Unintended Consequences from the French Financial Tax Experiment

Desperate governments scrounging for money via more taxes and regulations (financial repression) have been getting an unexpected pushback from the marketplace.

From Businessinsider.com (bold original)

One suggestion that has gained popularity in the post-crisis regulatory debate is a tax on financial transactions.

Proponents suggest that the tax would raise revenues for governments (at a time when such revenues are badly needed) and curb the excessive speculation that contributed to the global financial crisis.

In August 2012, France became the first eurozone nation in the wake of the financial crisis to implement such a tax, and so far, it's been a total failure.

In an article for Risk.net, Hannah Collins explains that in France, the tax – which amounts to 0.2 percent on transactions involving buying or selling of shares of stock – is actually just shifting investors out of equities and into even riskier, more opaque products like derivatives and derivatives-based ETFs:

Investors who own French shares are selling them and taking positions on them through derivatives instruments such as contracts for difference, structured products and ETFs, according to a Paris-based lawyer. "Most structured transactions remain outside the tax," he says. "It is due only if you have actually purchased the shares."

In other words, instead of curbing excessive speculation, the tax is simply forcing those speculative activities into darker, less-regulated corners of the market.

People’s incentives to act are also shaped by social policies.

Instead of moving in accordance to the intended goals set by politicians, the financial markets resort to regulatory arbitrage—finding legal loopholes from the new legislation from which to operate on.

And the incentive to reduce transaction costs by eluding the Financial Transaction tax would likely extrapolate to the nurturing of shadow derivatives-banking system where in this case has been signified as driving “investors out of equities and into even riskier, more opaque products like derivatives and derivatives-based ETFs”.

In short, politicians create or spawn their own Frankensteins.

Why Short Selling has been at the Losing End

Short sellers have been at the losing end.

Notes the Economist

THE long-short ratio of global equities, a gauge of market sentiment, is at a five-year high. The ratio, which measures the value of stocks available for short-selling to what is actually on loan, shows longs outnumber shorts by a factor of more than 12, suggesting investors are increasingly bullish. Higher stockmarkets are driving the ratio upwards, as the amount on loan has not changed significantly in the last few years. The appetite for short-selling has been affected by uncertainty over regulation, and by a change of strategy from hedge funds (big short-sellers), which have been less leveraged since the financial crisis. But while the long-short ratio of American and European equities has increased, bears are far from extinct: between 7% and 8% of lendable value is still on loan to short-sellers.

The “appetite for short-selling has been affected by uncertainty over regulation” has been true, but the significance of the role of policies influencing the marketplace seems to have been downplayed.

It must be remembered that markets respond to policies even as many of the current policies has been instituted to affect or influence the markets. 

The fact is that numerous countries have resorted to directly banning of equity and bond short sales despite the questionable efficacy of such measures. 

Inflationism employed by global central banks led by the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Banks have explicitly been targeted to shore up asset prices which means an assault on equity short sellers and bond vigilantes too. 

Bank capital standards have also influenced preferences and the distribution of asset ownerships held by mainstream institutions. 

The US crisis of 2008 reveals that tax and administrative policies had influences to the housing bubble. 

I hardly see any material changes on these.

The point is that current supposed “wealth effect” policies meant to promote asset bubbles signifies as an onslaught against short selling. Or policies have been designed to discriminate against equity short sellers and the bond vigilantes.

The real reason for such policies has hardly about “wealth effect” but to prop up the balance sheets of many insolvent political economic systems (banking-central banking-welfare and warfare state).

Short sellers and bond vigilantes will resurface in the fullness of time.

As a side note: In the Philippines, regulations on short sales have rendered short selling basically impractical. Thus, financial institutions have been incented to see a one directional market: up or a boom. 

Yet reality tells us that policies that shapes a boom will eventually lead to a bust.

The Philippine SEC’s Phantasm of “Trading Gangs”

Below is an example of Hayek's Fatal Conceit applied to the Philippines

From the Business Mirror,

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is studying new surveillance initiatives that may see the establishment of a special division to monitor online chatter targeting so-called trading gangs, SEC Commissioner Juanita Cueto said on Thursday.

Trading gangs, according to Cueto are loosely defined as short-term trader syndicates who have both the resources and numbers to drive market prices and volumes.

She added that the trading rings that “play” the market are nothing new in the country or even abroad, but she noted that their influence had been growing in recent years, aided by the anonymity offered by the Internet and the influx of new and relatively inexperienced investors who may fall prey to these groups.

“They have pseudo names on the Internet. The scary part is they buy and sell in unison. Some of their analyses are inaccurate and can hurt issuers,” Cueto told the BusinessMirror. “It is a concern of legitimate brokers and issuers.”

She said the surveillance measures could involve closer scrutiny of Internet-based stock-market forums.

Some people cheer at this development WITHOUT an inkling of understanding HOW the SEC will be able to define and enforce surveillance of the so called "short term trader syndicates" that “have both the resources and numbers to drive market prices and volumes” from so-called trading gangs.

At what criterion will groups of people (syndicates) who shares “beliefs” in certain stocks, even in the short term, whom they are or could be exposed to, culpable of “driving” market prices and volumes? What if the stocks they promote indeed goes up? 

If a prediction fails, does this mechanically imply fraud?

In bear markets, does allegations of “pump and dump” proliferate or even exist at all?

Importantly what delineates “belief” and “analysis” from the intent to “defraud” through manipulation?

So the implication is that such regulations will be arbitrarily defined or established according to the whims of the political masters.

People who espouse political intrusions have a strange mystic adulation for the supposed omniscience of authorities and of the platonic ethics of regulators.

Yet if this logic holds true, then markets DO NOT need to exist at all.

Áll such ruckus essentially boils down to the definition of prices and values.

Who determines what appropriate prices and values are? The SEC? From what basis?

For starters, market prices are ALWAYS subjectively determined

To quote the great Ludwig von Mises,

It is ultimately always the subjective value judgments of individuals that determine the formation of prices. Catallactics in conceiving the pricing process necessarily reverts to the fundamental category of action, the preference given to a over b. In view of popular errors it is expedient to emphasize that catallactics deals with the real prices as they are paid in definite transactions and not with imaginary prices. The concept of final prices is merely a mental tool for the grasp of a particular problem, the emergence of entrepreneurial profit and loss.

Prices, which are subjective expressions of people’s value scales and time preferences, are principally used for economic calculations from where trades (of all kinds including stock markets) emerge, again Professor Mises

In the market society there are money prices. Economic calculation is calculation in terms of money prices. The various quantities of goods and services enter into this calculation with the amount of money for which they are bought and sold on the market or for which they could prospectively be bought and sold. It is a fictitious assumption that an isolated self-sufficient individual or the general manager of a socialist system, i.e., a system in which there is no market for means of production, could calculate. There is no way which could lead one from the money computation of a market economy to any kind of computation in a nonmarket system.

So if prices are subjectively determined, how then does the "gods" of the SEC know each and every individuals order of priorities?

And at what levels are prices to be considered “fair”?

Again Professor Mises,

The concept of a "just" or "fair" price is devoid of any scientific meaning; it is a disguise for wishes, a striving for a state of affairs different from reality. Market prices are entirely determined by the value judgments of men as they really act.

So supposed fraud will be substituted for propaganda and the curtailment of civil liberties.

This comment by a market practitioner from the same article “It could be really hard to prove wrongdoing this way,” is half correct, but has been obscured by the misleading reference of “noting how identities can be masked online”.

“Anonymity” does not automatically make stock promotions unethical. What makes unethical is the deliberate act to defraud or bamboozle people, e.g. a breach of contract or deprivation of property rights, which based on the above seems very difficult to prove.

This would be analogical to say that advertising is a fraud.

To which government providing “truth” in advertising is likewise delusional, Professor Ludwig von Mises writes,

But whoever is ready to grant to the government this power would be inconsistent if he objected to the demand to submit the statements of churches and sects to the same examination. Freedom is indivisible. As soon as one starts to restrict it, one enters upon a decline on which it is difficult to stop. If one assigns to the government the task of making truth prevail in the advertising of perfumes and toothpaste, one cannot contest it the right to look after truth in the more important matters of religion, philosophy, and social ideology.

And government interventions DO NOT make transactions ethical too, on the contrary, they make them worst.

Bruce L Benson in “The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State” writes, (bold emphasis mine) 

When government becomes involved in the enterprise of law, both the rules of conduct and the institutions for enforcement are likely to change. The primary functions of governments are to act as a mechanism to take wealth from some and transfer it to others, and to discriminate among groups on the basis of their relative power in order to determine who gains and who loses.

Yes most people don’t seem to realize that in an inflationary boom, the guiding incentives provided by manipulation of interest rates promote rampant gambling and irresponsible actions which are always blamed on market actors.

From the great Henry Hazlitt

Inflation, to sum up, is the increase in the volume of money and bank credit in relation to the volume of goods. It is harmful because it depreciates the value of the monetary unit, raises everybody's cost of living, imposes what is in effect a tax on the poorest (without exemptions) at as high a rate as the tax on the richest, wipes out the value of past savings, discourages future savings, redistributes wealth and income wantonly, encourages and rewards speculation and gambling at the expense of thrift and work, undermines confidence in the justice of a free enterprise system, and corrupts public and private morals.

Non-Austrian Charles Kindleberger author of Mania’s Panics and Crashes also notes how swindles emerge during bubble cycles. (Previously I quoted him here)

Commercial and financial crisis are intimately bound up with transactions that overstep the confines of law and morality shadowy though these confines be. The propensities to swindle and be swindled run parallel to the propensity to speculate during a boom. Crash and panic, with their motto of sauve qui peut induce still more to cheat in order to save themselves. And the signal for panic is often the revelation of some swindle, theft embezzlement or fraud

And as proof, I cited instances of Ponzi schemes in the US has had meaningful correlations with the FED’s credit easing policies.

When political gods determine winners and losers, contrary to popular brainwashed expectations, the outcome is not one of optimism. According to author, philosopher and individualist Ayn Rand on her classic novel Atlas Shrugged,

Money is the barometer of a society's virtue. When you see that trading is done, not by consent, but by compulsion--when you see that in order to produce, you need to obtain permission from men who produce nothing--when you see that money is flowing to those who deal, not in goods, but in favors--when you see that men get richer by graft and by pull than by work, and your laws don't protect you against them, but protect them against you--when you see corruption being rewarded and honesty becoming a self-sacrifice--you may know that your society is doomed. Money is so noble a medium that is does not compete with guns and it does not make terms with brutality. It will not permit a country to survive as half-property, half-loot.

Such interventionism also leads to a suppression of freedom of expression.

Nonetheless, sorry to say but regulations will not solve or protect people form their silliness or foolishness, their reckless behavior and the entitlement mentality which most likely has been a result of existing policies…instead these would only do worse.

And in contrast, as I previously noted, successful investing requires Self discipline.

Quote of the Day: Better Regulation Means Regulation by Markets Forces

No stock market commentary for this week

We do need better regulation. But what does that mean? Once we understand the nature of markets and bureaucracies, there’s only one reasonable conclusion: Better regulation means regulation by market forces. Free markets are not unregulated markets. Instead, they are severely regulated by competition and the threat of losses and bankruptcy. Anything government does to weaken those forces simultaneously weakens the otherwise unforgiving discipline imposed on business firms (and their counterparties)—to the detriment of workers and consumers. Public well-being suffers.

Admittedly, this is a hard sell. Explaining how markets work when they are free of the government’s easy money, favoritism, implicit guarantees, and other perverse incentives takes time and the listener’s concentration. Denouncing markets, railing against greed (which of course never taints politicians), and calling for more government power makes for good sound bites. In the Internet and remote-controlled-cable-TV era, patience is a scarce commodity. So advocates of liberty have barriers to overcome.

Of course government interference with free exchange (misleadingly called “regulation”) is portrayed as necessary for the public good. A key to understanding why it is not is grasping the inability of bureaucrats to know what they would  need to know to do the job they promise to do. Markets–particularly financial markets–are too complex for government officials (or anyone else) to manage. No matter how much power they are given, they will not be able to see the future, spot “excessive risk,” or anticipate how things might go wrong.  But they can be counted on unwittingly to interfere with innovation that would yield public benefits. Any move toward central direction courts disaster. Decentralization and the discipline of competition are our only hope for economic security.

 This is from Sheldon Richman at the Freeman on how political regulation leads to the “money power” (cronyism)

Barclay’s LIBOR Scandal: Self Fulfilling Turmoil

The Barclay’s LIBOR scandal seems to be rippling across the world.

From the Bloomberg,

Regulators from Stockholm to Seoul are re-examining how benchmark borrowing costs are set amid concern they are just as vulnerable to manipulation as the London interbank offered rate.

Stibor, Sweden’s main interbank rate, and Tibor in Japan are among rates facing fresh scrutiny because, like Libor, they are based on banks’ estimated borrowing costs rather than real trades. In some cases they may be easier to rig than Libor as fewer banks contribute to their calculation, according to academics and analysts.

“Many of the ingredients which made it pretty easy to manipulate Libor and collude are common in other benchmarks,” said Rosa Abrantes-Metz, an economist with consulting firm Global Economics Group and an associate professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. “Regulatory agencies are starting to take a look at those and there is a growing sense they need to change.”

Barclays Plc (BARC), the U.K.’s second-largest bank, was fined a record 290 million pounds ($450 million) last month for attempting to rig Libor and Euribor, its equivalent in euros, to appear more healthy during the financial crisis and boost earnings before it. At least 12 banks including Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (RBS) and Deutsche Bank AG are being investigated for manipulating Libor.

Regulators and industry groups are now turning their attention to whether other benchmark rates were manipulated in the same way. Sweden’s central bank, the Japanese Bankers Association, the Monetary Authority of Singapore and South Korea’s Fair Trade Commission have all announced probes into how their domestic rates are set.

Derivatives Traders

Libor is determined by a daily poll carried out on behalf of the British Bankers’ Association that asks banks to estimate how much it would cost to borrow from each other for different periods and in different currencies.

The issue is here is that interest rates have been manipulated thereby prompting speculations that there might have been large discrepancies in the pricing of interest rates that affects much of the world financial markets.

The so-called manipulations occurred at the peak of the crisis in 2008 and has reportedly even been warned by NY Fed’s then President Timothy Geithner and so as with the BIS.

Apparently NO one took LEGAL action or that authorities simply looked the other way.

Now this has become a big issue.

But the much of the agog (impact of price manipulations) out of the LIBOR scandal has barely been a fact.

In spite of the alleged Libor shenanigans, Professor Gary North shows here in numerous charts that interest rates had been determined by the markets.

Writes Professor North, (bold original)

There is no sign that these two gigantic and interlinked credit markets were different in any significant sense over the entire decade. In other words, Barclays bank had no influence over rates. The banks that were involved rigged the system from 2005 to 2009.

Then what is the scandal all about? Ignorance of basic economics. What about the banks that manipulated the LIBOR rate? They made money on the margin, but they did not have any significant effect on these rates. You can see this in the LIBOR charts.

The scandal is a tempest in a teapot. No one lost much money. The banks did not keep rates lower than the market for more than a few hours -- maybe days, but I want to see proof.

The rates were governed by market forces.

The idea that Barclays kept rates down for years is ludicrous. No commercial bank can keep rates down if investors are willing to pay for a different allocation of capital than what the banks want. The bankers can make money at the margin, paying a little less for loans. But after 2008, none of this mattered. Bankers did not want to borrow from each other.

The appalling ignorance of basic economic theory is why we see the headlines about Barclays and the manipulation of rates. Bankers probably made many millions of pounds extra, but this had no measurable effect on the direction of interest rates. We are not talking about hundreds of billions. We are not talking about the Bank of England.

Columnists like to get attention. There is nothing like a scandal to get attention. But to say that the commercial banks manipulated inter-bank rates is saying that (1) central banks and reserve requirements don't count for much; (2) market rates can be held down by a few commercial banks, thereby overcoming the market for capital: lenders and borrowers.

The people who cry "scandal" do not think through the implications of what they are saying. Making a lot of money is one thing. It is possible. Re-structuring the derivatives market totaling about a quadrillion dollars in assets/promises is something else.

The problem has little to do with rate-tinkering by Barclays and the others. The problem, then as now, is the misguided Keynesianism that undergirds the policy decisions of the West's central bankers.

In reality, the major manipulators of the markets has been the central bankers led by the US Federal Reserve, who seem to be looking to divert the public’s attention from the real causes of the present imbalances: central banking inflationism.

With allegations that banks has been culpable for the manipulations of the interest rates the reactions will likely be a tsunami of lawsuits, of course calls for tighter regulations (which may be the real intent of the scandal-mongerers)

From another Bloomberg article,

Wall Street, grappling with mounting regulatory probes and investor claims over alleged interest-rate manipulation, may face yet another formidable foe: Itself.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Morgan Stanley are among financial firms that may bring lawsuits against their biggest rivals as regulators on three continents examine whether other banks manipulated the London interbank offered rate, known as Libor, said Bradley Hintz, an analyst with Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Even if Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley forgo claims on their own behalf, they oversee money-market funds that may be required to pursue restitution for injured clients, he said.

Because Libor is based on submissions from only some of the world’s largest banks, the probes threaten to pit firms uninvolved in setting the rate against any implicated in its manipulation, Hintz said. Libor serves as a benchmark for at least $360 trillion in securities.

“This will be a feeding frenzy of sharks,” said Hintz, who has served as treasurer of Morgan Stanley (MS) and chief financial officer of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. “We’re going to have Wall Street suing Wall Street.”

It’s definitely going to be a feeding frenzy especially for politicians whom are likely to use the current sentiment against Wall Street (Occupy Wall Street) and the global financial industry as fodder for electoral mudslinging or as an opportunity to acquire votes with the US national elections fast approaching.

Wall Street rending each other apart will likely exacerbate the prevailing uncertainty.

Will China Ease Banking Curbs? Has the Railway Stimulus been Launched?

China’s worsening slowdown has been prompting for a stream of news pouring out this morning.

One should note that the Shanghai Index broke down yesterday, but has opened mixed (slightly higher) today.

Yesterday I asked,

will China's policymakers ease on bank capital regulations?

I guess the initial indications points to the easing of restrictions on China’s shadow banking system perhaps as part of the proposed stimulus

Here is the Bloomberg,

China’s economic slowdown threatens to derail efforts to curb underground lending -- measures championed by Premier Wen Jiabao as crucial to future growth.

The country grew in the second quarter at the slowest pace since the depths of the global financial crisis in 2009, 7.6 percent, putting pressure on China’s leaders to boost stimulus spending. Wen’s proposals to rein in the shadow-banking system, estimated to be about one-third the size of official lending, may be sidelined as a result, according to half a dozen economists interviewed by Bloomberg News.

“With an economy slowing more aggressively than the authorities perhaps want, the imperative to crack down on shadow financing becomes increasingly conflicted,” said Alistair Thornton, a Beijing-based economist with research firm IHS Global Insight Ltd. (IHS) “With the government increasingly in firefighting mode, the desire to push through tough reform in the financial sector inevitably takes a back seat to staving off a hard landing and managing global economic volatility.”

Wen, whose term ends next year, has led calls to control what IHS estimates is $1.3 trillion of private financing, an amount equal to last year’s U.S. budget deficit. He has proposed channeling that money through government-regulated institutions to break what he called a “monopoly” on lending by state-owned banks and open a cascade of capital to China’s 42 million small and medium-sized businesses.

‘Terrible Damage’

Only 3 percent of those companies are able to get bank loans, according to Citic Securities Co. (6030), the nation’s biggest publicly traded brokerage, with underground lending by family, friends and acquaintances largely funding the rest.

If and when this becomes a reality, then this does nothing to solve the problem of systemic overleveraging, and in fact, should worsen it. What Chinese authorities are likely to do like their developed economy peers is to inflate aggressively.

Another Bloomberg article also says that China may have already launched a railway based stimulus.

China’s railway infrastructure investment may double in the second half of this year from the first six months, aiding efforts to reverse a slowdown in the world’s second-biggest economy.

Full-year spending will be 448.3 billion yuan ($70.3 billion), according to a statement dated July 6 on the website of the National Development and Reform Commission’s Anhui branch. That indicates about 300 billion yuan of investment in the second half, up from about 148.7 billion yuan in the first.

China’s fixed-asset investment has already started to pick up and a jump in spending on railway construction would echo the stimulus rolled out during the global financial crisis. A decline in foreign direct investment reported by Vice Commerce Minister Wang Chao in Hong Kong yesterday underscored the toll that Europe’s debt woes and austerity measures are taking on Asia’s largest economy.

In my view, both are signs of the growing desperation by the Chinese authorities, who may trying to offset adverse market developments with public relations work.

None of the above seems to have been made official yet. “May be sidelined” or “may double” seem like the psychological power of suggestion.

The recourse to managing public communications or public relations campaign seem as manifestations of the ongoing political deadlock within the Chinese political system

This means that, so far, political actions has mostly been about promises or “talk therapy”.

The frictions from the clash of hope and reality will likely produce more market volatilities in either direction over the interim but enhances the risks of a fat tail event (crash).

Be careful out there.

Who is to blame for JP Morgan’s $2 billion loss?

It’s all about bad decisions, argues Mike Brownfield of the conservative Heritage Foundation

Heritage’s David C. John explains that while JP Morgan’s loss represents a clear failure of management, it’s not a systemic problem that requires or would be fixed by additional regulation. For starters, JP Morgan is a $2.3 trillion bank with a net worth of $189 billion, meaning that this loss reduced the bank’s capital ratio from 8.4 percent to 8.2 percent. In other words, the bank can absorb the loss, and it’s nowhere close to needing any form of federal intervention.

Some more perspective could be gleaned by examining the $3.2 billion loss the U.S. Post Office experienced in the most recent quarter, or the billions lost on risky green energy bets made by President Obama and Energy Secretary Steven Chu. Only those losses weren’t incurred by private investors, but by you the taxpayer.

What’s more, John explains, the regulations that are now being called for — particularly the so-called Volcker Rule — would not have prevented the losses since it would not have affected this transaction. Finally, John writes, the system worked as is. “JPMorgan Chase losses were not discovered by regulators; they were discovered by the bank itself conducting its own management reviews.”

What America is witnessing is the left using the news of JP Morgan’s bad judgment as an excuse for more government regulation. But as even Carney acknowledged, regulations “can’t prevent bad decisions from being made on Wall Street.”

It’s true that regulations “can’t prevent bad decisions”. But I’d go deeper. Regulations, on the other hand, can induce bad decisions.

Moral Hazard is when undue risks are taken because the costs are not borne by the party taking the risk. So when regulations and political actions (such as bailouts) rewards excessive risk taking, by having taxpayers shoulder the burden of the mistakes of the privileged parties like JP Morgan and other Too Big To Fail banks, then we should expect more of these.

At the Think Market Blog, Cato’s Jerry O’ Driscoll expounds further,

Reports indicate that senior management and the board of directors were aware of the trades and exercising oversight. The fact the losses were incurred anyway confirms what many of us have been arguing. Major financial institutions are at once very large and very complex. They are too large and too complex to manage. That is in part what beset Citigroup in the 2000s and now Morgan, which has been recognized as a well-managed institution.

If ordinary market forces were at work, these institutions would shrink to a size and level of complexity that is manageable. Ordinary market forces are not at work, however. As discussed on this site before, public policy rewards size (and the complexity that accompanies it). Major financial institutions know from experience they will be bailed out when they incur losses that threaten their surivival. Morgan’s losses do not appear to fall into that category, but they illustrate how bad incentives lead to bad outcomes.

Large financial institutions will continue taking on excessive risks so long as they know they can off-load the losses on taxpayers if needed. That is the policy summarized as “too big to fail.” Banks may be too big and complex to close immediately, but no institution is too big to fail. Failure means the stockholders and possibly the bondholders are wiped out. Until that discipline is reintroduced (having once existed), there will be more big financial bets going bad at these banks.

Dr. Marc Faber Warns of 1987 Crash if No QE 3.0

From Bloomberg,

U.S. stocks may plunge in the second half of the year “like in 1987” if the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX) climbs without further stimulus from the Federal Reserve, said Marc Faber, whose prediction of a February selloff in global equities never materialized.

“I think the market will have difficulties to move up strongly unless we have a massive QE3,” Faber, who manages $300 million at Marc Faber Ltd., told Betty Liu on Bloomberg Television’s “In the Loop” from Zurich today, referring to a third round of large-scale asset purchases by the Fed. “If it moves and makes a high above 1,422, the second half of the year could witness a crash, like in 1987.”

The Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged 23 percent on Oct. 19, 1987 in the biggest crash since 1914, triggering losses in stock-market values around the world. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index plummeted 20 percent. The Dow still closed 2.3 percent higher in 1987, and the S&P 500 advanced 2 percent.
“If the market makes a new high, it will be a new high with very few stocks pushing up and the majority of stocks having already rolled over,” Faber said. “The earnings outlook is not particularly good because most economies in the world are slowing down.”

Profit Growth

More than 69 percent of companies the S&P 500 that reported results since April 10 have exceeded analysts’ forecasts for per-share earnings, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Profits are due to increase 3.9 percent in the second quarter and 6 percent the following period, estimates compiled by Bloomberg show.

Faber said a third round of quantitative easing would “definitely occur” if the S&P 500 dropped another 100 to 150 points. If it bounces back to 1,400, he said, the Fed will probably wait to see how the economy develops.

see Bloomberg's interview of Dr. Marc Faber below

Media has the innate tendency of reducing investment gurus into astrologers or soothsayers by soliciting predictions over the short term. And investing gurus eager to gain media limelight fall into their trap. And this is why Dr. Faber’s warnings comes with a Bloomberg notice about his latest failed predictions, which has been punctuated by "whose prediction of a February selloff in global equities never materialized."

Dr. Faber, who introduced me to the Austrian school of economics through his writings, is simply stating that if a tsunami of central banking money has been responsible for the buoyant state of markets, then a withdrawal of which should mean lower asset prices. In short, the state of the financial markets heavily, if not almost totally, relies on the actions of central bankers.

Yet since we can’t entirely predict the timing and the degree of central bank interventions, or if they intervene at all, we should expect markets to be highly sensitive to excessive volatility.

And aside from money printing, the risk of high volatility has been amplified by many other interventions on the marketplace (via various bank and financial market regulations). And heightened volatility could translate to a crash. And don’t forget a crash could be used to justify QE 3.0.

As to whether the Fed’s QE 3.0 will come before or after a substantial market move is also beyond our knowledge, since this will depend on the actions of political authorities. I have to admit I can’t read the minds of central bankers.

Yet QE 3.0 may come yet in the form of actions of other central bankers, e.g. ECB’s LTRO and or SMP.

What I know is that inflationism has been seen by the mainstream and by the incumbent political authorities as very crucial for the survival of the current forms of political institutions. This is why I, or perhaps Dr. Faber, sees the probability for more central bank interventions over the marketplace. This is because the cost of non-intervention would be a substantial reduction of the political control over society from vastly impaired political institutions.

It must be noted that Austrian economics is basically an explanatory science, where given a set of actions we see the consequence being such or such. The idea of reducing logical deduction into some form of predictive science is wizardry.

In short, while I don't predict a crash I would not rule out this option. Especially not in a highly distorted and politicized markets

Quote of the Day: Unintended Consequences of Regulations

Unregulated, a business’s reputation is its most valuable asset. A regulated business does not have the same problem, so long as it obeys the regulations. Regulations replace the overriding need for a business to protect its reputation, and it is no longer solely concerned for its customers: the rule book has precedence. And the more regulation replaces reputation, the less important customers become. Nowhere is this more obvious than in financial services…

The regulators assume the public are innocents in need of protection. They have set themselves up to be gamed by all manner of businesses intent on using and adapting the rules for their own benefits at the expense of their customers. These businesses lobby to change the rules over time to their own advantage and hide behind regulatory respectability, as clients of both MF Global and Bernie Madoff have found to their cost.

That’s from Alasdair Macleod at the GoldMoney.com

Actually this has represented more of the anatomy of crony capitalism and too big too fail corporations. Interventions upon interventions, through regulations, ultimately leads to politically captured industries.

Use Cash for Freedom

I had a gruesome first hand experience on how governments disdains the use of cash.

Sadly this has not been an isolated experience, but a deepening troublesome political trend around the world, particularly in developed economies.

Governments would like to confiscate more of the public’s resources to finance their lavish ways. So the compulsion to transact through their institutional accomplices, the politically endowed banking system.

Through stricter unilateral regulations or immoral laws, governments through the banking system place the public’s hard earned savings under intense scrutiny, and criminalize the actions of the innocent, whom have been uninformed by the rapid pace of changes in manifold regulations covering a wide swath of social activities through the banking system.

Private transactions which does not conform with the goals and the interests of the political authorities risks confiscation. Worst is the trauma of being labeled a criminal. Increasingly desperate governments have wantonly been in violation of the property rights of their citizenry.

A vote against government is to use cash transactions, that’s because cash, according to Charles Goyette at the LewRockwell.com, represents freedom

Mr. Goyette writes, (bold emphasis mine)

Governments hate that cash gives you anonymity. And they are often very anxious to track it and to control your use of it. They often attempt to criminalize the use of cash or at least criminalize having too much of it around.

Right now, 7% of the U.S. economy is cash-based. Across the Eurozone, it's a little bit higher, 9%, but in Sweden cash transactions are falling by the wayside. You can't use cash for buses there. A growing number of businesses are going entirely cashless. In fact, only 3% of all purchases in Sweden are transacted in cash. And some people think that 3% is too much.

Now, there are things you give up when you go cashless, and privacy is only one of them. Because you also give up a piece of every transaction to the facilitating financial institution, a state-approved financial institution that is going to take a cut one way or another of every purchase that it processes. And that cut will be paid by you.

In the United States, the government has implemented increasingly punitive and burdensome measures for those who use cash. Banks, for example, are required to file reports on the use of cash in certain circumstances, including suspicious persons reports for some cash activities. In fact, if you seem to be trying to transact in cash below the reporting threshold, that alone can trigger a suspicious persons report on you. Like a lot of the states' heavy-handed measures, this was all targeted at getting those drug dealers.

As earlier pointed out, governments has used all sorts of "noble" excuses like money laundering, tax evasion, the war on drugs and etc… to justify their confiscatory actions which in reality represents no more than financial repression.

And as governments tighten the noose on the public, people will intuitively look for ingenious alternatives to outflank such oppressive policies.

In the US, the liquid detergent Tide appears to have emerged even as an alternative to cash.

Writes Professor Joseph Salerno at the Mises Institute.

As has been widely reported recently, an unlikely crime wave has rapidly spread throughout the United States and has taken local law-enforcement officials by surprise. The theft of Tide liquid laundry detergent is pandemic throughout cities in the United States. One individual alone stole $25,000 worth of Tide detergent during a 15-month crime spree, and large retailers are taking special security measures to protect their inventories of Tide. For example, CVS is locking down Tide alongside commonly stolen items like flu medications. Liquid Tide retails for $10–$20 per bottle and sells on the black market for $5–$10. Individual bottles of Tide bear no serial numbers, making them impossible to track. So some enterprising thieves operate as arbitrageurs buying at the black-market price and reselling to the stores, presumably at the wholesale price. Even more puzzling is the fact that no other brand of detergent has been targeted.

What gives here? This is just another confirmation of Menger's insight that the market responds to the absence of sound money by monetizing highly salable commodities. It is clear that Tide has emerged as a subsidiary local currency for black-market, especially drug, transactions — but for legal transactions in low-income areas as well. Indeed police report that Tide is being exchanged for heroin and methamphetamine and that drug dealers possess inventories of the commodity that they are also willing to sell.

As governments stifle people’s social and commercial activities through tyrannical laws, expect the use of more cash, local currencies or commodities (such as Tide) as alternative medium of exchanges, as the informal or shadow economies grow.

Most importantly, real assets will become more valuable and may become an integral part of money, as sustained policies of inflationism, as Voltaire once said, will bring fiat money back to its intrinsic value—zero.

Money which emerges from the markets will be emblematic of freedom.

Bank Regulations as Instruments of Repression

From IFC Review, (hat tip Dan Mitchell)

Banks and other financial services firms had to deal with 60 regulatory changes each working day during 2011, according to a report from Thomson Reuters Governance, Risk & Compliance, reports City AM.

Regulators around the world announced 14,215 changes in 2011, a 16 per cent increase from the 12,179 announcements in 2010.

The report shows that the majority of regulatory activity, 57 per cent, came from the US, while the UK and rest of Europe made up 22 per cent and Asia accounted for 15 per cent.

The volume of announcements, which can include anything from a speech which may signal the direction of a new regulation to a final binding rule, has grown continuously since 2008 when regulators issued 8,704 changes.

The firm warn that the level of announcements will increase even more during 2012 as governments tighten regulation and new directives, including those related to the US Dodd-Frank act, are implemented.’

The incredible pace of regulatory changes (60 regulatory changes a day!!!) will prompt for many innocent people to be charged as criminals as in my experience.

The deluge of banking regulations represents the repressive nature of arbitrary regulations which will and has been used to subjugate the citizenry or the public largely unaware of the existence of these regulations.

Yet these are intensifying signs of desperation by the politicians whom has conscripted, and or colluded, with the banking system to extort resources from the public to sustain their privileges.

In reality, the torrent of new regulations also account for as disguised capital controls or a form of financial repression. Harvard’s Carmen Reinhart in today’s Bloomberg OpEd writes,

some of these requirements may be motivated by a government’s desire to curb money laundering and tax evasion, the measures also amount, in some cases, to administrative capital controls.

So the public is being wangled financially and oppressed politically through a variety of new arbitrary regulations under the cover of money laundering and or tax evasion. Laws are being used to violate and restrain our freedom in the name of political expediency.

Anti Money Laundering Laws (AMLA) is an example of the numerous bank regulations that has been covered by the alterations in the banking regulatory regime. Cato’s Dan Mitchell discusses the law’s ineffectiveness.

Nassim Taleb on Dodd Frank’s OFR: Soviet Style Management

While rapid advancement of technology has been decentralizing or democratizing data and information flows, central planners dream of the opposite: centralizing these in an attempt to control the markets.

A recently enacted financial overhaul law, Dodd Frank has an offspring called the Office of Financial Research.

According to the Wall Street Journal Blog, (bold emphasis mine)

Dodd-Frank created the new semi-autonomous office to support a new council of regulators – the Financial Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC – that is charged with spotting and tamping down emerging risks to financial stability. The OFR has two key components – a data-collection arm that has broad power to request any kind of information from financial firms it deems necessary, and a research and analysis arm that to be focused on monitoring the financial system for risk and producing research to improve regulation.

Celebrity author and Black Swan expositor Nassim Taleb critiqued the framework of this new office. In a prepared testimony Mr. Taleb says that this represents

an attempt to create “an omniscient Soviet-style central risk manager.”

That’s because Mr. Taleb points out that quant models can’t capture real events

According to the same article, (bold emphasis mine)

In his testimony, Mr. Taleb said that “[f]inancial risks, particularly those known as Black Swan events cannot be measured in any possible quantitative and predictive manner; they can only be dealt with [in] nonpredictive ways.” He argued that trying to do what the OFR is designed to do could actually increase risks, in part by increasing “overconfidence” in the information’s ability to predict the next crisis.

Like all quant-econometric based models, they suffer from what the great F. A. Hayek calls as the knowledge problem as embodied by the quote below:

The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.

Most people hardly ever learn