Sunday, June 21, 2015

Phisix 7,600: Shrinking Market Liquidity and Media’s Demand for More Stimulus!

If you react to that by piling more intervention on intervention, you encourage more untoward risk taking and you end up with even greater amount of mispriced risk, you end up with a never-ending cycle that is harder and harder to get out of- Ashley Alder, chief executive officer of Hong Kong's Securities and Futures Commission on central banks as market makers of last resort

In this issue

Phisix 7,600: Shrinking Market Liquidity and Media’s Demand for More Stimulus!

-Record Phisix in the Face of Shrinking Market Liquidity
-Divergences Even Among Key Phisix Issues
-Philippine Stocks: SECOND MOST Expensive in the World!
-More Signs of Shrinking Liquidity at the Treasury Markets
-Bureau of Customs April’s 8.5% Deficit: It’s Not About Oil, It’s About the Economy
-Media Downscales on G-R-O-W-T-H! Pressures Government for More Stimulus!

Phisix 7,600: Shrinking Market Liquidity and Media’s Demand for More Stimulus!

So finally the Philippine equity benchmark finally broke the recent losing streak.

With a sizeable 1.3% advance, the Phisix posted its first weekly gain in four. This week’s gains have added some cushion to protect the record levels from the incursion of the bears.

To recall, just the other week, the bears launched a blitzkrieg which easily smashed through the lines of record 7,400 Phisix, as well as, the 7,350 support levels before the selling momentum faded.

So far, the Phisix has recovered 3.79% from its closing low last June 9th at below record 7,323.44. But the headline index remains 6.48% off the April 10th record of 8,127.48.


The benchmark’s resistance can be seen at 7,728. On the other hand, the support, which was also encroached the other week, remains at 7,350.

The chart above also shows of the peso which partially recovered this week at 45.11 to a US dollar from the other week’s 45.15.

Incidentally, the current ‘peak’ in the USD-php has almost coincided with trough of the Phisix. Should history repeat where the peso’s performance will resonate with the equity benchmark—then a weak peso will suffuse onto a lackluster Phisix and vice versa.

Both have served as primary indicators to herald the 1997 Asian Crisis.

Record Phisix in the Face of Shrinking Market Liquidity

Last week, I noted that developments at the general marketplace should CONFORM with the actions of the index for a trend to be reckoned as sustainable[1]
Little has been appreciated that the headline index DEPENDS on the OVERALL health conditions of the entire population of listed stocks.
So watching the underlying actions of the bids (or the buyers) will be crucial in establishing whether last week’s activities represented an oversold bounce or a resumption of a secular trend.

For a week where the Phisix scored a substantial 1.3% headline advance, the considerable degree of gains should have filtered into the general market.

Additionally, considering the sustained dominance of bears at the broader market—or bears as the overriding force behind the scenes—it would have been natural to expect some reprieve in favor of the bulls.

But reprieve seems nowhere been in sight yet. 


This week’s headline improvement came with attenuated peso trading volume. 

The daily peso average of Php 7.78 billion per day ranks the FIFTH lowest for the year (left)! Moreover, it’s been four out of the five weeks where peso volume has traded below the Php 8 billion even as the Phisix drifts at record territory!

While sellers haven’t been aggressive, the bulls led by index managers can only do so much. Sellers have only taken advantage of aggressive buyers to sell at higher levels. So unless bulls can muster more volume, the task to regain the old high will signify an arduous challenge.

Importantly, whatever trading volume generated has increasingly been directed to the top 15 issues of the headline index. And the dearth of volume on the general market reveals of the increasing concentration of trading activities and risks on headline sensitive issues.

Aside from volume, this week’s frenetic push of the benchmark has seen little participation from the broad market in the context of market breadth or the advance decline spread.

So what else has been new?

With index’s 1.3% gain, one would at least expect SOME improvements. Yet as a continuing trend for the year, losers still edged out gainers 413 to 391 for the week. (right window)

The distribution of days has been in favor of losers: 3 against 2. The tally board: June 15: 72 advancers 91 decliners, June 16: 77 to 85, June 17: 77 to 90. The single day in favor of winners Thursday June 17: 89 to 71. Friday June 19 was dead even at 76 all.

So seller’s still rule the market despite the 1.3% headline.

And low volume coupled with the dominance of sellers seems to have NOW been accompanied by rapidly shrinking trading activities.


This week’s average daily trades have dwindled to the lowest level since December 2014, or accounts for the lowest number for the year! 

Meanwhile, average total daily traded issues have collapsed to 1Q 2014 lows!

Both daily trades and total traded issues can serve as a measure of market sentiment.

Although both have surged to records in 2014, it appears that these sentiment gauges has hardly helped market breadth. Instead, they seem to indicate of rotational actions: partial selling of broad market, partial pushing of select or a few non-Phisix and the key thrust has been to power headline issues via significant accounts of churning (as possibly seen in average daily trades).

While the collapse in average total traded issues may translate to the easing of selling pressures at the broad market, it is also telling sign of the massive contraction of trading activities.

All these suggest of a materially withering market liquidity now being ventilated as immensely reduced trading activities!

And again, the only thing that has kept the Phisix at record levels has been the tenacious concentration of rotational pumping of big ticket headline sensitive issues!

And current market activities hardly seem about reflecting price discovery, but about the propping of headline stocks.

When price discovery has been rendered dysfunctional, then the vast distortions of said security prices will be subject to the risk of an eventual violent market clearing process.

The obverse side of every artificial boom is a bust.

Divergences Even Among Key Phisix Issues


Stunningly, not even the 15 largest heavyweights had been unanimous. 

Seen from the perspective of the sectoral indices, the property and service sectors have defied the selective pumps in the Industrial, Holding and Financial sectors.

And interestingly, the index outperformers had largely been products of huge price pops by JUST five companies: URC (+7.03%), JG Summit (+5.15%), Security Bank (+7.84%), Ayala Corp (+4.24%) and EDC (+3.98%).

And remarkably, four of these five issues are members of the PSEi indices. Furthermore, three of the four issues belong to the elite 8 largest market cap. As of Friday, the market cap share of these issues as follows: URC 5.66%, JG Summit 5.33%, Ayala Corp 5.9% and EDC 2.11%. In total, the combined weights of the four accounts for 19% share of the basket. Thus the huge gains by these issues embellished the sectoral advances, and more importantly, the headline index.

Additionally only 21 of the 30 issues (or two thirds) closed the week in green while one third or 9 ended the week with a loss. So divergences exist even within the headline index basket.

The bottom line is that only four issues have been responsible for the gist of this week’s 1.3% advance!

And essentially the same dynamics has underscored record Phisix of 2015: a manipulated pump!

Yet the deepening corrosion of foundations undergirds record Phisix!

Philippine Stocks: SECOND MOST Expensive in the World!

And as increasing signs of the pricing system contortions, it’s becoming a lot obvious even to foreign investors that Philippine equity prices has become massively overvalued!


Well, the prestigious rank of the SECOND most EXPENSIVE stock market in the world belongs to the Philippines! Indonesia has been in close THIRD.

The prolific Gavekal team commented[2] (bold mine)
To put that in more perspective, only 9 out of 46 countries currently have price to cash flow below 10x and five countries (Switzerland, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and India) have a price to cash ratio above 20x. The US is currently trading at 16.9x cash flow.
Just awesome!

Of course, the reason for the artificially “lower” P/E ratio has been because some of the non-participating issues in the making of the headline record, which have been in bear markets, have weighed on the overall P/E or has offset the overvaluations of the others. Fundamentally, the biggest mispricing have mostly been in the top 15 headline stocks.

Current price levels should be seen instead as manifestations of wanton speculative PUMPs rather than from stocks as a function of discounted stream of expected cash flows

Thus, popular claims that paying for 28.8 price per cash flow represents ‘fundamentals’ or G-R-O-W-T-H should be seen instead as unalloyed hokum.

G-R-O-W-T-H has been transformed into a catchphrase or a shibboleth used by the establishment to unduly seduce the gullible public to jump into the speculative bandwagon and become part of the invisible transfer process as sources of funds/savings from which the establishment taps (aside from equity pumps, think equity and bond offerings, placements and etc..; inflated tax revenues financing government budgets)

This invisible transfer process, or stimulus in favor of the government and the oligarchy, that has been enabled and facilitated by financial repression policies through negative real rates, has only penalized the average person’s savings, incomes and of the currency holders with little or no assets. Negative real rates nudge via implied coercion the susceptible and unsuspecting public to join the transfer process. Yet unknowingly, the public carries with them the burden of various risks from such transfers (market, credit, currency and interest rate risks). Bizarrely, the BSP calls this reverse Robin Hood policy as ‘responsible’

Yet any signs of downturn on headline G-R-O-W-T-H numbers will only send valuations even higher (if prices don’t adjust ahead). Also any sustained PUMP will likewise do the same.

Hence the valuations or earnings trap means buying at present levels specifically on headline issues, which provides ZERO margin of safety, should be a recipe for prospective massive losses overtime.

More Signs of Shrinking Liquidity at the Treasury Markets


Yet more signs of shrinking liquidity? 

Look no further than the rapidly flattening yield curve at the Philippine treasury markets

Since March 2015, yields of Philippine government papers have become extremely volatile.

But let noise not be an obstacle in establishing signals.

Since December, the flattening of the yield curve has been intensifying. Such dynamic appears to have accelerated in March where the volatility emerged.

Since March to date, there have been repeated attempts to forcibly steepen the curve.

Yields of 1 month bills relative to 5, 7 and 10 year maturities epitomize on the current state of volatility (left).

The spread of the 1 month yield continued to narrow relative to her longer curve equivalents from November to March. However in April the spread just collapsed. Then intervention occurred to abruptly widen the spread!

In May, the spread not only collapsed but part of the curve even INVERTED! The response has been the same, force a widening. Then again last week, the curve precipitately narrowed again.

Part of the same volatility can be seen from the other spreads (6 months, 1 year, 2 year relative to 10 and 20 year). But overall, the volatility (most likely from interventions) has emerged primarily to prevent the yield curve from substantially narrowing.

As you can see, those headline numbers (whether the Phisix or economic statistics) have been decaying from the inside. And the rotting core has begun to affect the surface.

And all these have been unseen, ignored, denied or whitewashed by the establishment and their allies.

Manipulations can only do so much, economic reality will ultimately prevail.

Bureau of Customs April’s 8.5% Deficit: It’s Not About Oil, It’s About the Economy

Oh if you haven’t noticed…headlines today have become LESS and LESS optimistic. 

Or let me frame it from a different angle, if you haven’t noticed, headlines today seem to have been designed to program or to condition the public to expect LESS from published economic performance statistics or G-R-O-W-T-H

It’s like central banking “forward guidance” only that they have been channeled implicitly to influence the public outlook through media.

Thursday June 18th headline reports that the collection of revenues by Philippines Bureau of Customs (BOC) have fallen 8.5% below the agency’s target.

Well, curiously, the BOC doesn’t seem to share the establishment’s romance with falling oil prices as equivalent to consumer spending growth. Instead, media as mouthpiece of the BOC bannered a secondary headline: “Cheaper oil imports blamed for decline in collection”[3]

The article goes on to say that last April, BOC collection “slid by 8.5 percent to P28.1 billion, as the take from imported oil fell by more than half year-on-year.” Collections from oil “skidded by a hefty 40.5 percent year-on-year to P5.4 billion last April from P9.1 billion a year ago” that has reduced oil’s share of tax and duties collection “to 19 percent in April from 30 percent in the same month last year”

So while “non-oil imports rose 5 percent”, the gains hardly offset the losses in oil revenues! Thus media concludes, low oil prices accounted for as the notorious culprit for the collection shortfall!

Wonderful.

Perhaps the establishment should send a memo to the BOC to remind them of the meme ‘low oil prices equals consumer spending growth’!

Never mind the economics of spending as MAINLY a derivative of INCOME growth—secondarily the reduction of savings and the use of credit—and NOT from the changes in spending patterns or the redistribution of spending from static income.

And never mind too, the fact that non-oil imports have basically FAILED to offset deficits arising from oil tax and duty collections.

In other words, ceteris paribus*, consumer or even capital spending has been unsuccessful to neutralize the deficit from a “supposed” low oil price dynamic.

Therefore, contra the article which labors to explain BOC collection shortfall as a product of oil, it’s really NOT about oil.

“Cheaper” oil imports depend on the frame of reference. Compared to when? What would be the basis for the use of such adjective?

Based on April’s oil data, it’s NOT about oil.



The Philippines imports 70% of its oil requirements from the Middle East. Based on Department of Energy 2012 data, oil imports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE accounted for 45.9% and 25.18% share. This means Philippine oil have been mostly sensitive to the Dubai-Oman crude as benchmark. 

Since I don’t have access to Dubai-Oman data, I’m going to use US benchmark WTI only as reference for this analysis.

In April, WTI prices leapt 23.47% from $47.72 (end March) to $58.92 (end April).

So the claim of oil prices as being responsible for the BOC’s collection gap may have been based on other periods, because if April was the source of reference then the article misleads.

In this period, the USD php hardly budged.

So to extrapolate oil prices in peso, which also jumped by 23.36% over the same period, oil prices virtually reflected mainly changes in USD oil prices alone outside the foreign currency translation effect! (see right)

We can see how changes in domestic prices of oil via its byproducts affect the real economy.

In April, the first two weeks (April 7 and April 14) resulted to a rollback as announced by the DoE in response to falling oil prices in March. However, the next two weeks, (April 21 and April 28), the DoE announced price increases to exhibit the jump in world oil prices!

From April to June 16, there had been three rollbacks vis-à-vis SEVEN price increases. The last increase as stated by the DOE: “Year-to-date total adjustment rose to net increases of P5.69/liter for gasoline and P1.06/liter for diesel. LPG remained with net decrease of P6.60/kg”

So gasoline and diesel prices have gone up as LPG prices have gone down year to date as of June 16. Part of this must be due to the weak peso.

So the headline should have been rephrased as: Expensive Cheaper oil imports blamed for decline in collection

*And speaking of ceteris paribus, collection deficiency can also be a function of smuggling, or domestic production. The former looks plausible, but the latter doesn’t seem as to satisfy current conditions.


It’s interesting to note of the fabulous emergence of volatility in BOC’s collections (left). 

Based on the data from Bureau of Treasury, year on year changes in the Bureau of Customs revenues turned NEGATIVE in THREE of the last five months. On the other hand, December posted a HUGE 85% spike. Yet, April’s significant negative 8.5% data would mean FOUR negatives in the last 6 months. The most likely implication from the substantial decrease in collections data by the government agency must be that Philippine imports continue to underperform in April. Except for February 2015, import growth have been quite sluggish since November 2014

If this turns out correct, then again it’s not about oil.

Instead, to borrow James Carville’s election slogan for ex-US president Bill Clinton, “It’s the economy stupid”

Media Downscales on G-R-O-W-T-H! Pressures Government for More Stimulus!

Mood changes have become apparent.

As I noted above and as I have previously pointed out, there seems to be an orchestrated publicity campaign to gradually dampen the public’s heavy optimistic expectations on G-R-O-W-T-H!

Media communications seem as painting a soft landing in order to avoid a panic.

Wednesday’s (June 17) business headlines came with “PH faces economic headwinds, gov’t warned”[4] where the subsidiary headline revealed of the alleged reason: WEAK FISCAL SPENDING, SLOWING OFW REMITTANCES NOTED

Saturday’s (June 20) business headlines seem to reiterate the point “Underspending threat to growth”[5], except that this article came with an appeal to authority: MOODY’S URGES EFFECTIVE BUDGET EXECUTION



Ironically the BSP recently cheered April’s OFW remittances data to state of “sustained” G-R-O-W-T-H. Personal remittances grew by a modest 4.9% while year to date remittances increased 5.1%. Meanwhile cash remittances rose 5.1% on an annual basis ad 5.1% for the first four months.


It’s a curiosity to see how establishment experts have discounted on what the BSP has just lauded on.

Two days after, through media they declared “SLOWING remittances and weakness in the country’s manufacturing sector may be early signs of a cycle that may lead to the further moderation of economic growth”. And for G-R-O-W-T-H to remain, experts have pushed the government “to pick up the slack and get out of its spending rut to provide stimulus to the economy by rolling out projects at a faster pace”

Three days after, the pressure on government to act has been applied by media again this time through the recommendations of the credit rating agency Moodys which claimed G-R-O-W-T-H will remain strong this year, but at the same time slashed their projections to 6% from 6.2%

I suspect that the reason the establishment raised “slowing remittances” as an obstacle to G-R-O-W-T-H has been because, as the chart above shows, the trend already shows the way.

I truly doubt if they understand or appreciate that remittances are subject to the forces of diminishing returns and the limits from the law of compounding given its size and scale of contribution to the economy.

And I suspect too that there has been little appreciation for insights involving world developments that influences remittance dynamics. For instance, how would a calamitous Grexit or a sustained collapse in Chinese stocks affect the world economy that could filter into remittance dynamics?

For the mainstream, statistics equals economics. It’s why growth numbers just jumps out from their computer screens!

It is even ridiculous to suggest that government spending will produce growth. It will produce statistical G-R-O-W-T-H, but not food on the table growth.

The fact that government competes with private sector for resources means that resources government will use, will come at the expense of the private sector.

Those who make such a claim, which presupposes governments makes more efficient of resources, should look what happened to USSR, Mao’s China and or North Korea where all spending have been by governments.

Second, government use of resources means taxes on the public.

As the great Ludwig von Mises explained[6]
However, the means which a government needs in order to run a plant at a loss or to subsidize an unprofitable project must be withdrawn either from the taxpayers' spending and investing power or from the loan market. The government has no more ability than individuals to create something out of nothing. What the government spends more, the public spends less. Public works are not accomplished by the miraculous power of a magic wand. They are paid for by funds taken away from the citizens. If the government had not interfered, the citizens would have employed them for the realization of profit promising projects the realization of which they must omit because their means have been curtailed by the government. For every unprofitable project that is realized by the aid of the government there is a corresponding project the realization of which is neglected merely on account of the government's intervention. Yet this nonrealized project would have been profitable, i.e., it would have employed the scarce means of production in accordance with the most urgent needs of the consumers. From the point of view of the consumers the employment of these means of production for the realization of an unprofitable project is wasteful. It deprives them of satisfactions which they prefer to those which the government-sponsored project can furnish them.
Yet all those controversies, corruption, pork barrel scams, wasteful expenditures (boondoggles, junkets and etc…) do nothing to demolish the myth from a widely embraced popular belief.

Third, the orthodoxy treats GDP as some homogenized factors at work.

I have quoted economic professor and blogger Arnold Kling[7]
In macroeconomics, the conventional misrepresentation treats the economy as one big GDP factory. Macroeconomists look at total output, as measured by GDP, and they think of it as produced by homogeneous labor and homogeneous capital. Again, this is camping-trip economics, with value assumed to be embedded in the endowment of labor and capital, rather than in the coordination required to create patterns of specialization, production methods, trade, and innovation.
The orthodoxy sees humans as unthinking automatons that are beyond the influence of incentives. The orthodoxy also seem to see people as knobs that can be closed or opened, put in high or mid or low gear.

Homogeneous labor simply means interchangeability; a doctor can be an engineer or versa. Homogeneous capital means that capital used for fishing and manufacturing are non-specific or the same. Everything signifies a one size fits all dimension.

From the above news account, just think of how government spending will substitute the slack from OFWs.

Let us make public works as example. 

The major beneficiaries of public works will be the bureaucracy (national or local) who will oversee and supervise such projects. The secondary beneficiaries will be the private sector contractor/s who will be awarded to execute or implement on such projects. The succeeding beneficiaries will be the employees of the private sector contractor/s, the sub-contractors, as well as, suppliers of the said contractor/s or the government. 

The next set of beneficiaries will be the ancillary industries from the public works project, and lastly, the industries which benefit from the spending of the above economic agents. 

Since government projects represent a monopoly and are centralized, the spending will flow from top to bottom or the trickle-down effect.

BUT since public works are location specific projects, then the popularly “seen” benefits will be limited largely to the areas involved.

So if all the public works projects nationwide will be added up, this will account for only a minor share of the national economy, despite the peso amount involved.

And considering the trickle-down nature of government spending then such spending will be tilted largely on what the highest hierarchy spends on with limited amount of multiplier from the bottom.

Yet how about remittances? The population of OFW has been estimated at 10.5 to 13.5 million people. That’s about 10% or more of the local population. So it’s easy to deduce that most households depend on an OFW relative as source of financing.

And given that remittances also constitute about 10% (9.8% World Bank data 2013, which has been down from 13.3% in 2005) of the statistical GDP, or perhaps even more due to the shadow/informal remittances, this implies that the impact of OFW have been national.

Besides since remittances have hardly been about top-bottom political spending they are relatively more decentralized in nature. Thus, the decentralization dynamics limits the impact of global shocks on them. But they aren’t immune to such shocks.

Such intense fixation on the sustained benefits from OFW remittances has been the reason for the frenetic nationwide race to build shopping malls, housing, condos, hotels and resorts and other consumer spending related industries. Yet most of these projects have been built predicated on the linear growth rate trend for OFW remittances. SM’s Ms Coson’s projections for her projects seem as having been anchored on these.

Yet just how can limited specific local projects replace a nationwide slack from a remittance slowdown?

What will happen to the supply side chain—which has been desperately competing to gain market share through a race to build capacity mostly funded by debt—when OFW remittances fall?

How will the current capacity plus prospective capacity remain commercially feasible under such circumstances?

Of course, contra mainstream hyped expectations over the scale of OFW remittance contributions; it has been the leveraging of the supply side that has been delivering the meat of G-R-O-W-T-H growth. But much of these projects have been focused on remittances.

Yet what happens if an expected slowdown in OFW filters into supply side capex plans?

Will a double whammy occur that will self-reinforce the downturn? If it does, then how will these affect outstanding loan portfolios of banks, bonds and other creditors? 

Will all leveraged companies still have the capability to pay existing liabilities under such circumstances?

The establishment makes a lot of defective assumptions which they really don’t know about. All they do has been to conduct tea leaf reading in the context of statistics and equate them as economic reasoning.

Here is another example. Moody’s say that the Philippines “has demonstrated resilience to global shocks, which limits the possibility that improvements in fiscal or economic performance would be significantly undermined.”

Has Moody’s ever heard of the popular Wall Street mantra “Past performance does not guarantee future results?” The US agency the Security of Exchange mandates mutual funds to indicate this.

Does Moodys know of the changes in debt dynamics the Philippines has in the past relative to today and how these impact balance sheets?

Does Moody’s know that current fiscal regime has been almost entirely dependent on negative real rates stimulus such that once the stimulus will be lifted the entire façade will most likely crumble? So instead of fiscal discipline one would see massive deficits and soaring debt levels?

Yet Moodys, like all the rest, clamor for more stimulus even when the Philippine economy has been thriving on a 2009 stimulus. And BSP has only patronized them by refusing to do away with it.

Why?

Substance addiction has become so chronic such that a withdrawal syndrome can’t be tolerated?

A genuinely strong economy will not require dependence on invisible transfers or stimulus charged at the expense of the average citizenry. So how strong is strong?

Nonetheless media’s downshift in the reporting of economic developments has been quite revealing. 


And why shouldn’t they when the writing has been on the wall

The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) reported of price DEFLATION in the construction industry for the month of May, as seen in wholesale price index (top) and retail price index (bottom).

Based on prices, construction boom, where?

Oh don’t worry, in the realm of the orthodoxy, real economy prices don’t seem to matter. Prices only matter if they are something to cheer or rally at, like surging stocks and properties.



[2] Eric Bush Gavekal Capital Blog Who would have guessed? Russia is the best performing, and cheapest, country index YTD Gavekal Capital Blog June 18, 2015

[3] Inquirer.net BOC tax take down 8.5% in April June 18, 2015


[5] Inquirer.net Underspending threat to growth June 20, 2015

[6] Ludwig von Mises 6. The Limits of Property Rights and the Problems of External Costs and External Economies XXIII. THE DATA OF THE MARKET (Human Action, p.655)

Saturday, June 20, 2015

Chinese Stocks Suffers Biggest Weekly Crash since 2009!

Stock markets in China posted their largest weekly loss for the week since February 2009 according to a June 18 report from Bloomberg.

The report didn’t include Friday’s crash.



The table above from Bloomberg’s Asian Stocks Table exhibits Friday’s bloodbath.

Over the week, the Shanghai index hemorrhaged 13.32%, the Shenzhen composite 12.69% and the ChiNext 15%!

The Chinext benchmark as previously noted has been patterned after the Nasdaq and has been home for startups. The average ChiNext issues has been priced nearly 100 times earnings!

For the Shanghai and the Shenzhen index the crash came after last week’s record high.

For the ChiNext, the peak was on June 3rd. So combined with this week, losses has accrued to 16.75%.

Despite this week’s fantastic dump, the Shanghai index still relishes a 38.45% year to date return.



And given the vertiginous parabolic ascent as shown in the left window (chart from Zero Hedge) where Chinese benchmarks has magnificently outpaced US stocks, then current downside actions look like a typical violent market response.

Of course, soaring Chinese stocks has been fueled by manic retail accounts mainly financed by credit (right chart from Zero Hedge) which have been in response to the goading of the Chinese government (right chart from Zero Hedge). 

Interestingly, the Chinese government’s China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (CSDC) which keeps track of new stock market accounts seems to have forgotten to update their data (last update was on May 25-29 2015)

The initial cracks were seen at the IPO index




The Bloomberg IPO index returned more than 400% since 2014 178% in 2015 before last week’s meltdown, that's according to another Bloomberg report.

Since the public thirsts for explanation on what caused this, media has responded by offering many factors

The Wall Street Journal thinks that this has been due to tighter liquidity in response to the central bank’s activities PBoC:
This past week’s selloff was triggered by tighter liquidity in the market. China’s seven-day interbank repurchase rate, which is the borrowing cost among banks, jumped from 2.2% to 2.73% over the week. Since March, the People’s Bank of China was thought to be trying to keep the rate down by injecting more cash into the lending markets. But this past week, the central bank was absent from open-market operations, traders say, effectively letting the rate rise.
Broker tightening of credit had also been blamed
Brokerages in China already have been tightening requirements for lending to stock investors as a way to limit their exposure as share prices soared, and higher borrowing costs were liable to push them to further raise margin requirements. China’s margin debt reached a record $419 billion Friday, according to exchange data.
Investor frustrations over PBoC actions has likewise been attributed
Other signs also pointed to a tighter stance by China’s monetary-policy makers. Some investors were disappointed the central bank didn’t lower the required-reserve ratios—or the funds commercial banks are required to hold—this past week. In addition, the central bank published a report Tuesday predicting China’s economic growth would accelerate modestly in the second half of this year as the government stepped up efforts to spur growth, suggesting the bank might not lend a helping hand to the economy.
The Financial Times imputes this on a crackdown by authorities on credit flows from formal banks and shadow banks to stocks
Beyond officially sanctioned margin lending, regulators are scrutinising disguised lending by banks, brokerages and trust companies for stock investment.

Haitong Securities estimates that between $81bn and $161bn has flowed into the market via so-called umbrella trusts, in which trust companies sell structured products to investors offering a fixed return, using the money to invest in the equity market.
The Nikkei Asia also sees investor discontent on PBoC’s actions, as well as, investor irrationality out of 'the lack of safety nets'…
Investors wary of skyrocketing prices turned to selling to lock in profits. An improving real estate market was also a negative for the market as it dimmed prospects of additional monetary easing.

China's stock market is prone to volatile movements. Since the country lags in pension systems and other safety nets, individual investors are drawn to stocks, accounting for 60-80% of players.
Again all these seek to explain current events from price changes.

While there may be some grains of truth from the above, vertical price actions of stock markets are likely symptomatic of both Ponzi dynamics and the Greater fool theory in action. 

Ponzi dynamics require fresh money to bid prices aggressively higher from existing shareholders (mostly insiders) at current levels. Since vertical price actions have manifested sustained manic bidding up of stocks, which are likewise indications of pyramiding, then more fresh funds are required to sustain this manic trend. Otherwise, given the stratospheric state of stock prices, this would mean an avalanche of profit taking sellers.

Meanwhile the greater fool is when “an investor buys questionable securities without any regard to their quality, but with the hope of quickly selling them off to another investor (the greater fool), who might also be hoping to flip them quickly. Unfortunately, speculative bubbles always burst eventually, leading to a rapid depreciation in share price due to the selloff.” (Investopedia)

In short, manias are manifestation of one way trade crowd dynamics whose actions are premised from Greater Fool expectations backed by mostly credit financed (Ponzi) manic bidding of securities.

The credit crackdown or the reaching of credit limits (given record margin trades) could partly be responsible for the dearth of fresh speculative money to push prices at current levels.



The current stock market boom bust cycle has a predecessor (The bust in 2008-2009). 

At least then, the Chinese bubble had been buoyed along with the economy. Today, Chinese stocks have totally become detached from the economy!

I recently wrote that this bubble has been engineered by the Chinese government
The Chinese government seems to be hoping that the stock market boom may provide the economy an alternative of finance. They must be hoping that equity may replace credit as a source of financing for credit trouble firms, thus the stock market frantic pump matched by an avalanche of IPOs.

In addition, rising stocks could have been seen by the Chinese government as having the “wealth effect” enough to ameliorate the downturn in the property sector, spur consumer spending and create the impression that the Chinese economy has been recovering.

Little have they learned from their recent experience that the same credit bubble on the property sector has only incited for a huge imbalances. Huge imbalances that has to be paid for, which has been the reason for the recent downturn in the economy.

Yet once the Chinese stock market bubble crash, such will only aggravate and accelerate the ongoing downswing in the property bubble.

The lesson is: Two wrongs don’t make a right.



And it appears that my views have been validated because the major beneficiaries of the stock market bubble have been state owned companies. These companies have partly alleviated their onerous debt conditions through the tapping of equity financing and by inflating valuations.

The above chart from Bloomberg which shows the shifting of financing from lesser bond issuance to more equity financing also reinforces my views.

The Business Insider has the recent numbers:
A blistering rally in the equity markets enabled mainland Chinese companies to raise funds at a furious rate, with the year-to-date sum at a record US$97.1 billion, data company Dealogic reported on Friday.

The sum is 81 per cent higher than the US$53.6 billion fund raised in the same period last year. In terms of the number of deals, it was also up by 77 per cent to 434 deals year-to-date this year, from the 244 deals in the same period a year ago.

The deals are mainly driven by new listings or fund raising in the secondary market by Shanghai or Shenzhen listed A-shares, which account for US$57.5 billion and 279 deals, representing 59 per cent while the rest is composed of H-shares in Hong Kong and others that were listed overseas.

Of the total, 79 per cent or US$76.7 billion are related to listed companies which raised funds in the market by share placements, right issues or other offerings, which is also the highest on record.
And given that the Chinese government has been attempting to fill the gap or remedy the adverse repercussions from the colossal property bubble with another gigantic stock market bubble, this implies a transfer of resources and risks from the average Chinese’s savers to publicly listed firms (including SOEs)

So when the bubble pops, a significant chunk of the Chinese society will suffer.

Yet just look at how the stock market bubble has been reducing investments by diverting funds into speculative activities.

From the Wall Street Journal: (bold mine)
Take Dong Jun, who earlier this year shut down his factory making lighting equipment and electrical wiring and let go some 100 workers. The 50-year-old comes to the plant in the eastern city of Yancheng almost daily, but spends his time trading stocks on behalf of his company, Yanwu Keda Electric Co.

“Manufacturing is a very hard business these days,” said Mr. Dong, chairman of the company. “I want to make some money from the stock market and use the profits to restart my manufacturing business later, when the economy turns for the better.”

Chinese companies are finding stock investing an attractive option as the wider economy struggles with tepid demand, excess industrial capacity, persistently high borrowing costs and other troubles. Their interest poses a challenge for policy makers, who want to nurture markets companies can tap for investment capital, rather than creating a venue for speculation….

According to the latest official data, profits earned by Chinese manufacturers rose 2.6% from a year earlier in April, a turnaround from a drop of 0.4% in the previous month. Yet nearly all of that increase—97%—came from securities investment income, data from the National Bureau of Statistics show. Excluding the investment income, China’s industrial profits were up 0.09%.

Meanwhile, over the course of 2014, the value of stocks, bonds and other tradable securities owned by listed Chinese companies rose by 946 billion yuan ($152.4 billion), a 60% increase, according to an analysis by Mr. Zhu.
The Chinese economy has now been overwhelmed bubbles or consumed by or by malinvestments! 

When the twin bubble bursts, losses will be tremendous and this will have a wretched spillover effect to the world.

Nikkei Asia sees the Chinese government to come to the rescue…
But the Chinese government is not quite ready to let the stock market boom subside as it helps boosts personal spending. If the slide continues next week, Beijing could step in to prop up the market, as it is not likely to tolerate an excessive plunge.
Again the $10 trillion question will be where will the money come from? And will these be enough to overcome expectations of current shareowners? If the answer for the latter is yes then the boom will go on…until it can’t

The government will likely liberalize her stock markets to accommodate more foreign investors who may become the bigger greater fools. The Chinese government failed to get her domestic stocks included in the MSCI index which would have opened the gates for Western asset managers. I may add that this may have added to fund sourcing pressures in support of higher price levels for Chinese stocks.

We have seen a smaller version of such a crash last January. Then I wrote,
Given the huge growth of stock market credit or the record levels of margin debt, losses from today’s crash will likely lead to margin calls which may prompt for even more selling. And absent access to new credit many heavily levered firms will see their balance sheets impaired from sustained stock market losses.

But if regulators are here just to put a brake, or in effect, a façade at it, then today crash could just be part of the script to a manipulated boom.

Regardless of what the government does, the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises describes of the eventual outcome for the Chinese runaway bubble economy (Interventionism: An Economic Analysis p. 40)
But the boom cannot continue indefinitely. There are two alternatives. Either the banks continue the credit expansion without restriction and thus cause constantly mounting price increases and an ever-growing orgy of speculation, which, as in all other cases of unlimited inflation, ends in a “crack-up boom” and in a collapse of the money and credit system. Or the banks stop before this point is reached, voluntarily renounce further credit expansion and thus bring about the crisis. The depression follows in both instances.


Donald Trump and Carl Icahn Agree: US Economy is in a Big Fat Bubble


Billionaire businessman and tv personality turned presidential aspirant Donald Trump at the MSNBC's Morning Joe declared: 

We are in a financial and economic bubble in my opinion (1:17).


Mr Trump wanted to recruit his friend billionaire Carl Icahn as his Treasury Secretary, in case he wins.

But Mr. Icahn promptly turned down the offer with his reply posted on a blog...

My comments re Donald Trump running for President & wanting to nominate me for the Secretary of Treasury June 19, 2015 by Carl Icahn 
I was extremely surprised to learn that Donald was running for President and even more surprised that he stated he would make me Secretary of Treasury. I am flattered but do not get up early enough in the morning to accept this opportunity.

There are others much more knowledgeable than I concerning Presidential elections. I will therefore decline to opine on his chances. But I am knowledgeable concerning markets and believe Donald is completely correct to be concerned that we have “a big fat bubble coming up. We have artificially induced low interest rates.”

I personally believe we are sailing in dangerous unchartered waters. I can only hope we get to shore safely. Never in the history of the Federal Reserve have interest rates been artificially held down for so long at the extremely low rates existing today. I applaud Donald for speaking out on this issue – more people should. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Icahn has been warning of a bubble (particularly in the high yield/junk bond) sector since last year.

Friday, June 19, 2015

Chart of the Day: Anatomy of a Shopping Mall Bubble: China Edition


All is not well in China's retail sector. Shopping centers are being shuttered with regularity, as tenants abandon them. Yet the overall amount of commercial space in the country continues to swell. 

The economy's weakening momentum and President Xi Jinping's belt-tightening are discouraging consumption. At the same time, shoppers are moving online, and foreign retailers are reviewing their strategies for expansion in the Chinese market.

The result of these developments: ghost malls.
More...
Finding tenants is unlikely to get any easier, since shopping centers continue to sprout around the country.

In a quest for revenue, China's local governments eagerly sold land-use rights to real estate developers, which in turn were optimistic about retail prospects in a country where incomes are rising.

According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, the net increase in commercial space came to about 120 million sq. meters last year. If we assume an average facility takes up 50,000 sq. meters, the extra space would be enough to fit about 2,400.

A separate study projects that 50 major Chinese cities will see an increase of 560 million sq. meters this year. That would mean growth of roughly 80% in two years.

But what good is space if you cannot fill it? 
When mall supply grows faster than or outstrips demand, the result would be "ghost malls" (excess capacity).

China's "ghost malls" and US "dead malls" serves as blueprints for the coming Philippine version

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Behind Grexit: Multilateral Agency Politics, US Sphere of Influence and Debt Trap

At the Cato Institute economist Steve Hanke explains why the IMF has been playing hardball with Greece: (bold mine)
Under normal conditions, the IMF is supposed to be limited to lending up to 200% of a country’s quota (each country’s capital contribution made to the IMF) in a single year and 600% in cumulative total. However, under the IMF’s “exceptional access” policy there are, in principle, virtually no limits on lending. The exceptional access policy, which was introduced in 2003, opened the door for Greece to talk its way into IMF credits worth an astounding 1,860% of Greece’s quota – a number worthy of an entry in the Guinness Book of World Records.

The IMF’s over-the-top largesse towards Greece explains why the IMF has been forced to play hardball with Greece’s left-wing Syriza government. The IMF’s imprudent over-commitment of funds to Greece leaves it no choice but to pull the plug on Athens. That is why the IMF’s negotiators packed their bags last week and returned to Washington, and that is why it will probably remain uncharacteristically immovable.
Wow. This serves as a shocking revelation of how the politics of multilateral agencies work. Internal rules will be broken to accommodate politically privileged sector/s.

And there's more. But some background required.

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This chart from Fathom Consulting/Reuter’s Alpha now reveals of the astounding shift in the Greece debt composition from private sector to the public sector.

In short, political agencies as the IMF, ECB and European governments bailed out previous private sector creditors.

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And this pie chart of Greek debt from Der Spiegel exhibits the current distribution of creditors.

This shows that  reason for the “IMF’s “exceptional access” policy” where “there are, in principle, virtually no limits on lending” has been because the IMF and various governments have been deeply hocked into Greek debt.

In short, the troika (IMF, EC, ECB) has been doubling down to provide financing to Greece because they hold most of it. Talk about Ponzi financing.

Now the IMF’s resources may have been stretched to the limits for them to play “hardball” with the former!

As a side note, I recently pointed out that of the 13% of the estimated $29 trillion bailout funds provided by the US Federal Reserve during the last 2008 crisis have mostly channeled been to European banks. So such rescue measures may have helped in the transfer of Greek debt exposure from private hands to public coffers.

Yet the IMF has been funded by taxpayers from around the world through a quota system. The allocated quota determines both the financing contribution and the voting power of member nations. Since US holds the biggest quota this means that the US has largest influence on how IMF distributes its tax funded resources. 

I would add that aside from possible IMF financing constrains, the Greek government’s overture to the Russian government where the latter could turn out as a 'white knight' or lender of last resort, could also play a factor for IMF-Greece government impasse.

For instance this recent development from the CNN:
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is reported to have scheduled a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on Friday.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, another deadline is fast approaching. Next week, the European Union must decide whether or not to renew sanctions on Russia.
In other words, much of European politics have been anchored on US influences whether seen from the prism of previous bailouts or recent sanctions on Russia or on Greek financing negotiations

All seems connected.

And this is the reason why the Chinese government has launched a counterweight to US sphere of influence through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

And more importantly, many have come to believe that in the case of a default, the public sector’s exposure to Greek debt will limit contagion on marketplace. Some expect ECB’s action to provide enough firewall to contain the crisis.

Well debt is debt. The transfer to a claim on resources from private to public will also have repercussions.
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The influential think tank the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) via Benn Steil and Dinah Walker warns of complacency from the risks of a Grexit: (May 7, 2015)
The IMF has turned up the heat on Greece’s Eurozone neighbors, calling on them to write off “significant amounts” of Greek sovereign debt.  Writing off debt, however, doesn’t make the pain disappear—it transfers it to the creditors.

No doubt, Greece’s sovereign creditors, which now own 2/3 of Greece’s €324 billion debt, are in a much stronger position to bear that pain than Greece is.  Nevertheless, we are talking real money here—2% of GDP for these creditors.

Germany, naturally, would bear the largest potential loss—€58 billion, or 1.9% of GDP.  But as a percentage of GDP, little Slovenia has the most at risk—2.6%.

The most worrying case among the creditors, though, is heavily indebted Italy, which would bear up to €39 billion in losses, or 2.4% of GDP.  Italy’s debt dynamics are ugly as is—the FT’s Wolfgang Münchau called them “unsustainable” last September, and not much has improved since then.  The IMF expects only 0.5% growth in Italy this year.

As shown in the bottom figure above, Italy’s IMF-projected new net debt for this year would more than double, from €35 billion to €74 billion, on a full Greek default—its highest annual net-debt increase since 2009.  With a Greek exit from the Eurozone, Italy will have the currency union’s second highest net debt to GDP ratio, at 114%—just behind Portugal’s 119%.

With the Bank of Italy buying up Italian debt under the ECB’s new quantitative easing program, the markets may decide to accept this with equanimity.  Yet assuming that a Greek default is accompanied by Grexit, this can’t be taken for granted.  Risk-shifting only works as long as the shiftees have the ability and willingness to bear it, and a Greek default will, around the Eurozone, undermine both.

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The reemergence of market volatility has partly been due to the risks of Grexit. (Reuters Alpha Now June 12, 2015)

Finally, all these cumulative attempts to bridge finance debt strained nations reveals of the current heightened state of fragility from an event risk pillared on the global debt trap.

And if such event risk materializes that would have massive consequences then all the recent funneling of resources to Greece by the IMF, as I previously wrote, would pose as a constraint to future bailouts.