P2.265 trillion, reflecting the jump in the administration’s assumption of a 7- to 8-percent growth in gross domestic product next year.”

The Inquirer has a great graph on this. It shows of the accelerating rate of increases in the government budget particularly 10.4% in 2012, 10.5% in 2013, 12.9% in 2014 and 15.1% for 2015. In terms of year on year percent increases, 2013-2014 growth rate was at 22.8% while for 2014-2015 at 17.05%.

It doesn’t take us very far to deduce and ask, what happens if the one sided expectations of 7-8% statistical growth will not come into fruition? 1Q 2014 at 5.7% statistical growth rates has already been considerably below such estimates, and marks the third consecutive quarter of decline[12], what if this downtrend is sustained? What if the Philippine government due to external factors or even from internal imbalances suffers a recession down the road?

How will the government finance the gap between slowing tax revenues with the significant enlargement of the government spending? How will this impact the debt-to-GDP ratio and the government’s balance sheet?

Evidently politics abetted by media and vested interest groups have ensured that 7-8% growth has been set in the proverbial stone. This hallmarks a fantastic one way trade with hardly any leeway for errors. And this is why the one way political trade is destined to fail and may even give rise to a black swan due to overconfidence.

And blind hope hardly represents a good strategy whether for investments or for politics.

How Financial Repression Masks Debt-to-GDP Ratio: Blowing Bubbles

It is terribly misplaced to solely look at debt-to-GDP ratio and issue a self-vindication. Since debt is one of the three ways how government finances itself, aside from taxes and from inflation, we shouldn’t overlook on how tax revenues are currently being funded or even how 30% money supply growth rates has contributed to the current façade of fiscal serenity

The reason why debt-to-GDP has been low is PRIMARILY because of financial repression policies.

And as I said before, costs are not benefits. The social policy of negative real rates essentially serves as subsidies to government debt. All inflationism has been about access to resources via credit or simply access to cheap credit.

Such subsidies have been channeled through lower debt maintenance than would have been when priced in free markets. This allows governments to expand spending while keeping debt levels suppressed.

But such comes at what costs?

As I previously noted[13], The statistician cum economic analyst will see this as good news. Yehey, great debt management they say! But if we apply the great Bastiat’s methodology of looking at the “unseen” long term consequence from current policies that have brought about the current benign “visible” effects, we will see a vastly different picture.

Yet the PRINCIPAL cost to attain lower public debt has been to inflate a massive bubble. The current public debt levels have been low because the private sector debt levels, specifically the supply side, have been intensively building.

Zero bound rates (negative real rates) has impelled for a debt financed “buy high, sell higher” dynamic in the financial markets and in the ‘capital intensive’ segments of the real economy, specifically to the bubble sectors (real estate, construction, shopping mall, hotels and financial intermediaries) but certainly not limited to them as many other industries are connected with these bubble sectors.

Such price inflation arbitrages has inflated profits, earnings and incomes that have pillared the so-called ‘consumer demand’ which has spawned capital expansions (part of buy high activities) directed at consumers (sell high). The inflated profits, earnings and incomes have filtered into government coffers which imply that tax revenues have been inflated too. OFW and BPO remittances are only sideshows to the demand fueled by the massive balance sheet expansions. And such dynamic have, so far, provided the moorings for increased social spending from which political authorities see as a one way road.

But there is no such thing as a free lunch. Rising Non Performing Loans (NPLs) in the banking’s systems real estate consumer loans as well as auto loans in Q1 as noted[14] last week, are indications which not only reveals that debt levels have risen to hit their natural limits, but likewise herald increasing instability risks to the system.

How Financial Repression Masks Debt-to-GDP Ratio: Peso Loss of Purchasing Power

The SECONDARY major cost from inflating a bubble in order to keep debt levels low has been to diminish the purchasing power of citizenry. This has now become conspicuous whose signs have been converging via many angles, higher domestic bond yields (from a one year perspective), falling peso vis-à-vis the US dollar (one year frame) and BSP’s official inflation rates (which has become widespread[15] and now a major political issue[16]). Most important has been the BSP’s seemingly frantic responses to the current inflation environment.

Oh yes the dovish Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) seems to have been pushed to wall for them to finally but reluctantly raise official rates last week.

From the BSP (bold mine)[17]: The Monetary Board’s decision is a preemptive response to signs of inflation pressures and elevated inflation expectations. Latest baseline forecasts indicate that the inflation target could be at risk, as the forecasts have shifted closer toward the higher end of the target range of 3±1 percent for 2015. At the same time, the balance of risks to the inflation outlook continues to be tilted toward the upside, with price pressures emanating from higher food prices, short-term volatility in international oil prices, and pending petitions for adjustments in power rates and transport fares. Moreover, while inflation expectations remain within target, they are seen to be settling toward the upper end of the inflation target range, particularly for 2015. The Monetary Board also sees the increase in policy rates as a preemptive measure in the context of the eventual normalization of monetary policy in some advanced economies. Given these considerations, the Monetary Board believes that an increase in the BSP’s policy rates will moderate inflation pressures and arrest potential second-round effects by helping anchor inflation expectations. The Monetary Board noted that the continued favorable outlook for domestic demand allows some scope for a measured adjustment in policy rates without adversely affecting the country’s economic growth prospects. Going forward, the BSP will remain vigilant against risks to price and financial stability and stands ready to undertake further policy actions as necessary.

Funny but, hasn’t it been for the longest period that the BSP has continually placed the burden of inflation on the supply-side constrains? So why the need to raise official rates at all?

Yet the BSP hardly even bothers to explain of the transmission mechanism of how adjusting interest rate channel impacts price inflation to the public. Why??? Do they expect the public to know this? Or do they expect the media and or their supporters to sanitize this for them? Or do they expect the public to be kept in the dark?

Essentially the above statement represents an indirect admission of the snowballing setback from credit fueled demand policies. It reveals of further signs that the phony boom has begun to hiss.

Moreover the BSP leadership claims that this has been a “preemptive response” at their risk of breaching their inflation targets. Really? Then why has BSP has launched FIVE actions (two reserve requirements[18], one banking stress test, and SDA interest rate[19]) including the July end official rates in a span of just 5 MONTHS which means one policy action per month??? 

If ‘inflation expectations remain within target”, then WHY the urgency??? And whatever happened to the alleged $2.7 billion siphoning from two reserve requirements? Why not give earlier actions a chance to gain ‘traction’? Again why the seeming desperation? Has the gap between the official inflation rates and real economy inflation been broadening? Have the reserve requirement been a rabbit out of the hat trick? Has all four measures miserably failed?

And who among the influential pressure groups has been compelling the BSP to act? I doubt that the BSP will solely heed on the warning by the Bank of International Settlements, if so who or which groups may be behind BSP’s actions? To what degree have they been affected?

The BSP’s series of actions has raised even more questions than it has answered.

The BSP’s Ambiguous and Non Transparent Signalling Channel

Yet I don’t see the need for the BSP to raise rates. That’s because I believe that the market has effectively already been doing the job. Proof? Growth rates of domestic liquidity have tumbled fast enough to have already reached my target, even before July!

From the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (bold mine)[20]: Domestic liquidity (M3) grew by 23.0 percent year-on-year at end-June 2014 to reach P7.1 trillion. This increase was slower than the 28.4-percent expansion recorded in May. On a month-on-month basis, seasonally-adjusted M3 declined by 0.4 percent, following a zero growth in the previous month…Money supply continued to expand due largely to the sustained demand for credit in the domestic economy. Domestic claims rose at a stronger pace of 13.0 percent in June reflecting the steady uptrend in lending to the private sector.  The bulk of bank loans during the month was channeled to real estate, renting, and business services, utilities, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, as well as the agriculture sector…As in previous months, the high—though decelerating—M3 growth reading in June continued to reflect in part the decline in the Special Deposit Account (SDA) placements of trust entities compared to their levels a year ago, in line with the BSP’s operational adjustments in the SDA facility.

As usual, the BSP resorts to smokescreens where they continue to blame “in part” SDA for money supply adjustments.

On the one hand, they raise interest rates supposedly to control price inflation, yet again they never explain how interest rates affect consumer prices. Yet on the other hand, they say that the decline in liquidity has partly been about SDA while admitting to domestic credit expansion as the larger component of changes in liquidity, as if to suggest that SDA and loans operate distinctly from each other.

They hardly ever explain on the connection, or more importantly, the casual linkages of how changes in interest rates affect demand for credit, how changes in liquidity and deposits are really symptoms of bank credit expansion, how spending power injected to the economy from credit expansion impacts prices both in the real economy and in the asset markets, how prices coordinates economic activities or how prices affects the flow of the production process, and lastly, how changes in interest rates affect SDA flows, as well as, the balance sheets of both lenders and creditors (from the banking and ex-banking sectors) or even the BSP.

The BSP signaling channel has been filled with opaque, non-transparent and most importantly self-contradictory messages. Such obfuscation represents added signs of concern that the monetary politburo may be concealing colossal risks from the gullible and vulnerable public whom has become dependent on BSP’s monetary wizardry.

The surge in 1Q NPL loans in the banking system’s real estate and auto loan portfolio combined with clues from the SWS self-rated poverty survey, the price inflation taking on the awareness of the political authorities, cascading liquidity and below expectations GDP in 1Q, reinforces my suspicion that the Philippine political economy “may already have reached a ‘saturation’ or ‘tipping’ point for debt absorption[21]

This implies of the acceleration of the diminishing returns on debt for the domestic economy, particularly for the bubble industries which brings to fore greater risk of instability for a system that has become excessively reliant on debt.

image

To add evidence to this we see a marked slowdown in general banking loans, particularly in the supply side last June.

From the BSP[22] (bold mine): Loans for production activities—which comprised about four-fifths of banks’ aggregate loan portfolio—expanded by 17.7 percent in June from 19.0 percent in May…Loans for household consumption grew at a faster pace of 16.2 percent from 10.8 percent in the previous month, reflecting the expansion in auto loans and other types of loans (i.e. salary loans and personal loans).

As one would note, the decline in growth rates in loans to the real estate and the construction sector appears to have intensified. Although hotel loans continue to dazzle, loans to the financial intermediary may have inflected. Even the growth rates in the banking loan portfolio to the manufacturing sector have turned sharply lower.

The share of loans to the bubble sectors relative to overall banking loans have now fallen to 49.78% from above 50%.

As a side note the BSP will be overhauling its classification of industry loans based on the 2009 Philippine Standard Industrial Classification (PSIC) starting this month and will end original data in June 2015. The possible side effect is that there will be shortages of historical data if the old data will not be readjusted to conform with new accounting standards. If the latter holds true then this shows how government can erase “risk” via changes in accounting standards.

Meanwhile consumer loans, which is significantly less than supply side loans has picked up, despite rising 1Q NPLs. Consumer loans are less of a threat because of the limited penetration level by domestic households to the formal banking industry. But less does not mean immunity. Since current demand comes from supply side leveraged expansion, the reduction in supply side loans will eventually be reflected on consumer loans in terms of lower take up and higher NPLs as demand retrenches.

Nonetheless the falling growth rate of liquidity appears to have spread even to the banking loan portfolio which may most likely recoil to liquidity growth.

A further implication is that arbitraging through price inflation from the Tetangco PUT appears to be diminishing. This will put pressure on profits, income and earnings dependent on sustained money pumping.

My guess is that 2Q statistical GDP, which may fall to 5.5% or even below, will disappoint the consensus.

How Financial Repression Masks Debt-to-GDP Ratio: The Other Factors

These brings me back to “costs are not benefits” of the artificially low debt to GDP.

Aside from blowing bubbles and diminishing purchasing, the THIRD major cost is in the illicit and immoral transfer of resources not only to the government but also to politically connected firms who has and continues to benefit from the BSP sponsored redistribution.

A FOURTH major cost is that bubbles have effectively heightened “financial stability risks”. Contra to the BSP’s claim that they “remain vigilant against risks to price and financial stability and stands ready to undertake further policy actions as necessary”, by unleashing the inflation ‘Godzilla’ the major source of “financial stability risks” has been the BSP’s negative real rates policy which have been implemented by the leadership. Most of the BSP people are well meaning people and have been ignorant of the policy gambits which have been undertaken by the leadership that comes at the expense of the public.

The general public has also been unaware of the mischiefs employed by the BSP chieftains, otherwise as Henry Ford once admonished, It is well enough that people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning.”

Fingerprints of financial instability can be seen not only in the escalating private sector debt levels, the previous absurd 30% money supply growth rates, but also in massively overvalued asset markets, as well as, the convergence trade.

A FIFTH major cost is that resources channeled to the bubble sectors have been malinvestments. Resources that should have been used by the market for real productive growth has instead been diverted to unproductive and speculative undertaking. This means that the massive misallocation of resources now awaits a potentially disorderly market clearing process which will underscore a shift in consumer’s preferences from which will bring to light consumed capital via financial losses.

A SIXTH major cost is that once the bubble implodes, government revenues will dramatically fall while government spending will soar as the government applies the so-called “automatic stabilizers” (euphemism for bailouts). This would also extrapolate to a phenomenal surge in debt levels. All these will unmask today’s Potemkin’s village seen in the fiscal and debt space. Such will likely be accompanied by tax increases, in particular the E-VAT which seems as the Philippine government’s seemingly most successful tax collection platform

A SEVENTH major cost is that not only will a bubble bust imply possible curtailment of civil liberties but the onslaught against economic freedom in particular the informal economy will likely intensify. This will come with more mandates, regulations and other restrictions. A government deprived or starved out of taxes for her insatiable spending appetite will desperate seek a larger tax base whose resources they intend to seize by taxation. 

So never rule out a bank bail in or depositor’s haircut.

Global Property Guide says Philippines has Ghost Cities!

Warren Buffett once warned that “never ask a barber if you need a haircut”. Mr. Buffett’s word of caution has been predicated on the principal agent problem which underscores of the conflict of interest between interacting parties with different incentives.

Having read the recent report from the Global Property Guide reminded me of Warren Buffett’s warning. This is aside from the palpably desperate thoroughly confused state by property bulls to justify bubbles.

The article says that the rate of increase in Philippine land and rental prices has been cooling. Aside, vacancy rates have been inching higher. They believe that all these are temporary. 

image

And because a major real estate investment and management firm declares that there is no bubble, the article accepts such ‘proof by assertion’ as a gospel of truth.

The reason given is that current oversupply comes from the completion of new projects. So the assumption is that demand will remain robust which means demand will eventually reduce excess supply. The company or the article does not explain how and where demand comes from except to assume its existence. Although ironically the article mostly focuses on demand from BPO and OFW.

Also another reason for their bullishness has been due to a statistical guidepost. While nominal prices of 3 Bedroom condo units has surpassed 1997 highs, because in inflation adjusted terms this represents 39% off the 1997 highs, prices thereby have been deemed as far from the dangers of 1997 levels and so the implied upside.

Here are my questions: What if official inflation rates have been calculated differently in the 90s or today? The BSP’s proposed changes in classification of bank loans seem as proof of continuing changes in accounting methodology. What if current inflation rates have been understated? Since inflation has recently become a key political issue which even hugged the headlines, how reliable are the official inflation numbers? Why has the BSP raised rates (or acted 5 times in a span of 5 months) if price inflation has been within their targets? How will inflation affect demand or disposable income?

As one can note, preoccupation with statistics can increase risks to one’s portfolio (if not one’s health too)

But here is the striking segment of the article’s commentary[23]
We believe that the middle tier is over-supplied.  Many of these lower middle-class condominium developments are ghost cities
Wow! Did you get that? Move over China, “Ghost cities” have landed in Philippine shores! Yet paradoxically there is NO bubble!

Yet I wonder how do the property bulls define bubbles: an ex post phenomenon?

Even more…[bold mine]
A visit to any ‘Barrio Fiesta’ in any city where Philippine OFWs work abroad is dominated by condominium offerings from developers like Megaworld, DMCI, Ayala Land, etc..  The Philippines is one of the world’s largest remittance recipients, with 10.5 million Philippine Overseas Foreign Workers (OFWs) living and working in 210 countries and territories worldwide, 47% of them permanent migrants, 40% temporary, and the rest "irregular migrants". Among the permanent overseas Filipinos, 65.2% live in the US, followed by Canada (13.1%), Europe (7.1%), Australia (6.8%), and Japan (3.4%), according to the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO).  In 2013, remittances from OFWs grew 7.4% to US$22.9 billion, or around 8.4% of GDP.

It is estimated that 60% of these remittances go directly or indirectly to the real estate sector, according to the World Bank. These OFW remittances power the low-end to mid-range residential property market, housing projects and mid-scale subdivisions in regions near Metro Manila, such as Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna Provinces.

According to the Philippine Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, 452,198 condominium units were built in Metro Manila from January 2001 to March 2014. There are around 807,496 families or 27.5% of the NCR population who have a dispensable income greater than PHP 34,962 (US$ 783), which is the required monthly income to be able to afford the monthly amortization of PHP 10,500 (US$ 235). PHP 10,500 (US$ 235) is the minimum monthly amortization for a housing loan of PHP 2 million (US$ 44,801), with accommodating loan rates of 90% LTV, with an annual interest rate of 5.7%, and a loan tenor of 30 years.

So for all these newly-built condominiums to be occupied by those who could afford to rent or buy (we calculate for the buying case, but given current interest rates it may be more expensive to rent), 56% of locals who have the financial capacity to occupy them would need to do so, i.e., 56% of the 807,496 families with the financial capacity to do so, should purchase or rent a unit, for the available supply of condominium units to be taken up.

These are problematic numbers given that many of these families already have houses in the first place.  The World Bank assumes only 10% of these capable end-users as prospective end-users, indicating a gross oversupply.

In terms of affordability, property developers are building more mid-end condominium units than locally-based Filipinos can afford to occupy.  Many of the buyers are OFWs, causing a mismatch between demand and supply.
Notice that the demand which the article focuses on, contributes only EIGHT Percent or specifically 8.4% of the GDP. My question why the focus on 8.4%, which has almost been the entire thrust of the article, when there is 91.6% to consider? Have developers and media been blind to the 90%? Or is it that 8.4% has been seen as quantifiable, therefore easy to write about?

Next look at the writer’s one tract fixation on statistics where numbers have been made to fit either “should purchase or rent a unit”.

Are people’s lives all about purchasing and renting condo or housing units? What if the qualified buyer instead decides to spend his/her money on helping the family or subsidizing education of relatives or indulge instead in shopping or traveling or to frequent gimmick outs with friends or even just to save? The writer doesn’t seem to give any consideration to this. The outlook has been tunneled to solely at buying or renting—a very fictitious sense of reality. Yet the World Bank’s data of capable end-users seem to have pushed back on the writer’s bias thus the generalization of “gross oversupply”. Even the World Bank’s model based data would be as good as a guess or basically unreliable numbers.

And as one would note, without economic theory, empirical based analysis would lead to grave reasoning lapses and heuristic fallacies.

Even bizarrely the writer castigates on the supposed miscalculation by OFW investors on their failure to match acquired properties with BPO renters.

By 2016, it is estimated that as many as 1.3 million people will be employed in the BPO sector.  The sector is expected to generate as much as US$ 25 billion in annual revenue.

BPO agents are likely to wish to rent residential spaces near their workplaces due to their night shift schedules.  Since BPO agents have foreign countries as their clientele, their work hours follow suit. This means that most BPO employees work at the night time where commuting is risky while taxi cab fares are expensive.

There is a puzzle here.  The income of this rising demographic overlaps with the investments made by the OFWs.  Many call-centre agents are in the targeted income-bracket.  But anecdotal evidence suggests that many of condominiums bought by OFWs are in the wrong place for call-centre agents.

In any case, the bottom line is that their spending-power is not yet strong enough to absorb supply.  Many have family obligations and prefer to live at home or with relatives.
Another severe error here is to believe that OFW buying has all been about rental yields through matching with rental habits of BPOs workers. 

OFWs have different reasons for buying properties, this could be for personal or family use, as vacation house, as inheritance, as speculative instrument, for rental income or more. I am quite sure that there are a handful of OFWs targeting BPOs for their property purchases but they are unlikely a significant force.

Yet the writer hopes that the demographic dividend or the demographic sweet spot will save the day. Well that really depends if people will be allowed to conduct commerce freely or if people will become all wards of the state and her private sector apparatus. The former will most likely reap a demographic dividend while the second will lead to standardized poverty. 

Bubble blowing is a function of the second. This US homeownership chart should be a wonderful example.

Yet economics of demography is one of long term framework and not for short term or immediate response. Enterprises or financial institutions presently hooked on debt can’t wait for long term fixes.

Also while the article believes that there may be brewing oversupply of properties serving the mid tier markets, they believe that the high end and the low end segment will continue to be strong due to “economic growth”.

Apparently the writer has not considered how inflation harms the lower segment of the market by reducing disposable income. Well, here is what I wrote based on their article in October 2013[24]
Property bubbles will hurt both productive sectors and the consumers. Property bubbles increases input costs which reduces profits thereby rendering losses to marginal players but simultaneously rewarding the big players, thus property bubbles discourage small and medium scale entrepreneurship. Property bubbles can be seen as an insidious form of protectionism in favor of the politically privileged elites.

Property bubbles also reduces the disposable income of marginal fixed income earners who will have to pay more for rent and likewise reduces the affordability of housing for the general populace.

Outside the ethics of the property bubbles, the mania as shown by chronic overconfidence by industry participants, nominal prices of real estate at 1997 highs and signs of rising vacancy rates could be seen as a potential red flag especially if the bond vigilantes will reassert their presence.
So a reduction in disposable income due to a stagflationary environment will undermine demand for both low and mid-tier housing projects from which the article laboriously tries to conflate with deficiencies of OFW and BPOs where “spending-power is not yet strong enough”. The latter two may be contributing factors but hardly are they the primary cause.

Also stagflation will undermine both statistical and real economic growth.

The article also tries to rationalize the aggravating weakness in the property sector by spewing out selective statistics without the realization that the numbers and the participants they cite have been part of the mostly high and mid tier markets as well as some low end projects, for instance, “A visit to any ‘Barrio Fiesta’ in any city where Philippine OFWs work abroad is dominated by condominium offerings from developers like Megaworld, DMCI, Ayala Land, etc..”

This means that if the current ghost projects have been financed by debt, then the slack in demand for units implies a hit in both the income and balance sheet statements of property companies who cater to these markets.

Remarkably even spotty arguments of the property bulls contain bearish undertones.

And if the facts of the report are correct, then obviously cracks in the Philippine property bubble have been widening and has become palpable such that even the bulls can’t hide them anymore!

Tail Pieces: On the US Economy and Foundering Stocks….

2Q US GDP beat expectations with a 4% growth rate[25]. A large segment or about 40% springs from real private inventories growth. Financial analyst Alasdair Macleod notes that the huge 14% increase in inventories and durable goods means that these will be subject to possibly big revisions[26]. Even perma bulls as the Canadian BCA Research thinks that the growth data seems “Good (If it is true”)[27].

Meanwhile the Fed continued to pare down on QE by reducing agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $10 billion (from $15 billion) per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $15 billion (from $20 billion) per month[28]. The growth data initially prompted for a spike in yields of 10 year US Treasuries but the selloff in stocks pushed yields back down.

US stocks have entered the month of August with sharp losses of more than 2.0% per major benchmark for the week. It is too early to call anything. But as I pointed out last week, the exodus in high yield bonds may have been instrumental in contributing to the loss. This week global investors yanked $4.4 out of high yield junk according to Reuters[29]. Adding to this has been a bigger selloff in US mortgage bonds[30], thus homebuilder index as seen by SPDR S&P Home builders Index have been hit hard.

Has the Fed’s tightening begun to impact financial markets?

Tail Pieces: On China’s New Quasi QE

The Chinese central bank the PBOC have launched a 1 trillion yuan ($171 billion) stimulus (or QE?) via the “Pledged Supplementary Lending"[31] (PSL) which has spurred the recent surge in China’s stocks [up 2.76% for the week and 6.04% in two weeks].[32] This fills in the gap I wrote last week—”this implies a Xi-Zhou PUT (from China’s President Xi Jin Ping and PBoC governor Zhou Xiaochuan) in motion”

image

What this implies is that the Chinese government can’t withstand pain from a withdrawal syndrome from debt addiction. And even more is that credit risks will likely balloon as banks assets continues to grow as debt levels grow.

Since 2009, the US has added $2.3 trillion in bank assets, exclusively thanks to the Fed's reserve creation, writes the Zero Hedge[33] (bold, italics and underline original), As for China... total bank assets more than doubled from $11.5 trillion to a record $25 trillion! This is a number that is nearly double that of the US, and represents a pace of $3.5 trillion per year - or nearly four concurrent QEs - a rate of "financial asset" addition five times greater than in the US!

Again, 2009 serves as the monumental pivot for global central banks.

As Credit Bubble Bulletin’s Doug Noland observed of China’s bubbles[34]: The Chinese Bubble is a government-dictated financial scheme of epic proportions.

Epic bubbles means epic collapse.




[1] Inquirer.net Aquino tears up in his 5th Sona July 25, 2014

[2] John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1919. pp. 235-248 PBS.org

[3] Donald J. Boudreaux Sound & fury, signifying pandering August 10, 2011 Triblive.com



[6] Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Rense.com




[10] Ludwig von Mises 10. The Procedure of Economics Chapter II. The Epistemological Problems of the Sciences of Human Action Human Action Mises.org




[14] Op. Cit July 28, 2014



[17] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Hikes Policy Rates by 25 Basis Points July 31, 2014



[20] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Domestic Liquidity Growth Continues to Ease in June July 31, 2014


[22] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Bank Lending Sustains Growth in June July 31, 2014




[26] Alasdair Macleod USD FMQ carries on growing despite tapering FinanceandEconomics.org August 1, 2014

[27] BCA Research U.S. Q2 GDP: Good (If It’s True) July 31, 2014

[28] Federal Open Market Committee Press Release July 30, 2014 FederalReserve.gov




[32] See Hong Kong Dollar-US Dollar Peg Under Pressure July 30, 2014


[34] Doug Noland Bubbles & Schemes Credit Bubble Bulletin July 25, 2014 PrudentBear.com

Monday, July 28, 2014

Phisix: Stagflation Upends Boom Time Politics as BSP’s 1Q Property NPLs Surge!

The most realistic distinction between the investor and the speculator is found in their attitude toward stock-market movements. The speculator's primary interest lies in anticipating and profiting from market fluctuations. The investor's primary interest lies in acquiring and holding suitable securities at suitable prices. Market movements are important to him in a practical sense, because they alternately create low price levels at which he would be wise to buy and high price levels at which he certainly should refrain from buying and probably would be wise to sell.- Benjamin Graham

In this Issue

Phisix: Stagflation Upends Boom Time Politics as BSP’s 1Q Property NPLs Surge!
-As Predicted, Stagflation Upsets Populist Politics
-BSP’s 1Q Property NPLs Surge! From Boom Bust Economy to Boom Bust Politics
-Too Obvious Bubbles: More Authorities Jump into the Bubble Warning Bandwagon!
-IIF Warns on Global Carry Trade and Global Bond Liquidity
-Speculators Flee Junk Bonds: Has US Bubble Been Pricked?
-An Ongoing China “Pump and Dump”?

Phisix: Stagflation Upends Boom Time Politics as BSP’s 1Q Property NPLs Surge!

As Predicted, Stagflation Upsets Populist Politics

Last February, I raised the issue of how Filipinos thought themselves as becoming “poorer”. My commentary was based on two December surveys conducted by two different major domestic pollsters who saw a substantial surge in the perception of deterioration in the “national quality of life”.

I predicted that this would eventually spillover or spread into the political realm[1].
So while the government can talk about their robust statistical growth ad infinitum to ensure their access to the credit markets in order to finance their politically correct justified boondoggles, as well as, to redistribute resources from society to the small segment (politically connected elites) who benefits from the credit fuelled property and stock market bubble out of zero bound rates policies, the real economy may be pushing back.

If this sentiment persist to become a trend or even deepens, then in terms of politics we can expect the political divide to widen.
Apparently this observation turned out to be prescient. 

About two weeks back the same survey outfits noted of a “dive” in the Philippine President’s popularity rating. The Pulse Asia observed that “President Benigno Aquino III's approval and trust ratings plunged after the Supreme Court (SC) declared his administration's Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) as partially unconstitutional”[2]. The SWS likewise shared the same outlook[3]: Public satisfaction with President Benigno Aquino III took a steep plunge during the second quarter of 2014, giving the chief executive his lowest rating since he took office.

Then this week, the dramatic shift in public sentiment has been transformed into action: THREE impeachment complaints had been filed against the Philippine president. Such should have been FIVE; unfortunately the other two had been plagued by technical deficiencies or partly “lacked lawmakers who will endorse them”[4] and thus had been placed in the back burner.

Of the three impeachment complaints, two had been based on the ongoing Pork Barrel scam while the third had been premised on the Philippine-US military cooperation agreement or the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)[5]. For the latter, I previously said that the boom has allowed the administration to “Sell nationalism to get popular approval to justify the defense agreement”[6]. Now that we are seeing the twilight of the phony boom, diminished popular approval paves way to a legal clash between executive branch and several interest groups opposed to the defense agreement.

The drastic reversal of the Philippine President’s approval rating, as well as, the three impeachment proceedings comes in the limelight of (Monday July 28, 2014) State of the Nation’s Address (SONA) before the Congress by the Philippine president.

All it takes to make such prediction is to understand the elementary dynamics of inflationism. I do not require statistics or math models to prove this point.

The causal realist logic says that when governments “confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens” and where they “confiscate arbitrarily” and in “the process impoverishes many”, while “actually enriches some”[7] will ultimately boomerang.

Said differently, when many from the political constituency begin to see themselves “poorer” while at the same time several segments of society have been perceived as having been “enriched”, then these aggrieved groups vent their angst, frustration and or ire at the political leadership whom has been expected to perform with “virtuosity”.

In the context of populist politics, there are THREE short cuts to solve every economic malaise (which I call Three Wise Monkey solution[8]); one is to THROW money at the problem. Another is to LEGISLATE prohibitions, regulations or taxes on what has been perceived politically incorrect. Lastly, to REPLACE supposed deficient political authorities or personality based politics.

So the Pork Barrel scandal has been seen as immoral actions undertaken by political agents and their private sector conspirators that has been instrumental to a deterioration in the public’s quality of life.

And the administration’s tolerance for its existence has only galvanized public opinion against them, hence, the sudden and sharp decline in popularity and the impeachment proceedings (which may just turn out to be symbolical).

Yet the public confuses the visible or the symptoms with the disease.

Because the essence of electoral ‘social democratic’ politics has been about promising free goodies in order to generate votes for politicians to acquire political power, those promises would have to be transformed into arbitrarily determined redistributive political spending.

Thus the public hardly understands that when people engage in a system that permits Pedro, mandated with a badge and a gun, to forcibly pick on the pocket of Juan to give to Mario via legislation and taxation, it is a system of Pork Barrel politics. So whether such expenditures has been to embellish a politician’s electoral odds for reelection (e.g. social “infrastructure” projects on political bailiwicks), office improvements on branches of the government or ghost projects which has been funneled into the pockets of unscrupulous officials, they are all the same, they represent non-productive consumption spending that amounts to a deadweight loss to the economy. In the eyes of the public the difference is on what has been popularly construed as moral.

Isn’t it the easiest money to spend is to spend someone else’s money? Isn’t it the easiest way to get votes is to promise to spend someone else’s money?

As the great libertarian HL Mencken explained[9]
The government consists of a gang of men exactly like you and me. They have, taking one with another, no special talent for the business of government; they have only a talent for getting and holding office. Their principal device to that end is to search out groups who pant and pine for something they can't get and to promise to give it to them. Nine times out of ten that promise is worth nothing. The tenth time is made good by looting A to satisfy B. In other words, government is a broker in pillage, and every election is sort of an advance auction sale of stolen goods.
So when election spending even at the grassroots or Barangay levels[10] has been soaring—to even even beyond the accrued basic compensation of the entire term of local officials—it is because pork barrel has been deeply embedded into the system. In short, the pork barrel system has been the essence of the Philippine social democratic order 
 
The nice part about the Pork Barrel scam saga has been to open the eyes of some to the duplicitous nature of populist politics and government

And as I have been pointing out here, the showbiz political economy[11] hardly realizes that the Pork Barrel controversy has been a sideshow to how inflationism corrupts and destroys society.

Yet the current deterioration in domestic populist politics seems as only an appetizer.

BSP’s 1Q Property NPLs Surge! From Boom Bust Economy to Boom Bust Politics

image 
The Philippine central bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas recently reported that the banking system’s consumer loans grew strongly in the 1Q 2014. This has been pegged at 13.6% from the same period last year[12].

The BSP further adds that: While the consumer finance portfolio increased, the ratio of the banks’ non-performing CLs to total CLs slightly decreased to 5.2 percent at end-March from 5.3 percent a quarter earlier. U/KBs and TBs also set aside loan loss reserves of 70.5 percent of their non-performing CLs as a safety net against consumer credit risks. Moreover, the consumer loan exposure of the banks also remained low relative to their peers in the region. At end-March 2014, the consumer credit exposure in Malaysia stood at 58.1 percent; Indonesia, 28.4 percent; Thailand, 27 percent; and Singapore, 25.7 percent.

The BSP hasn’t been forthright to say that the reason of the decline in the general non-performing consumer loans (NPL) has been due to a big collapse in the NPLs of the “Other Consumer Loans” category.

As shown in the above table, the BSP has been reticent about the big upside move in NPLs in the 1Q 2014 of Auto Loans and Real Estate Loans at 7% and 7.78% (!!!) respectively. Year on Year, the NPL growth rates has been at 9.25% and 4.41% correspondingly. As of March 2014, auto loans and real estate loans account for 26.4% and 44.47% of total consumer loans. And the surge in Real Estate and Auto Loans NPLs has been borne by Universal and Commercial Banks.

I will focus on real estate loans as they are the centerpiece of the current bubble. Nonetheless this represents a one-two punch.

To apply the 7.78% jump in real estate NPLs in 1Q 2014 in the perspective of the full year (March 2013-2014), the average 3 quarter growth for the last 3 Quarters of 2013 has been at 3.29% [based on the algebraic equation .25 (7.78) + .75(x) =4.41], this means real estate NPLs has MORE than DOUBLED!

The more than doubling of the growth rates of the real estate consumer NPLs in the 1Q 2014 vis-à-vis the average of the last three quarters of 2013 can be juxtaposed to the breathtaking 8.95% 1Q 2014 spike in the prices of 3 bedroom condominium units in Makati[13], the cresting of money supply growth rates also in Q1 2014[14], the intensifying official inflation rates and the below consensus expectations of 5.7% 1Q 2014 GDP growth rates[15].

It is striking to observe that as speculators fervently bid up on Makati condos at an 8.95% inflation rate which became a world sensation (see below on IIF), other buyers of condos have become delinquent. In other words, the growth rates of real estate NPLs (bad debts) have nearly caught up with the Makati’s property inflation.

Also we can deduce that inflation’s substitution and income effect[16] has begun to hamstring on consumers spending by diminishing disposable income, thereby most possibly contributing to the 1Q rise in bad debts.

Additionally, the significant drop in private sector construction in 1Q official GDP could partly be signaling such VERY INTERESTING twist of events.

Lastly, the 1Q increase in debt delinquency rates support my theory that the culminating liquidity growth rates have been signaling the acceleration of diminishing returns of debt. This means that soaring debt levels amidst the slowing formal economy growth rates puts into spotlight the heightening of credit risks. Instead of fresh spending power from new debt issuance which represents money from thin air or digital money, much of the current borrowing may have been channeled to paying existing debt, thereby the tumbling of liquidity growth rates.

The BSP claims that there have been enough loan loss reserves on the system. For now, yes. Everything is hunky-dory when the storm is away or at a distance.

My guess is that the BSP has been overestimating on their capability to address credit risks while contemporaneously underestimating the hazards of rampant debt accumulation into the system.

The danger is that when the current NPL trends continue or even intensify, then this will not only put on a big ghastly surprise to bubble worshippers and to the consensus with regards to economic growth trends, but importantly this may even present a “shock” to the financial system. The financial sector has been playing with a credit Russian roulette founded on reckless abandon and blindness from overconfidence inspired by the BSP’s Tetangco’s PUT. The implication is a disaster in the making.

Alternatively, this means that the real test to whether the domestic banking system has sufficient cushion is when the NPL drizzle morphs into a downpour. Model based stress test will hardly ever capture the human response to systemic distress.

And in order to paint the ambiance of tranquility, the BSP resorts to the repeated communications fallacy of framing by contrast principle, i.e. depicting how Philippine debt has been “low” by contrasting with the neighbors to imply safety without noting of the penetration levels underpinning such debt levels. This is the standard Talisman effect—the notion that shouting statistics will be enough to rid of “evil spirits” in the form of economic imbalances—prominently used by authorities and by their bubble zealots

Yet one would have to wonder: How does a 4.4% statistical official inflation rate generate so much furor as to reflect on a somber public perception of becoming “poorer”, to food prices grabbing the attention of the Senate, or even to reverse the sentiment of populist politics? You see, statistical numbers will hardly ever explain the unfolding events which are real time reactions and consequences to the intertemporal or previous and current monetary manipulations.

Nonetheless, the strains in the current political environment represent manifestations of the initial phases of stagflation. And as stagflation intensifies, public dissatisfaction will likewise be reflected on political sentiment. Stagflation, thus, fuels the rise in the political risk environment.

This also means that the public hardly has been aware that that when this entire credit house of cards crumbles or collapses—whose symptoms will be debt defaults, insolvencies, soaring formals sector unemployment, economic recession and even possibly a financial crisis—the combo mix of stagflation and bursting bubble will magnify today’s political hubbub.

The appetizer has been served, the main course is coming.

Too Obvious Bubbles: More Authorities Jump into the Bubble Warning Bandwagon!

I have been saying here that financial asset bubbles have become so so so very much obvious such that officials can no longer deny them. What they do now is first to admit to it, then next, downplay the degree of its perils and or shift the burden of responsibility to the markets.

Aside from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and the US Federal Reserve’s Janet Yellen[17] here are recent accounts of the bubble warning bandwagon…

The CNBC on German Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann[18]: ECB policymaker and President of the German Bundesbank Jens Weidmann warned on Thursday that the stimulus policies being delivered by the ECB could - over time - lead to financial risks such as exorbitant gains on real estate markets. (bold mine)

The Channelnewsasiaa.com on German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble[19]: German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble warned the European Central Bank just days ago that its loose monetary policy risked inflating markets to dangerous levels with cheap money. (bold mine)

This Bloomberg article noted of the actions recently taken by some European based central banks[20]: Last month, the Bank of England introduced measures to limit riskier mortgages, while the Swiss government in January forced banks to hold additional capital to protect them against a real estate crisis. In Denmark, the central bank has been pushing to reduce borrowers’ ability to defer principal repayments. (bold mine)

Simon Black on Monetary Authority of Singapore’s Lim Hng Kiang[21]: the deputy chair of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (Lim Hng Kiang) said last night at a dinner that “an uneasy calm seems to have settled in markets” and that “we remain in uncharted waters.” t was pretty amazing, really, to see such pointed language from a central banking official. Mr. Lim jabbed at the “obvious” risks and said there would be “bumps on the road” ahead. That’s putting it mildly. (bold mine)

The Australian on Treasury secretary Martin Parkinson[22]: Treasury secretary Martin Parkinson has warned low interest rates can “only do so much”, with the build-up of risks requiring the use of other tools to stimulate the economy… “Monetary policy needs to continue to play a supportive role,” Mr Parkinson said during a speech in London overnight. “Of course, there is a certain point at which the build-up of undesirable risks becomes a concern. In such instances, there is a need to consider what other tools are available.

Some very important highlights from former Fed Chief Alan Greenspan interview with Marketwatch.com[23] (bold mine)

Asked about the Fed’s recent stock market valuations concerns, Greenspan responded: You can’t get around the fact that asset values have a major impact on economic activity, and no central bank can be oblivious to what is happening, not only in credit markets, which is, of course, the Fed’s fundamental mandate, but in asset markets, as well. As a central banker, in addition to evaluating stock prices, you have to cover commercial-real-estate markets, commodity markets and the price of owner-occupied homes, as well. Without asset-market surveillance, you do not have an integrated view of how the economy works. How to respond to asset-price change is a legitimate issue. But not to monitor it, I think, is clearly a mistake.

As Fed Governor, I wonder why he didn’t practice what he preached today.

Mr Greenspan on bubbles: When bubbles emerge, they take on a life of their own. It is very difficult to stop them, short of a debilitating crunch in the marketplace. The Volcker Fed confronted and defused the huge inflation surge of 1979 but had to confront a sharp economic contraction. Short of that, bubbles have to run their course. Bubbles are functions of unchangeable human nature. The obvious question is how to manage them. All bubbles expand, and they all collapse. But how they are financed is critical. The dot-com boom [of 1994 to 2000] produced a huge financial collapse with almost no evidence of economic impact. You will be hard pressed to see it in the GDP figures of the early 2000s. Similarly, on Oct. 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 23% — an all-time one-day record, then and since. Goldman was contemplating withholding a $700 million payment to Continental Illinois Bank in Chicago scheduled for the Wednesday morning following the crash. In retrospect, had they withheld that payment, the crisis would have been far more disabling. Few remember that crisis because nothing happened as a consequence. But it was the scariest experience I had during my 18 years at the Fed.

My comment: Human nature or the behavioral side of asset bubbles and access to finance are two different but indispensably interrelated aspects that contributes to asset bubbles. The self-reinforcing process of bubbles is hardly a function of human nature alone but one critically intertwined with access to financing. Think of it, even if everyone would like to ride or piggyback on a specific bubble bandwagon, but if there will be limited or no access to (cheap) credit/money to finance this yield chasing phenomenon, then bubbles would barely come into existence. In short, human nature is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the formation of bubbles. The question is what motivates or goads on the human tendency to chase bubbles? The answer would be profits financed by cheap credit. And who is responsible for cheap credit? Mr. Greenspan sees such relationship in a vacuum.

The point of the above is to demonstrate how officials here and abroad have been painted to corner. There is no way out of a bubble bust.

IIF Warns on Global Carry Trade and Global Bond Liquidity

And speaking of apprehensions of bubbles the Janus faced global association of financial institution, the Institution of International Finance, with 450 members from 70 nations in their latest outlook seems deeply concerned with the Fed’s tapering.

They write[24]: Against this background, a key potential trigger for a correction in asset prices could be an acceleration in the expected path of the Fed funds rate currently priced in by futures markets—which is now much more relaxed than the median estimate of FOMC members. Uncertainty in the interpretation of new economic data and the FOMC’s intentions is likely to create more uncertainty about the timing and pace of the Fed's tightening moves, probably leading to a correction in the currently low levels of volatility. This would set the stage for a potentially large correction in asset valuations when short-term rates rises since asset valuation is quite lofty relative to fundamentals—i.e. economic and earnings growth. Moreover, such a correction could be substantial due to significant "one-way" positioning by market participants in various asset classes —including emerging market carry trades and mature market equities. (bold mine)

image

Absolutely a stunning picture of bubbles (left window)!

The "one-way" positioning in Emerging Market-Developed Market carry trades looks like one of the major time bombs set to detonate soon.

To see how such carry trades has goosed up financial markets we look first at stock market performances.

The year-to-date stock market returns for the major beneficiaries Brazil 12.26%, Indonesia 19.06%, India 23.26% and Turkey 24.21%. Paradoxically, these four carry trade beneficiaries (excluding in the above South Africa) have been part of the newly coined “fragile 5 economies” whose markets had been hammered in 2013 due to large current account deficits. So the greater the risks, the bigger the gains. This means larger risks has attracted more frenzied speculative activities

We are not only witnessing spectacular record carry trades, this week alone emerging market sovereign debt issuance hit a record. Sovereign debt sales of emerging market exclusive of China according to the Financial Times[25], reached $69.47bn in the first six months of the year, a jump of 54 per cent on the same period in 2013.The increase makes 2014 a record year for emerging market government debt issuance so far, according to data from Thomson Reuters. (bold mine)

So record carry trades must have diffused into speculations on emerging market debts as well!

And the spectacular debt buildup can be seen in the furious growth of banking assets in emerging market economies. You can see the chart here. For instance, banking assets as % to gdp for the Philippines has about doubled from 2005-2013.

image

Global home prices are also at record highs. This has been spearheaded by emerging markets as housing prices of mature markets underperform.

The fragile 5 has also been one of the biggest gainers in terms of housing price inflation in 1Q 2014.

This is a sign where carry trades have filtered not only to currency trades, stock and bond markets but also to the eye-popping speculative run on housing.

And guess which EM country topped the housing in 1Q 2014 (right window)? No bubble eh?

And this is also a sign where almost every part of the world has been entranced to zero bound (quasi permanent boom) rates that have spawned asset bubbles.

And sadly, this signifies further evidence of the MOTHER of all Bubbles.

I called the IIF Janus Faced because in this week’s report, the global financial trade association seems to have been oblivious of what they wrote in their monthly report.

Nevertheless going back to the IIF’s monthly report they raise concerns over the shrinking liquidity in the global bond markets even as bond issuance swell.

From the IIF[26] (bold mine): Global secondary bond market liquidity appears to be in less than perfect health. In emerging markets, turnover has been decreasing while at the same time, bid -ask spreads have been increasing. Both measures are indicating jointly an impairment in secondary market liquidity. This problem appears to be present in mature markets as well: recent studies on market liquidity in the Euro Area and Japan suggest similar problems with liquidity. In the U.S., turnover has been decreasing and not been able to keep up with issuance. Trade sizes and block trades have fallen, while primary dealer inventories have been decreasing. There is a risk of market disruptions with the Fed exit: on one side, there is a large number of investors who may potentially try to sell their bond positions. On the other side of the trade there may not be a sufficient number of willing counter-parties. In fact, there are fewer willing market makers and those willing hold less inventory. As mentioned at the outset, market depth—a critical dimension of market liquidity—is contingent on the risk bearing capacity of market makers and their number. Higher capital charges and stricter regulatory requirements have made the secondary bond market making business less economically viable to market makers, increased their level of risk aversion and reduced their numbers. This may lead to an undesirable situation where the unwinding of the long bond trade runs into a one-way market, potentially creating disruptions, and disorderly adjustment.

Aside from higher capital charges and stricter regulatory requirements, I believe that for the US[27] and Japan[28] their respective central bank’s Quantitative Easing has played a substantial role in the siphoning liquidity out of their respective bond markets.

Government interventions to manipulate yield curves through bond purchases have only reduced the available securities for trade. And the bigger bid-ask spreads and reduced turnover amplifies risks of sharp volatility.

Nonetheless, the US Federal Reserve may be increasingly using its reserve repo facility to fill in the void. However the deepening reliance on the very short term repo market also accentuates the risks of runs.

Former chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp Sheila Blair writing at the Wall Street Journal warns[29] (bold mine): the reverse repurchase program doesn't look like a temporary experiment. Large institutional investors, notably including money-market funds and government-sponsored entities (such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ) are using it regularly. The facility hit an overnight high of $242 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2014. The Fed has raised the overnight allotment cap for individual buyers from $500 million in September to $10 billion today. The mere existence of this facility could exacerbate liquidity runs during times of market stress. Borrowers in the short-term debt markets will have to compete with it for investment dollars and all, to varying degrees, will be viewed as higher risk than lending to the Fed. Even a relatively minor market event could encourage a massive flow of funds to the Fed while contributing to a flow away from other short-term borrowers. Nonfinancial companies could find themselves unable to find buyers for their commercial paper. Banks could confront a sudden outflow of deposits, particularly those which are uninsured. Even the U.S. Treasury—traditionally viewed as the safest harbor—could see its borrowing costs spike as investors decide that the Fed is even safer. Ironically, faced with a more acute liquidity crisis, the Fed would likely have to use the funds it is borrowing through reverse repos to provide a lifeline to the very markets that suffered. For investors seeking safety, the Fed would become the borrower of first resort. For borrowers affected by the resulting diversion of funding, the Fed would become the backstop lender.

In short, private borrowing and lending activities will diminish as most participants would likely focus their trade with the Fed. The Fed’s more engaged presence translates to sizeable distortions among counterparties, thus amplifies the risks of a run.

I believe that the US government may have anticipated this as to allow money market funds to impose restrictions on withdrawals or charge fees on securities redeemed[30].

As one would observe, in the attempt at suppressing volatility, interventions beget interventions. Yet deepening of interventions creates more complexities that give rise to even more uncertainties and risks.

Such sows the seeds for a Black Swan. As my favorite math iconoclast Nassim Taleb explains[31] (bold mine)
The problem with artificially suppressed volatility is not just that the system tends to become extremely fragile; it is that, at the same time, it exhibits no visible risks. Also remember that volatility is information. In fact, these systems tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policy makers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained systems become prone to Black Swans. Such environments eventually experience massive blow-ups…catching everyone off guard and undoing years of stability or, in almost all cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm to both economic and political systems.
Speculators Flee Junk Bonds: Has US Bubble Been Pricked?

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Could it be that the US credit and stock market bubble may have already been pricked?

Junk bonds have reportedly hit the wall on signs of distressed outflows.

From the Wall Street Journal (bold mine)[32]: Investors are selling junk bonds at the fastest pace in more than a year, as fresh interest-rate fears and geopolitical turmoil amplify valuation concerns following a long rally. Prices on bonds issued by lower-rated U.S. companies tumbled to a three-month low this week, according to a Bank of America Merrill Lynch index. Investors yanked $2.38 billion from mutual funds and exchange-traded funds dedicated to junk bonds in the week ended Wednesday, the largest weekly withdrawal since June last year, said fund tracker Lipper. That came on the heels of $1.68 billion that poured out the week before…Yields closed at 5.29% on Wednesday, meaning the bonds now offer just 3.65 percentage points in extra yield above comparable Treasurys. That spread rarely has gone below four points and in recent years has at times doubled that figure and more. Investor worries don't stem primarily from fear that borrowers will default. U.S. employment and industrial output are expanding, and U.S. companies are as cash-rich as they have been in recent memory.

A lot of these junk bonds have used to fund buybacks, dividends and LBOs. If junk bonds continue to fall does this mean the end to buybacks too? How will these affect other credit markets both domestic and international?

As for U.S. employment and industrial output’s sustained expansion, I won’t bet on it.

The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis is slated to release the advance estimates of US second quarter GDP on July 30. Remember the US economy shrunk by 2.9% in the first Quarter.

Will the US economy bounce strongly from the early slump? As I pointed out last week, there has been a rush to pare down on growth estimates from mainstream analysts. Or will the US show little growth or stagnation?

Or at worst, will the US enter a technical recession? If the latter holds, how will the markets and authorities respond? Will bad news be interpreted as good news? Will the Fed end the taper? Will there be fireworks?

A very interesting week ahead.

An Ongoing China “Pump and Dump”?

I am supposed to write lengthily about the recent sparkle in China’s stock market (which jumped 3.28% over the week) grounded on the government’s digging herself deeper into debt hole with the recent runup in debt levels. But I seem to have reached my limits for the day so I will make a short note on this instead.

China’s overall debt levels have now reportedly reached 251% of GDP[33] which has been a few percent off the US at 260%. China’s statistical growth recovered to 7.5% in 2Q but this has emerged out of bigger than expected loan growth that had been reflected on her money supply growth. China’s credit growth has vastly been outperforming the economic growth rate which means debt levels will continue to mount. This is simply unsustainable

Additionally debt hasn’t just been about statistics, as borrowed money gets to be allocated somewhere. Chinese fixed asset investment posted a 17.3% growth during the first half of 2014, where has all the borrowed money been spent on? Will the recent increase in debt add to her laundry list of ghost projects?

Chinese officials seem to have opted to focus on the short term at the expense of the long term, shelved supposed reforms and appear to be desperately attempting to buy time from a full blown debt crisis.

Besides Chinese data appears inconsistent with her external trade data when measured from China’s trading partners as Dr Ed Yardeni notes: Indeed, total imports (using the 12-month sum in US dollars) is down 0.7% in June from its record high in February. On a yearly percent change basis, it has been growing around 5% since late 2012, well below the double-digit pace of the previous three years. I also track Chinese imports by country of origin. The recent slowdown in imports to China has been widespread among these countries, with the exception of the European Union, which is at a new record high. Australia and Brazil, the big commodity exporters to China, are flat-lining. So are Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which tend to ship capital equipment and technology goods to China. Chinese imports from emerging countries have been submerging a bit in recent months from February’s record high.

The spike in Chinese stock market comes as a local government has bailed out what could have been the first commercial paper default in Huatong Road & Bridge Group[34].

Also another trust company China Credit Trust whose trust product Credit Equals Gold 2 warned last Friday that they might be unable to repay investors. Such concerns had been impetuously written off by the stock markets. Why so? Because earlier on, a delinquent trust product, Credit Equals Gold 1, from the same company has been bailed out by the Chinese government[35].

So the Chinese government seems to be orienting the public that impending credit problems would mostly be dealt with by the government through bailouts. This implies a Xi-Zhou PUT (from China’s President Xi Jin Ping and PBoC governor Zhou Xiaochuan) in motion.

Perhaps the Chinese government may be attempting to mimic her US and European contemporaries by igniting a stock market boom in order to paint a picture of recovery. If so, then expect consumer price inflation to soar. This would put a cap on the boom.

China’s “pump and dump” anyone? [Templeton's Mark Mobius says yes]





[3] ABSCBSNews.com Public satisfaction with PNoy plunges: SWS July 14, 2014




[7] John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace pp. 235-248. PBS.org


[9] Henry Louise Mencken Prejudices First Series (1919) Wikiquote



[12] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Banks' Consumer Loans Continue to Grow July 22, 2014










[22] The Australian Treasury secretary Martin Parkinson July 25, 2014


[24] Institute of International Finance, Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Low Volatility July-August 2014 Capital Markets Monitor and Teleconference p. 4


[26] IIF op cit p.8



[29] Sheila Blair The Federal Reserve's Risky Reverse Repurchase Scheme Wall Street Journal July 24, 2014


[31] Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile Things that Gain from Disorder p. 106


[33] Business Insider China’s total debt surges to 251% of GDP Economic Times July 23,2014

[34] IFR Asia Default scare for China bonds July 27, 2014