Friday, October 27, 2017

The Secret of Star Analysts; the Ayala Family Joins the Razons, the Gokongweis and the Tys in “Profit-Taking”

The Secret of Star Analysts

The financial markets of the European Union will be implementing a new legislation called the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) in January 2018

Because part of the mandate includes the unbundling of market research with other financial services, some media analysts had a gander, not only at how valuable star analysts are worth but the role they play in the industry.


Many senior analysts spend only 10 percent of their time conducting research and writing reports. Teams of junior associates (or sometimes robots) maintain financial models and blast out notes. Some use pre-recorded voice mails to alert clients to new research.

Gadfly estimates that between 50 and 70 percent of a senior analyst's time is spent on corporate access. Things like arranging lunch with a CFO or connecting a client with a lawyer, supplier or other industry expert to delve into what the data doesn't. For this reason, analysts are often required to log the number of phone calls, meetings and events arranged each month.

The final 20 percent of an analyst's time is spent on pre-IPO research, conferences and bespoke projects, such as flying a drone over a retailer's parking lot to track how full it is; scoping the laundry outside apartment blocks; or conducting so-called channel checks to see how much oil's being pumped through a particular pipeline.

Sales and business development appear to be the main functions of star establishment analysts; that’s if we go by such observations. Objective in-depth assessments or evaluations of the companies covered by them have been virtually inexistent. What happens instead is that publicity materials are repackaged and presented as research papers. So such analysts essentially moonlight as copywriters or as public relations specialists. The conflict of interests between researchers and their clients/readers have been showcased by such arrangements.

I understand this because I have experienced it. I was once asked by a mid-scale listed firm to write about them in exchange for a paid vacation trip. Because I didn’t believe in the firm’s business model, I politely declined. I would be very much in the mainstream limelight and would likely be showered by perks and privileges had I pursued such path. But as tradeoffs, I would have comprised the interests of my clients and blog readers then.

Unlike the establishment, my work here is 100% objective (theory and empirical) research.

As a sales agent, I should benefit from encouraging people to transact. However, learning from experience, material benefits should be subsidiary to responsibility, as well as, to people relationships. In short, long-term goals must not be sacrificed for instantaneous or short-term gratifications. This position holds true for me even when my clients or readers don’t share my view.

From my perspective, the purpose of trade is to profit. A portfolio exists to handle a variety of trades in the objective of attaining generalized gains. Yet, perfection in trades is not the goal. To attain profits for the portfolio, whether through momentum or trend-following trades or value investing, such should translate to the suppression of risks and the maximizing of space for advances.

And this should apply even if I don’t directly handle my reader’s accounts.

For instance, not only do I send (post) this outlook for free, I do not benefit from non-stock recommendations. When I recommend a buy on the USD-peso, this is beyond my scope. To have a handle on this, readers can go to the banks and foreign exchange dealers have a handle on this.

In so many words, mandates like MiFID II or the US Fiduciary Rule would not be in place had transparency between principal and agent had been a priority and embedded as part of the industry’s culture.
 
Finally, here is an example of an important function that has persistently been ignored by the establishment. Well, it can be interpreted that way or has been designed to imprint on the public’s mindset as normative activities.

However, we are dealing here with the pricing system. Because it is ignored or deemed as a standard, does it mean that the manner of pricing securities have been irrelevant?

Will securities that have been priced unnaturally have only benefits? Will there be no long-term ramifications to the health of equity price trends? More importantly, what would be the transmission repercussions of such price signaling distortions to the capital allocation process in the real economy?  In short, the consequence from such deliberate distortions will span more than the stock markets and the real economy but have indirect social and political aspects too.

If the markets and the real economy will get affected, would such artifices have no consequences to the social and political front over time as well?

Finally, as an agent, I do not question any orders forwarded to me by my clients for execution. I am just a lowly order taker

The Ayalas Join the Razons, the Gokongweis and the Tys in “Profit-Taking”

Last Monday, a huge special block sale of Ayala Corp shares (7,063,490 shares at Php 1,060 per share) was posted at the PSE.

Unlike their peers, the Ayala’s reportedly unloaded Php 7.84 billion of their flagship company to foreign investors.

I saw only one stock market article which covered this. From the Inquirer:

Mermac Inc., the holding company of the Zobel family, sold a portion of its stake in Ayala equivalent to 7.06 million shares or 0.86 percent to a foreign institutional investor.

After the transaction—which was executed by BPI Securities and UBS Securities—Mermac will hold 47.75 percent of Ayala’s common shares and 55.56 percent of the voting shares, and will remain Ayala’s largest shareholder.

There are now four elite families who have sold part of their holdings to the public during the last two years through wholesale sales.


 

In 2016, as their share prices of their respective flagship firms were aggressively bid higher, the families of the Gokongwei and of the Tyliquidated a portion of them.


This week, it was the turn of the Ayala family.

As I have previously explained, the actions by these elites could be appreciated as likely expressions of demonstrated or revealed preferences. 

The easiest way to justify these actions is that they “took some profits”. Of course, they did.  

But the question is why did the Ayala’s opt to sell at 1,060 and not at 1,100 or 1,150 or higher if they so believe that their shares are worth MORE than their present prices? Or one can also ask why not lower at 1,000 or 980 or 950? Why Php 1,060 per share?

It would be useful to see the actions of Ayala’s predecessors.

Empirical evidence appears to support my hypothesis that perceived overvaluations were the foundations of such profit taking activities

The present price quotes of JG Summit, GT Capital and Bloomberry have significantly been lower than their published selling prices from the special block sales.

Moreover, sales by these titans occurred while the PSEi drifted at the range of milestone levels: 7,400 and 8,000.

And because the Phisix fell to a trough of 6,563.37 on December 23, 2016, JGS share prices even crashed to Php 65.55. The recent sprint to a record high for the Phisix buoyed JGS prices to current level but still below the threshold point where it sold in block. It is unclear if the Gokongwei’s bought back during the latest nadir.

Meanwhile, present prices of GTCAP shares have drifted near the December 2016 low of Php 1,120. So, the shareholders of GT Capital have missed entirely the “record” rally.

The point of this exercise is to show that while the elites took profits, they did so because they must have seen excessiveness in the way the markets have valued them. Thus, they capitalized on it.

And if they are right, this means they could be positioned to buyback their shares at significantly lower levels. Or perhaps they’ll just consume the profits.

And another thing. It would seem that the four tycoons sold their shares to foreigners. Yes, all four.

What if the purpose of the sale was not only to take profits but to load up on the US dollar too???

So far, actions do speak louder than words.

Despite The Impressive September Government Revenue Growth, 2017’s 9-Month Fiscal Deficit Runs Nose-to-Nose with 2016’s Performance

The National Government’s (NG) revenue growth for the month of September was impressive!


 
General Revenues (tax and non-tax) soared 20.57%. Tax revenues (BIR + Bureau of Customs) jumped 24.18% on the back of BIR’s 25.16% and Bureau of Customs’ 20.81% scintillating numbers for the month. 2017 was the best September performance since 2014 (upper pane).

In the 3Q, September’s activities pulled revenue collection growth (+14.54%) to the third highest in 9 years after 2013 (+19.29%) and 2014 (+15.03%).

Even with the magnificent 3Q lift, over the 9 months period (+9.4%), 2017 trailed the years of 2011 through 2015, which posted a median growth of 12.63%.

It is worth repeating that the revenue outperformance in the 3Q by 2013 and 2014 coincided with sizzling hot M3 growth of 30%+++.

 
And it is not surprising to see the same dynamics at work again.

The difference has been that in 2013-2014, M3 was powered solely by bank credit. Thus M3 lagged bank credit growth.

Today, M3 has been energized by BOTH Net claims on the central government (QE) and by banking lending. Hence, it would appear that NG revenues have risen synchronically with bank credit (upper pane) and with M3 (domestic liquidity)

As one would note, to spike revenues for the government, the BSP’s emergency or ICU measures have been used to boost NGDP. Or, the BSP used zero bound rates as means for inflation targeting.

Boosting NGDP not only signify a subsidy for the NG; it also projects a strong GDP for publicity purposes.

But the costs of these policies are:

1) economic growth has been frontloaded or has borrowed from the future,
2) resources have been misdirected to capital consumption activities
3) balance sheets have increasingly become leveraged and
4) the purchasing power of the citizenry shrinks from the continuing invisible transfers to the government and to bank borrowers 

So far that was the good news.

Though September expenditures contracted by a measly 1.78%, the enormous jump in revenues still wasn’t able to solve the deficit problem.  

2017’s deficit of Php 36.892 billion was the second largest in 10 years after last year’s Php 75.327 billion.

2017’s 9-month deficit of Php 213.066 billion has run nose-to-nose with 2016’s Php 213.703 billion with just a difference of Php 637 million!

2009 and 2010s deficit were more about the Great Recession’s spillover effects (mostly relatively weaker revenues than today), hence vastly differs from current conditions.

Understand here (again) that the government through the BSP has employed emergency measures to obtain revenue 20%+ growth by spiking NGDP, which as shown in 2013 and 2014, had been unsustainable.

What would happen if the rate of revenue growth can’t keep with the pace of rate of government spending growth??? Will government borrow to finance these??? Or will it keep monetizing NG’s debt to ensure the overabundance liquidity, and to create the façade of having less NG debt??? Or will it be a combination of both?

Present actions of the USD peso suggest that the NG and the BSP have opted for the inflationary (debt monetization) path.