Monday, September 09, 2013

US Equity Markets: The Deepening Wile E. Coyote Moment

Central bankers and interventionists need to stop approaching the system as one driven by random shocks, because this mind-set leads them to manipulate and attempt to control the system — a cycle that destroys far more in the long run than it saves temporarily.The longer they erroneous thinking persists, the more out of balance things become, until there is a tinderbox of malinvestment ready to ignite in a massive, uncontrollable inferno. Mark Spitznagel

I described the Wile E. Coyote Moment as the incompatibility or the unsustainable relationship between rising trend of risk assets, particularly stock markets, amidst the conflicting forces of ascendant bond yields and of elevated oil prices or particularly $100 per bbl[1].
The stock markets operates on a Wile E. Coyote moment. These forces are incompatible and serves as major headwinds to the stock markets. Such relationship eventually will become unglued. Either bond yields and oil prices will have to fall to sustain rising stocks, or stock markets will have to reflect on the new reality brought about by higher interest rates (and oil prices), or that all three will have to adjust accordingly...hopefully in an 'orderly' fashion. Well, the other possibility from 'orderly' is disorderly or instability.
This is not to say that stock markets won’t rise, but rather rising bond yields compounded by rising oil prices magnifies the risks of sharp and intense downside volatility for credit fueled stock markets.

Thursday’s Global Bond Market Crash and $110 Oil Prices

Stock markets mentally conditioned or programmed to the Bernanke Put or government-central guarantees and from $150 billion a month stimulus (US Fed $85 billion + Bank of Japan $70 billion) have largely been desensitized to risks.

The ingrained belief has been that goverments will continue to support the markets and that expectations of the Fed’s tapering (marginal reduction from the $85 billion) will hardly affect on “fundamentals”.

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Yet absent in mainstream media last week was Thursay’s huge crash in the global bond markets[2].

The yields of 10 year US treasury notes (UST) alone jumped 20 basis points to 2.938% from last week’s 2.74%, this week.

Last Thursday, the same UST yields raced by 82 basis points from 2.897% to 2.979% to a two year high which nearly breached the 3% level. Thursday’s huge yield gains virtually erased the declines during the early week.

This week’s remarkable 7.3% weekly upswing in 10 year UST yields compounds on the year-to-date performance where at Friday’s 2.938%, gains on yields have accrued to 123 basis points or 71% year-to-date.

And even more remarkable has been what seems as the broadening of losses of the international sovereign bond markets[3] (soaring yields). With Asia also posting huge increases in sovereign bond yields I would estimate that vastly more than 60% of the $99 trillion bond markets have been afflicted by the actions of the bond vigilantes.

Since stock markets shrugged off the activities in the bond markets, media has largely been reticent of this increasing fragility of the market system’

Yet the sustained spike in yields of the UST appear to be intensifying thereby deepening the degree of volatility or the ambiance of uncertainty in the immensely larger bond markets.

Importantly, UST yields have been rising faster than US equity benchmarks (S&P 500 16.06% Dow Jones 13.88% year to date), the statistical economy 2.5% in 2nd quarter[4] and even corporate earnings at an estimated 3.6% for Q3 2013[5]

In other words, the cost of servicing debt has been climbing alarmingly faster than the economy’s ability to pay them (via real economic growth) and from Ponzi finance dynamics—where the liabilities are growing far more than the increases in asset prices.

In Ponzi finance[6], refinancing debt ultimately depends on a sustained appreciation of the value of assets that should be greater than the cost of debt service.

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And for US stocks which has partly been powered by near record levels of net margin debt[7] and from share buybacks funded mostly by bonds[8] in reaction to distortions in the tax environment[9] and to the easy money environment, rising yields across the curve may not only impede fund raising activity to sustain an upside move for the US stocks but also jeopardize the credit quality of stock market borrowers.

Over the past 13 years, rising yields and rising S&P 500 (green arrows) has resulted to either a market crash (2007-8) or major retrenchments (green ellipses). I only noted of the major moves, there are minor symmetries between stocks and UST yields.

But rising yields have not only been a threat, it is being compounded by the recent breakout of oil prices.

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Rising yields may reflect on price inflation dynamics. A strong upside on oil prices may reinforce the public’s inflation expectations thus add to pressures for higher UST yields.

In the past, except for one instance, a period of sharp increases in oil prices produced mostly negative returns for US equities[10]. The biggest beneficiaries has been T-bills and high quality debt.

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$100+bbl oil have been associated with falling US stocks. $100 oil ($140 bbl) aggravated the troubles of the bursting US housing bubble in 2008 where the S&P dived.

Subsequent events where oil prices jumped over $100 bbl have also shown an eventual ‘meaningful’ retracements for the US S&P 500.

Sharp increases in oil prices has also been associated with 11 of the 12 post-World War II recessions in the US as I previously pointed out[11].

While oil prices are hardly the cause of recessions, they signify as symptoms to an underlying problem. In the current case, if oil prices continue to ascend, which as noted above will exacerbate pressures on the bond markets via the inflation premium, then significantly higher yields will likely undermine economic activities of interest rate sensitive industries. And considering today’s highly leveraged or debt laden economy, a severe slowdown may result to a broad based contamination that would only enhance the risk of a recession.

The accelerating increase of bond yields combined with soaring oil prices can be analogized to a ticking time bomb on the US stock market.

Don’t Ignore the War Premium

And as much as the destiny of bond yields have partly been tied to oil prices. Oil prices have partially been connected with geopolitics.

The Obama administration has been appealing for a limited military strike on Syria[12] based on allegations that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against the US suppported rebels. Ironically the US government has been in support of rebel groups whom have links to terror ‘Al Qeada’ groups[13].

Yet the US government seems as having a difficult time assembling an international coalition. Even at home, the Obama adminstiration’s proposed military actions has been unpopular.

Some Pollyannaish analysts see the propects of the Syrian war as having little negative effects on the markets. They even cite academic literatures which exhibits how recent engagements by the US has led even to rising markets. Yet this represents an example of underestimating risks by relying on misleading historical data sets and by comparing apples with oranges.

In the current predicament, given evidences that the chemical weapon recently used in Syria’s civil war has been attributed to US supported rebels who may have used this to raise a “false flag” or ‘provocation” to encourage “western intervention”[14], Russian president Vladimir Putin has declared at the G-20 that the Russians will help Syria[15].

The Russian President seems as taking advantage of the unpopularity of Obama’s agenda to score political points. 7 nations, the UN president and the Vatican via Pope Frances have been reported as categorically against a military intervention in Syria.

And of course given Russia’s significant role as energy provider to the EU where 34% of EU’s crude oil imports come from Russia (as of 2010) aside from imports of “significant volumes of refined products”[16], Russia’s energy geopolitics appears to have swayed the EU to mute their support for a US led military intervention.

While declaring strongly against the chemical weapons, the European Union said that military strike should come only after the findings of UN inspections
The point is: during wars of the recent past, there hardly has been a major nuclear power involved in the opposite fence. So underestimating the possible involvement of Russia could signify as a source of a Black Swan.

A Syrian strike by the US could extrapolate to the escalation risks or “one thing leads to another”. As German Field commander and one of the greatest strategists of the 19th century Helmuth von Moltke the Elder said "no plan survives contact with the enemy”[17].

And an accident can provoke a confrontation between the major superpowers of the US-Russia. And initial engagements may spread and intensify.

Once emotions get the better of any of the warring parties, the temptation to use nuclear weapons can be compelling.

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Should the military conflict degenerate into a full scale nuclear war where both protagonist holds significant inventory of nuclear weapons[18], then you can kiss tomorrow goodbye.

Given the Philippines has shown to be a lackey of the US, one can’t discount that one of the anti US missiles may be targeted here.

Remember in World War II, the Japanese occupation of the Philippines begun on December 8th 1941, only a day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor[19].

Should we be lucky enough that a nuclear exchange will be limited, the scale of destruction will unlikely be a bullish outcome.

Also remember current warfare involves high technology weaponries to include drones, cyberwarfare and more. So it would be a mistake to view conventional warfare with World War II strategies and tactics.

And even if there won’t be a direct confrontation between two super nuclear powers, the proxy war could prompt for a contagion that sends the Middle East region engulfed in flames, thereby spiking oil prices to $200 bbl or more oil that would cause a global recession.

There is also the financial aspect to the warfare. Russia has $138 billion worth of USTs as of June[20]. Should Russia and her allies wish to undermine financing of the US war machine, they can resort to dumping USTs in order to shoot up bond yields that would unsettle and possibly force a recession on the US economy

During the past where major economies squared off in the battlefield or have threatened to do so, stock markets barely welcomed such conflict.

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In the Korean war of 1950-1953[21] where the USSR supported 1.35 million Chinese forces who fought alongside the North Koreans against the combined troops of South Korea and an international alliance led by the US which ended in an armistice, the S&P 500 fell by about 15% during the outbreak.

Perhaps the US markets realized of the limitations in the scope of damage and of the potential contagion, since the conventional methods of the Korean War had practically been a carryover of World War II, such that the negative effects of war had been discounted. 

Also inflationary financing of the war may have also contributed to the booming stocks.

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A more related event has been the 13 day Cuban missle crisis of October 1962 where the standoff by US and the USSR brought them closest to a nuclear conflict[22].

The seeds of the impasse began when the U.S. launched an embargo against Cuba in February 1962[23], US stocks as measured by the S&P 500 began its gruelling steep 4 month bear market dive. The S&P lost about 28% (peak to trough). 

The S&P rallied from July to September only to fall back to the proximity of June lows. The S&P 500 began to rally once the contending parties reached an agreement on October 28th, 1962.

While I am not saying that any of the above will function as the current paradigm, since current events and conditions (including level of technology, political economic environment legal framework, market and legal institutions and etc…) are vastly dissimilar from then, what I am saying is that it would be imprudent to dismiss the risks of a financial market contagion if and when US-Syrian war becomes a reality.

As iconoclast author, philosopher and mathematician Nassim Nicolas Taleb rightly points out[24]
risk management is about fragility, not naive interpretation of past data
Troubled President, the Fed’s Leadership Transition and the Debt Ceiling

Policy and political gaffes and the plunging approval ratings by the US president could also be seen as headwind for the US stock markets

"When the president is in trouble, the stock market is in trouble, that’s according to Economist Eliot Janeway (1913-1993)

A US based analyst Jeffrey Saut, chief investment strategist at Raymond James says US President Obama and the US stock market appears to be in big trouble noting that "Those troubles began with the Benghazi scandal, escalated with the (Department of Justice) spying on news reporter James Rosen, followed by the IRS scandal, and now we have Syria. ..In fact, we are even alienating two of our steadfast allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, whose silence on our Syrian strategy has been deafening."[25]

I would add the blowback from the NSA expose by whistleblower Edward Snowden as another factor.

The proposed Syrian military caper can be read in two ways or even a combo: one as diversion from policy blunders and an attempt to shore up popularity ratings by appealing to nationalism, and two, a proxy war and a staging point for future actions Iran[26] in favor of the cabal of politcally influential Israel-neoconservative groups and of the military industrial complex.

The underlying cog behind the wheel rational for portentous stock markets from a troubled president is uncertainty. And uncertainty clouds the investors economic calculation and reduces confidence levels which leads to reduced investments or even appetite for speculations.

Political uncertainty hasn’t just affected the domain of the executive branch but also on the leadership of the US Federal Reserve.

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Given that the incumbent Fed chair Ben Bernanke is likely due for the exit door or will retire on January 2014, where media has been rabidly speculating on the potential replacement or who President Obama will appoint, the choices of candidates for Mr. Bernanke’s replacement seems to have narrowed down[27] to US Federal Reserve vice chair Janet Yellen or ex-Harvard President and director for President Obama’s US National Economic Council Larry Summers.

Unknown to many the FED leadership transition process have coincided with large spikes in interest rates as measured by the FED Fund Rate[28]. Current rioting bond yields appear to reinforce such dynamic.

It is possible aside from the many stated reasons (uncertainty over effectivness of current easing policies, too much debt, diminishing real savings or scarcity of capital, inflation premium), uncertainty over the new leadership’s policy direction could exacerbate on the current conditions.

Nevertheless it isn’t a certainty that the assumption of a new Fed chair may calm the bond markets as many of the cited factors may continue to dominate bond market pricing.

Finally another source of uncertainty will likely be the bi-partisan debate on the coming debt limit which is due to be reached by mid-October[29].

Bizarrely the US debt appears to have been “locked in at this implausible limit for three months: $16,699,396,000,000” notes Austrian economist Gary North which may be due to “cooked books”[30]. There seems to be some beef on this. Rising yields of USTs may partly be signalling the “cooked book” “locked in” debt levels uncertainty story, where the public doubts on the accuracy of the reported fiscal conditions, uncertainty may prompt investors to sell.

Bottom line: Risks are Intensifying

Many of the bullish case for a rebound on global (Asian and emerging market) stock markets has been anchored on the US recovery story (aside from Europe and Japan).

But contrary to this assertion, indications are that the Wile E Coyote moment seems as intensifying. Sharply rising bond yields and surging $100+ oil prices have been inconsistent with rising stocks both from theoretical and from empirical perspectives. Thursday’s global sovereign bond market crash reinforces such systemic fragility.

While stocks may rise in the interim, due to the grasping at the straws by increasingly desperate yield chasing seekers, such upside actions, which will likely be limited, will magnify on the downside risks.

And adding to the uncertainties that may push or drive bond yields and oil prices higher is the war premium. A realization of a US military strike on Syria may increase the chances of an accidental confrontation with Russia which may increase the risks of escalation. And even without Russia’s direct involvement, a proxy war could also lead to contagion or a destabilization of the Middle East.

The Syrian war crisis may compound on the troubles brought about by the bond vigilantes. These are risks that shouldn’t be discounted without intense scrutiny and evaluation.

Aside from the war premium, other political uncertainties may blight the risk environment. Political uncertainties reflecting on a troubled leadership for the US executive branch, the transition process on the leadership selection for the US Federal Reserve and the coming debt ceiling debate may add to the turmoil in the US bond markets

Finally bond market volatility in itself represents a major source of market risk or instability. For as long as the volatilities in bond markets has not been contained, global financial markets will remain highly fragile and vulnerable to intense downside actions.

And turmoil in the US equity markets will act as the final nail in the coffin for the global contemporaries.





[3] Bloomberg Rates & Bonds


[5] Fact Set S&P EARNINGS INSIGHT September 6, 2013





[10] Zero Hedge How Stocks Respond To Oil Price Shocks September 2, 2013


[12] Globe and Mail Obama faces uphill battle for Syria strike votes September 7, 2013




[16] European Commission EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 March 2013

[17] Wikipedia.org Moltke's Theory of War Helmuth von Moltke the Elder




[21] Wikipedia.org Korean War China intervenes (October – December 1950)

[22] Wikipedia.org Cuban missile crisis


[24] Nassim Nicolas Taleb The “Long Peace” is a Statistical Illusion FooledbyRandomness.com



[27] Fox Business News Obama: Mulling Range of Candidates for Fed Chief August 9, 2013


[29] Marketwatch.com U.S. to hit debt limit in mid-October, Lew says August 26, 2013

Ignoring the Risks of an Asian Crisis and the Bang Moment

The consensus has spoken, there will be no Asian crisis.

The common denominator of their defense: huge international currency reserves.

While I agree that rich foreign currency reserves may reduce the risks of a crisis, as previously pointed out, these reserves must not be treated as a “get out of jail” or free passes for more bubble policies.

Second, a common mistake by the consensus is to anchor on the past. Their general focus has been on the risks of a currency crisis. They have ignored the risks of other forms of crisis such as banking crisis or sovereign debt default.

The Foreign Exchange Reserve Myth

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The above chart reveals of Japan’s foreign exchange reserves today and in 1990. During the pre-bubble era, Japan’s reserves jumped to $100 billion. Japan’s asset boom was even given a boom day buzzword called “Japan Inc”, where many ‘revisionist experts’ argued that Japan’s state capitalism would lead her to overtake the US[1]. Unfortunately these experts failed to see that artificial booms eventually unravel. The banking crisis of 1990s, an offshoot to the bursting bubble, put a kibosh on the phony Japan Inc. boom.

During the halcyon days, Japan’s external position as earlier noted seemed strong embellished by current account surpluses, enormous net international investment position[2], huge savings and low external debt. So who would have seen a bubble unless the theory of bubbles has been adequately comprehended?

By the time of the crisis, Japan’s forex reserves reached $80 billion (about current Philippine levels in nominal terms).

Fast forward today, as of August of 2013 Japan’s reserves have skyrocketed to US$1.254 trillion[3].

Here is Wikipedia description on Japan’s asset price bubbles of the 1980s[4], “The bubble episode has been characterized by rapid acceleration of asset prices, overheated economic activity as well as uncontrolled money supply and credit expansion”

Has huge forex reserves been a factor in preventing crisis? Again from Wikipedia
By August 1990, stock price has plummeted to half the peak by the time of fifth monetary tightening by Bank of Japan (also known as BOJ) The asset price began to fall by late 1991 and the asset price officially collapsed in the early 1992. Consequently, the bubble's subsequent collapse lasted for more than a decade with asset price plummeted resulting a huge accumulation of non-performing assets loan (NPL) and consequently difficulties to many financial institutions. Such Japanese asset price bubble contributed to what some refer to as the Lost Decade. 

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This is what the lost decade looks like. Japan’s asset bubbles crumbled when domestic credit shrank[5] (lower bottom). The lost decade also saw Japan’s statistical economy popping in and out of recessions.

Ironically today’s Japan’s aggressive monetary experiment called “Abenomics” where the monetary base has been targeted to double in two years represents one of the many similar attempts to resolve on the carryover or the lingering malaise from the 1990 bubble bust.

Nevertheless Japan’s massive decline in private sector credit has been replaced by a massive quadrillion yen[6] worth of government debt. This comes amidst a colossal stockpile of forex reserves. Will Japan’s giant reserves prevent a government debt default? We shall soon see.

So Japan’s experience shows that having massive forex reserves hardly serves as a guarantee against a crisis.

The Bang Moment

There’s more. The impression peddled by the mainstream is that a country with supposedly strong fundamentals would translate to immunization from a crisis.

It’s sad to see how people use backward looking data to forecasts on forward looking markets. Such type of mistaking forest for trees analysis can lead to big frustrations.

Now even the IMF seems to understand this (bold mine)[7]:
Policy makers should allow exchange rates to respond to changing fundamentals but may need to guard against risks of disorderly adjustment, including through intervention to smooth excessive volatility
I am not saying that I agree with the policy recommendation I am saying that IMF recognizes that current market prices have reflecting on changing fundamentals something which the mainstream refuses to acknowledge.

A more important factor is that crises tend to flow from periphery to the core.

Writing at the New York Times, MIT Professor and former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson[8] (bold mine)
In 1982, higher interest rates in the United States raised borrowing costs for Mexico and other emerging markets, contributing to the onset of what became known as the Latin American debt crisis and, for many of the affected, a “lost decade.” And in early 1997 the United States was also tightening monetary policy. Sometimes small changes in global funding can have big consequences on emerging markets.
Mr Johnson further describes on the contagion effects which is usually regional of nature.
Most financial crises begin with one weak country and then spread as investors re-evaluate prospects more broadly. The 1982 “developing country debt” crisis was brought on initially in Mexico, and the financial unraveling of Asia in 1997 started with Thailand. Greece was supposed to be an isolated case in early 2010, but then pressure followed on Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy.
While Mr. Johnson sees no imminent emerging crisis he warns the public not to dismiss or ignore them. 

The difference between then and today is that the bond market seems as saying that current dynamics hasn’t been sourced from the US only as the bond vigilantes has gone global.

Crises have always been an ex-post reckoning: we never know they exist until the bang moment.

Harvard’s dynamic duo of Professors Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff describes the bang moment[9], (bold mine)
Perhaps more than anything else, failure to recognize the precariousness and fickleness of confidence – especially in cases in which large short-term debts need to be rolled over continuously – is the key factor that gives rise to the this-time-is-different syndrome.

Highly indebted governments, banks, or corporations can seem to be merrily rolling along for an extended period, when bang – confidence collapses, lenders disappear, and a crisis hits.

Economic theory tells us that it is precisely the fickle nature of confidence, including its dependence on the public's expectation of future events, which makes it so difficult to predict the timing of debt crises. High debt levels lead, in many mathematical economics models, to "multiple equilibria" in which the debt level might be sustained – or might not be.

Economists do not have a terribly good idea of what kinds of events shift confidence and of how to concretely assess confidence vulnerability. What one does see, again and again, in the history of financial crises is that when an accident is waiting to happen, it eventually does. When countries become too deeply indebted, they are headed for trouble. When debt-fueled asset price explosions seem too good to be true, they probably are. But the exact timing can be very difficult to guess, and a crisis that seems imminent can sometimes take years to ignite."
The bang moment has always been a product of an accretion of a series of events.

It is easy to dismiss the risks of a crisis, but when one sees crashing markets on multiple fronts and on a regional scale, we understand that such signs as reversal of confidences that have real economic consequences.

In other words, for me, recent market actions seem to have already set in motion real world dynamics that risks evolving into a full blown crisis

Take for instance signs of the real world impact from the recent market crash on Asia

From Wall Street Journal[10]: (bold mine)
Companies in exposed parts of Asia are facing a debt-repayment crunch as plunging local currencies make it more costly to repay foreign loans, a situation that is exacerbating stresses on the region's economies.

Asian companies took out sizable foreign loans in recent years as the U.S. Federal Reserve kept interest rates low and printed money. For companies in nations like India and Indonesia, rates on U.S.-denominated debt were more attractive than local borrowing costs…

The situation in India is notable. Indian companies have a combined $100 billion of unhedged foreign debt, according to data from Indian ratings firm Crisil, an affiliate of Standard & Poor's. A nearly 18.5% fall in the rupee since May has increased the cost of repaying those debts in local currency terms.
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The article further notes that the huge ASEAN reserves seen in the context of current account and short term external debt or foreign exchange cover may not warrant the region’s perceived impregnability from a crisis. Bubbles in the ASEAN region has led to a sharp deterioration of reserve cover.

Another example: Indian banks have reportedly been taking a big hit, from the Financial Times[11]
Fears are rising for the health of India’s banking system as slowing economic growth and rapid currency depreciation threaten to worsen asset quality and reduce demand for bank credit from large industrial companies.

Non-performing and restructured loan levels in Asia’s third-largest economy have risen steadily over the past year to stand at about 9 per cent of assets and could reach 15.5 per cent over the next two years, according to Morgan Stanley.

A combination of weaker growth, waning business confidence and RBI measures to support the rupee will further dent asset quality, analysts say, in particular as some of the larger industrial companies struggle to repay loans.
So if market pressures in India will be sustained and if the banking system gets hit, then a no-crisis can easily morph into a crisis.

Bear Market Slows Philippine Loan Activities

The recent market crash have begun to impact on loan activities of the Philippine banking system

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Loans on production activity has been on a decline since May, based on the year on year change per month—data from the BSP[12].

The biggest impact has been in the financial intermediation where growth seemed to have hit the wall. The slowdown in loan growth will impact the pace of statistical economic growth of the service sector.

Lending to the Hotel and restaurant sector fell dramatically.

Loans to the real estate renting and other businesses dropped below the 20% level. This will partly impact construction related activities in the statistical economy.

Loans to the trading sector and construction activity (perhaps public construction) has partly offset these declines.

If the July trend will be sustained then we will likely see a modest slowdown by the 3rd quarter. There are two months to go for the statistical data to be completed.

And if the July trend worsens, then statiscal growth likely post a bigger than expected slowdown.

The BSP reformatted their statistical treatment of domestic liquidity[13], nonetheless they report that the strong M3 growth is a manifestation of expanding credit to the domestic sector

Finally while government statistics tend to dismiss the risk of domestic price inflation I suspect that the current brouhaha over rice price inflation[14] could be signs of a rotation from domestic asset bubble to price inflation or increased risks of a price inflation given the recent decline of the Peso.

Bottom line: Be Vigilant and Cautious

It will be hasty and reckless to dismiss the risks of a crisis merely out of forex reserves grounds. 

Market selloff represents fundamental changes. They are not based on mere sentiment or irrationality.

We must take vigil of the continuity and the intensity of volatility in the domestic markets, the damages or ramifications from the recent market crash, and importantly, the policy responses that may exacerbate or reduce the odds of a crisis.

Since the common trait of many crises has been one of regional contagion, then observing the ASEAN markets based on the above parameters may provide clues if a crisis, or if a recovery, is coming.

Conditions are so fluid and fragile for one to take on substantial risks.





[3] Tradingeconomics.com JAPAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES





[8] Simon Johnson The Next Emerging Market Crisis New York Times Blog September 4, 2013

[9] Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff This Time is Different MAULDIN: The 'Bang!' Moment Is Here Businessinsider.com

[10] Wall Street Journal Plunging Currencies Crimp Asian Companies (bold mine)

[11] Financial Times, India crisis threatens big hit on banks September 4, 2013

[12] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Bank Lending Sustains Growth in July September 6, 2013


[14] Philstar.com Rice prices up; kickback probe set September 5, 2013

Saturday, September 07, 2013

Humor: Send Congress to Syria says Majority of Americans in Poll

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From the Onion
WASHINGTON—As President Obama continues to push for a plan of limited military intervention in Syria, a new poll of Americans has found that though the nation remains wary over the prospect of becoming involved in another Middle Eastern war, the vast majority of U.S. citizens strongly approve of sending Congress to Syria.

The New York Times/CBS News poll showed that though just 1 in 4 Americans believe that the United States has a responsibility to intervene in the Syrian conflict, more than 90 percent of the public is convinced that putting all 535 representatives of the United States Congress on the ground in Syria—including Senate pro tempore Patrick Leahy, House Speaker John Boehner, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and, in fact, all current members of the House and Senate—is the best course of action at this time.

“I believe it is in the best interest of the United States, and the global community as a whole, to move forward with the deployment of all U.S. congressional leaders to Syria immediately,” respondent Carol Abare, 50, said in the nationwide telephone survey, echoing the thoughts of an estimated 9 in 10 Americans who said they “strongly support” any plan of action that involves putting the U.S. House and Senate on the ground in the war-torn Middle Eastern state. “With violence intensifying every day, now is absolutely the right moment—the perfect moment, really—for the United States to send our legislators to the region.”

“In fact, my preference would have been for Congress to be deployed months ago,” she added.

Citing overwhelming support from the international community—including that of the Arab League, Turkey, and France, as well as Great Britain, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Japan, Mexico, China, and Canada, all of whom are reported to be unilaterally in favor of sending the U.S. Congress to Syria—the majority of survey respondents said they believe the United States should refocus its entire approach to Syria’s civil war on the ground deployment of U.S. senators and representatives, regardless of whether the Assad regime used chemical weapons or not.

In fact, 91 percent of those surveyed agreed that the active use of sarin gas attacks by the Syrian government would, if anything, only increase poll respondents’ desire to send Congress to Syria.
Read the rest here

Aside from Congress and the other politicians why not also send all the boisterous war agitators?

In Defiance of the Bond Vigilantes, Bank of Mexico Slashes Interest Rates

The current actions of Mexico’s central bank is an example of what I call as policy shaped and driven by the philosophical ideology of the “euthanasia or the rentier”, or of the entrenched creed that economic growth can only be spurred by abolishing interest rates which have been seen as obstacles of “scarcity value of capital” through unlimited ‘free lunch’ credit expansion.

The Bank of Mexico surprised the market and most analysts Friday with a quarter-percentage-point interest rate cut, and in the process set central bank watchers squarely into two camps: those who see it as a one-off event and those who expect further easing if the economy continues to struggle.

The central bank, led by Governor Agustín Carstens, was clear in its reasons for cutting the overnight rate target to 3.75%: the economic downturn in the second quarter was “faster and deeper” than expected, and the slack in the economy is likely to remain for a prolonged period.

The bank acknowledged that economic growth this year will be well below the 2%-3% estimate it gave in August, about a week before the National Statistics Institute released the bad news about second-quarter gross domestic product, which contracted 0.7% from the first quarter and was up just 1.5% from a year earlier.
Never mind if the current woes have been created by the same solutions policymakers earlier applied to artificially bolster the economy.

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Since the 2008 US crisis, Mexico’s monetary policies via official rates had been zero bound.

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The consequence has been to balloon or more than double private sector debt.

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And the other ramification has been to expand government spending financed by external debt.

Low interest has enabled the Mexican government to indulge in a spending spree.

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But through the period where zero bound rates prompted for a debt financed growth, Mexico’s annual GDP growth rate has been in a conspicuous decline where quarter on quarter GDP growth has even turned contractionary or negative during the second quarter

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And part of the negative 2nd quarter growth can be traced to a spike in Mexico’s 10 year bond yields

Domestic credit markets which rates have been tied to such bond benchmark has extrapolated to higher interest rates. Higher rates have thus became a drag on a debt finance statistical growth.

And coincidentally the arrival of the bond vigilantes has only unmasked the diminishing returns of a credit driven statistical boom.

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And another symptom of the damage from the bond vigilantes has been the falling Mexican peso.

USD-MXN has been on the rise over the same period.
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Aside from Peso and bonds, the Mexican benchmark the Bolsa plunged towards the bear market, over the same period. The Bolsa bounced back strongly from June lows, but have showed renewed signs of infirmity.

It remains to be seen who will be proven right and who will look like a fool, the bond vigilantes or the Bank of Mexico.

Bottom line: The contemporary central banker know only of one solution to economic woes: to permanently blow quasi-booms via zero bound rates and by adding asset purchasing programs for the same goals. Never mind if such policies has ever been effective. The policy recourse as if shaped by intuition has been the same.

Someone previously noted that doing the same things over and over again and expecting different results is called insanity. Insanity via permanent boom bust cycles have become the dominant governing monetary policies of the global economy.

Poland Government Seizes Half of Pension Funds

Desperate debt burdened governments will resort to the brazen confiscation of the savings of their constituents. 

In the case of Poland almost half of private pensions have been nationalized.

Notes the Zero Hedge (bold original)

By way of background, Poland has a hybrid pension system: as Reuters explains, mandatory contributions are made into both the state pension vehicle, known as ZUS, and the private funds, which are collectively known by the Polish acronym OFE. Bonds make up roughly half the private funds' portfolios, with the rest company stocks.

And while a change to state-pension funds was long awaited - an overhaul if you will - nobody expected that this would entail a literal pillage of private sector assets.

On Wednesday, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said private funds within the state-guaranteed system would have their bond holdings transferred to a state pension vehicle, but keep their equity holdings.  The funds would effectively be left with only the equities portions of their assets, even this would be depleted, and there will be uncertainty about the number of new savers joining.

But why is Poland engaging in behavior that will ultimately be disastrous to future capital allocation in non-public pension funds (the type that can at least on paper generate some returns as opposed to "public" funds which are guaranteed to lose)? After all, this is a last ditch step which no rational person would engage in unless there were no other option. Simple: there were no other option, and the driver is the same reason the world everywhere else is broke too - too much debt.

By shifting some assets from the private funds into ZUS, the government can book those assets on the state balance sheet to offset public debt, giving it more scope to borrow and spend. Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski said the changes will reduce public debt by about eight percent of GDP. This in turn, he said, would allow the lowering of two thresholds that deter the government from allowing debt to raise over 50 percent, and then 55 percent, of GDP. Public debt last year stood at 52.7 percent of GDP, according to the government's own calculations.

To summarize:

1. Government has too much debt to issue more debt
2. Government nationalizes private pension funds making their debt holdings an "asset" and commingles with other public assets
3. New confiscated assets net out sovereign debt liability, lowering the debt/GDP ratio 
4. Debt/GDP drops below threshold, government can issue more sovereign debt
    The seizure of private sector savings to lower debt levels only whets government’s appetite to go into a spending binge.

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    The Polish government’s spending extravaganza as seen via chronic budget deficits
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    Nationalization of pensions funds means that the Polish government sees a growing risk of diminished access to external financing as external debt has been swelling to finance lavish government spending habits.

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    The actions of the Polish government appear to have slammed her equity markets as seen via the WIG benchmark.
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    And with it, Polish bonds has been sold off (along with the world)

    Actions by Polish policymakers may aggravate the dour sentiment on emerging markets.

    As Reuter’s analyst Sujata Rao at Global Investing observed: (bold mine)
    If the backdrop for global emerging markets (GEM) were not already challenging enough, there are, these days, some authorities that step in and try to make things even worse, writes Societe Generale strategist Benoit Anne. He speaks of course of Poland, where the government this week announced plans to transfer 121 billion zlotys ($36.99 billion) in bonds held by private pension funds to the state and subsequently cancel them. The move, aimed at cutting public debt by 8 percentage points,  led to a 5 percent crash yesterday on the Warsaw stock exchange, while 10-year bond yields have spiralled almost 50 basis points since the start of the week. So Poland, which had escaped the worst of the emerging markets sell-off so far, has now joined in.

    But worse is probably to come. Liquidity on Polish stock and bond markets will certainly take a hit —the reform removes a fifth of  the outstanding government debt. That drop will decrease the weights of Polish bonds in popular global indices, in turn reducing demand for the debt from foreign investors benchmarked to those indices. Citi’s World Government Bond Index, for instance, has around $2 trillion benchmarked to it and contains only five emerging economies. That includes Poland whose weight of 0.55 percent assumes roughly $11 billion is invested it in by funds hugging the benchmark.
    As the US dollar liquidity is being drained off the world, governments will become increasingly exposed on their dependence on debt, and subsequently on their debt based economies.

    Such dynamic are presently being ventilated mainly via the currency markets where many emerging markets including the ASEAN region have been facing a currency storm.

    Nonetheless, pension funds have increasingly become targets for government’s financial repression as in the case of Argentina and Spain.

    Pension funds have also transformed into tools for market interventions in order to support political objectives such as in the Philippines.

    And the seeming political trend in response to the US dollar scarcity has been knee jerk reactions to indulge in more direct and harsher financial repression or savings confiscation measures. 

    Hardly a positive sign.