Showing posts with label stagflation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label stagflation. Show all posts

Sunday, September 14, 2025

Minsky's Fragility Cycle Meets Wile E. Coyote: The Philippine Banking System’s Velocity Trap


But the boom cannot continue indefinitely. There are two alternatives. Either the banks continue the credit expansion without restriction and thus cause constantly mounting price increases and an ever-growing orgy of speculation, which, as in all other cases of unlimited inflation, ends in a “crack-up boom” and in a collapse of the money and credit system. Or the banks stop before this point is reached, voluntarily renounce further credit expansion and thus bring about the crisis. The depression follows in both instances—Ludwig von Mises 

In this issue

Minsky's Fragility Cycle Meets Wile E. Coyote: The Philippine Banking System’s Velocity Trap

I. Introduction: The Banking System’s Wile E. Coyote Moment

II. NPL Benchmarks Unveil Minskyan Fragility and the Wile E. Coyote Moment

III. Diminishing Returns: Policy Stimulus-Backstop Backlash

IV. Banks’ Drift Toward Consumers: Credit Cards and Salary Loans Power NPLs Higher

V. Stagflation Signals and the Death Knell of Benchmark-ism: Labor Frailty Meets Inflation’s Third Leg

VI. The Wile E. Coyote Dynamic in Bank Investments via Available For Sale (AFS) Assets

VII. AFS Surge and Recession-Grade Financial Losses

VIII. Benchmark-ism and the Illusion of Confidence

IX. Velocity or Collapse: The Wile E. Coyote Reckoning

X. BSP’s Tacit Pivot: From Sovereign Risk to Banking Backstop

XI. Conclusion: The Velocity Charade Meets Its Limits 

Minsky's Fragility Cycle Meets Wile E. Coyote: The Philippine Banking System’s Velocity Trap

The Wile E Coyote velocity game—credit expansion, AFS bets, and central bank lifelines—keeps Philippine banks afloat, but the stability it projects is an illusion

I. Introduction: The Banking System’s Wile E. Coyote Moment 

Inquirer.net, September 06, 2025: Bad debts held by the Philippine banking system rose to their highest level in eight months in July, as lenders—facing slimmer margins from declining interest rates—may have leaned more on riskier retail borrowers in search of yield. Latest data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas showed that nonperforming loans (NPL), or debts overdue by at least 90 days and at risk of default, accounted for 3.40 percent of the industry’s total loan portfolio. That marked the highest share since November 2024, when the NPL ratio stood at 3.54 percent. 

Time and again, we’ve detailed the escalating challenges facing the Philippine banking system—chief among them, its role in financing the government deficit amid elevated rates. 

This has led to record levels of held-to-maturity (HTM) securities, mounting investment losses from mark-to-market exposures, and potentially unpublished credit delinquencies buried in loan accounts. 

Together, these forces have contributed to the system’s entropic liquidity conditions: a slow, grinding erosion of institutional health masked by policy choreography. 

But recent developments take the proverbial cake. While NPLs remain elevated, their apparent ‘containment’ has served as public reassurance—an illusion of stability. 

Beneath that veneer, banks have shifted into a "velocity game" to preserve KPI optics: record-high credit expansion running in tandem with record-high NPLs. 

This statistical kabuki masks growing stress but sets the system on a path to its own Wile E. Coyote moment

While this sustains confidence in the short term, the moment loan growth slows, the cliff edge becomes visible—and the entire charade unravels. 

II. NPL Benchmarks Unveil Minskyan Fragility and the Wile E. Coyote Moment


Figure 1

Since the second half of 2022, Philippine banks have seen a structural uptrend in gross nonperforming loans (NPLs), with nominal levels breaching all-time highs by April 2024 and reaching a record Php 535 billion in July 2025. (Figure 1, topmost chart) 

Though the industry’s NPL ratio remains at a deceptively flat at 3.4 percent, this apparent stability is largely the effect of the ‘denominator illusion’: total loan growth (+11 percent) has been fast enough to offset the rise in bad loans.  (Figure 1, middle window) 

This accelerates procyclical risk-taking—banks extend more credit, often to riskier retail borrowers, to maintain headline ratios

Neo-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky famously proposed that financial instability evolves in stages—from hedge finance to speculative finance, and finally to Ponzi finance—where borrowers can no longer generate sufficient cash flows to service debt and must rely on refinancing, rollovers, or asset sales to stay afloat (see references) 

But Minsky’s framework has a counterparty: the lender

In the Philippine case, banks have become enablers of this drift. To keep overleveraged firms and households solvent, they must sustain ever-faster credit expansion—rolling over weak loans, extending new ones, and deferring recognition of losses. 

This is the Minskyan drift on the supply side: not just borrower pathology, but lender complicity

A banking system whose apparent stability depends on pyramiding credit to increasingly marginal borrowers, refinancing delinquent accounts, and chasing yield into riskier consumer segments—exacerbating the very fragility it was meant to manage. 

The result is a velocity-dependent equilibrium—one that demands constant motion to avoid collapse. 

When the sprint falters or bad debts surge, the NPL ratio will spike—mechanically, inevitably—unveiling the proverbial skeletons long buried beneath the benchmark gloss. 

The system confronts its Wile E. Coyote moment: suspended mid-air, legs still spinning, gravity imminent. Once credit growth slows, the ground disappears—and the fragility long masked by velocity is fully revealed. 

III. Diminishing Returns: Policy Stimulus-Backstop Backlash 

This Minskyan drift is unfolding despite a full-spectrum easing cycle from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: reserve requirement cuts, interest rate reductions, the USDPHP softpeg regime, doubled deposit insurance, and lingering regulatory relief. 

Layered atop record fiscal stimulus, these measures were designed to cushion the system—but they now reveal diminishing returns

The irony is sharp: instead of stabilizing credit dynamics, these policies have parlayed into rising risksencouraging yield-chasing behavior and masking stress through refinancing

And to maintain the illusion of stability, authorities have upped the ante on benchmark-ism—using statistical bellwethers to project ‘resilience’ while embellishing markets to fit the narrative. 

As nominal NPLs climb and consumer credit deepens, the central bank faces an unenviable dilemma: tighten policy and risk triggering defaults, or deploy unprecedented, pandemic-style liquidity injections to preserve appearances even as the system runs out of runway. At the same time, banks themselves may be compelled to conserve liquidity and pull back on credit expansion, exposing the system’s velocity game for what it is. 

Needless to say, whether in response to BSP policy or escalating balance sheet stress, banks may begin pulling back on credit—unveiling the Wile E. Coyote moment, where velocity stalls and gravity takes hold. 

IV. Banks’ Drift Toward Consumers: Credit Cards and Salary Loans Power NPLs Higher 

This fragility is no longer confined to institutional (supply side) exposures—it’s now bleeding into the household sector. 

The banking system’s transformational pivot toward consumer credit—particularly credit card loans—has deepened latent risks, building a larger stock of eventual loan portfolio losses. 

While aggregate nominal consumer loans (including real estate) hit a record high in Q2 2025, non-performing loans also sprinted higher from their December 2022 bottom. Gross consumer NPLs now sit just 4.7% below their Q2 2021 peak. (Figure 1, lowest graph) 

Though recent increases have been broad-based, the lag in consumer credit delinquencies reflects delayed stress transmission—especially in motor vehicle and real estate segments.


Figure 2

Crucially, the share of consumer loans to banks’ total loan portfolio (net of interbank) reached an all-time high of 22.34% in Q2 2025. Year-on-year growth in consumer NPLs has accelerated from single digits in 2024 to double digits in the last two quarters. (Figure 2 topmost pane)  

As noted earlier, surging NPLs have accompanied blistering growth in credit card loans—both hitting record highs in Q2. (Figure 2, middle image) 

But it’s not just credit cards: salary loan NPLs also spiked to a record, juxtaposed against all-time high disbursements. (Figure 2, lowest graph)


Figure 3

Strikingly, even as bank lending hits new highs, consumer real estate NPLs have climbed over the past two quarters. This uptick comes despite previously stable delinquency rates—a counterintuitive anomaly given the record and near-record vacancy levels observed in Q1 and Q2 2025, potentially a product of sustained refinancing. (Figure 3, topmost diagram)  

These pressures are permeating into the demand side of the economy—further evidence of a consumer squeezed by inflation, debt, and the slow erosion of repayment capacity. 

Taken together, weak household balance sheets, rising camouflaged NPLs, and a slowing economy raise systemic risks that extend well beyond macro fundamentals—threatening institutional health and reaching deep into the financial sector’s core, even as headline growth continues to mask the underlying fragility. 

V. Stagflation Signals and the Death Knell of Benchmark-ism: Labor Frailty Meets Inflation’s Third Leg 

Credit risk pressures should intensify with the July labor market data, which unexpectedly exposes the labor market’s underlying frailty. 

The unemployment rate (5.33%) and unemployed population (2.59 million) surged to pandemic-era highs (August 2022: 5.3%, 2.681 million), while the labor participation rate fell to 60.7%—slightly above July 2023’s 60.1%. (Figure 3 middle and lowest images) 

Stunningly, despite a 1.51% YoY increase in population, the non-labor force swelled to 31.45 million, the highest level since at least 2021

Combined, the unemployed and non-labor force accounted for a staggering 42.5% of the 15-and-above population in July 2025—a July 2023 high. 

Ironically, authorities amusingly blamed the weather. 

For banks, a looming storm is brewing: fragile household balance sheets, concealed loan delinquencies, and a deteriorating labor market set the stage for increased NPL formation in Q3 2025, with potentially systemic consequences


Figure 4

There’s more. 

Authorities also reported that despite rice price controls and the 20-peso rollout, headline CPI jumped to 1.5% in August—exposing the likely anomalous 0.9% dip in July. More concerning is the CORE CPI breakout, rising from 2.3% to 2.7%, the highest since December 2024. (Figure 4, topmost visual) 

Historically, a negative spread—where CORE CPI exceeds headline—has signaled cyclical bottoms for headline inflation. 

History rhymes. Peak CPI in October 2018 marked the launchpad for the record run in gross NPLs, which climaxed in October 2021 before slowing. (Figure 4, second to the highest image) 

Likewise, February 2023’s peak CPI became the springboard for the recent all-time highs in gross NPLs—records now eclipsed or obscured by the Wile E. Coyote velocity game. 

The pattern is clear: Each cycle shows how households use credit to bridge spending power losses during inflation surges, only to leave borrowers delinquent in its wake

The fatal cocktail of surging unemployment and a potential third leg of the inflation cycle—stagflation—could be the coup de grâce for NPL benchmark-ism. The illusion of resilience may not survive the next impact. 

VI. The Wile E. Coyote Dynamic in Bank Investments via Available For Sale (AFS) Assets 

There’s another aspect we’ve barely touched—yet it has become a critical factor in the banking system’s health challenges, now showing symptoms of the Wile E. Coyote dynamic: investment assets

First, the distribution of bank assets reveals a transformational shift—from safeguarding liquidity to an entrenched addiction to leverage. This seismic rebalancing is evident in the rising share of investments and, more recently, the rebound in loan activity, both at the expense of cash reserves. (Figure 4, second to the lowest graph) 

Since the BSP’s historic rescue during the pandemic recession, the cash share of bank assets has plunged to an all-time low of 6.93% as of July 2025. 

Second, as we’ve repeatedly noted, the pandemic-level fiscal deficit has driven the banking system’s net claim on central government (NCoCG) to a record Php 5.547 trillion (up 7.12% last July). This is mirrored in Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assets, which rose 2.15% to a record Php 4.1 trillion. Today’s deficit is not just a macro concern—it’s manifesting as a liquidity squeeze across the banking system. And that’s before accounting for the adverse effects of crowding out. (Figure 4 lowest graph) 

Third, the very investments that carried the banking system through the pandemic—buoyed by the historic BSP cash injections—have now become a source of friction

The need for sustained liquidity from the BSP to keep asset prices afloat has morphed into a Trojan Horse for inflation and a fuel source for increasingly speculative risk-taking engagements. 

To stave off asset deflation, the BSP must inject liquidity—primarily via bank credit expansion—yet this comes at the cost of spiking inflation risk.


Figure 5

This dynamic is most evident in Available-for-Sale (AFS) assets, which now constitute 41% of gross financial assets, fast catching up to HTMs at 52%. (Figure 5, topmost window) 

VII. AFS Surge and Recession-Grade Financial Losses 

The record build-up of AFS assets has heightened exposure to mark-to-market shocks, transmitting valuation swings directly into capital accounts and investor sentiment. 

The impact is already visible: In Q2, Philippine banks suffered an income contraction of (-) 1.96%, driven largely by a surge in losses on financial assets totaling Php 43.782 billion—the largest since December 2020, at the height of the pandemic recession. Let it be clear, these are recession-grade losses. (Figure 5, middle chart) 

With fixed income rates falling and bond prices rallying, the source of these losses becomes clear by elimination: deteriorating equity positions and bad debt. This is reinforced by the all-time high in banks’ allowance for credit losses (ACL)—a supposed buffer against rising delinquencies that signals institutional awareness of latent stress. (Figure 5, lowest diagram) 

Yet, like NPLs, these record ACLs are statistically suppressed by spitfire loan growth.

VIII. Benchmark-ism and the Illusion of Confidence


Figure 6

Nonetheless, this structural shift helps explain the growing correlation between AFS trends and the PSE Financial Index. (Figure 6, topmost window) 

In this light, banks—alongside Other Financial Corporations (OFCs)—may well represent a Philippine version of the stock market “National Team”: pursuing benchmark-ism or, perhaps, reticently tasked with pumping member-bank share prices within the Financial Index to choreograph market confidence. 

Patterns of coordinated price actions—post-lunch ‘afternoon delight’ rallies and pre-closing pumps—can often be traced back to these actors. 

Whether by design or silent coordination, the optics are unmistakable. 

IX. Velocity or Collapse: The Wile E. Coyote Reckoning 

The implication is stark: even as banks expanded their AFS portfolios —ostensibly for liquidity and yield, they deepened their exposure to volatility and credit deterioration. 

Equity-linked losses began bleeding into financial statements, and provisioning behavior revealed a system bracing for impact. 

The liquidity strain was hiding in plain sight—concealed by statistical optics and benchmark histrionics.

Compounding this is the shadow of large corporate exposures—most notably San Miguel Corporation, whose Q2 profits were largely driven by asset transfers, shielding its Minskyan Ponzi-finance model of fragility 

For instance, if banks hold AFS equity stakes or debt instruments linked to SMC, any deterioration in valuation or repayment capacity would surface as mark-to-market losses or provisioning spikes. 

Alas, like Wile E. Coyote, banks now require another velocity game—pumping financial assets higher to sustain investment optics. 

Without it, they risk compounding their liquidity dilemma into a full-blown solvency issue.

X. BSP’s Tacit Pivot: From Sovereign Risk to Banking Backstop 

The drain in the banking system’s cash reserves appears to be accelerating

Following June’s 11.35% jump (+Php 224.78 billion), July posted a 12.8% contraction (–Php 281.87 billion), fully offsetting gains of June, and partly last May (+Php 66.11 billion). Nonetheless, cash and due from banks at Php 1.923 trillion fell to its lowest level since at least 2014. 

And July’s slump signifies a continuum of long-term trend. However, from the slomo erosion, the depletion appears to be intensifying. 

So, despite interim growth bounce of deposits and financial assets, net (excluding equities), the cash-due banks to deposit and liquid-assets-to-deposit ratios resume their respective waterfalls.  In July, cash to deposit ratio slipped to all-time lows, while liquid assets-to-deposit fell to pre-pandemic March 2020 lows! (Figure 6, middle chart) 

Ironically, July’s massive cash drain coincided with the implementation of CMEPA. 

Importantly, banks drew a massive Php 189 billion from the central bank’s coffers as shown by the BSP’s claims on other depository corporations (ODC). (Figure 6, lowest diagram) 

This wasn’t a routine liquidity operation—it was a balance sheet pivot, redirecting support away from direct government exposure and toward the banking sector itself. The implication is clear: the system is leaning harder on central bank liquidity to offset deepening reserve depletion.


Figure 7

By shrinking its net claims on the central government (NCoCG) while expanding its claims on ODCs, the central bank has effectively told the Treasury to park its funds at BSP, while opening its own balance sheet wider to banks. This reduces BSP’s exposure to sovereign credit, but leaves banks more dependent on central bank lifelines to cover liquidity shortfalls. (Figure 7, topmost visual)  

In practice, this means banks are now forced into a double bind. On one hand, they must absorb more government securities and expand credit to keep up the optics of balance-sheet strength. 

On the other, they rely more heavily on BSP’s injections to plug holes in cash reserves. This rebalancing masks systemic strain—liquidity looks managed on paper, but the underlying dependence on continuous velocity (credit growth, AFS positioning, and central bank drawdowns) signals fragility. 

Far more crucial, what emerges is a structural shift: the BSP’s balance sheet is less about backstopping fiscal deficits and more about propping up the banking system. Yet this is not a permanent fix—if banks stumble in their velocity game or government borrowing intensifies, the pressure could quickly return in the form of crowding-out, valuation losses, and even solvency fears. In short, the pivot may buy time, but it also deepens the Wile E. Coyote dilemma: run faster, or fall.

With the BSP pivoting towards a backstop, bank borrowing growth decelerated to 8.9% YoY or fell by 14% MoM in July to Php Php 1.58 trillion—about 17% down from the record Php 1.907 trillion last March 2025. (Figure 7, middle image) 

This deceleration underscores the limits of the velocity game: even with central bank support, banks are struggling to sustain credit expansion without exposing themselves to deeper asset and funding risks. 

XI. Conclusion: The Velocity Charade Meets Its Limits 

The deepening Wile E. Coyote dynamic—where velocity props up optics of loans and investments—is unsustainable. (Figure 7, lowest cartoon) 

Surging NPLs and rising latent loan losses belie the façade of credit expansion. 

Accelerated exposure to AFS assets injects mark-to-market volatility, while HTMs tie banks to the unsparing race of public debt. 

There is no free lunch. Policy-induced fragility is no longer theoretical—it is compounding and irreducible to benchmark-ism or statistical optics. 

The illusion of managed liquidity is cracking. Each policy lifeline buys time—but only deepens the fall if velocity fails. 

Yet banks and the political economy have locked themselves in a fatal trap:

  • Deposit rebuilding is punished by state policy,
  • Recapitalization is constrained by fiscal exhaustion,
  • Capital markets are dominated by overleveraged elites,
  •  Hedge finance is crowded out by Ponzi rollovers,
  • Tax and savings reform is politically dead under “free lunch” populism 

In short: a trap within an inescapable trap. 

___

References: 

Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, May 1992 

Prudent Investor Newsletter Substack Archives: 

-Goldilocks Meets the Three Bad Bears: BSP’s Sixth Rate Cut and the Late-Cycle Reckoning August 31, 2025 (substack) 

-Philippine Banks: June’s Financial Losses and Liquidity Strains Expose Late-Cycle Fragility August 7, 2025 (substack) 

-Liquidity Under Pressure: Philippine Banks Struggle in Q1 2025 Amid a Looming Fiscal Storm May 18, 2025 (substack) 

-BSP’s Fourth Rate Cut: Who Benefits, and at What Cost? April 13, 2025 (substack) 

CMEPA 

The CMEPA Delusion: How Fallacious Arguments Conceal the Risk of Systemic Blowback July 27, 2025 (substack)

The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design July 20,2025 (substack) 

  


Sunday, October 13, 2024

Has the Philippine Government Won Its Battle Against Inflation? SWS Self-Poverty Survey Disagrees, Unveiling Its Hidden Messages


There is no escape from debt. Paying for the government’s fictitious promises in paper money will result in a constantly depreciating currency, thereby impoverishing those who earn a wage or have savings. Inflation is the hidden tax, and it is very convenient for governments because they always blame shops or businesses and present themselves as the solution by printing even more currency. Governments want more inflation to reduce the impact of the enormous debt and unfunded liabilities in real terms. They know they can’t tax you more, so they will tax you indirectly by destroying the purchasing power of the currency they issue—Daniel Lacalle

 In this issue

Has the Philippine Government Won Its Battle Against Inflation? SWS Self-Poverty Survey Disagrees, Unveiling Its Hidden Messages

I. Unveiling the Likely Hidden Messages Behind the Declaration of Victory Over Inflation

II. Treasury Curve was Spot On about Inflation, Short-Term Treasury Yields Plunge! Will the BSP Cut by 50 bps?

III. Supply-Side Disinflation? Despite Strong Credit Growth, Manufacturing Remains in the Doldrums, as Reflected by PPI Deflation and Output Sluggishness

IV. Supply-Side Disinflation? Lethargic Consumer Imports and July FDI Reflect Frail Capital Goods Imports

V. Demand-Side Disinflation? September CPI Plunged Despite Vigorous August Consumer Bank Lending, Liquidity Growth Dived

VI. Disinflation with Employment at Near Historic Highs Backed by a Credit Boom? Slower Deficit Spending Puts Pressure on Liquidity Strains

VII. SWS’s Self-Rated Poverty Survey versus the Government’s CPI 

Has the Philippine Government Won Its Battle Against Inflation? SWS Self-Poverty Survey Disagrees: Unveiling Its Hidden Messages

A Philippine media outlet proclaimed that the Philippine government won its battle against inflation, while a private survey contradicted this view. Who's right?

I. Unveiling the Likely Hidden Messages Behind the Declaration of Victory Over Inflation

Figure 1 

Two interesting headlines that hallmark this week’s conflicting message on inflation. 

Inquirer.net, October 7, 2024: The Philippines may now declare victory in its long and painful fight against inflation after price growth last month eased to a four-year low, helping create the perfect economic condition for gradual interest rate cuts…The BSP is now at a point where it has to undo its most forceful tightening actions in two decades, which had sent the benchmark rate to its highest level in 17 years to tame stubbornly high inflation. Cutting borrowing costs is necessary amid market predictions that the economy may grow below the government’s target for this year after consumption showed signs of weakening…Moving forward, Governor Eli Remolona Jr. said the central bank would take “baby steps” until the key rate falls to 4.5 percent by the end of 2025, suggesting that monetary authorities would unlikely resort to jumbo cuts that may stir up market fears that the economy is headed for a hard landing. (bold mine)

SWS.org.ph, October 9, 2024: The national Social Weather Survey of September 14-23, 2024, found 59% of Filipino families rating themselves as Mahirap or Poor, 13% rating themselves as Borderline (by placing themselves on a line dividing Poor and Not Poor), and 28% rating themselves as Hindi Mahirap or Not Poor. The September 2024 percentage of Self-Rated Poor families rose by 1 point from 58% in June 2024, following a significant 12-point rise from 46% in March 2024. This was the highest percentage of Self-Rated Poor families since June 2008. The estimated numbers of Self-Rated Poor families were 16.3 million in September 2024 and 16.0 million in June 2024. The percentage of respondent households rating themselves as poor was applied to the Philippine Statistics Authority medium-population projections for 2024 to arrive at the estimated numbers of Self-Rated Poor families… The September 2024 survey found the percentage of Borderline families at 13%, up by 1 point from the record low 12% in June 2024 following an 18-point decline from 30% in March 2024… As of September 2024, the percentage of Not Poor families was at 28%, 2 points below the record high 30% in June 2024. (bold mine)

First and foremost, what does "declare victory in its long and painful fight against inflation" mean? (Figure 1, upper tweet)

The Philippine CPI posted two straight months of DEFLATION (statistical price decreases) in September (-0.37%) and October (-0.19%) 2015; yet, the media and establishment experts barely made such a brazen pronouncement until now.

Yes, Q3 2024 statistical inflation of 3.2% has dropped to its 9-year support level, but this doesn’t mean that the inflation cycle has been broken.


Figure 2
 

In Q3 2015, the CPI slipped into deflation at -0.1%, which prompted banks to accelerate their net claims on central government (NCoCG) or indirect QE. Ironically, this germinated the current inflation cycle, which is now on its ninth-year.  (Figure 2 upper image)

Despite its recent decline, given that the CPI has remained on an uptrend since 2015 and appears to have settled at the support levels, what assurances does the establishment hold that it won’t be subject to a third wave?

Second, the September CPI of 1.9% doesn’t translate to the evisceration of inflation; it only means that GENERAL prices have risen at REDUCED rates (or have dropped to within the BSP’s target), but they are still RISING!

In fact, BSP data tell us that even in the context of the understated inflation rate, over 99% of the purchasing power of the peso has been eroded since 1957! How is that for "declaring victory over inflation"? (Figure 2, lower chart)

On the other hand, while authorities and media bask in this pretentious statistical feat, a private sector survey tell us a different story: slower inflation has exposed the persistent and growing burden of a lower standard of living! (More on this below.) (Figure 1, lower tweet)

Third, "declaring victory over inflation" was NEVER a goal of the BSP’s monetary policy anchored on inflation targeting.

From the BSP: The primary objective of the BSP's monetary policy is “to promote price stability conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy” (Republic Act 7653). The adoption of inflation targeting framework of monetary policy in January 2002 is aimed at achieving this objective. Inflation targeting is focused mainly on achieving a low and stable inflation, supportive of the economy’s growth objective. This approach entails the announcement of an explicit inflation target that the BSP promises to achieve over a given time period. (bold mine)

There is no defined quantification or qualification of "low and stable inflation" because statistical inflation has always been a subjective measure, arbitrarily defined by the BSP.

That said, the goal of the politics behind inflation targeting has been to keep the inflation "genie" confined within the boundaries of the BSP’s proverbial "lamp."

That’s because inflation, as a hidden tax, benefits the government most.

However, the inflation genie has been set loose, or has gone beyond its bounds, marking the difference between the previous era and today.

In this way, the BSP can be conservatively said to have been "asleep at the wheel."

At worst, and unbeknownst to the public, the BSP’s policies have unleashed the inflation genie!

Or, although authorities continue to push the narrative of supply-side-driven inflation to shift the blame onto the private sector, the current inflation cycle signify an unintended consequence of their policies!

Yet, has anyone among the array of establishment experts, including those in government, been correct in predicting the incumbent inflation cycle? 

Fourth, the CPI is just a statistic. While its intent is to approximate changes in general prices, it neither reveals the full accuracy nor explains the causes of those changes. 

The fact is that inflation statistics are misleading.

My inflation rate and yours are different.  This is because of dynamic individual spending habits and ever-changing preferences that vary not only over time but also differs across individuals. 

Is it not the averaging a Netflix subscription and rice an exercise of apples-to-oranges comparison?  If so, would this not be applied to the CPI? 

Or, not only is the weighted averaging of goods and services across different groups of people a flawed metric, but people’s spending preferences are constantly changing! 

How accurate is an inflation rate derived from averaging the spending patterns of billionaires with those of the bottom 30%? 

Even on a personal level, my preferences are always changing. If I prefer sautéed prawns with bread this moment, adobo with rice later, and only sinigang for tomorrow, how could the inputs used to create these meals be accurately averaged? How would this apply to a population of 110 million people? 

Furthermore, because the CPI is a politically sensitive statistic—created and calculated by politically sensitive institutions—it is prone not only to errors (in assumptions, inputs, etc.) but also to political biases

For instance, changing the base year of the CPI can lead to different outcomes. If I’m not mistaken, using the now-defunct 2006 base would produce a much higher CPI today than the current 2018 base. 

Since the CPI is used as a primary benchmark for the market’s pricing of interest rates, wouldn’t the government—as the biggest borrowers—have the incentive or motivation to suppress it to influence the cost of borrowing

Fifth, what happened to journalism

Isn’t journalism about "seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues"? 

When media outlets use ambiguous qualifications like " declare victory against inflation" to describe the "perfect economic condition for gradual interest rate cuts" intended to support "consumption (which) showed signs of weakening," could this not signify cheerleading or an advocacy for a biased policy stance? For whose benefit? 

Might this be seen as advancing the interests of vested groups, particularly the primary beneficiary, the government and the politically connected elites? How is this different from propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation? 

Importantly, if an alleged news article makes an economic generalization, why would it lack narratives supported by economic logic? 

Or, are low rates a GUARANTEE of an INCREASE in consumption? How so, and based on what theory and evidence? 

Why cite partisan and non-sequitur explanations from "establishment experts" whose principal-agent problems have hardly been laid bare to the public? 

Have media outlets distilled such insights or selected statements for print that only promote their biases? I’ve seen this happen (personally) before, which is why I refuse interviews. 

Sixth, if media pronouncements reflect exuded marketplace confidence, could such article/s signify a manifestation of the magazine/headline cover indicator or express an extreme state of sentiment? 

Or have the media’s declarations echoed the "overconfidence" stemming from recent euphoria over the price spikes in Philippine assets (stocks, bonds, and the peso)? 

Seventh and lastly, could this be related to the upcoming elections? 

Will declaring 'victory in its long and painful fight against inflation' be part of the campaign to promote the electoral chances of the administration’s national slate in the 2025 midterm elections? 

Ultimately, the establishment's obsession has been to promote a regime of easy money, using the declaration of triumph over inflation as justification. 

As the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises once explained 

The popularity of inflation and credit expansion, the ultimate source of the repeated attempts to render people prosperous by credit expansion, and thus the cause of the cyclical fluctuations of business, manifests itself clearly in the customary terminology. The boom is called good business, prosperity, and upswing. Its unavoidable aftermath, the readjustment of conditions to the real data of the market, is called crisis, slump, bad business, depression. People rebel against the insight that the disturbing element is to be seen in the malinvestment and the overconsumption of the boom period and that such an artificially induced boom is doomed. They are looking for the philosophers' stone to make it last (Mises, 2019)  

II. Treasury Curve was Spot On about Inflation, Short-Term Treasury Yields Plunge! Will the BSP Cut by 50 bps? 

While the headline CPI plummeted from 3.3% in August to 1.9% in September—its lowest monthly rate since May 2020—excluding food and energy, the core CPI slipped to 2.4%, signifying 17 of 18 months of decline (one unchanged) since peaking at 8% in March 2023. 

Before that, we showed how changes in the Philippine yield curve have accurately predicted the CPI slump. 

despite the 4.4% CPI bump in July (and Q2 6.3% GDP), the Philippine treasury market continues to defy inflationary expectations by maintaining a deep inversion of the curve’s belly, which again signals slower inflation, upcoming BSP cuts, and increased financial and economic uncertainty. (Prudent Investor, August 2024) 

 

Moreover, the curious take is that despite all the massive stimulus, the belly’s inversion in the Philippine treasury market has only deepened at the close of August.  

This does not suggest a build-up of price pressures or a strong rebound in the private sector. On the other hand, rising short-term rates indicate intensifying liquidity issues.   

In the end, while Marcos-nomics stimulus seems to have reaccelerated liquidity, a resurgence of inflation is likely to exacerbate "stagflationary" pressures and increase the likelihood of a bust in the Philippines’ credit bubble. (Prudent Investor, September 2024) 

Volatility has crescendoed in the Philippine treasury curve.


Figure 3

The present slope exhibits an astounding collapse in short-term rates (STIR), manifesting institutional market expectations of substantial cuts in BSP rates. Will the BSP cut by 50 bps this October? (Figure 3, upper graph) 

Yet, the curve’s magnified volatility has been incredible: following the gradual transition from flat to an inverted curve, then swiftly to a bullish steepening, and next to the current abrupt regression to a partial belly inversion—even with the plunge in STIR—how could this not be conducive to the rising risks of stagflation?

III. Supply-Side Disinflation? Despite Strong Credit Growth, Manufacturing Remains in the Doldrums, as Reflected by PPI Deflation and Output Sluggishness 

While we perceive government statistics with cynicism, we still use them because almost every financial market participant does.

Instead of focusing on the potential factors for the drop, the mainstream fixates on the prospective policy easing by the BSP.

Could the plunge in inflation have been a supply-side phenomenon marked by a glut?

In a word: Barely.

Manufacturing value grew by 2.9% in June, 6.45% in July, and 1.78% in August, while volume was up by 3.2%, 6.9%, and 2.8% over the same period.

Meanwhile, despite strong Universal Commercial Bank (UCB) loan growth to this sector—rising by 8.9%, 9.5%, and 9.8%—the Producer Price Index (PPI) deflated by -0.2%, -0.4%, and -1%. (Figure 3, lower chart)

Here’s the question: Why has robust credit growth not been reflected in output performance?

Worse yet, why is the deflation in the PPI escalating? PPI defined by the Philippine Statistics Authority, "measures the average change over time in the prices of products or commodities produced by domestic manufactures and sold at factory gate prices."

Where has all the credit money generated gone?

Has it been diverted to real estate or other undeclared allocations? Or has it been used for refinancing existing liabilities?

IV. Supply-Side Disinflation? Lethargic Consumer Imports and July FDI Reflect Frail Capital Goods Imports

If manufacturing growth has been unimpressive or sluggish, the situation is even worse for imports.

Imports in USD posted a 7.3% YoY contraction in June, then rose by 7.3% in July and 1.8% in August.

Converted to average pesos, imports were down by 2.63% YoY in June, surged by 14.3% in July, and grew by 4.6% in August, with the last month’s growth reflecting revaluation effects from a strong peso.


Figure 4

Here’s the thing: Consumer goods USD imports contracted by 7.3% in June, increased by 3.1% in July, and remained unchanged in August. (Figure 4, topmost pane)

Meanwhile, capital goods imports shrank by 8.8% in June but surged by 9.5% and 9.6% in the next two months. A substantial segment of the YoY changes reflects base effects. (Figure 4, middle diagram)

Nonetheless, the growth in capital goods imports partly reflected foreign direct investment (FDI).

The prosaic July FDI growth of 5.5% YoY (7.5% year-to-date) resonated with mediocre import growth. (Figure 4, lowest graph)

Yet, debt accounted for 74.3% of total FDI inflows and 63.5% of year-to-date FDI inflows. How much of this represent actual investments?

Still, why is the growth rate of FDIs declining?

Importantly, where are the investment pledges from the US-NATO allies?

V. Demand-Side Disinflation? September CPI Plunged Despite Vigorous August Consumer Bank Lending, Liquidity Growth Dived

Was the CPI slump a function of demand?

In short, yes!

We should put into context the seismic transformation of the Philippine banking system, with its recent focus on consumer loans coming at the expense of the supply side.

Figure 5

Universal Commercial (UC) bank consumer lending slowed from 24.3% year-over-year (YoY) in July to 23.7% in August, marking its slowest pace since November 2023. (Figure 5, topmost chart)

Consumer loan growth was strong across all segments in August: credit cards +27.44%, auto loans +19.3%, salary loans +16.4%, and others +26.8%.

Meanwhile, production loans continue to accelerate, expanding from 8.8% in July to 9.4% YoY in August, primarily in the real estate and trade sectors.

Overall, UC bank lending grew from 10.4% to 10.9% in August (Figure 4, second to the highest graph)

Despite mainstream claims of "restrictiveness" or "tightness" due to elevated rates, UC Bank's loan growth has been on an uptrend. Still, the CPI continues its downward trajectory!

Worse yet, despite this, financial liquidity plummeted in August.

M3 growth, which was 7.3% in July, dived to 5.5% in August. Incredible.

Incidentally, the yield curve inversion reflected this!

Once again, what happened to all the record money creation by the banking system and the BSP? Why the black hole?

VI. Disinflation with Employment at Near Historic Highs Backed by a Credit Boom? Slower Deficit Spending Puts Pressure on Liquidity Strains

Why could this be happening when employment rates are near all-time highs?

It was 96% last August, only a smidgen lower than the 96.9% record set last December 2023. (Figure 5, second to the lowest window)

Could it be that, aside from trade, government jobs were the primary source of growth in August? (Figure 5, lowest image)

Or could it also have been that employment growth has been mostly about low-quality labor? Alternatively, could the employment data also have been embellished?


Figure 6

Moreover, as we previously noted, because Philippine public spending has slowed, the fiscal deficit slightly "narrowed" year-to-date (YTD) as of August. Public spending has tracked the CPI over the long-term. (Figure 6, topmost diagram) 

As a result, aided by the strong peso, public debt marginally weakened in August.

Moreover, has the stalling growth in system leverage (UC bank credit + public debt) contributed to the demand pressures reflected in the CPI? (Figure 6, second to the highest graph)

Consequently, net claims on the central government (NCoCG) by banks and the BSP plateaued or consolidated. (Figure 6, second to the lowest chart)

Or, aside from the BSP, liquidity injections channeled through banks have slowed slightly.

This, combined with a stealth rise in bank non-performing loans (NPLs) and elevated levels of held-to-maturity assets (HTMs), has contributed to the liquidity squeeze.

And this has occurred despite the record nominal bank credit expansion and historically high employment rates. The plunge in September’s CPI might reflect a downturn in public and private demand, possibly worsened by mounting signs of a liquidity shortfall.

VII. SWS’s Self-Rated Poverty Survey versus the Government’s CPI 

Things don’t happen in a vacuum.

The BSP suddenly announced a massive reduction of the banking system’s reserve requirement ratio (RRR) on September 20th, obviously in response to such developments. The adjustment takes effect on October 25.

The PSA’s September CPI data exhibits a broad-based decline in price growth. While food prices had the biggest influence on the CPI’s significant downside volatility, slowing aggregate demand reflected the diminishing pace of price increases across most sectors. (Figure 6, lowest image)

All these factors point to the SWS Q3 data indicating an increase in self-rated poverty, which not only highlights the decline in living standards for a significant majority of families but also emphasizes the widening gap between the haves and the have-nots.

As a caveat, survey-based statistics are vulnerable to errors and biases; the SWS is no exception.

Though the proclivity to massage data for political goals is higher for the government, we can’t discount its influence on private sector pollsters either.

In any case, we suspect that a phone call from the office of the political higher-ups may compel conflicting surveys to align as one.

____

References 

Ludwig von Mises, The Boom Is Worse than the Bust, November 30, 2018 Mises.org 

Prudent Investor, The Philippines' July 4.4% CPI: Stagflation Remains a Primary Political, Economic, and Financial Risk August 12, 2024

 

Prudent Investor, Philippine Government’s July Deficit "Narrowed" from Changes in VAT Reporting Schedule, Raised USD 2.5 Billion Plus $500 Million Climate Financing September 1, 2024

  

Monday, August 12, 2024

The Philippines' July 4.4% CPI: Stagflation Remains a Primary Political, Economic, and Financial Risk


Doom-loops don't occur in isolation: they interact with each other, reinforcing each other. Attempts to suppress one doom-loop by papering over the unwelcome reality accelerate other doom-loops—Charles Hugh Smith 

In this short issue 

The Philippines' July 4.4% CPI: Stagflation Remains a Primary Political, Economic, and Financial Risk

I. July’s CPI Momentum Accelerates

II. July Headline and Core CPI’s Diametric Paths 

III. Philippine Treasury Market Defied the July CPI Data

IV. Government Monetary and Deficit Spending Policies as Primary Determinant of Inflation

V. Stagflation Ahoy! Bottom 30 CPI Exhibits Inflation’s Broadening Inequality

The Philippines' July 4.4% CPI: Stagflation Remains a Primary Political, Economic, and Financial Risk

Not only inflation, but stagflation remains a principal risk to the Philippine political, financial, and economic landscape

Inquirer.net, August 6, 2024: Headline inflation in July reached its highest rate in nine months, driven by higher price increases in housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, transport items, and food and non-alcoholic beverages, the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) reported on Tuesday. Preliminary data from the agency showed the consumer price index grew by 4.4 percent year on year in July, accelerating from the 3.7 percent in June, but slower than 4.7 percent in the same period last year…Inflation print in July marked the fastest growth in nine months or since the 4.9 percent logged in October 2023.  

Some observations from the July CPI Data:  

I. July’s CPI Momentum Accelerates

Figure 1

First, a greater than 0.5%—but less than 1%—spike in the Month-on-Month (MoM) growth rates has typically been a harbinger of a sustained uptick in the Headline CPI Year-over-Year (YoY). July’s MoM rate jumped by 0.72%. (Figure 1 upper image) 

Does this imply a higher CPI in August and the strengthening of the third wave of this first CPI cycle?

II. July Headline and Core CPI’s Diametric Paths 

Second, while the Philippine headline CPI surged from 3.7% in June to 4.4% in July, core CPI dropped from 3.1% to 2.9%. The gap between the headline and core reached its widest level since 2022. (Figure 1, lower graph) 

In the past, this chasm was a result of the headline rising faster than the core or vice versa. Or, while both were headed in the same direction, the divergent pace or speed resulted in the disparity. The recent gap signified a product of path divergence. 

Energy was the primary source of July’s "inflation." According to the BSP, although food inflation also accelerated due to faster price increases of meat and fruits, "the uptick in July inflation was traced mainly to non-food inflation, particularly higher electricity rates and upward adjustments in domestic prices of petroleum products."

Figure 2

Interestingly, the transport CPI spiked from 3.1% to 3.6% despite the moderation in global oil prices as measured by the US WTI. (Figure 2, upper window)

According to the BSP’s inflation basket, food, transport, electricity, and gas constitute 53.5% of the CPI basket. 

However, the antipodal directions indicate generally weak demand for non-food and transportation items. 

Could this signify an escalation of stagflation? 

Moreover, the weakening MoM change in the core CPI has barely supported the rise in general prices in the economy. (Figure 2, lower diagram) 

III. Philippine Treasury Market Defied the July CPI Data

Figure 3 

Next, despite the 4.4% CPI bump in July (and Q2 6.3% GDP), the Philippine treasury market continues to defy inflationary expectations by maintaining a deep inversion of the curve’s belly, which again signals slower inflation, upcoming BSP cuts, and increased financial and economic uncertainty. (Figure 3, upper chart) 

IV. Government Monetary and Deficit Spending Policies as Primary Determinant of Inflation 

Needless to say, the escalating tensions between the deflationary and inflationary forces in the economy should lead to more volatility, and this directional impasse will likely be resolved by (path-dependent) government policies. 

Or, while we are not fans of government statistics, should the government maintain the pace or speed of the latent "Marcos-nomics stimulus," forces of inflation are likely to prevail in this phase of the CPI cycle. 

Marcos-nomics, as Q2 GDP has validated, will continue to anchor on boosting GDP (infrastructure and welfare), funding pre-election, and defense spending. 

That is to say, such stimulus would increase demand by intensifying systemic leverage. 

Figure 4 

The combination of record Universal Commercial Bank lending levels—or rebounding growth rate—and the upsurge in the government’s deficit spending has prompted the most liquid of the money supply measures (M1) to accelerate upward. (Figure 3, lower chart, Figure 4, top and bottom graphs) 

If sustained, this should send the CPI higher over time. 

V. Stagflation Ahoy! Bottom 30 CPI Exhibits Inflation’s Broadening Inequality

Lastly, using official data, the CPI reveals shades of broadening inequality.

The Bottom 30% (B30) income households buy at the same prices as others.

Figure 5

In July, the headline CPI rose faster than the B30, which pulled their spread marginally lower after reaching 2018 highs last June. (Figure 5, topmost graph) 

However, the spread in the Food CPI between the headline and the B30 remains wide and at 2022 levels. (Figure 5, middle image) 

The widening gap in the PSA’s B30-headline inflation data partially confirms a private sector poll’s finding that hunger rates have been rising—not limited to the B30 class, but also on self-poverty ratings. (Figure 5, lowest chart) 

Stagflation is already present among the average citizens. 

Until the government and the BSP discipline themselves from their free-money "trickle-down" policies, stagflation will remain a primary political-economic-financial risk.