Showing posts with label Portfolio flows. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Portfolio flows. Show all posts

Saturday, January 05, 2013

More Signs of Japan’s Capital Flight

I propounded in March of 2012 that the Bank of Japan’s inflationist policies will prompt for capital flight via carry trades, which will be disguised as FDI’s and portfolio flows into ASEAN and the Philippines:
The foremost reason why many Japanese may invest in the Philippines under the cover of “the least problematic” technically represents euphemism for capital fleeing Japan because of devaluation policies—capital flight!…

Japan’s investments in ASEAN do not seem to be country specific, but more of a regional dynamic. Or that the Japanese probably hedge their ASEAN exposure by spreading their investments throughout the region.
Signs of such capital flows I have noted here in July 2012

But the yen carry trade may not just be limited to ASEAN but to the emerging market space.

A report from Reuters partly affirms my prognosis: (bold mine) 
JP Morgan analysts calculate that EM-dedicated Japanese investment trusts, known as toshin, have seen inflows of $7 billion ever since the U.S. Fed announced its plan to embark on open-ended $40-billion-a-month money printing.  That’s taken their assets under management to $67 billion. And in the week ended Jan 2, Japanese flows to emerging markets amounted to $234 million, they reckon. This should pick up once the yen debasement really gets going — many are expecting a 100 yen per dollar exchange rate by end-2013  (it’s currently at 88).

At present, the lion’s share of Japanese toshin holdings — over $40 billion of it — are in hard currency emerging debt, JP Morgan says (see graphic).


image

But if developed central banks’ seemingly endless money-printing starts to significantly inflate emerging currencies again, local currency debt is likely to become more attractive.
BoJ's policies will inflate bubbles not just EM currencies and debts denominated in EM local currencies but in their respective stock markets, as well.
 
I’ll post an update of Japan’s capital flight into ASEAN once I get the updated data.

Saturday, July 14, 2012

Japan’s Capital Flows to ASEAN Accelerates

I have been saying that the current international monetary environment will prompt for a deluge of (direct and portfolio) investments (euphemism for capital flight) towards ASEAN, mainly from Japan, as well as from Western Countries.

As I previously noted

Japan’s investments in ASEAN do not seem to be country specific, but more of a regional dynamic. Or that the Japanese probably hedge their ASEAN exposure by spreading their investments throughout the region…

We are getting some signs of confirmation.

Japan has reported intensifying direct investment flows to:

Indonesia. As per the account of Kenichi Amaki of Matthews Asia,

The Japanese are pursuing opportunities beyond just the auto industry in Indonesia. A local operator for a major convenience store chain talked to us about the intense quality control training they receive from their Japanese partner. This operator plans to significantly accelerate store openings over the next several years.

The investment push into Indonesia makes sense from a return perspective. According to Japan's Balance of Payments statistics, return on direct investment into Indonesia has averaged 10.7% in the decade up to 2010. In contrast, investment returns from North America and China have averaged only 5.4% and 8.1%, respectively, during the same period. As growth in China moderates, Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia are emerging as a new source of growth for Japan Inc.

Economic growth seems to be a secondary factor or a rationalization to the real cause: Japan’s domestic financial repression mainly through inflationism as political recourse to her ballooning debt woes.

Malaysia. From the Malaysian Trade Industry

There has been no let-up in interest among Japanese investors in Malaysia's main industrial pillar - the electrical and electronics (E&E) sector, said International Trade and Industry Minister Datuk Seri Mustapa Mohamed.

"There continues to be interest either by way of reinvestments or interest by those companies (from within and out of Japan) to relocate their businesses here," the minister said at a media briefing after the 2012 Panasonic Scholarship Award ceremony at the ministry yesterday.

He said there was no slowdown in the trend of Japanese interest in the E&E sector which last year accounted for 34 per cent of the total employment in the manufacturing sector.

For the first seven months of this year, Japanese investors poured in some US$824 million (RM2.6 billion) into 48 projects, almost double the US$400 million (RM1.2 billion) invested in 26 projects in 2010.

Malaysia saw a 76 per cent jump in foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the first half of the year with RM21.3 billion versus RM12.1 billion in the same period last year. Some 52 per cent of these FDIs valued at RM15 billion were in the manufacturing sector.

Japan led the foreign investment pack, in the first seven months of the year, with RM3.4 billion worth of investments followed by the US (RM2.3 billion) and Singapore (RM1.4 billion).

Thailand. As reported by the Organization of Asia Pacific News Agencies

Thai Industry Minister M.R. Pongsvas Svasti has acknowledged that foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand has kept steadily growing, with FDI from Japan alone doubling in the first five months of this year, compared with the corresponding period of last year.

Let me repeat what I wrote

But since (inward) capital flows into ASEAN will reflect on global central bank activities, this dynamic would not be limited to Japan but would likely include western economies as well.

And under the political climate that induces yield chasing dynamics, YES we should expect these flows to translate to a vastly higher Phisix and ASEAN bourses overtime, largely depending on the degree of inflows. This will be further augmented by the response of local investors to such dynamic as well as to local policies.

Although NO the Philippines will not decouple from events abroad and the pace of FDIs and investment flows will largely be grounded on the general liquidity environment.

Japan’s deepening capital flows will likely be a medium to long term trend and has been conditioned or will be significantly influenced by evolving global dynamics.

Yet all these seems as an eerie reminiscent of the Asian Crisis of 1997.

Sunday, August 31, 2008

Philippine Peso-US Dollar Dynamics: Forced Liqudation, Momentum and Big Brother

``In sum, the world is approaching a turning point after nearly a decade of growth without serious emerging market crises. It has benefited enormously from the specialisation of parts of the developed world, primarily the US, in the output of non-traded goods and the specialisation of emerging markets in traded goods. The US, with its strong institutions and impeccable credit, was thought to be in a good position to handle this specialisation, though the financial crisis shows that even it has its limits. As the US reduces its current account deficit, a transition in specialisation will have to take place. In the medium term, this will create opportunities in emerging markets, while also increasing risks.-Raghuram Rajan professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, is a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, Emerging markets must shift their focus inwards

The Philippine Peso dropped .6% over the week to Php 45.92 against the US dollar, this despite the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ recent move to raise its policy rates by 25 basis points (
Bloomberg). So much for the argument of interest rate rate differentials.

Dollar bulls earlier claimed that the reason why the Philippine Peso has been recently clobbered was due to “rising consumer price inflation”. Now that signs of “food price” driven “inflation” has been moderating as we expounded in
Philippine Peso Wilts Under The Unwinding Short US Dollar Carry Trade!, the argument has shifted towards a “weakening economy”.

US-Philippines Economic Growth Differential Mirage

While true enough the Philippines accounted for a sharp deceleration in terms of economic growth,
4.6% in the 2nd quarter (compared to 8.3% over the same period last year) at the time when consumer goods inflation reached 12.2% last July (to our guess the peak of the present cycle), US economic growth which surprisingly accelerated to 3.3% over the same period is still far below the present Philippine growth rates.

Yet what appears to have driven US economic growth in the 2nd quarter has been mostly “improved demand for exports” which according to
CNNmoney.com, “added 3.1% to GDP, compared to just 0.8% in the advanced reading.”

Yet looking forward, gains from such progress look questionable,

Figure 6: Northern Trust: Deteriorating Corporate Profits

According to Northern Trust’s Asha Banglore, ``However, corporate profits from the rest of the world on a quarter-to-quarter basis have now dropped for two quarters in a row. Moreover, the recent rally of the dollar casts doubts about the ability of corporate profits from the rest of the world to help trim the decline in overall corporate profits.”

Why? From a theoretical standpoint a faltering global economy isn’t likely to give a lift to the already moderating export growth clip which should equally translate to declining corporate profits from exports going forward, as shown in figure 6.

This soft environment essentially translates to an adverse feedback loop that could drag US economic growth lower over the coming quarters.

On the other hand, the Philippine growth had been likewise boosted by ironically a resurgence of “exports” in the face of supposed deterioration of trade linkages, aside from remittances and the outperformance in agriculture. This from the
Inquirer.net, ``Only the agriculture, fisheries and forestry (AFF) sector posted a faster growth at 4.9 percent from 4.2 percent. The faster rise in the AFF sector was due to higher demand for domestically produced food because of the country’s growing population and the rising cost of imported food.”

Why our emphasis on the agriculture? Because from the “inflation” standpoint, food accounts for the biggest chunk or nearly half of the Filipinos’ headache when reckoning in terms of the expenditure basket. And the growing output from agriculture related industries will likely mitigate statistical inflation aside from redirecting wealth to the countryside.

So what has weighed on the Philippine economy aside from “inflation”? The answer from the industrial viewpoint is in services (
communications and transport) and industry particularly mining. While it is easy to blame “inflation”, it is unclear what has prompted such a slowdown and if these had been merely hiccups.

Overall, even based from the recent significant deceleration in Philippine growth, the US economy isn’t likely to outgrow the Philippines enough to justify the Peso’s weakness in terms of growth differentials. This also shows that monetary policy isn’t likely to favor the US too, because stronger economic growth allows more leeway for the local central bank to raise interest rates enough to widen the interest rate spread between the Peso and the US dollar.

US Dollar As Safehaven? Not In The Context of Iraqi Bonds or China’s Anxieties Over Fannie and Freddie

And again we simply can’t buy the hokum that the US dollar should function as “safehaven” in today’s global financial crisis; especially not when the source or origin or epicenter of today’s stresses –a diffusion of the deeply rooted US credit crisis emanating from an insolvent financial industry-is from the US.

Take a look at this news account…

From the
Financial Times, ``Bank of China has cut its portfolio of securities issued or guaranteed by troubled US mortgage financiers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by a quarter since the end of June.

``The sale by China’s fourth largest commercial bank, which reduced its holdings of so-called agency debt by $4.6bn, is a sign of nervousness among foreign buyers of Fannie and Freddie’s bonds and guaranteed securities.”

Does China’s queasiness over the fate of its
$376 billion holdings of Fannie and Freddie Mac securities signify US assets or the US dollar as a safehaven status?

…or how about this…Iraq bonds are now considered as “safer” than some US banks!

From the
Bloomberg (emphasis mine),

``Iraq's bonds are delivering the biggest returns in emerging markets as oil export revenue bolsters government finances and violence declines.

``The country's $2.7 billion of 5.8 percent bonds due 2028 gained 45 percent since August 2007, according to Merrill Lynch & Co. indexes. Investors demand 4.84 percentage points more in yield to own the debt instead of Treasuries, down from 7.26 percentage points a year ago. The spread is narrower than for notes of Ohio banks National City Corp. and KeyCorp, suggesting Baghdad may be safer for bond investors than Cleveland…

``Iraq provides some insulation from the market,'' Brown said. ``The risks are so idiosyncratic that it trades on its own drivers.''

The “Iraq is safer than Ohio bonds” doesn’t seem to support the US dollar as “safehaven” status, does it? Or maybe there has been a sudden epiphany for global investors to reckon Iraq bonds as the alternative “safehaven” asset? Moreover, I thought I heard someone utter “decoupling is a myth” argument?

In Taleb’s Black Swan rule, a single contradictory observation is enough to demolish a long held, deeply entrenched and popular espoused generalization.

Portfolio Outflows As Evidence

If there is anything that supports the case of a strong US dollar is that today’s forcible liquidations-in efforts to monetize liquid assets and shore up capital for the wobbly US financial industry-seems to be one of the main reasons behind the weakness of the Peso see figure 7.

Figure 7 DBS bank: Net foreign Selling in Philippines

The underperformance of the Philippine Peso and the Phisix relative to its Indonesian counterparts (JKSE and the Rupiah) can be partially explained by portfolio outflows for the Philippines and inflows in Indonesia.

But this isn’t just based on relative dimensions but seen from even across the region see figure 8.

Figure 8: EPFR Global: Asia ex-Japan least favored among EM regions; clear preference for commodities exporting regions

EPFR Global says that fund flows have favored commodity exporters. But generally, reckoned from a year-to-date basis, international portfolio funds have been net sellers of Emerging Markets, except for EMEA or Europe Middle East and Africa (green line).

And again this seems to be the invisible knot that ties the so called “recoupling” theory. Beleaguered companies or institutions embroiled in the credit crunch sell their most liquid assets to raise capital. Since many of these have accumulated significant overseas assets especially based on former favorite themes, thus the selling activities seem to be global and synchronic in nature.

Albeit, the outperformance of Middle East and Africa also seems to be buttressed by the rotation of portfolio flows. And we can’t discount momentum; liquidity constrains could have also introduced the sell EM Asia and buy Middle East Africa arbitrage. Yet as a puzzle the EMEA’s markets seem to be immune from the inflation story even when “inflation” seems to be relatively higher than Asia.

As an aside, Saudi’s Stock Exchange (Tadawul) is set to open its doors to foreigners (
Economist). Will the sagging Tadawul index get the much needed shot in the arm from foreign investors? Perhaps. If today’s preferential flows to the Middle East and Africa will continue. If foreign investors will remain blinded by market momentum even as the inflation story has been much more entrenched in the region.

Big Brother Is All Over

But again such appears to be just part of the major movers, the other, we suspect comes from the unwinding of the paired trades possibly triggered by government intervention as previously argued in
Philippine Peso Wilts Under The Unwinding Short US Dollar Carry Trade!

Recently the Bloomberg quoted on Japan’s Nikkei English News which reported of a long planned coordinated exercise by the officials of the US, Japan and Europe to support the US dollar.

From the
Bloomberg, ``Finance officials from the U.S., Japan and Europe in mid-March drew up plans to strengthen the U.S. dollar following troubles at Bear Stearns Cos., Nikkei English News reported, citing unnamed sources.

``The intervention designed by the U.S. Treasury Department, Japan's
Finance Ministry and the European Central Bank called for the central banks to purchase dollars and sell euros and yen, with Japan providing the yen needed for the currency swap if the greenback's value dropped significantly, the news service said.”

So present activities may have reflected government’s strong arm tactics.

Aside, chatters of market manipulation hasn’t been restricted to the US dollar, but to gold markets as well.

Some has speculated that governments through several banks have tried to suppress oil prices to shape conditions of an improving economic environment as the Presidential election nears.

According to the
Moming Zhou of CBS,

``Recent heat from Congress and regulators, along with public speculation, over whether commodity prices are being manipulated has also reached gold pits, where the debate was stirred by a surge in bets last month that gold prices would fall…

``Three unidentified U.S. banks held 86,398 short positions, or bets that gold prices will fall, in the COMEX gold market as of Aug. 5 -- 10 times more short positions than a month earlier, a government report showed.

``The report by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which regulates U.S. futures markets, also showed short positions held by three U.S. banks in silver futures had increased more than four times during the same period…

``Mendelsohn said he believes the government has tried to make the U.S. economy, oil, and markets appear in better shape and also to temporarily curb the immediate effects of the slumping housing market, of bad home loans and of the credit crisis.

With US government hands evidently seen in almost every corner of the financial sphere working feverishly to avoid what seems to be for them the menace of a catastrophic “deflationary” crash, it isn’t farfetched to also intervene for political purposes.

Epilogue

So, for us, issues germane to 1) statistical inflation, 2) economic growth differential, 3) interest rate differentials, 3) higher risk aversion landscape or lastly 4) US dollar as safehaven seem to be unconvincing fundamental reasons behind the recent US dollar’s rebound.

We are more convinced of the dynamics of 1) momentum 2) global capital raising activities partly via forcible liquidations by the developed world financial industry and most importantly 3) the tweaking of government hands of the financial markets for political and financial reasons.

However, continued US government support for the financial industry (Fannie and Freddie, growing bank closures) plus clamors for expanding Federal rescue to other industries like the
Detroit automakers, aside from vastly expanding fiscal deficits combined with baby boomers claims on unfunded liabilities are likely to weigh on US balance sheets and is expected to reflect on the US dollar.