October’s Historic Php 16.02 Trillion Public Debt: Insights on Spending, Employment, Bank Credit, and (November’s) CPI Trends

 

The essence of public debt, as a financing institution, is that it allows the objective cost of currently financed expenditure projects to be postponed in time. For the taxpayer, public debt delays the necessity of transferring command over resource services to the treasury. —James M. Buchanan, “Confessions of a Burden Monger” 

In this issue

October’s Historic Php 16.02 Trillion Public Debt: Insights on Spending, Employment, Bank Credit, and (November’s) CPI Trends

I. Preamble: The Perils of a Credit-Financed Economy

II. Analyzing Fiscal Policy: A Critical Perspective of the Record Php 16.02 Trillion Public Debt

III. Why Public Debt Will Continue to Rise: The Continuing Burden of the Military and Uniformed Personnel Pension (MUP) System 

IV. Pre-Election Labor Data? Declining Labor Participation Boosts Employment, While Agriculture Jobs Rise Despite Typhoons

V. Debt-Driven Consumption: The Risks of Unsustainable Household Borrowing

VI. Near Full Employment and Record Leverage, Yet a Tepid CPI Bounce in October: What Happened to Demand? 

VII. Philippine Public Debt Hits Record Highs in October 2024: Rising FX and Fiscal Risks Ahead!

October’s Historic Php 16.02 Trillion Public Debt: Insights on Spending, Employment, Bank Credit, and (November’s) CPI Trends 

Philippine public debt hit a record Php 16.02 trillion last October. Here are the reasons why it is likely to maintain its upward trajectory.

I. Preamble: The Perils of a Credit-Financed Economy

This week’s outlook builds on last week’s exposition, "Debt-Financed Stimulus Forever? The Philippine Government’s Relentless Pursuit of 'Upper Middle-Income' Status."

But here’s a brief preamble that encompasses our economic analysis over time—dedicated to our new readers. 

1 Spending reflects the ideology underpinning the Philippine approach to economic development. 

2 This Keynesian-based framework has been built on a "top-down" or "trickle-down" model, relying on the elites and the government to drive growth. 

3 Consequently, the nation's political and economic structures have been significantly shaped by this approach.

Figure 1

For instance, the elite owned universal-commercial banks have restructured their operations to prioritize consumer lending over industrial loans. Banks have also controlled 83.3% of the Total Financial Resources (TFR) as of September (or Q3). (Figure 1, top and middle charts) 

4 A key outcome of this credit-driven spending is the historic savings and investment gap (SIG), manifested by the "twin deficits." These deficits reached unprecedented levels during the pandemic recession in 2020–2021, as the National Government and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) stepped in to rescue the banking system and protect elite interests. (Figure 1, bottom window) 

5 Credit-financed private sector investments have also included speculative activities based on a "build it, and they will come" or "race-to-build supply" dogma.  These activities span sectors such as real estate, infrastructure, construction, retail, and accommodations. 

6 Since these deficits require substantial funding—and with the government, non-financial corporations (including PSEi-listed firms), and even banks now acting as net borrowers—households and external savings have become critical sources for bridging this economic gap. 

7. In addition to the erosion of the peso's purchasing power, the depletion of savings is clearly reflected in the scale of financing requirements. 

Figure 2 

Even by mainstream measures, the nation’s gross savings rate has been on a downward trend since 2009, despite a brief two-year recovery in 2022 and 2023, from the lows of 2021. (Figure 2, topmost graph) 

8. Trends in motion tend to stay in motion—until a crisis emerges. 

Thus, it comes as no surprise that the serial expansion of systemic leverage—encompassing public debt and bank credit growth—has become the cornerstone of the "top-down" spending-driven GDP architecture. 

II. Analyzing Fiscal Policy: A Critical Perspective of the Record Php 16.02 Trillion Public Debt

Bureau of Treasury, December 3:  The NG's total outstanding debt stood at P16.02 trillion as of end-October 2024, reflecting a 0.8% or P126.95 billion increase from the end-September 2024 level. The increase was primarily driven by the valuation impact of peso depreciation against the US dollar from 56.017 at end-September 2024 to 58.198 at end-October 2024. Of the total debt stock, 67.98% is composed of domestic securities, while 32.02% consists of external obligations. (bold added) 

Bureau of Treasury, October 1: The National Government’s (NG) total outstanding debt stood at P15.55 trillion as of the end of August 2024, reflecting a 0.9% or P139.79 billion decrease from the end July 2024 level. This decline was primarily attributed to the revaluation effect of peso appreciation and the net repayment of external debt (bold added) 

“Look,” the establishment analyst might argue, “strong revenues have led to a declining fiscal deficit, and consequently, increases in debt have also decreased.” (Figure 2, middle diagram) 

We counter, "Yes, but that view is backward-looking." As economist Daniel Lacalle observed, "Deficits are always a spending problem because receipts are, by nature, cyclical and volatile, while spending becomes untouchable and increases every year."

That is to say, analyzing public balance sheets is more about theory than statistical analysis.

First, despite the hype surrounding the supposed ‘multipliers’ of deficit spending, diminishing returns are a natural outcome of political policies and are therefore unsustainable. 

Why has Japan endured an era known as the "lost decades" if this prescription worked? And if public spending is so successful, pushing this reasoning with reductio ad absurdum logic, why not commit 100% of resources or embrace full socialization of the economy?

Second, as long as public spending rises—which is mandated by Congress—economic slowdowns or recessions magnify the risks of a fiscal blowout. The pandemic recession exemplifies this. (Figure 2, bottom image) 

Briefly, the embedded risks in fiscal health arise from the potential emergence of volatility in revenues versus political path dependency in programmed spending. 

Third, cui bono? Are the primary beneficiaries of spending not the political elites, bureaucrats, and the politically connected private sector? Without a profit-loss metric, there is no way to determine whether these projects hold positive economic value. 

For instance, government fees from infrastructure projects do not reflect market realities but are often subsidized to gain public approval. 

How much economic value is added, or what benefit does a newly erected bridge in a remote province or city provide relative to its costs?

Fourth, in a world of scarcity, government activities not only compete with the private sector but also come at its expense—resulting in the crowding-out effects. 

Since the government does not generate wealth on its own but relies on extraction from the productive sectors, how can an increase in government spending not reduce savings and, therefore, investments?

Figure 3

Have experts been blind to the fact that these "fiscal stabilizers" or present-day "Marcos-nomics" stimulus have been accompanied by declining GDP? (Figure 3, topmost chart)

Lastly, who ultimately pays for activities based on "concentrated benefits and dispersed costs," or political transfers through the Logic of Collective Action?

Wouldn’t that burden fall on present day savers and currency holders or the peso (through financial repression—inflation tax) as well as future generations?

III. Why Public Debt Will Continue to Rise: The Continuing Burden of the Military and Uniformed Personnel Pension (MUP) System

A segment of the government’s October jobs report offers valuable insights into the trajectory of public spending. 

The basic pay for personnel in the Philippine military or Armed Forces is higher than, or on par with, the salaries of top-tier positions in the private sector. (Figure 3, middle graph) 

This is remarkable. 

The data reflects the political priorities of the government. 

After the overthrow of the Marcos 1.0 regime, the civilian government sought to pacify a restive military bureaucracy by granting pay increases and other benefits or perquisites. 

The previous administration implemented across-the-board pay raises to maintain favor with the military.

These actions have contributed to significant excesses in the unfunded Military and Uniformed Personnel (MUP) pension system, which now poses an increasing risk of "fiscal collapse. The system’s unfunded pension liabilities are estimated at Php 9.6 trillion, equivalent to 53% of the Philippines’ gross domestic product (GDP).

Yet, even after the Department of Finance (DoF) proposed reforms in 2023 to address these issues, the reform bill remains pending in Congress and could remain unresolved due to internal dissent.

It goes without saying that the recent pay increases affirm a subtle transition to a war economy, which will be publicly justified in the name of "defense" or under the guise of "nationalism." 

Yet, by setting pay scales higher than those in the private sector, the government have been prioritizing political appeasement over fostering the productive economy. This misalignment could lead to further erosion of the private sector. 

Consequently, this egregious pay disparity may incentivize individuals to seek government employment over private-sector jobs, potentially crowding out labor from the productive economy. 

These developments contradict the government’s stated goal of positioning the Philippines as a global investment hub. 

Perhaps partly due to MUP operating under unprogrammed funding, public debt increases have risen disproportionately above public expenditures. (Figure 3, lowest image) 

Needless to say, due to the protection of entrenched interest groups, public debt will continue to rise. 

IV. Pre-Election Labor Data? Declining Labor Participation Boosts Employment, While Agriculture Jobs Rise Despite Typhoons 

As an aside, authorities reported a slight increase in the unemployment rate, rising from 3.7% in September to 3.9% in October. Conversely, the employment rate declined slightly from 9.63% to 9.61%. Both figures remain close to the milestone rates of 3.1% and 9.69%, respectively, achieved in December 2023.

Figure 4

The increase in the employment rate, however, was driven by a drop in labor force participation. (Figure 4, upper visual)

Despite the population aged 15 and above increasing by 421,000 month-on-month (MoM) in October, the number of employed individuals decreased by 1,715,000, while the labor force shrank by 1,643,000. 

The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) explains that the non-labor force population includes "persons who are not looking for work because of reasons such as housekeeping, schooling, and permanent disability." 

This highlights how arbitrary qualifications can inflate the employed population figures. 

Interestingly, among the three major employment sectors, only agriculture recorded a MoM increase (+282,000). Industry (-48,000) and services (-1,950,000) both experienced significant declines. Of the 21 employment subcategories, only seven posted expansions, led by agriculture (+323,000), construction (+234,000), and accommodation (+163,000). (Figure 4, lower chart) 

Notably, government and defense jobs saw a sharp drop of 358,000. 

The near all-time highs in labor data appear to be strategically timed for the upcoming elections. 

V. Debt-Driven Consumption: The Risks of Unsustainable Household Borrowing

Figure 5

On a related note, the BSP reported all-time highs in universal and commercial (UC) consumer lending last October, driven by credit card, auto, and salary loans in nominal or peso amounts. (Figure 5, topmost window) 

Household borrowings surged with 23.6% year-on-year (YoY) growth, fueled by increases of 27.8%, 18.34%, and 18.5%, respectively. (Figure 5, middle graph) 

This blazing growth rate has pushed the share of these loans in the bank’s portfolio to unprecedented heights. 

This dynamic indicates that "banked" households have been steadily increasing their leverage to support consumption and, possibly, to refinance existing debt. 

However, as the PSEi30’s Q3 data reveals, despite high employment rates and the rapid rise in household leverage, consumer spending remained sluggish. 

This suggests three possibilities: wage growth has been insufficient to keep up with current price levels, households are increasingly reliant on debt to bridge the gap and maintain their lifestyles, or it is a combination of both factors. 

Additionally, despite the BSP implementing a second rate cut, UC total bank lending growth showed early signs of slowing, decelerating from 11.32% in September to 10.7% in October. 

Do these trends imply a productivity-driven or credit-driven economy? 

At the current pace of unsustainable household balance sheet leveraging, what risks loom for consumers, the banking system, and the broader economy? 

VI. Near Full Employment and Record Leverage, Yet a Tepid CPI Bounce in October: What Happened to Demand? 

Still, despite near full employment, increases in household and production loans have failed to boost liquidity, savings, and inflation. 

October M3 growth remained stagnant at 5.5% from a month ago.

Also, the October CPI rose marginally from 2.3% to 2.5%, while core inflation increased from 2.4% to 2.5% over the same period. (Figure 5, lowest chart)

Additionally, could the CPI be nearing its bottom?

Might this signal the onset of the third wave in the inflation cycle that began in 2015?

Will a fiscal blowout fuel it?

Figure 6

Ironically, what happened to the correlation between systemic leveraging and the CPI? While systemic leveraging has been rising since Q3 2024, the CPI has failed to recover since peaking in Q1 2023. (Figure 6, topmost pane) 

Or, what happened to the record consumer leveraging, rising production debt, and near all-time highs in government spending? Why has demand slowed in the face of milestone-high systemic leveraging (public spending + bank credit expansion)?

Have the balance sheets of the private sector become a barrier to 'spending-based GDP'?

Intriguingly, while the government attributes the rise in the October CPI to typhoons (Typhoon Kristine and Typhoon Leon), which have caused price increases due to supply-side disruptions in food, jobs data indicate that such natural calamities have actually bolstered agricultural employment.

This possibly suggests a belief in the "broken window fallacy"—the misconception that growth can be driven by disasters or war!

These are incredible contradictions!

VII. Philippine Public Debt Hits Record Highs in October 2024: Rising FX and Fiscal Risks Ahead!

Circling back to the unparalleled Php 16.02 trillion debt, which—according to the BTr report—has risen due to the decline of the peso.

In contrast, when public debt declined last August, the improvement was also attributed to the strengthening of the Philippine peso.

While changes in the USDPHP exchange rate influence the nominal amount of public debt, the government continues to borrow heavily from both local and international capital markets. For instance, in Q3, the BSP approved state borrowings amounting to USD 3.81 billion. (Figure 6, middle image)

Following the surge in Q1 2023, foreign exchange (FX) borrowings by the public sector have continued to climb.

Moreover, since reaching a low of 28.12% in March 2021, the share of FX borrowings has been on an upward trend, with October’s share of 32.02% approaching May 2020's level of 32.13%. (Figure 6, lowest diagram)

This trend also applies to foreign debt servicing, as demonstrated last week, where FX-denominated servicing for the first ten months increased from 18.08% in 2023 to 21.9% in 2024.

Figure 7

In the face of fiscal stabilizers (deficit spending), the external debt of the Philippines continues to reach record highs in Q2, primarily due to state borrowings, which accounted for 57% of the total. Borrowing by banks and non-banks has also been on the rise. (Figure 7, topmost visual)

Debt levels in Q3 are likely to hit a new milestone given the approval of state FX loans by the BSP. 

Inadequate organic FX resources—reflected in revenues and holdings—have led to "synthetic dollar shorts," as highlighted last November. 

Meanwhile, the BSP appears to be rebuilding its FX reserves to restore the 85-88% range, which likely represents its USD anchor (de facto US dollar standard) for stabilizing the USDPHP exchange rate and domestic monetary operations. (Figure 7, middle image)

As of August, the BSP’s international reserves remain below this anchor level, as well as below its domestic security holdings. These holdings were used to inject a record Php 2.3 trillion to stabilize the banking system in 2020-2021.

While the liquidity injected remains in the system, it seems insufficient, as a 'black hole' in the banking sector appears to be absorbing these funds.

Compounding the issue, the lack of domestic savings to finance the widening savings-investment gap (SIG)—manifested through the "twin deficits"—necessitates more borrowing, both domestic and FX-denominated.

This deepening reliance on spending driven by the savings-investment gap increases the risk of a fiscal deficit blowout, accelerating the pace of debt accumulation 

Because the establishment peddles the notion that links public debt conditions to the USDPHP exchange rate, the BSP has recently been intensively intervening to bring the exchange rate below the 59 level.

These interventions are evident in the 5.6% year-on-year drop in November’s gross international reserves (GIR), which fell to USD 108.47 billion—well below the Q2 external debt figure of USD 130.18 billion. (Figure 7, lowest graph)

Yet, the wider this SIG gap becomes, the greater the pressure on the government, the BSP, and the economy to borrow further to meet FX requirements.

Thanks to NIRP and ZIRP; Many Japanese Turn to Crime In Order to Live Off From Prison Welfare

The following serves as wonderful example of how government interventions fundamentally mangle society’s ethical fabric.

Through ZIRP and NIRP or the invisible redistribution/transfers via monetary channels, or the Japanese government’s thrust to inflate her debt away has only led to the crucifixion of Japanese savers.

Destruction of the yen has only shrunk the purchasing power or reduced real income of Japan’s dramatically aging society (yes Japan has a declining to population).

So the expanding paucity of income, such has now spurred many of the elderly to commit crime with the intent to get fed or live by Japan’s prison welfare state.

From CNBC.com (bold added)

Japan's prison system is being driven to budgetary crisis by demographics, a welfare shortfall and a new, pernicious breed of villain: the recidivist retiree. And the silver-haired crooks, say academics, are desperate to be behind bars.

Crime figures show that about 35 per cent of shoplifting offences are committed by people over 60. Within that age bracket, 40 per cent of repeat offenders have committed the same crime more than six times.

There is good reason, concludes a report, to suspect that the shoplifting crime wave in particular represents an attempt by those convicted to end up in prison — an institution that offers free food, accommodation and healthcare.

The mathematics of recidivism are gloomily compelling for the would-be convict. Even with a frugal diet and dirt-cheap accommodation, a single Japanese retiree with minimal savings has living costs more than 25 per cent higher than the meagre basic state pension of Y780,000 ($6,900) a year, according to a study on the economics of elderly crime by Michael Newman of Tokyo-based research house Custom Products Research.

Even the theft of a Y200 sandwich can earn a two-year prison sentence, say academics, at an Y8.4m cost to the state.

The geriatric crime wave is accelerating, and analysts note that the Japanese prison system — newly expanded and at about 70 per cent occupancy — is being prepared for decades of increases. Between 1991 and 2013, the latest year for which the Ministry of Justice publishes figures, the number of elderly inmates in jail for repeating the same offence six times has climbed 460 per cent.

The surging rates of crime among the elderly disguise a darker trend than mere contempt for the law, say economists and criminologists. Retiree crime is rising more quickly than the general demographic ascent into old age that will put 40 per cent of the Japanese population over 65 by the year 2060.

So as the prison system absorbs more people, the government’s budget will have to increase to accommodate this, thus furthering the vicious cycle of bigger debts and the destruction of the yen.

And more affirmation of how inflationism will lead to the destruction of society, from JMKeynes

Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose. 

Updated to add: Sorry for the small font.

Quote of the Day: Europe is Drowning Under the Cost of Welfare Bills

A debt crisis in Europe seems inevitable. Reason? Exploding costs of welfare politics.

Telegraph's Matthew Lynn explains:

Europe’s welfare spending is out of control, and is on a scale that is both lavish and unaffordable compared with the rest of the world. There is a problem, however. Neither she, nor any other political leader in Europe, has the will to do anything about it.

Eurostat, the statistical agency of the European Union, has this week published updated figures on the total welfare bill across Europe. It is rising, and in some countries is getting up to a quarter of national output. Meanwhile, the percentage of spending on stuff like infrastructure or education, which increase an economy’s potential output, is falling.

So long as that is true, it is very hard to see anything other than a bleak future for any of Europe’s economies.

If you dip into the blogs, there is a mildly entertaining debate about whether Merkel’s often-quoted figures are correct. On close inspection, it turns out that nations that make up the EU currently account for 7.2pc of the world’s population and a shade over a quarter of total output. When the World Bank crunched the numbers on social spending, however, it found that in fact Europe accounts for a massive 58pc of global welfare spending.

What is certainly true is that Europe’s welfare budget has turned into a juggernaut that is careering out of control. On the World Bank data, the United States accounts for 18.8pc of global welfare spending, as you might expect from the world’s biggest economy. But Germany, around a third of its size, currently spends 12.5pc of the global total. France, a smaller country still, accounts for 9.9pc. The UK racks up close on 7pc. Contrast that with some far bigger, and faster- growing, countries. China, with 20 times our population, accounts for 2.4pc of the total. Russia accounts for 2pc and India just 0.6pc.

According to Eurostat, the total cost of welfare across the EU now amounts to 19.5pc of total GDP, compared with 17.5pc as recently as 2006. If you restrict that to the eurozone countries, the total rises to 20.5pc. In Denmark and France it is now close on 25pc.

For all that the Left complains about austerity in this country, our total spending on social protection is only slightly below the European average at 16.5pc of GDP. In controversial areas such as disability benefits, where the Government has now abandoned some modest cuts, we are in line with the EU average, spending 2.8pc of GDP. (Our welfare bill is only less than average because a fantastic performance on job creation means we spend just 0.2pc of GDP on unemployment, compared with a eurozone average of 1.8pc, and 2pc in a country such as France).

Overall, in almost every country, it is going up. With ageing populations, that is hardly likely to decrease – poverty-stricken Greece is now spending 15pc of GDP on pensions, and Italy 14pc. Europe is literally drowning under the cost of its welfare bills.

Quote of the Day: This Time is Different: Sovereign Debt Crisis will Wipe Out Pensions

Why is this Sovereign Debt Crisis collapse different from 1931? When the governments of the world defaulted on their debts in 1931, there were no pension funds. Government has exempted itself from all prudent reason for you take the state operated pension funds, like Social Security in the USA, where 100% of the money is in government bonds. They may have no intention of defaulting, but very few government have ever paid off their debts in the end. 

Then there are states who regulate pension funds requiring more than 80% to be in government bonds. A Sovereign Debt Default this time around will wipe out socialism, yet the bulk of the people are clueless not merely about the risk, but the ramifications. Younger generations do not save to support their parents for that was government’s job post-Great Depression. Socialism has altered thousands of years of family structure following the ranting of Karl Marx. This has been one giant lab experiment that ended badly in China and Russia and is coming to a local government near you. 

So this time it is SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT. Government is now on the hook, which is part of the reason why they are moving to eliminate cash to prevent bank runs and to force society to comply with their demands. This is why we have people like Gordon Brown, who sold Britain’s gold reserves in 1999 making the low, claiming now that eliminating cash will eliminate the boom and bust of the business cycle. Let’s face it, Gordon Brown has NEVER been right when it comes to politics, not even once, and he has been the worst manager of finance that Britain has ever known. He sold the low in gold and now he presumes he can fulfill Marxism by eliminating cash. He postulates ideas that are theory without any support whatsoever. We cannot afford more arrogant people like this in politics who believe they have a right to experiment with society. 

This time it is very different. They have wiped out society placing the entire scheme of socialism as a terrible nightmare that will end badly, and they have ruined the social family structure disarming people that for thousands of years was our very means of self-sufficient survival. These clown have set the tone for wiping out the dreams they sold the elderly, all while hunting taxes and causing job creation to implode as the youth has been converted into the lost generation. All this with pretend good intentions. Can you imagine the damage to society if they had actually intended this mess? They have lied to themselves and to the people. We have to crash and burn – that part is inevitable. Only when the economy turns down will we then argue over solutions.

(italics mine)

This is from economist Martin Armstrong from his website.

Related to  this, for all the economic 'boom' projected by record stocks, the Bloomberg recently reported that 32 out of 50 or 64% of US states have been faced with budget gaps and thus have been making cuts, tapping reserves or face higher budget shortfalls. And the same report says that state governments have only about half of reserves compared to the pre recession era.

And due to pension concerns Moody's recently downgraded Chicago. 

Puerto Rico which is categorized as Unincorporated territory of the US has  currently been enduring a debt crisis, that has put to risk social services provided by socialism.

Data on US State fiscal and debt conditions can be found here.

Additionally the pension warning doesn't just apply to the US but to many other developed economies as well (OECD data as % of GDP  here).

Crashing Oil Prices: OPEC Deadlock, Shale Bubble, Global Liquidity and Philippine OFWs

I recently pointed out that October brought upon us the reality of real time crashes—a dynamic we have not seen since 2008.

In spite of the ECB-PBOC-BOJ fueled stock market boom, crashes seem to be still haunting global markets

From Reuters:

Saudi Arabia blocked calls on Thursday from poorer members of the OPEC oil exporter group for production cuts to arrest a slide in global prices, sending benchmark crude plunging to a fresh four-year low.

Brent oil fell more than $6 to $71.25 a barrel after OPEC ministers meeting in Vienna left the group's output ceiling unchanged despite huge global oversupply, marking a major shift away from its long-standing policy of defending prices.

This outcome set the stage for a battle for market share between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, as a boom in U.S. shale oil production and weaker economic growth in China and Europe have already sent crude prices down by about a third since June.

The sustained crash in oil prices (WTI left, Brent right) has just been amazing

On the one hand, we see record stocks in developed economies backed by record debt. On the other hand, we see crashing commodities led by oil prices. So the world has been in a stark divergence in terms of market actions. 

Prior to the US prompted global crisis of 2008, divergence in the US housing and stocks heralded the (2008) crash.  US housing began to decline in 2006 as stock markets soared to record highs. When the periphery (housing) hit the core (banking and financial system), the entire floor caved in.

Today’s phenomenon (crashing commodities as well as crashing Macau stocks and earnings) runs parallel to the 2008 crash, except that this comes in a global dimension.

Bulls rationalize that lower oil price benefit consumption. This is true. Theoretically. But what they didn’t explain is why oil prices have collapsed and now nears the 2008 levels. Has this been because of slowing demand (which ironically means diminishing consumption)? If so why the decline in consumption (which contradicts the premise)? 

Or has this been because of excessive supply? Or a combination of both? Or has a meltdown in oil prices been a symptom of something else--deflating bubbles?

Yet how will consumption be boosted? Is consumption all about oil?

If economies like Japan-Eurozone and China have been floundering because of too much debt or have been hobbled by balance sheet problems that necessitates for central bank interventions, how will low oil prices improve demand? Well my impression is that low oil prices may alleviate only the consumer’s position, but this won’t justify a consumption based boom. 

Again the problem seems to be why prices are at current levels?

From the production side, what collapsing oil prices means is that oil producing emerging markets will likely get hit hard…

The above indicates nations dependent on oil revenues.

Oil production share of GDP won’t be much a concern if not for the role of domestic political spending (welfare state) which oil revenues finance…

At current levels, almost every fiscal position (welfare state) of oil producing nations will be in the red.

This simply means several interrelated variables, namely, economies of these oil producing nations will see a sharp economic slowdown, the ensuing economic downturn will bring to the limelight public and private debt problems thereby magnifying credit risks (domestic and international), a downshift in the economy would mean growing fiscal deficits that will be reflected on their respective currencies where the former will be financed and the latter defended by the draining of foreign exchange reserves or from external borrowing and importantly prolonged low oil prices and expanded fiscal deficits would eventually extrapolate to increased incidences of Arab Springs or political turmoil.

But the implications extend overseas.

I have pointed out in the past that any attempt to use oil prices as ‘weapon’ (predatory pricing) to weed out market based competitors, particularly Shale oil, will fail over long term

But over the interim, collapsing oil prices will have nasty consequences for the US energy sector, particularly the downscaling, reduction or cancellation of existing projects and most importantly growing credit risks from the industry's overleveraging.

The Shale industry has been a part of the US Fed inflated bubble.

Notes the CNBC: (bold mine)

Employment in the oil and gas sector has grown more than 72 percent to 212,200 in the last decade as technology such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have made it possible to reach fossil fuels that were previously too expensive to extract. In order to fund the rapid growth, exploration and production companies have borrowed heavily. The energy sector accounts for 17.4 percent of the high-yield bond market, up from 12 percent in 2002, according to Citi Research.

Falling oil prices will increase credit risks of US energy producers, from the Telegraph

Based on recent stress tests of subprime borrowers in the energy sector in the US produced by Deutsche Bank, should the price of US crude fall by a further 20pc to $60 per barrel, it could result in up to a 30pc default rate among B and CCC rated high-yield US borrowers in the industry. West Texas Intermediate crude is currently trading at multi-year lows of around $75 per barrel, down from $107 per barrel in June.

Collapsing oil prices will thus prick on the current Shale oil bubble.

But the basic difference between oil producing welfare states and debt financed market based Shale oil producers have been in the political baggage that the former carries. 

The current bubbles seen in the energy sector implies that inefficient producers today will simply be replaced by more efficient producers overtime. The industry will experience a painful market clearing adjustment process but Shale energy won’t go away.

The damage will be magnified in terms of political dimensions of welfare states of oil producing nations.

And as previously noted, the non-cooperation or perceived persecution of rival oil producing nations will have geopolitical consequences. There may be attempts by rogue groups financed by rival nations to disrupt or sabotage production lines in order to forcibly reduce supplies. This will only heighten geopolitical risks.

In addition, since forex reserves of producing nations will be used to finance domestic welfare state and defend the currency, such will reduce liquidity in the system

As the Zero Hedge duly notes: (bold italics original)

As Reuters reports, for the first time in almost two decades, energy-exporting countries are set to pull their "petrodollars" out of world markets this year, citing a study by BNP Paribas (more details below). Basically, the Petrodollar, long serving as the US leverage to encourage and facilitate USD recycling, and a steady reinvestment in US-denominated assets by the Oil exporting nations, and thus a means to steadily increase the nominal price of all USD-priced assets, just drove itself into irrelevance.

A consequence of this year's dramatic drop in oil prices, the shift is likely to cause global market liquidity to fall, the study showed.

This decline follows years of windfalls for oil exporters such as Russia, Angola, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. Much of that money found its way into financial markets, helping to boost asset prices and keep the cost of borrowing down, through so-called petrodollar recycling.

But no more: "this year the oil producers will effectively import capital amounting to $7.6 billion. By comparison, they exported $60 billion in 2013 and $248 billion in 2012, according to the following graphic based on BNP Paribas calculations."

In short, the Petrodollar may not have died per se, at least not yet since the USD is still holding on to the reserve currency title if only for just a little longer, but it has managed to price itself into irrelevance, which from a USD-recycling standpoint, is essentially the same thing.

According to BNP, Petrodollar recycling peaked at $511 billion in 2006, or just about the time crude prices were preparing to go to $200, per Goldman Sachs. It is also the time when capital markets hit all time highs, only without the artificial crutches of every single central bank propping up the S&P ponzi house of cards on a daily basis. What happened after is known to all...

"At its peak, about $500 billion a year was being recycled back into financial markets. This will be the first year in a long time that energy exporters will be sucking capital out," said David Spegel, global head of emerging market sovereign and corporate Research at BNP.

Spegel acknowledged that the net withdrawal was small. But he added: "What is interesting is they are draining rather than providing capital that is moving global liquidity. If oil prices fall further in coming years, energy producers will need more capital even if just to repay bonds."

In other words, oil exporters are now pulling liquidity out of financial markets rather than putting money in. That could result in higher borrowing costs for governments, companies, and ultimately, consumers as money becomes scarcer.

It’s interesting to note how some major oil producers have seen some major selling pressures in their stock markets…

Kuwait Stock Exchange

Saudi Arabia’s Tadawul

Oman’s MSM

Nigerian stock Exchange

The pressures have likewise been reflected on their currencies: USD-Kuwait Dinar, USD-Saudi Riyal and Nigeria’s Naira.

For the populist Philippine G-R-O-W-T-H story, if the Middle East runs into economic and financial trouble or if the collapse in oil prices triggers the region’s bubble to deflate, then how will this translate into OFW “remittance” growth? The largest deployment of OFWs  has been in the Middle East. Or is it that OFWs are immune to the region’s woes?

Interesting.

Has the French Atlas Shrugged Moment Arrived?

In the dystopian classic one of the world’s best selling novel, Atlas Shrugged, written by the great philosopher, novelist and free market champion Ayn Rand, deepening government intervention in a society has led the wealthiest to refuse paying soaring taxes and to reject government regulations by shutting down vital industries and the economy.

It seems that we are witnessing a real time “Atlas Shrugged” moment in France such that even establishment media seem to acknowledge the gravely flawed political economic model.

The Newsweek recently published an article by Janine di Giovanni depicting the Atlas Shrugged moment entitled "The Fall of France".

Some excerpts (hat tip Cato’s Dan Mitchell)

Since the arrival of Socialist President François Hollande in 2012, income tax and social security contributions in France have skyrocketed. The top tax rate is 75 percent, and a great many pay in excess of 70 percent.

As a result, there has been a frantic bolt for the border by the very people who create economic growth – business leaders, innovators, creative thinkers, and top executives. They are all leaving France to develop their talents elsewhere…

This angry outburst came from a lawyer friend who is leaving France to move to Britain to escape the 70 percent tax he pays. He says he is working like a dog for nothing – to hand out money to the profligate state. The man he was pointing to, in a swanky Japanese restaurant in the Sixth Arrondissement, is Pierre Moscovici, the much-loathed minister of finance. Moscovici was looking very happy with himself. Does he realize Rome is burning?…

The curse of the welfare state…

But the past two years have seen a steady, noticeable decline in France. There is a grayness that the heavy hand of socialism casts. It is increasingly difficult to start a small business when you cannot fire useless employees and hire fresh new talent. Like the Huguenots, young graduates see no future and plan their escape to London.

The official unemployment figure is more than 3 million; unofficially it’s more like 5 million. The cost of everyday living is astronomical. Paris now beats London as one of the world’s most expensive cities. A half liter of milk in Paris, for instance, costs nearly $4 – the price of a gallon in an American store…

Part of this is the fault of the suffocating nanny state. Ten years ago this week, I left my home in London for a new life in Paris. Having married a Frenchman and expecting our child, I was happily trading in my flat in Notting Hill for one on the Luxembourg Gardens.

At that time, prices were such that I could trade a gritty but charming single-girl London flat for a broken-down family apartment in the center of Paris. Then prices began to steadily climb. With the end of the reign of Gaullist (conservative) Nicolas Sarkozy (the French hated his flashy bling-bling approach) the French ushered in the rotund, staid Hollande.

Almost immediately, taxes began to rise…

Productive citizens flee as the Santa Claus fund goes dry…

When I began to look around, I saw people taking wild advantage of the system. I had friends who belonged to trade unions, which allowed them to take entire summers off and collect 55 percent unemployment pay. From the time he was an able-bodied 30-year-old, a cameraman friend worked five months a year and spent the remaining seven months collecting state subsidies from the comfort of his house in the south of France.

Another banker friend spent her three-month paid maternity leave sailing around Guadeloupe – as it is part of France, she continued to receive all the benefits.

Yet another banker friend got fired, then took off nearly three years to find a new job, because the state was paying her so long as she had no job. “Why not? I deserve it,” she said when I questioned her. “I paid my benefits into the system.” Hers is an attitude widely shared.

When you retire, you are well cared for. There are 36 special retirement regimes – which means, for example, a female hospital worker or a train driver can retire earlier than those in the private sector because of their “harsh working conditions,” even though they can never be fired.

But all this handing out of money left the state bankrupt…

The most brilliant minds of France are escaping to London, Brussels, and New York rather than stultify at home. Walk down a street in South Kensington – the new Sixth Arrondissement of London – and try not to hear French spoken. The French lycee there has a long waiting list for French children whose families have emigrated.

Read the rest here

So no matter how mainstream media portrays improving statistics or rising financial markets as signs of recovery, in the real world, for as long as the government wages war on her productive citizens, real economic recovery will hardly materialize.

And considering France’s ballooning debt (measured by debt to GDP which stands at 90% as of 2012), soaring yields of French bonds (10 year as shown in the chart above from Bloomberg), which extrapolates to higher cost of servicing debt amidst economic stagnation, will equally make the highly levered French economy vulnerable.

Importantly, given the global dynamic of rising bond yields, France may serve as another potential trigger for a Black Swan event in 2014.