Monday, March 05, 2018

Bullseye! Crowding Out Effect in Motion: Sugar Farmers Move to the Construction Industry! Excise Taxes: Will Sardine Manufacturing Be the Next Coca-Cola?

Bullseye! Crowding Out Effect in Motion: Sugar Farmers Move to the Construction Industry! Excise Taxes: Will Sardine Manufacturing Be the Next Coca-Cola?

In my January treatise on the crowding out effect from the “build, build and build”, I wrote,

However, as earlier noted, public sector construction has grown at the expense of the private sector.  Think of it this way: A construction crane used in public sector projects is the same construction crane that will NOT be used in the private sector. Hence, private projects are the opportunity costs of public works


A media report provides for a live example of this dynamic at work. [bold mine]

The Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) is trying to find ways to keep the sugar industry alive as more and more farmers shift to working in other industries with better pay.

In an interview with SRA administrator Hermenegildo Serafica, he said the agency had to make adjustments on its production outlook this year as reports from different provinces showed the country’s sugar producers are gradually leaving the sector.

“Almost all our milling districts right now are affected with the infrastructure project, especially the cane cutters. If you are a cane cutter,you will opt to work in the ‘Build, Build, Build’ since the salary is bigger,” he said…

Board member Roland Beltran said the going rate for industrial and construction workers are higher against what they earn as farm workers.

“Although there are additional benefits and bonuses given through the sugarcane amelioration program, it’s not enough to compete with industry standards,” he said.

See, another bullseye!

Aside from the crowding out, this anecdote provides two other incisive perspectives. The first is the conflict of economic policies. The SRA is tacitly competing with the public agencies engaged in Build, Build and Build. Or, the crowding out syndrome applies even to government agencies.

The most important is that the National Government (NG) now determines the direction of the economy!

Yet, such crowding out dynamic will have very nasty effects.

Unless landowners mechanize sugar farming to replace the loss of farm labor, the industry’s output will diminish. HIGHER prices of sugar or on agricultural products affected by the worker migration will ensue.

As a side note, while mechanizing farms should be productive, this will likely be obtained via increased imports, thereby contributing to the deficits. The next question is how will farm mechanization be funded, through credit or savings? Should such farm modernization be financed by credit, the interest rate channel is where the “crowding out” will be vented on. There is no such thing as a free lunch forever!
 
Oh, please don’t expect so much from domestic manufacturing. The struggles of the manufacturing industry have only been worsening! Despite price pressures in the real economy, deflation in the producer’s price index deepened (-2%) in January to signify tremendous slack in demand.Industrial production tanked by 10.3% in December. How the heck did the manufacturing post increased growth in 4Q GDP? Even worse, the Markit’s Manufacturing Survey the Nikkei PMI index in February suffered “the joint second-lowest in the survey history” as “inflationary pressures intensified, driven up partially by new excise taxes” and as “slower rise in input inventories and job losses weighed on sector performance.”

Back to the crowding out.

And to control prices from spiraling, the government will likely allow imports of sugar and other agricultural products. These imports would then compound on the trade and current account deficits, which would exact toll on the nation’s hard currency (US dollar stash), and thus prompt for additional pressures on the peso. 

So while the mainstream experts disingenuously acclaim such deficits as a function of “economic growth”, the reality is that these imports would signify a function of the redirection of resources towards activities determined by politics that consumes capital or towards areas affected by the shift in the use of capital to the political sphere.

Public work and other political projects derive its appeal on the fixation on the immediate effects while taking for granted the comprehensive longer-term costs.

At what price do these government profligacies come with? What are its opportunity costs?

As the report showed, lured by higher wages, farmers transfer to the construction industry as laborers. Working to improve one’s weal is intuitive. However, borne out of the aggressive public works, the fast-expanding social welfare projects, military upgrades and burgeoning bureaucracy, the crowding out syndrome (e.g. shift in activities from farm to construction), and the fall of the peso, price pressures in the real economy would only negate whatever interim income gains the farmers acquired from such shift.

To top it off, the corralling of labor and resources into the construction sector brings about concentration risks, showcasing the exacerbation of misallocations or malinvestments.

Hence, if the government terminates these projects, the farmers turned construction laborers will likely be unemployed.  And increased social tensions will result from mass unemployment. And capital committed to these projects will become idle.

As one would observe, these are just the initial impact from the transitional phase of the evolving political economy.

Back Shifting Effects from the Excise Tax: Will Sardine Manufacturing Be the Next Coca-Cola?

And more anecdotes exhibiting the mounting of economic strains

In reaction to the present political environment, manufacturers of canned sardines have appealed to the NG to adjust prices. (bold mine)

Manufacturers of canned sardines will ask the government for a price increase because of higher production costs due to the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Law.

A report on 24 Oras said canned sardines manufacturers will ask the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for an increase of between P1.00 and P2.00 per can of sardines.

The report said that according to the manufacturers, the cost of imported raw materials for canned sarines, including the tomato paste, has increased due to the TRAIN Law.

The manufacturers also cited the increase in the pump prices of petroleum products and electricity

The DTI, meanwhile, said the pending price hike petition may be turned down because it was too much.


The political gods believe that they can control economics. They think that sardine manufacturers will have to sacrifice from earning a decent income to accommodate lavish political expenditures.

While the NG will likely accommodate SOME increases, the likelihood is that this would barely be sufficient to cover the rising costs of inputs.

Thus, like the Coca-Cola episode, the back-shifting effect of excise taxes will come into motion. [See HB 10963 TRAIN’s Initial Victim: Coca-Cola Will Be Laying Off Workers! The Back Shifting Effect of Excise Taxes Validated! February 8, 2018]

Sardine manufacturers will likely scale back on capital investments, retrench labor, reduce operating expenses and diminish output. Marginal producers will likely suffer losses and close shop. Higher prices will be the likely outcome!

And because of price controls, canned sardines will likely trade in the black market than in the formal markets.

So instead of transitory, upside price pressures will likely be a persistent feature for the Duterte regime.



Sunday, March 04, 2018

After a 51% Pump, SM Investment posted a Net Income Growth of ONLY 6% in 2017 as SM Retail’s 4Q Net Income Tumbled by 25%!


The consensus holds that the prices of the stock market are a reflection of the health of the economy and corporate conditions

How valid has this been?

SM delivered a staggering 51.15% return in 2017!

So what were SM punters actually paying for?

From the Company’s Press release for 2017  (dated February 28) [bold added]

SM Investments Corporation (SM) reported a 6% growth in net income to PHP32.9 billion in 2017 from PHP31.2 billion in 2016. Consolidated revenues rose 9% to PHP396.1 billion from PHP363.4 billion last year.

Huh? Some people frantically bid up SM shares by 51.15% for only a SIX percent Growth???!!!

Or, some people paid for 8.5 years of the firm’s earnings. How rational is this?

It gets better.

From the 9 months or 3Q Performance in 2017 (November 8, 2017)

SM Investments Corporation (SM) reported consolidated net income rose 8% to PHP23.8 billion for the first nine months of the year. Recurring net income, net of one-time items, climbed 13%. Consolidated revenues likewise grew 8% to PHP272.2 billion for the period from PHP252.7 billion in the same period last year.

Going into the final quarter of 2017, SM reported an 8% in net income growth (9 mos), yet for the entire year, net income growth skidded to a mere 6% growth!

These numbers reveal that SM’s 4Q performance has been SIGNIFICANTLY DISMAL to have PULLED down the 9-month net income growth numbers. Through their press releases, I estimate that Net Income in the 4Q registered a slight contraction (-1.09% y-o-y)! The slack in 4Q activities came at the time when SM share prices went berserk, breaking records upon records and pulling along with it, the Phisix!

From the Press release for 2016 (March 1, 2017)

SM Investments Corporation (SM) reported an 8% growth in net income to PHP31.2 billion in 2016. Property accounted for 39% of total earnings, with banks comprising 37% and retail 24%.  SM’s consolidated revenues grew 9% to PHP362.8 billion for the period, up from PHP332.8 billion in 2015. This was driven by an 8% increase in retail revenues and a 12% growth in property revenues.

And 2017’s net income growth was slightly lower than 2016’s!


The upper chart showcases the divergence of SM’s share prices with its fundamentals.

SM’s share prices soared in 2015 (+6.01%),  2016 (+13.72%) and 2017 (+51.15%) in the face of stagnant revenue growth (2015 +7.0%, 2016 +9.01%, 2017 +9.0%) and lackadaisical income growth (2015 unchanged, 2016 +8% and 2017 +6%). If inflation is factored in these numbers shrink by even more!

SM’s real growth is in its DEBT! As of 9 months, SM’s debt expanded a staggering 15.54% or more than double the net income growth of 6% to a massive Php 49.7 billion (or 50% more than the Php 33 billion net income growth)

Ballooning debt on decaying fundamentals.

 
SM core retail stores swelled by 11.92% in 2017. Core retail stores are SM Stores, Supermarkets, Hypermart, Savemore, and Waltermart.

Total retail stores went down by 3.7% to 2,032 in 2017 from 2016’s 2,110. That’s because SM pruned its specialty outlets by 16.5% to 1,299 from 2016’s 1,556. Some growth eh?  

And as Ayala-SSI dumped Familymart, SM’s 24/7 Indonesian franchise Alphamart ballooned by 65% to 348 outlets in 2017 from 210 in 2016.

In 2017, SM was silent about changes in retail net income performance.

Operations under SM Retail Inc., which consist of non-food (THE SM STORE and specialty stores) and food stores (SM Markets), reported total revenues grew 7% to PHP297.4 billion, while net income stood at PHP10.4 billion.

In 2016, SM reported a Php 10.6 billion increase.

Operations under SM Retail Inc., which consist of non-food (THE SM STORE and specialty stores) and food stores (SM Markets), reported sustained growth in total revenues of 8% to PHP276.5 billion, while net income grew 7% to PHP10.6 billion from PHP9.9 billion the previous year.

So SM Retail’s net income fell by 1.9% year on year!
In the 3Q of 2017, SM retail’s net income was up by 10%

Retail operations under SM Retail Inc. reported growth in total sales of 6% to PHP197.9 billion while net income rose 10% to PHP7.7 billion. Revenues from Specialty Retail grew 9%

In the 3Q of 2016, SM’s retail net income was up by 6%

Retail operations under SM Retail Inc. reported sustained growth in total sales of 9% to PHP186.0 billion while net income grew 7% toPHP7.0 billion. Revenues from recently acquired specialty retailers grew 13%.

A back of the envelope calculation tells us that 2017’s net income of Php 10.4 billion minus 9-month net income of Php 7.7 billion totaled Php 2.7 billion net income in the 4Q 2017.

Since SM Retail’s 2016 net income was Php 10.6 billion and 9m net income was Php 7.0, the difference or 4Q 2016 net income was Php 3.6 billion. (2.7/3.6=.75)

Thus, SM Retail’s 4Q income growth TUMBLED by a whopping 25%, which led to a 1.9% decline in net income growth in 2017!!!

So the additional inventory of retail outlets led to ironically a decline rather than income growth.

Remember, TRAIN took effect only in January 2018

So has SM retail reached peak growth???????????

SM Malls have been growing in number, but smaller in sizes. SM Malls expanded 11.67% to 67 malls in 2017 as against 60 malls in 2016. However, Gross Floor Area (GFA) in sqm grew by 3.9% to 8 million from 7.7 million in 2016.

So far, revenue growth of SM Malls has remained at a steady 9% over the past two years. The company has not provided explicit details indicating the net income contribution of the malls. Nevertheless, additional inventories have barely been augmenting the company’s topline performance.

This information should be available once the company’s annual report is published (probably by next week).

Eventually, what happens in the retail space should be reflected on the malls.

The detachment of SM’s share prices with its fundamental performance represents a prima facie evidence of the massive impairment of the domestic stock market’s pricing system.

And how has SM attained its fabulous feat in the context of returns despite stagnating fundamentals?

In a word: Manipulation

 
SM has been a major beneficiary of organized pumping at the PSE since late 2014.

Friday’s magical pump, which eviscerated 1% of losses, had partly been due to a massive 1.3% pump on SM. The other major recipients of coordinated and engineered bids were SM’s subsidiaries: BDO (+2.1%) and SMPH (+2.4%)

For the week, these end-session pumps-and-dumps accrued to staggering 296.06 points or 3.5% of the Phisix based on the close of February 23!

SM’s 51.15% return in 2017 was accompanied by a colossal jump in its share weight in the PSEi 30 to 12.88% from 11.31% or an increase of 13%.

As of last Friday, the SY group accounted for 28.56% share of the Phisix. It reached a high of 29.27% in the second week of January. At the close of 2016, the combined share weight was only 25.21%. The index has been beholden to the performance of the Sy group

Day in day out, the PSEi 30 has been experiencing intensifying price spikes as the PSE, the SEC, and the BSP continue to keep their eyes wide shut.

With thousands of highly paid experts, there has been no realization that when you mess with the pricing system of the markets, you foster imbalances from which eventually prices will have to clear. Expecting free lunch forever; everyone seems fixated on the present.

Yet, the festering of imbalances has begun to escalate. SM’s fundamentals should be a noteworthy example.

And no amount of price fixing will forestall its day of reckoning.