Quote of the Day: Dancing on the Grave of Keynesianism

From author Gary North at the Mises Institute:

The Keynesians seem to be dominant today. They are dominant because they have been brought into the hierarchy of political power. They serve as court prophets to the equivalent of the Babylonians, just before the Medo-Persians took the nation.

They are in charge of the major academic institutions. They are the main advisers in the federal government. They are the overwhelmingly dominant faction within the Federal Reserve System. Their only major institutional opponents are the monetarists, and the monetarists are as committed to fiat money as the Keynesians are. They hate the idea of a gold-coin standard. They hate the idea of market-produced money….

The welfare-warfare state, Keynesian economics, and the Council on Foreign Relations are going to suffer major defeats when the economic system finally goes down. The system will go down. It is not clear what will pull the trigger, but it is obvious that the banking system is fragile, and the only thing capable of bailing it out is fiat money. The system is sapping the productivity of the nation, because the Federal Reserve's purchases of debt are siphoning productivity and capital out of the private sector and into those sectors subsidized by the federal government…

I offer this optimistic assessment: the bad guys are going to lose. Their statist policies will bring destruction that they will not be able to explain away. Their plea will be rejected. "Give us more time. We just need a little more time. We can fix this if you let us get deeper into your wallets."

In the very long run, the good guys are going to win, but in the interim, there is going to be a lot of competition to see which group gets to dance on the grave of the Keynesian system.

Get out your dancing shoes. Keep them polished. Our day is coming.

Gary North: The Keynesian Era is Coming to a Close

Author and Professor Gary North talks about how the Keynesian political economic system via the welfare-warfare state, like Marxism, is bound for doom.

I say this to give you hope. The Keynesians seem to be dominant today. They are dominant because they have been brought into the hierarchy of political power. They serve as court prophets to the equivalent of the Babylonians, just before the Medo-Persians took the nation.

They are in charge of the major academic institutions. They are the main advisors in the federal government. They are the overwhelmingly dominant faction within the Federal Reserve System. Their only major institutional opponents are the monetarists, and the monetarists are as committed to fiat money as the Keynesians are. They hate the idea of a gold coin standard. They hate the idea of market-produced money.

There was no overwhelming outrage among staff economists at the Federal Reserve when Ben Bernanke and the Federal Open Market Committee cranked up the monetary base from $900,000,000,000 to $1.7 trillion in late 2008, and then cranked it up to $2.7 trillion by the middle of 2011. This expansion of the money supply had no foundation whatsoever in anybody's theory of economics. It was totally an ad hoc decision. It was a desperate FOMC trying to keep the system from collapsing, or least they thought it was about to collapse. The evidence for that is questionable. But, in any case, they cranked up the monetary base, and nobody in the academic community except a handful of Austrians complained that this was a complete betrayal of the monetary system and out of alignment with any theory of economics.

The Keynesians are eventually going to face what the Marxists have faced since 1991. Literally within months of the collapse of the Soviet Union, when members of the Communist Party simply folded up shop and stole the money that was inside the Communist Party coffers, any respect for Marxism disappeared within academia. Marxism became a laughingstock. Nobody except English professors, a handful of old tenured political scientists, and a tiny handful of economists in the Union of Radical Political Economists (URPE), were still willing to admit in late 1992 that they were advocates of Marxism, and that they had been in favor of Soviet economic planning. They became pariahs overnight. That was because academia, then as now, is committed to power. If you appear to have power, you will get praised by academia, but when you lose power, you will be tossed into what Trotsky called the ashcan of history.

This is going to happen to the Keynesians as surely as it happened to the Marxists. The Keynesians basically got a free ride, and have for over 60 years. Their system is illogical. It is incoherent. Students taking undergraduate courses in economics never really remember the categories. That is because they are illogical categories. They all rest on the idea that government spending can goose the economy, but they cannot explain how it is that the government gets its hands on the money to do the stimulative spending without at the same time reducing spending in the private sector. The government has to steal money to boost the economy, but this means that the money that is stolen from the private sector is removed as a source of economic growth.

The Keynesian economic system makes no sense. But, decade after decade, the Keynesians get away with utter nonsense. None of their peers will ever call them to account. They go merrily down the mixed economy road, as if that road were not leading to a day of economic destruction. They are just like Marxist economists and academics in 1960, 1970, and 1980. They are oblivious to the fact that they are going over the cliff with the debt-ridden, over-leveraged Western economy, because they are committed in the name of Keynesian theory to the fractional reserve banking system, which cannot be sustained either theoretically or practically.

The problem we are going to face at some point as a nation and in fact as a civilization is this: there is no well-developed economic theory inside the corridors of power that will explain to the administrators of a failed system what they should do after the system collapses. This was true in the Eastern bloc in 1991. There was no plan of action, no program of institutional reform. This is true in banking. This is true in politics. This is true in every aspect of the welfare-warfare state. The people at the top are going to be presiding over a complete disaster, and they will not be able to admit to themselves or anybody else that their system is what produced the disaster. So, they will not make fundamental changes. They will not restructure the system, by decentralizing power, and by drastically reducing government spending. They will be forced to decentralize by the collapsed capital markets.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, academics in the West could not explain why. They could not explain what inherently forced the complete collapse of the Soviet economy, nor could they explain why nobody in their camp had seen it coming. Judy Shelton did, but very late: in 1989. Nobody else had seen it coming, because the non-Austrian academic world rejected Mises's theory of socialist economic calculation. Everything in their system was against acknowledging the truth of Mises's criticisms, because he was equally critical about central banking, Keynesian economics, and the welfare state. They could not accept his criticism of Communism precisely because he used the same arguments against them.

The West could not take advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union, precisely because it had gone Keynesian rather than Austrian. The West was as compromised with Keynesian mixed economic planning, both in theory and in practice, as the Soviets had been compromised with Marx. So, there was great praise of the West's welfare state and democracy as the victorious system, when there should have been praise of Austrian economics. There was no realization that the West's fiat money economy is heading down the same bumpy road that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It was not a victory for the West, except insofar as Reagan had expanded spending on the military, and the Soviets stupidly attempted to match this expenditure. That finally "broke the bank" in the Soviet Union. The country was so poverty-stricken that it did not have the capital reserves efficient to match the United States. When its surrogate client state, Iraq, was completely defeated in the 1991 Iraq war, the self-confidence inside the Soviet military simply collapsed. This had followed the devastating psychological defeat of the retreat of the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan in 1989. Those two defeats, coupled with the domestic economic bankruptcy of the country, led to the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The present value of the unfunded liabilities of the American welfare state, totaling over $200 trillion today, shows where this nation's Keynesian government is headed: to default. It is also trapped in the quagmire of Afghanistan. The government will pull out at some point in this decade. This will not have the same psychological effect that it did on the Soviet Union, because we are not a total military state. But it will still be a defeat, and the stupidity of the whole operation would be visible to everybody. The only politician who will get any benefit out of this is Ron Paul. He was wise enough to oppose the entire operation in 2001, and he was the only national figure who did. There were others who voted against it, but nobody got the publicity that he did. Nobody else had a system of foreign-policy which justified staying out. His opposition was not a pragmatic issue; it was philosophical.

The welfare-warfare state, Keynesian economics, and the Council on Foreign Relations are going to suffer major defeats when the economic system finally goes down. The system will go down. It is not clear what will pull the trigger, but it is obvious that the banking system is fragile, and the only thing capable of bailing it out is fiat money. The system is sapping the productivity of the nation, because the Federal Reserve's purchases of debt are siphoning productivity and capital out of the private sector and into those sectors subsidized by the federal government.

Read the rest here.

What Draghi’s Statement “The ECB is Ready to do Whatever it Takes to Preserve the Euro” Means

I pointed out that ECB President Mario Draghi delivered a magical statement last week which sent markets soaring (I think much had to do with the covering of short sales).

For Professor Gary North such statement has the following implications…

What he said was in fact a cry of desperation. He does not know what to do, other than to inflate. He knows he must break the Maastricht treaty that created the EU, but he does not have any choice. He has defined out of existence the treaty's limits on the ECB. He defines his mandate broadly. He knows that Spain is close to default. The ECB must buy Spain's bonds, or else provide funds for some other agencies to buy Spain's bonds. The weekend summit meeting less than a month ago has already broken down. Spain's ten-year bond rate went above the failsafe 7% figure.

The European banking system is being propped up by monetary inflation. There are signs that this cannot go on much longer, but the central bankers have enormous self-confidence. They believe that fiat money can delay any major crisis. They believe that fiat money is the ultimate ace in the hole. So do Keynesians. So do politicians. They really do believe that the exclusive government monopoly authority to supervise the creation of digits is the basis of prosperity.

Investors invest digits called money. They are convinced that the ability of central banks to create digits has created a failsafe for investors' digits. They believe that a prudent mixture of digit-generating investments will gain them a positive rate of return, as measured in digits, just so long as the total number of digits is always increasing. This is the key to every investment strategy that is tied to "digits invested now, more digits to invest later": an ever-increasing supply of digits.

You might think that investors would judge their success in investing by increased real income: stuff, not digits. But the vast majority of investors assume that stuff will inevitably take care of itself, if only the supply of digits is increasing. Here is the mantra of this generation: "The system of stuff production depends on a steady increase in the supply of digits."

This is why there is no resistance to central bank monetization. On the contrary, there is cheering. The journalists follow the economists. The economists have adopted the mantra of digits with the zealous commitment of any priesthood. Milton Friedman is their high priest.

Professor North sees depression or another crisis ahead, but this will either be through hyperinflation or through mass defaults. He thinks that defaults will be the most likely outcome because the incentives guiding the career of central bankers have been tied with large banks.

I think that the both scenario has a level 50-50 odds, as central bankers will most likely underestimate the impact of their actions.

Read the rest here

Deepening Information Age: In the US, Public Education is being Undermined by the Internet

The internet seems on path to unravel 20th century welfare state institutions partly through the public education model.

Professor Gary North explains,

Parents are pulling their children out of the government schools. This is happening across the USA.

In city after city, enrollment is declining. This is not a recent development. It has been going on for a half a decade. It has taken place in half of the nation’s largest districts.

The trend looks irreversible.

As the Web offers better programs free of charge, the public schools cannot compete. The inner city schools are catastrophic. They are getting worse. As whites ans Asians flee the cities, the inner-city schools get worse.

The tax base shrinks. The teachers union demands more pay and smaller classes. The city governments are trapped. Solution: cut programs, fire teachers, and enlarge classes back to (horror!) 1959?s 33 students.

Nobody is supposed to talk about this. It is time to talk about it. Public education will not recover. The longer the decline takes place, the more parents will conclude that there is only one solution: pull their kids out.

At some point, voters will not pass any more bond issues. They will not consent to higher property taxes. They will let the public schools sink.

Read the rest here

Democratization (and the de-politicization) of education will become a global phenomenon as educational platform will mostly migrate to the internet.

One example:

Coursera a free internet educational platform that offers high quality courses from the top universities recently announced that 12 universities — including three international institutions — will be joining them particularly, the Princeton University, Stanford University, University of Michigan, and University of Pennsylvania in offering Coursera classes (Coursera Blog)

On Coursera, you will now be able to access world-class courses from:

• California Institute of Technology
• Duke University
• École Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
• Georgia Institute of Technology
• Johns Hopkins University
• Princeton University
• Rice University
• Stanford University
• University of California, San Francisco
• University of Edinburgh
• University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• University of Michigan
• University of Pennsylvania
• University of Toronto
• University of Virginia
• University of Washington

For traditional schools, it would be adapt or perish.

The salad days of the education bubble in the US or even in the Philippines have been numbered.

Money Abhors a Vacuum: Alternative Digital Based Barter-Currency System Emerge in Greece

Money and trade abhors a vacuum and a replacement will always emerge at the margins.

From BBC.com

In lean economic times, alternative financial systems are sprouting up around the world. And now they come with a digital twist.

"The Greek state is completely absent," says Katarina with a deep chuckle. We are standing across from each other inside a sweltering building on the outskirts of the Greek city of Volos, about 200 miles north of Athens on the Mediterranean. Both Katarina and her daughter, who stands beside her, have been unemployed for months. They are at this makeshift market to sell their array of homemade jams, pickled vegetables and liqueurs, which are spread out on the table between us.

But this isn't a typical market. In fact, there isn't a euro in sight. Katarina is part of a network of more than 500 people in Volos who are taking financial matters into their own hands as part of an alternative local currency, known here by its Greek acronym TEM. "In the network, people can trade their goods and services," says Christos Papaioannou, one of the network's founders. "If I do a service for you, then you owe me a favour. And I can use that favour to get some service from someone else. So, we don't have to exchange directly, I can get it from some third person."

To be clear, there is no actual currency or scrip exchanged. Credits are tracked via an open-source community banking software system called Cyclos. Katarina, for example, banks her credits from selling jam to buy staple foods such as eggs and fresh vegetables that are offered through the network.

The barter idea is catching on in a number of cities in Greece during these lean economic times, returning communities to a centuries old system but with a digital twist. And it's not just in Greece. The global economic downturn has created renewed interest worldwide in alternative economic models.

"I think that people are becoming increasingly aware, over the past few years, that financial systems aren't sustainable. And that boom and bust is always going to be with us, despite politicians continually telling us they are going to work to remove [them]," says Ken Banks, who recently launched a project called Means of Exchange. The idea behind the project, says Banks, is to create a "toolbox" of web-based and mobile apps that will make it easier for people to engage in things like bartering, swapping and alternative currencies.

This has clearly been the free market alternative; spontaneous order, no taxes and strictly competition based.

Yet the emergence of digital bartering and currency alternatives are likely the future trend

As Professor Gary North rightly points out,

This is going to spread. It will appear whenever governments and banks break down. When this happens, production will scape the tax collector’s nets. The tax collector cannot track everything. He cannot brig charges against everyone. The more people who get away with unreported income, the more difficult it will be for governments to avoid contraction.

The future will have smaller, weaker governments.

Classical Liberal and Libertarian Legacies: Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard

The classical liberal and libertarian legacies of Ludwig von Mises and Murray N. Rothbard in the account of Professor Gary North (at the LewRockwell.com)

Ludwig von Mises

My only meeting with Mises came in the fall of 1971. I had been hired by the Foundation for Economic Education. I was invited to attend a special ceremony. F. A. Harper had edited a second collection of essays honoring Mises. The first book of essays honoring Mises had been edited by Mary Sennholz and was published in 1956. The meeting was held in a nice hotel in New York City. After the meeting, I was able to talk with Mises about a number of things, including his connection with the German sociologist, Max Weber. Weber referred to Mises's 1920 essay on Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, in a footnote in a book that Weber did not complete. He died in 1920. Mises told me he had sent the essay to Weber.

Mises left a legacy that has steadily grown since his death in 1973. He was one of those rare men who had two phases in his career. The first phase, beginning in 1912 and ending after the publication of John Maynard Keynes's General Theory (1936), established his reputation as a major economic theorist. His 1912 book on money and banking, his 1922 book on socialism, and his many articles on specialized topics in economic theory identified him as a major theorist. But his opposition to all forms of fiat money gained him a reputation as a 19th-century Neanderthal in the world of fiat currencies, which began with the abolition of the gold standard at the outbreak of World War I in 1914. His hostility to socialism also contributed to his status as a pariah. He was clearly resisting what was regarded in academic circles as the wave of the future. Academics want to be trendy. Mises was not trendy.

The triumph of Keynesianism after 1936, coupled with the outbreak of World War II in 1939, led to an eclipse in Mises's career. When he came to the United States in 1940 as a refugee, he was virtually unknown here. He had no teaching position. He was 59 years old. He had never been known in the United States. He was dependent on occasional writing assignments, and also on donations from friends, including Henry Hazlitt.

He served as a free market voice crying in the Keynesian wilderness for the next 30 years. He presided over a graduate seminar at New York University which went on for a quarter-century. Murray Rothbard was one of the regular attendees, although as an auditor. He was not paid by the university, which relegated him to the status of visiting professor. He was supported by donors. Yet there was no one on the NYU economics faculty who is remembered today. They were nonentities, and they left no legacy.

The publication of his book, Human Action, by Yale University Press in 1949 did begin to establish his reputation in America. The book sold far better than anyone had expected. This book was the first comprehensive, integrated theory of free market economics that had ever been published. Very few people understood this in 1949, but anyone who has studied the history of economic thought finds in this book the first comprehensive application of economic theory to the entire market-based economy. The analysis is integrated in terms of the Austrian economic defense of subjective value theory and methodological individualism.

He continued to write after 1949. His books were sold by the Foundation for Economic Education, which brought him to the attention of readers who were in favor of the free market. His articles appeared in the Foundation's magazine, The Freeman. The Freeman did not circulate widely in academic circles, but it was a widely read magazine on the Right.

I bought a copy of Human Action in 1960. I was aware of Mises's importance in the history of economic thought, but at my university, I was probably the only student who knew about him. I suspect that the only professor who knew about him was Carl Uhr, who taught a course in the history of economic thought.

Mises was tenacious in his commitment to free-market principles. Probably more than any other major scholar of the 20th century, he was known to his peers as uncompromising. He was regarded as ideological by Chicago school economists. They were correct. Because of his consistency in applying the principle of nonintervention into every nook and cranny of the economy, but above all in his opposition to central banking, free-market economists regarded him as eccentric. "Eccentric" for them was a word for "rigorously consistent."

He was known to the Left as the West's most implacable opponent of economic intervention. When the Nazis marched into Austria in 1938, they confiscated his library. He had left it behind when he left the country to go to Switzerland in 1934. He feared that the Nazis would take over in Austria, and he was correct. As a free market economist and a Jew, he would not have survived in Austria.

The Soviets also recognized who he was, and they confiscated the library from the Nazis, and sent it to Moscow. It was not discovered there by any Western economist until the 1980s. That was a great irony: Western economists did not know who he was, but Soviet economists did. This became increasingly true in the 1980s, as the Soviet economy began to disintegrate, exactly as Mises had predicted it would.

Mises's great advantage over almost all of his peers was this: he wrote in English as a second language. Most economists write in English as a third or fourth language. He did not use equations. He did not use a lot of jargon. He developed paragraphs based on sentences that were developed consecutively. You could begin on page 1 of any of his books and, if you paid attention, you could get to the end without becoming confused.

This was an advantage because average people who were interested in economics could follow his logic. His reputation spread by way of "The Freeman" throughout the late 1950s and the 1960s. That magazine had a circulation as high as 40,000 in some years. There were not many economists who could reach an audience that large.

He really did stick to his knitting, and he really did stick to his guns. He stuck to his guns with such tenacity that for decades he had no influence whatsoever in the academic community. They wrote him off. But, after his death in 1973, his influence began to grow. In 1974, his disciple F. A. Hayek won the Nobel Prize in economics. Bit by bit, his reputation spread. Because of the Mises Institute, his name is now more widely known than almost any other economist of his generation, either before World War I or after World War II. The average person would be unfamiliar with the name of most economists in the first half of the 20th century, and he would be unable to read the works of almost any economist in the second half.

So, because Mises was unwilling to compromise, especially in the area of methodology, refusing to use equations, his legacy has been greater than most of his long-dead peers. His legacy is growing, and theirs is almost nonexistent.

Murray Rothbard

Much of Mises's influence is the result of Murray Rothbard's voluminous writings, in powerful, captivating, and flawless English, from the late 1950s until his death in 1995. Rothbard became the primary interpreter of the works of Mises, even though he did not share Mises's commitment to 19th-century limited government. It is possible to read Human Action, but it is a lot easier to read Man, Economy, and State. Rothbard never found full-time employment in a college or university that had an economics department until late in his career. He taught engineering students, who were not interested in economics and surely did not know who Rothbard was. If he had any legacy from his classes at Brooklyn Polytechnic, nobody has been able to discover it.

He gained his reputation as an economist mainly through the publications that appeared in a 12-month period from 1962 through early 1963. Columbia University Press published his doctoral dissertation on America's first depression: The Panic of 1819. It read like a dissertation, unlike anything else Rothbard ever wrote. It had some minor influence in the economic history, but it was a narrow topic.

Then came Man, Economy, and State in the fall of 1962. Then, the following spring, came America's Great Depression. That book was a study of the statist policies of the Hoover Administration. It applied the Austrian theory of the trade cycle to the economic and political events of the Hoover Administration. Because it was based on Austrian economic theory, academic economists rejected it. Because it was hostile to Herbert Hoover, any conservative who found out about it probably rejected it before even looking at the table of contents. It was almost a perfect book for alienating everybody. Then came the acceleration of the Vietnam War and the development of the antiwar movement. Rothbard became actively involved in the antiwar movement, and he ceased writing books on economic theory. This continued until the early 1980s, when he wrote the best upper division textbook in money and banking that has ever been written, and which has probably never been assigned in any university in the United States: The Mystery of Banking. It is totally hostile to fractional reserve banking, central banking, and all forms of fiat money. It is the primary task of all university-level courses in money and banking to establish the students' confidence in all three of these. Rothbard once again had painted himself into a corner.

Only at the very end of his life did he begin to do a detailed academic study in economics. He wrote two volumes on the history of economic thought. He died before the third volume was completed. There has never been any history of economic thought to rival it in terms of a mixture of minute details of the lives of economists, coupled with careful analyses of their economic doctrines.

His legacy stems from the power of his economic analysis and the cogency of his writing style.

He left another legacy in the area of early American history: his study of colonial America up to, but not including, the American Revolution. Sadly, he took his notes on a piece of audio recording technology that disappeared, so he was never able to finish the fifth volume.

Then there is his legacy as the most literate defender of economic and political anarchism in the history of anarchist thought.

He stuck to his knitting. He never stopped writing. He did not compromise in his hostility to economic intervention by the state. He did short articles, midsized articles, fat books, heavily footnoted books, pamphlets, newsletter articles, movie reviews, political analysis, and whatever else interested him, which was everything except possibly nuclear physics. The huge volume of his writings, the clarity of his writings, the ideological consistency of his writings, and the fact that he got Lew Rockwell on his side, established a legacy which has been leveraged by the power of the World Wide Web. He is reaching a larger audience today than he could have imagined. He died in 1995, the year that the Netscape browser was introduced. He could not have foreseen the impact of this event.

His skills were ideally suited to this new technology. His skills in written communication are exactly what people doing Web searches are looking for. He was a print-media person, and while the Web is equally geared to video, for those who are looking for cogent writing, Rothbard's body of material is vast.

Libertarian Legacies of Henry Hazlitt and Leonard Read…

…in the account of Professor Gary North at the lewrockwell.com

Henry Hazlitt…

Like so many people who came to an understanding of the free market in the 1950s and 1960s, Henry Hazlitt was an influential figure. He had been an influential figure for at least 30 years. He is most famous for his book, Economics in One Lesson, which he wrote in 1946. But he was a New York Times columnist at the time he wrote that book. H. L. Mencken once said that Hazlitt was the only economist who knew how to write.

Hazlitt never went to college. He wrote his first book, Thinking as a Science, when he was 20 years old. That was the same year that he went to work for the Wall Street Journal. That was in 1915. To say that Hazlitt had a long writing career does not begin to convey just how long it was. His final article was published in 1988. He died in 1993 at the age of 98.

I did not meet him until I went to work for the Foundation for Economic Education in 1971. But I had been reading his materials ever since the late 1950s. I was a latecomer in this process. It is safe to say that anyone who called himself a libertarian in 1960 had been influenced, directly or indirectly, by Hazlitt. I suspect that this is still true.

Hazlitt was one of the early American promoters of the writings of Ludwig von Mises. He was convinced in the late 1930s that Mises was right, and that the New Deal was wrong. He wrote a positive review of Mises's book, Socialism, for the New York Times Book Review in 1938. This book had been published in South Africa in 1936, although it had been available in German since 1922. I think it is safe to call him an early adopter. He understood the magnitude of what Mises had been teaching long before most American economists had read Mises's books.

Hazlitt's critique of John Maynard Keynes, published in 1959, The Failure of the 'New Economics,' is a comprehensive and thoroughly readable critique of Keynes's General Theory. It was ignored by the academic profession, possibly because it was so thorough in its criticisms, but probably because Hazlitt was noted as a financial journalist, not as a professor of economics somewhere. He did not have the right credentials, so the academic community ignored him. I don't think this bothered him in the slightest.

He was always enthusiastic. He was always extremely lively. In this sense, he reminded me of Murray Rothbard and Burt Blumert, the co-founder of the Center for Libertarian Studies. I never saw him dejected in any way.

I suppose my best recollection of him was late in his life, when he was in a retirement home. At his age, there were not many men in the home. He remarked, twinkle in his eye, that a lot of the ladies in the home made a fuss over him. Then, coming to his senses, he added, "but don't tell Frances." Frances was Mrs. Hazlitt. He was altogether a sensible man.

Again, the lesson is clear: stick to your knitting, and stick to your guns.

Leonard E. Read…

If anyone deserves the title of the founder of libertarianism, it is Read. He was a born promoter. He was the head of the Chamber of Commerce in Los Angeles in the 1930s. He had never gone to college. He was an effective speaker, and in later years, he proved to be an effective writer. He was never a back-slapper, but he was never confrontational, either.

His story of how he was converted to a free market position made an impression on me. He had gone to see the head of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, William Mullendore. He went there, as he said, "to straighten out this fellow." By the time he had spent a couple hours being taught the principles of voluntarism, he realized that the worldview which he had held when he walked in the door was wrong.

From that day on, he was not really in alignment with the Chamber of Commerce. The chamber was always ready to promote government intervention in favor of business. From that fateful meeting onward, Leonard Read was not.

A decade later, he turned down a job heading the International Chamber of Commerce, which would have paid him $100,000 a year, which in 1946 was a fortune. Instead, he started the Foundation for Economic Education. He had contacts with rich men because of his time spent in the Chamber, but he always attempted to establish a broad-based support for the organization. FEE was not a rich men's plaything. In 1956, he launched the magazine which served as the major source of recruiting for the libertarian movement for the next 20 years: The Freeman. William F Buckley had wanted to buy it, but Read owned the name, and a year after Buckley started National Review, FEE started publishing The Freeman.

While Read was not a trained economist, he had a very clear understanding of how free markets operate. He wrote an article which I regard as the finest statement of the principle of the division of labor that has ever been written. It is called "I, Pencil." It is the story of how nobody knows how to make a pencil. A simple pencil is such a complex device that it takes coordination and cooperation beyond anyone's ability to comprehend in order to produce a simple pencil.

This insight has persuaded an untold number of people of the power and creativity of the free market. What was also creative about the article is that he wrote it as a narrative given by a pencil. He listed his own name only with these introductory words: "as told to."

He also wrote a classic little book, which is unfortunately out of print, Elements of Libertarian Leadership. He wrote many other books, and numerous collections of essays. He never stopped writing, almost until the day he died at the age of 84.

Here is the same lesson: stick to your knitting, and stick to your guns. He turned down a lot of money in 1946 to do this.

Both libertarians were not trained economists; Hazlitt even “never went to college”, yet both came out with classic economic books and articles. Bottom line: economics can be self-learned. Try the Mises Institute

Quote of the Day: Legalizing Fascism

Economic fascism is the doctrine that there is a government-business alliance that makes the nation wealthy or strong militarily. This idea has never had a judicial basis before. Now it does.

A tax in America prior to last week was a payment by the citizen or legal entity to an agency of civil government. Not so in the new, improved American fascism, as articulated by Chief Justice Roberts. In fascism, a compulsory payment to a private, profit-seeking entity is considered a tax. You can pay it to an insurance company, or you can pay a fine to the federal government. Take your pick. They are both taxes.

(bold emphasis original)

This from Professor Gary North on the recent validation of Obamacare by US Supreme Court. (lewrockwell.com).

Doug Casey: End of the Nation State

Investing guru, and anarchist philosopher Doug Casey believes that today’s nation states is on path to the dinosaur age

Mr. Casey writes at the Casey Research, (bold highlights mine)

Mankind has, so far, gone through three main stages of political organization since Day One, say 200,000 years ago, when anatomically modern men started appearing. We can call them Tribes, Kingdoms, and Nation-States.

Karl Marx had a lot of things wrong, especially his moral philosophy. But one of the acute observations he made was that the means of production are perhaps the most important determinant of how a society is structured. Based on that, so far in history, only two really important things have happened: the Agricultural Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. Everything else is just a footnote.

Let's see how these things relate.

The Agricultural Revolution and the End of Tribes

In prehistoric times, the largest political/economic group was the tribe. In that man is a social creature, it was natural enough to be loyal to the tribe. It made sense. Almost everyone in the tribe was genetically related, and the group was essential for mutual survival in the wilderness. That made them the totality of people that counted in a person's life – except for "others" from alien tribes, who were in competition for scarce resources and might want to kill you for good measure.

Tribes tend to be natural meritocracies, with the smartest and the strongest assuming leadership. But they're also natural democracies, small enough that everyone can have a say on important issues. Tribes are small enough that everybody knows everyone else, and knows what their weak and strong points are. Everyone falls into a niche of marginal advantage, doing what they do best, simply because that's necessary to survive. Bad actors are ostracized or fail to wake up, in a pool of their own blood, some morning. Tribes are socially constraining but, considering the many faults of human nature, a natural and useful form of organization in a society with primitive technology.

As people built their pool of capital and technology over many generations, however, populations grew. At the end of the last Ice Age, around 12,000 years ago, all over the world, there was a population explosion. People started living in towns and relying on agriculture as opposed to hunting and gathering. Large groups of people living together formed hierarchies, with a king of some description on top of the heap.

Those who adapted to the new agricultural technology and the new political structure accumulated the excess resources necessary for waging extended warfare against tribes still living at a subsistence level. The more evolved societies had the numbers and the weapons to completely triumph over the laggards. If you wanted to stay tribal, you'd better live in the middle of nowhere, someplace devoid of the resources others might want. Otherwise it was a sure thing that a nearby kingdom would enslave you and steal your property.

The Industrial Revolution and the End of Kingdoms

From around 12,000 B.C. to roughly the mid-1600s, the world's cultures were organized under strong men, ranging from petty lords to kings, pharaohs, or emperors.

It's odd, to me at least, how much the human animal seems to like the idea of monarchy. It's mythologized, especially in a medieval context, as a system with noble kings, fair princesses, and brave knights riding out of castles on a hill to right injustices. As my friend Rick Maybury likes to point out, quite accurately, the reality differs quite a bit from the myth. The king is rarely more than a successful thug, a Tony Soprano at best, or perhaps a little Stalin. The princess was an unbathed hag in a chastity belt, the knight a hired killer, and the shining castle on the hill the headquarters of a concentration camp, with plenty of dungeons for the politically incorrect.

With kingdoms, loyalties weren't so much to the "country" – a nebulous and arbitrary concept – but to the ruler. You were the subject of a king, first and foremost. Your linguistic, ethnic, religious, and other affiliations were secondary. It's strange how, when people think of the kingdom period of history, they think only in terms of what the ruling classes did and had. Even though, if you were born then, the chances were 98% you'd be a simple peasant who owned nothing, knew nothing beyond what his betters told him, and sent most of his surplus production to his rulers. But, again, the gradual accumulation of capital and knowledge made the next step possible: the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution and the End of the Nation-State

As the means of production changed, with the substitution of machines for muscle, the amount of wealth took a huge leap forward. The average man still might not have had much, but the possibility to do something other than beat the earth with a stick for his whole life opened up, largely as a result of the Renaissance.

Then the game changed totally with the American and French Revolutions. People no longer felt they were owned by some ruler; instead they now gave their loyalty to a new institution, the nation-state. Some innate atavism, probably dating back to before humans branched from the chimpanzees about 3 million years ago, seems to dictate the Naked Ape to give his loyalty to something bigger than himself. Which has delivered us to today's prevailing norm, the nation-state, a group of people who tend to share language, religion, and ethnicity. The idea of the nation-state is especially effective when it's organized as a "democracy," where the average person is given the illusion he has some measure of control over where the leviathan is headed.

On the plus side, by the end of the 18th century, the Industrial Revolution had provided the common man with the personal freedom, as well as the capital and technology, to improve things at a rapidly accelerating pace.

What caused the sea change?

I'll speculate it was largely due to an intellectual factor, the invention of the printing press; and a physical factor, the widespread use of gunpowder. The printing press destroyed the monopoly the elites had on knowledge; the average man could now see that they were no smarter or "better" than he was. If he was going to fight them (conflict is, after all, what politics is all about), it didn't have to be just because he was told to, but because he was motivated by an idea. And now, with gunpowder, he was on an equal footing with the ruler's knights and professional soldiers.

Right now I believe we're at the cusp of another change, at least as important as the ones that took place around 12,000 years ago and several hundred years ago. Even though things are starting to look truly grim for the individual, with collapsing economic structures and increasingly virulent governments, I suspect help is on the way from historical evolution. Just as the agricultural revolution put an end to tribalism and the industrial revolution killed the kingdom, I think we're heading for another multipronged revolution that's going to make the nation-state an anachronism. It won't happen next month, or next year. But I'll bet the pattern will start becoming clear within the lifetime of many now reading this.

What pattern am I talking about? Once again, a reference to the evil (I hate to use that word too, in that it's been so corrupted by Bush and religionists) genius Karl Marx, with his concept of the "withering away of the State." By the end of this century, I suspect the U.S. and most other nation-states will have, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

The Problem with the State – and Your Nation-State

Of course, while I suspect that many of you are sympathetic to that sentiment, you also think the concept is too far out, and that I'm guilty of wishful thinking. People believe the state is necessary and – generally – good. They never even question whether the institution is permanent.

My view is that the institution of the state itself is a bad thing. It's not a question of getting the right people into the government; the institution itself is hopelessly flawed and necessarily corrupts the people that compose it, as well as the people it rules. This statement invariably shocks people, who believe that government is both a necessary and permanent part of the cosmic firmament.

The problem is that government is based on coercion, and it is, at a minimum, suboptimal to base a social structure on institutionalized coercion. I'm not going to go into the details here; I've covered this ground from a number of directions in previous editions of this letter, as well as in Crisis Investing (Chap.16), Strategic Investing (Chap. 32), and, most particularly Crisis Investing for the Rest of the '90s (Chap. 34). Again, let me urge you to read the Tannehills' superb The Market for Liberty, which is available for download free here.

One of the huge changes brought by the printing press and advanced exponentially by the Internet is that people are able to readily pursue different interests and points of view. As a result, they have less and less in common: living within the same political borders is no longer enough to make them countrymen. That's a big change from pre-agricultural times when members of the same tribe had quite a bit – almost everything – in common. But this has been increasingly diluted in the times of the kingdom and the nation-state. If you're honest, you may find you have very little in common with most of your countrymen besides superficialities and trivialities.

Ponder that point for a minute. What do you have in common with your fellow countrymen? A mode of living, (perhaps) a common language, possibly some shared experiences and myths, and a common ruler. But very little of any real meaning or importance. To start with, they're more likely to be an active danger to you than the citizens of a presumed "enemy" country, say, like Iran. If you earn a good living, certainly if you own a business and have assets, your fellow Americans are the ones who actually present the clear and present danger. The average American (about 50% of them now) pays no income tax. Even if he's not actually a direct or indirect employee of the government, he's a net recipient of its largesse, which is to say your wealth, through Social Security and other welfare programs.

Over the years, I've found I have much more in common with people of my own social or economic station or occupation in France, Argentina, or Hong Kong, than with an American union worker in Detroit or a resident of the LA barrios. I suspect many of you would agree with that observation. What's actually important in relationships is shared values, principles, interests, and philosophy. Geographical proximity, and a common nationality, is meaningless – no more than an accident of birth. I have much more loyalty to a friend in the Congo – although we're different colors, have different cultures, different native languages, and different life experiences – than I do to the Americans who live down the highway in the trailer park. I see the world the same way my Congolese friend does; he's an asset to my life. I'm necessarily at odds with many of "my fellow Americans"; they're an active and growing liability.

Read the rest here.

When we follow the money, we will come to realize that the evolution of political economic dynamics have already been indicative of the impending degeneracy and forthcoming obsolescence of the incumbent nation (welfare-warfare) states.

The foundations of the industrial age political system, which operates on a modern day industrial age (top-down) platform based on modified parasitical relationship via “democracy”, is apparently being gnawed by internal structural incoherence, systemic flaws and its rigidity or failure to adjust or adopt with changes of technology, market trends, environment and time.

The manifestations of which has been today’s self perpetuating financial crisis. Eventually self-fulfilling debt based collapse will likely culminate the end of the nation (welfare-warfare) state.

The deterioration of nation state will be compounded by rapid advances in technology where the information age will continue to usher in dramatic and radical changes in commerce and social lifestyles.

Where the printing press destroyed the “monopoly” of knowledge held by the elite, the advent of the internet connectivity, which has paved way for the emergence of geographically noncontiguous communication (information not limited by space or vicinity of one’s physical reach), has been neutralizing the top-down flow of communications emanating from the current construct of political institutions. That’s why centralized government have frantically been waging war with the web, desperately trying to censor and regulate the flow of information

Horizontally flow of communications has been democratizing information which should lead to the Hayekean knowledge revolution. And consequently, the knowledge revolution will provide the ideological underpinning for the transition towards decentralized societies.

The transformation may not be smooth nor peaceful, as there are multitudes of entrenched interest groups living off or benefiting from the current system. But again, unsustainable systems simply won’t last.

Along with visionary author Alvin Toffler, Professor Gary North, Professor Butler Shaffer and guru Doug Casey, I do share the view that decentralization’s ball has began rolling.

US Spent $72 Billion for Climate Change Since 2008

Writes Professor Gary North at the LewRockwell.com,

Remember when global warming was called global warming? You know: back in 2001, before a decade elapsed in which there was no measurable global warming.

It’s not called global warming any longer. That was just too embarrassing, because there hasn’t any global warming for a decade. This stable temperature has taken place, despite the fact that worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide are higher.

“In light of the 2010 data, global carbon dioxide emissions have risen by fully a third since the year 2001, yet global temperatureshave not risen during the past decade. Global warming activists argue that carbon dioxide emissions are the sole or primary factor in global temperature changes, yet global temperatures show no change despite a 33% increase in global carbon dioxide emissions.”

So, the anti-warmers changed tactics. They invented a new threat: climate change.

Mankind is responsible for climate change, we are told. Therefore, the U.S. government is required to spend money to combat it, all over the world. It has no jurisdiction outside the United States, but that has not dimmed the hopes and plans of warmers

The U.S. government has spent over $72 billion to combat climate change since 2008.

This has failed. The climate keeps changing. Sometimes it’s warmer. Sometimes it’s cooler. It it refuses to cease changing.

This means that taxpayers must still be compelled by the government to do their fair share.

This means $72 billion down the sinkhole (wasted productive capital), $72 billion added burden for US taxpayers, and $72 billion subsidies for the benefit of Obama’s green energy cronies.

Abetted by the constant barrage of propaganda by mainstream media aimed at convincing the median voter, vested interest groups, who benefit from political privileges, have been screaming for more.

How Empires Die and the End of Centralization

Professor Gary North has a splendid article on the coming end of the empire states and of the centralized form of governments…

Death of the Empire

Empires disintegrate. This is a social law. There are no exceptions.

The first well-known social theorist to articulate this law was the prophet Daniel. He announced it to King Nebuchadnezzar. You can read his analysis in Daniel 2. Verses 44 and 45 are the key to understanding the law of empires.

The Roman Empire is the model. But there is a serious problem here. There are at least 210 theories of why it fell. There are so many that even my 1976 Ron Paul office colleague Bruce Bartlett gets credit for one of them – on Wikipedia, no less. He has made the big time!

In any case, Rome did not collapse. It wasted away over several centuries, wasting the treasure of its citizens along with it.

I suppose there were highly educated people who came to the voters in the late Roman republic and said something like this: "Unless decisive action is taken now, Rome will go bankrupt." If so, they were right. But it took a lot longer than they thought.

These days, it does not take nearly so long.

An empire grows at first almost unconsciously. No one goes to the powers that be and says, "Hey! Why don't we create an empire?" It is more like the person who says this: "I'm not greedy. All I want is to control the land contiguous to mine."

In military affairs, there are economies of scale. An army of warriors makes conquest cost-effective. There are also taxation advantages. An army of tax collectors makes tax collection cost-effective. "Hand over your money" is more effective. Pretty soon, you've got an empire.

But there is a law of bureaucracy that applies to empire. At some point, it costs more to administer the bureaucracy than the bureaucracy can generate through coercion. Then the empire begins to crack. It cannot enforce its claims.

So, the growth of empire has economics at its center: economies of scale. The fall of empire also has economics at its center: economies of scale.

I think this process is an application of the law of increasing returns. In the initial phase of the process, adding more of one factor increases total output. But, as more of it is added, another law takes over: the law of decreasing returns.

Example: water and land. Add some water to a desert, and you can grow more food. Add more water, and you can grow a lot more food. There is an accelerating rate of returns. The joint output is of greater value than the cost of adding water. But if you keep adding water, you will get a swamp. The law of decelerating returns takes over. Add more water, and the land is underwater. You might as well have a desert.

This law applies to power. Add power, and you generate more income. But if you keep adding power, expenses of the bureaucracy will begin to eat up revenues. Resistance will also increase: internal and external. The system either implodes or withers away.

With only one exception in history – the Soviet Union in 1991 – empires have not gone out of business without bloodshed.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the senior politicians privatized the whole system in December 1991. They handed over the assets to what immediately became the ultimate system of crony capitalism. They divvied up the Communist Party's money and deposited it in individual Swiss bank accounts. The suicide of the USSR was "Vladimir Lenin meets David Copperfield." Now you see it; now you don't. In the history of Marxism, no event better illustrates Marx's principle of the cash nexus. It seduced Lenin's vanguard of the proletariat.

Notice the pattern of empire. It begins slowly, building over centuries: the Roman Empire, the Russian Empire, the French Empire. Then the empire either erodes or else it is captured by revolutionaries, as was the case in France (1789-94) and Russia (1917). But this only delays the reversal. It does not overcome it.

Death of the Modern Centralized States

Economies of scale shaped the development of the modern nation-state. In 1450, the governments of Western Europe were small. They controlled little territory. They were remnants of the medieval world, which had been far more decentralized.

By 1550, this had begun to change. The beginnings of the modern nation-state were visible.

Tax revenues flowed into the centralizing kingships. Trade was growing. Revenues were increasing. Weaponry was advancing. All of this had been going on for half a millennium. But, like an exponential curve, the line began to move upward visibly around 1500.

Maritime empires grew: Spain, Portugal, England. They challenged each other on the seas. Then came the Netherlands and France. The fusion of naval power and trade monopolies lured nations into competition for trade zones. The idea of free trade was centuries away, except in the academic enclave of the school of Salamanca.

The law of increasing returns was evident in this process. It paid rulers to tax more and extend the jurisdiction of the nation-state at the expense of local governments internally and foreign governments externally. The benefits accrued mostly to the political hierarchy and its system of connected families.

Economies of scale drove the process. The division of labor favored centralization. Local units of civil government could not compete.

Let me give an example from the field of historiography. The historian of colonial America can write about lots of topics: immigration, technology, family structure, town planting, economic development, intellectual trends, and so forth. He writes about the issues of life that affected people's daily lives. He cannot write about national politics until after May of 1754: the "battle" of Jumonville Glen.

The Battle of Jumonville Glen is unknown to all historians except specialists in colonial America. This is a pity, because that battle was the most important military event in the history of the modern world. It literally launched the modern world. It led to (1) the French & Indian War (Seven Years' War), (2) the Stamp Act crisis, (3) the American Revolution, (4) the French Revolution, (5) Napoleon, (6) nationalism, (7) modern revolutionism, (8) Communism, (9) Fascism, and (10) the American Empire. It was started by Virginia militia Major George Washington, age 22.

Before the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, it is both possible and wise to write about America without tying the narrative to politics. After 1788, every textbook writer is drawn like a moth to the flame: Presidential elections. He cannot narrate the text without hinging everything on the outcome in the four-year system of national covenant renewal-ratification.

We are fast approaching a day of judgment. It has to do with economies of scale. It has to do with the law of decreasing returns.

The best account of this process is a book by Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld: The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge University Press, 1999). He traces the history of the Western nation-state from the late Renaissance until the late twentieth century. He argues that there will be a break-up of nation states and a return of decentralization.

Read the rest here.

The transition from the decaying centralized social structures out of the law of decreasing returns is presently being compounded by the widespread adaption of massive advances from technology.

People will need ideological justifications for such transition. Remember, the world does not operate on a vacuum.

And with the democratization of knowledge through the web or the cyberspace, people’s perception, mentality and attitudes will likely adapt to favor decentralized social orders.

Futurist Alvin Toffler calls this the Third Wave. From his 1980 book,

The Third Wave thus begins a truly new era--the age of the de-massified media. A new info-sphere is emerging along-side the new techno-sphere. And this will have a far-reaching impact on the most important sphere of all, the one inside our skulls. For taken together, these changes revolutionize our images of the world and our ability to make sense of it

The Arab Spring revolts of 2011 has partly been manifestations of the combination of the law of decreasing returns on centralized social orders and of technology facilitated knowledge revolution in process.

Several welfare states in the Eurozone are in the process of a monumental collapse from a debt trap.

This will deepen overtime.

Quote of the Day: Gold as Insurance against Uncivility

Civilized people should buy gold when uncivilized people are in charge. They should also buy it when civilized people in power adopt the economic policies of uncivilized people.

That’s from Professor Gary North rebutting Warren Buffett’s alter ego Charles Munger on gold.

Quote of the Day: Government Bonds as Instruments for Financial Repression

Fact: every dollar that goes into government debt is not going into the private sector. This is a major problem today. The U.S. government is borrowing and wasting an additional $1.2 trillion a year in on-budget (admitted) debt. Meanwhile, it must roll over existing debt as it matures.

The single most important economic factor in strengthening the growth of the modern state has been the development of government bonds. Governments have been able to sustain their growth because they have promised investors to pay interest on money lent to the government.

The government guarantees the payment of a specific rate of interest over a specific period of time. Investors, looking for safety, and looking also for a steady stream of income that is not subject to the risks of the free market, hand over their money to the government on the basis of their trust that the government will not default in any way on its obligations.

As mentioned, a major way that governments default is accomplished through mass inflation, or even hyperinflation. When governments, meaning central banks, increase the money supply, this has an effect on prices. Prices will begin to rise. Investors realize that the money that they will get back over the period of the loan will be worth less than today. So, they demand that the government promise to pay a higher rate of interest.

Those investors who accepted the government's promise when the rate of inflation was lower now suffer capital losses. They hold IOUs from the government to pay a particular rate of interest, and now the government is paying new investors a higher rate of interest. So, new investors are not going to buy bonds from the older investors at the old selling price, because those bonds pay a lower rate of interest than newer ones. They are going to demand that existing sellers of bonds take a lower price than the sellers paid when they bought the bonds from the government.

The ability of the government to extract wealth from rich people through taxation has always been limited. Rich people know how to hide their money. They know how to get it out of the country, and they know how to get it into markets that are less easily taxed.

So, politicians learned half a millennium ago to get their hands on rich people's money before rich people started hiding their money. They did this by promising to pay a rate of interest on the money. Government bonds are ways of extracting money in advance, especially from rich people, which politicians would have preferred to tax directly, but which they did not tax directly because they knew that rich people would hide the money.

The whole point of the bond market is to enable the government to expand its operations beyond what would be possible by collecting taxes today. Politicians are able to get more money to expand operations today, because they promise to repay lenders a specific rate of interest. But, of course, this does not promise that the government will not repay with debased money.

That’s from Professor Gary North. Read the rest here

The Impending Collapse of the Immoral Welfare State

The welfare state has been sold to the public as a moral political system. In reality, it is a gigantic fraud, not only built upon unsustainable economics or the Santa Claus principle but on immoral grounds of thievery.

Professor Gary North explains, (bold emphasis added)

The welfare state is defended ethically as a system of safety nets. These safety nets are defended as ethically necessary for a good society, meaning ethically good. Intellectuals see business profits as legitimate mainly because profits provide a tax base for funding the welfare state.

These safety nets require constant and ever-increasing funding. They are going to lose this funding. Why? Because of national government bankruptcies.

There is no question that the deficits will produce a series of fiscal crises. These crises will initially be covered up by central bank inflation, but the end result of that policy will either be hyperinflation, which is a form of concealed default, or stable money, which will be followed by open default. There will be a default. The political fall-out of this default will change the nature of Western politics.

The welfare state is going to self-destruct. It is highly unlikely that we will see the complete destruction of the welfare state in any nation, but it will contract on a scale not seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. That is because we have not seen a welfare state as comprehensive as Rome's until modern times.

The bigger they are, the harder they fall.

I know of no studies of the effects of the fall of Rome on the masses of welfare recipients. It took centuries for the system to decline. We know that the central state in 400 A.D. could no longer support the welfare clients that it supported with bread and circuses in the days of Nero. Manorialism steadily replaced the central government in the Western Empire. But for centuries, welfare clients lived and died as clients.

Then the welfare state died. It did not revive until the twentieth century.

THE GREAT DEFAULT

What will make the coming Great Default different from Rome's will be the speed of its arrival and the magnitude of the contraction.

Birth rates have fallen everywhere outside the United States. The number of aged retirees in every Western nation, including Japan, is increasing relentlessly. The number of children born is falling. The end is clear. So is the politics of kick the can.

Unlike Rome, the West's intellectuals have defended the spread of the welfare state by means of a system of ethics. It rests on a variation of the Mosaic commandment against theft: "Thou shalt not steal, except by majority vote." So widespread has this revised commandment been that the electorates in every Western nation will not tolerate its rejection. Yet the economics of the deficits points to the operational failure of the welfare system.

The defenders of the welfare state will then have to explain this widespread collapse of the programs. How did such an ethically superior system fail? How did it lead millions of welfare clients to trust a self-destructive state? How did it mislead so many addicts to government handouts? How did it lead them into a ditch, devoid of skills to compete in the post-default world?

Answer: because the welfare state was ethically corrupt before it was fiscally corrupt. It is based on theft by majority vote.

We have seen what happens to the false messiahs of the messianic state. Western Marxists had a solid though small market for their fat books until the Soviet Union went bankrupt in the late 1980s and shut down in December 1991. Overnight, Marxism lost its academic defenders. They became as invisible as Baghdad Bob did on the day American troops marched in.

The Marxist system had been seen by Western intellectuals as intellectually viable, one of several legitimate perspectives. Then, overnight, it was regarded as a total failure, and – even worse for intellectuals – a fool's quest, a bad joke. Marxism was rejected in theory because of its visible loss of power. The ethics of Western Marxism – in contrast to Marx's rejection of ethics – had always been an illusion. Marxism had always been what Marx had said it was: a matter of power. Defenders who steadfastly had defended Marxism in theory if not in actual practice were no longer willing to do in public. They did not want to be identified with historical losers – losers of power.

If Marxism had been ethically based, it would not have faded overnight just because its power base collapsed. The true believers would have stayed the course. But Marxism was never about ethics. It was always about power.

So is the welfare state.

The defenders of the welfare state have come in the name of a higher ethics. When the system goes belly-up fiscally, these defenders will face the same sort of existential crisis that the Marxists faced in 1992.

They ought to be able to see that the welfare state is a fraud, a delusion, and an ethical monstrosity: charity with guns. They ought to be able to see that theft is theft, with or without majority votes. But they don't.

Read the rest here

The coming global debt default binge will most likely highlight the collapse of welfare state. And this would most possibly suck into the vortex the paper money system. That's because the central bank fractional reserve monetary system has enabled and facilitated the existence of the welfare state. The proverbial chickens will come home to roost.