How could they? How could policymakers have allowed so much debt to be created in the first place, and then failed to regulate their own system accordingly? How could they have thought that money printing and debt creation could create wealth instead of just more and more debt? How could fiscal authorities have stood by and attempted to balance budgets as opposed to borrowing cheaply and investing the proceeds in infrastructure and innovation? It has been a nursery rhyme experience for sure, but more than likely without a fairytale ending. William H. Gross, How Could They? Janus Capital December 2014
In this issue
Phisix: Tremors Rock Philippine Casino Stocks, Malaysian Financial Markets
-Stock Market Drivers: Liquidity, Credit and Confidence
-Examples of Liquidity, Credit and Confidence: China, Japan, Europe and US
-US Treasury Arm Warns on Financial Instability, BOJ-ECB Internal Split Deepens, Moody’s Downgrade JGBs
-Malaysian Ringgit Crashed; Malaysian Stocks Smashed!
-Cracks in the Philippine Casino Bubble: Philippine Casino Stocks Crushed!
Phisix: Tremors Rock Philippine Casino Stocks, Malaysian Financial Markets
Stock Market Drivers: Liquidity, Credit and Confidence
Has economic or earnings growth really been driving stocks?
Establishment institutions amplified by media have imprinted on public consciousness of such relationship, without having to prove its casual connections except to assume its existence.
Everybody says it, so it must be true. And like religion, anyone who defies such deeply held beliefs would be treated as blasphemer. For the consensus reality must be abandoned for the sake of convenience.
First of all there won’t be massive mispricing of the stock market if growth indeed mattered. The basic reason for overvaluations has been that stock markets returns have vastly outpaced corporate earnings and economic growth, the result of which have been multiple expansions. This is elementary. Yet the establishment persist to regale the unwitting and hapless public with the ‘G-R-O-W-T-H’ regardless. Yet the establishment does not reveal to the public their interests in promoting these.
This leads us to the subsequent factor: the WHY. The reason behind multiple expansions have been because momentum. Momentum signifies the piling up of money on winning trends. They are products of the assumption of trend continuity (linear thinking) and of the survivorship bias—a cognitive error which focuses on the winners at the exclusion of non-winners or even risks.
Dismissing the risks from piggybacking on momentum has not escaped even the Philippine central bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas chief Amando Tetangco Jr., who recently warned: So in a period of low volatility such as what we have been experiencing, practice the discipline of setting limits. This discipline will not only help you to avoid the pitfalls of “chasing the market”.[1] In a follow-up speech he admonished that yield chasing has been a stock market and real estate phenomenon.
For the Philippines, there has been third factor: manipulation of the index. Entities benefiting from today’s risk appetite has been goading the public to “chase the market” via manipulation of the stock market index.
The massaging of the index via the “afternoon delight” pump and marking the close has become so evident if not a regular dynamic. Apparently because it works to the benefit of the consensus, such haven’t been an issue. Regulations[2] yield to convenience. It’s when the honeymoon ebbs or when the tide turns where finger pointing will emerge.
Yet stealth massaging of the index is a sign of overtrading or “chasing the markets”
Lastly it doesn’t take math models to disprove the populist wisdom G-R-O-W-T-H EQUALS a STOCK Market Boom. All it takes is for a keen sense of observation of real events.
In the last global crisis (2007-2008), the Phisix suffered severe losses from a contagion that basically disregarded fundamentals. The Philippine benchmark lost 54% (peak to trough) even when the rate of corporate earnings growth (then at a record) declined by only a margin. Said differently, earnings growth decelerated as the Philippine statistical economy eluded recession.
I wrote then[3]: The Phisix did not suffer a recession or a crisis, yet the local stock market endured MORE losses compared to the epicentre or the source of the crisis—the US markets. In short, there has been no meaningful correlation or even an established causation nexus between corporate profits and the economy relative to the stock market under the local setting.
The Phisix even lost as much as the US S&P 500 even when there was hardly any fundamental impairment except on the export sector. So despite the rout, it was easy to be bullish on the Phisix.
Yet during those days what mattered: the shriveling of global liquidity or domestic economic or earnings growth? Apparently history lost its relevance. Why? Because this time is different?
Examples of Liquidity, Credit and Confidence: China, Japan, Europe and US
Statistical economic growth data measures the formal economy. Therefore, a slowdown on statistical GDP should generally translate to a decline in earnings of publicly listed corporations.
More examples.
As of 3Q, Japan entered a ‘technical’ recession. Yet the Nikkei has been 10% up year to-date, has amazingly soared by 23% from the mid-October lows and as of Friday has been at 7 year highs. From the mid-October lows the Japanese yen has collapsed by 13.04% vis-Ã -vis the US dollar. Why? Because the Japanese government has been inflating or flooding liquidity into the system. The Japanese government via the Bank of Japan (BoJ) expanded her program to purchase government bonds (JGB) to 80 trillion yen, the stock market via exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITs) worth 3 trillion yen (tripled compared with the past) and about 90 billion yen (tripled compared with the past), respectively[4].
Playing the role of ‘greater fool’, as of the last 3 trading days, the BoJ bought 37.4 billion yen ($309 million) in exchange-traded funds, according to Nikkei Asia[5]. This should add to the “roughly 7.2 trillion yen in stocks and ETFs at the end of September, fast approaching the 7.5 trillion yen held by Nippon Life Insurance. The BOJ is expected to become the second-largest holder of Japanese stocks, after the Government Pension Investment Fund. A public pension fund and the central bank will thus be corporate Japan's top two shareholders.” (bold added)
As you can see, none of the above has been about growth. Rather all of the above has been about the BoJ’s massive redistribution of resources via money printing to reward owners of bonds, real estate and equities, as well as, speculators at the expense of the average citizenry.
All these, like its antecedent in April 2013 have been anchored on, or peddled by the establishment on HOPE. And given that the Japanese government “will become the second-largest holder of Japanese stocks” implies two things; first, stock markets will become even more politicized thereby eroding its function as discounting mechanism, and second, market risks will now become a burden of taxpayers, pension beneficiaries and currency holders.
How about China?
The drastically slowing highly levered Chinese real (and not statistical) economy has compelled the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) to do a series of easing measures. As I recently pointed out the Chinese government has launched “targeted easing” last June, has resorted to selective bailouts of firms which almost defaulted last July, imposed price controls on stock market IPOs last August, injected $125 billion over the last two months.
The much ballyhooed China-Hong Kong connect also went onstream November 17 where the Chinese government also liberalized fund flows on IPOs conducted overseas to ensure money overseas can be repatriated with ease.
The Chinese government via the PBoC has also refrained from sterilizing funds injected to system.
I have also pointed out that the Chinese government has been manipulating the stock market via the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) by dictating on the prices of companies offering shares to the public. Since there have been signs of ballooning credit strains in the system, IPOs has become a fashionable route to raise alternative source of funding. The IPOs have essentially been set by the government at lower prices than market prices, thereby fueling outsized demand where the public deems this as “sure profit source”.
The Nikkei Asia affirmed this interventionist route last week which they say “has been fueling an overheating of IPO stocks”.
In addition, the frenzied demand for IPOs has been reached nearly 5 year highs, that’s only for IPOs issued between Nov. 24-28 which totaled about 1.43 trillion yuan ($232 billion). And because of soaring demand for credit to speculate on IPOs the PBoC has injected 50 billion yuan into the system last November 21[6]. The PBoC also refused to conduct open market operations which means that the Chinese central bank continues to feed to the huge demand for credit used to speculate on IPOs.
While IPOs has functioned as the trigger, credit has fueled a Viagra like 90 degree skyrocketing of the Chinese stock market, as seen via the Shanghai Composite index.
The Shanghai Composite has been up by a staggering 38% year to date, a 3 year high, up a stunning 46% from the lows of March which has only been marginally different from the June lows. It’s been a vertical climb for the SSEC!
Retail investors have been stampeding to open stock market accounts “at the fastest pace in three years, official data shows”[7]. Such dash for easy money gains has prompted Chinese punters to acquire a stunning RECORD margin debt. From Bloomberg[8]: Investors bought 99.7 billion yuan ($16 billion) of shares using margin debt on the Shanghai Stock Exchange yesterday, taking the outstanding value of share purchases through borrowed money to a record 552.1 billion yuan, according to data from the bourse (bold mine)
Gee. It took quite some years for US stock punters to bring margin debt into record levels while it took only a few months for Chinese peers to do the same!
And as daily trading turnover to above 1 trillion yuan ($163 billion), paradoxically Chinese authorities warns of irrationality and market risks. From another Bloomberg account[9], “Illegal activities including stock manipulation have recently been “raising their head” and investors should invest rationally, Deng Ge, a spokesman for the China Securities Regulatory Commission, said in a statement on the agency’s website. A stable market is important for the economy, Ge said…I hope investors, especially small and medium investors that are new to the market, invest rationally, respect the market, fear the market and bear in mind the risks present in the stock market,” Ge said.
Huh? Juice up the stock markets by distorting IPO prices, and feed them with credit—then cry foul?!! Blame markets instead of policies that have driven the market’s incentive to ramp up on a speculative orgy?
And as for market manipulation, historian Charles Kindleberger reminds us[10]: The propensities to swindle and be swindled run parallel to speculate during a boom.
Said differently when people become greedy, greed make them vulnerable to unscrupulous activities hatched by entities who recognize of such opportunities. In short, greed engenders fraud.
Yet it’s been a sad plight for the average Chinese, which the Wall Street Journal describes as being caught in chasing one bubble after another[11]: Chinese investors have long chased the best-performing assets. They dumped stocks to buy into a property boom before the global financial crisis, and when the housing market cooled about two years ago, they piled into high-yield but risky bank loans packaged as wealth-management and trust products…
The Chinese government’s financial repression policies have only been diverting precious Chinese savings into needless speculation that consumes their capital—all for the sake of short term political objectives.
And as I have repeatedly been pointing out here, China’s approach to solve her debt problem has been to offer even MORE debt. Such appears as a validation of my theory of the politics of monetary easing policies: I recognize the problem of addiction but a withdrawal syndrome would even be more cataclysmic.
And as Janus fund manager Bill Gross points out above: how can debt problems be solved with even more debt?
To sum it up, since 2008, stocks have NOWHERE been about G-R-O-W-T-H, but about LIQUIDITY and CREDIT from which CONFIDENCE or MOMENTUM has been a product of. Expand liquidity and or credit, then financial assets (stocks, real estate, bonds etc…) booms, regardless of the direction of the economy.
Hounded by negative real rates via zero bound (financial repression), the public response to such policies have been to chase on yields even when they have been pillared from gross misperceptions.
Yet take away credit and liquidity, the illusion of CONFIDENCE and MOMENTUM evaporates.
The same factors can be seen in Thailand whose economy has been walking a tightrope between stagnation and recession but whose stocks, via the SET, like the Philippines (whose chart also has been replica of the Phisix) have been approaching milestone highs. The SET has been up 23% y-t-d as of Friday.
The US has been no different, stocks rising to record after record on inflationary record credit boom that has been backed financial engineering record buybacks, M&As and LBOs even as the economy has been spruced up by mostly government spending in 3Q.
Yet as of the 3Q, according to the Financial Times[12] companies spent roughly $238bn on dividends and buybacks, with the latter making up nearly 63 per cent of the total. The preliminary figure ranks second only to the first quarter of 2014, when company expenditures on the two reached $241.2bn.
But media just love the headlines, they simply ignore that the latest 2012 high US job growth has been more about consumption side of the economy rather than the productive side, e.g. Professional Services excluding temp help: +63K, of which administative assistants +12K, bookkeepers +16.4K; Retail Trade: +50K; Leisure and Hospitality: +38K, of which waiters and bartenders +26.5K; Manufacturing: +28K; Temp Help: +22.7K[13].
Yet it’s a wonder how the oil and energy industry (also the material industry) will respond to still collapsing prices or how they will affect economic activities. So far, new oil and energy permits have plummeted 40% (!), and so with Shale permits down 15% for across all major oil formations last month. Shale oil at the Bakken oil field at North Dakota has seen prices even plunge to $49.69 last November 28 (!), according to a Bloomberg report. That’s way (24%) below the $65.63 WTIC oil quoted last Friday. Yet from 2007-2012, about 16% of job growth came from the oil gas industry which outperformed the other sectors, according to the EIA[14]. If the oil industry retrenches this will impact jobs as well as other sectors attached to them.
Also the consensus seems to ignore that credit expansion not only affects asset prices, but how they inflate profits, earnings, income and taxes.
In short, an inflationary boom has widespread repercussions.
As for a credit driven stock market boom, the Austrian economist Fritz Machlup taking on the lens of the 1929 stock market warned[15], (bold mine)
If it were not for the elasticity of bank credit, which has often been regarded as such a good thing, a boom in security values could not last for any length of time.In the absence of inflationary credit the funds available for lending to the public for security purchases would soon be exhausted, since even a large supply is ultimately limited. The supply of funds derived solely from current new savings and amortization current amortization allowances is fairly inelastic, and optimism about the development of security prices, inelastic would promptly lead to a "tightening" on the credit market, and the cessation of speculation "for the rise." There would thus be no chains of speculative transactions and the limited amount of credit available would pass into production without delay.
US Treasury Arm Warns on Financial Instability, BOJ-ECB Internal Split Deepens, Moody’s Downgrade JGBs
As the consensus remains mesmerized by booming stocks, there hardly goes a week where political entities elevate mentioning risks from current conditions.
For the consensus, ignoring risks prolongs the honeymoon. It’s unfortunate to say that this signifies denial. Denial of reality is hardly helpful for investing.
Well the new research arm of the US Treasury department, The Office of Financial Research, a creation of 2010 Dodd-Frank law, warned that the US financial system “growing more vulnerable to debilitating shocks”[16]. They cited “new regulations make lending cash and securities more expensive” as well as ballooning debt from low interest rates, specifically “rapid expansion in corporate credit” that is being extended, increasingly, by nonbank entities that remain outside the reach of regulators. The outfit has been worried of a “sudden rise in interest rates” that may affect the credit markets “as the Fed inches closer to ending a prolonged period of low rates”
As I will keep repeating here, it doesn’t take interest rate to rise for debt to become problematic. It only takes the inability to service even the principal, or just plain loss of confidence; to borrow from historian Mr. Kindleberger, a causa proxima—some incident that snaps the confidence of the system[17].
The Polish central bank likewise warned of “growing imbalances” in her commercial property market where despite increasing vacancy rates and where “supply outstrips demand” developers continue to add new projects[18]. Ironically Polish central bank recently cut rates either to ignite debt based demand or to lower the cost of servicing debt. So the Polish central bank misreads the symptoms for the disease.
My hunch is that Polish developers and financiers might have entered into a “debt trap”. Developers need to keep building, while financers need to keep the greasing the debt cog, otherwise the gravity of debt problems surfaces. It’s part of Minsky’s Ponzi finance scheme that anchors on the deepening reliance on the recycling of debt to finance operations and on dependence on asset sales as compliment.
In short, the Polish central could be buying time and hoping for a deus ex machina rescue to her domestic bubbles.
The more interesting part has been Moody’s downgrade of Japan’s debt over “uncertainties whether Japan will achieve its deficit-reduction goals and succeed in boosting growth” further noting that “increasing risks of a rise in bond yields that could make it harder for Japan to manage its debt”[19].
Media says that this represents the first downgrade for Japan by one of the top-three ratings companies since Abe came to power in December 2012.
But it looks as if Moody’s has been depending on a second increase in the Japan’s sales tax for them to make this call. Raising taxes doesn’t necessary entail higher revenues. Raising taxes only compound on the burdens of Japan’s already heavily strained debt suffocated economy.
Moody’s seem clueless to how the BoJ’s policies have been destabilizing the economy. The collapsing yen has prompted bankruptcies to hit a record high last November straining both small and medium sized companies, according to the Japan Times[20]. To add even exporters have raised concerns over the yen’s torrid decline citing, ‘will push up prices of imported goods and materials, hitting households already struggling with a decline in buying power caused by the inflation-stoking policies of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’[21].
If many more companies continue to fold, there won’t be anyone (companies and consumers) to tax. So where the heck will the spendthrift government gets its revenues, except to keep borrowing from mostly the Bank of Japan (BoJ)?
Yet an even more interesting development has been signs of growing dissension WITHIN the ranks of the Bank of Japan.
Former BoJ officials have reportedly broken out of the “general silence” to sound off alarm bells over Kuroda’s recent policies. An official analogized Kuroda’s policies “like a car driving down the highway without brakes…And that car has just been needlessly filled up with extra gas”. Former BoJ chief economist Hideo Hayakawa says Kuroda’s policies are heading in a “precarious direction”[22].
The Wall Street Journal reports that dissension within the ranks of BOJ, “bank is not limited to the four board members”
And one of the board members, Takehiro Sato who recently voted against Kuroda trenchantly stated in public that “Prices reflect the temperature of the economy, not a variable that can be directly controlled by a central bank” and recommended that to boost economy required “structural overhaul of various economic entities”. Contra Kuroda, Sato san sees the weakening yen a “risk” and “headwind”[23].
Moody has been first to take action and will not be the last. My guess is that credit-rating agencies will be on a rush to downgrade Japan’s debt very soon.
Well as a sign of parallel universe, ironically Moody’s downgrade has even sent Japanese stocks flying!
Discord among policymakers has not just been a BOJ affair. The European Central Bank (ECB) appears to be suffering from the same affliction.
The ECB appears to have dilly-dallied on implementing a US version of QE last week[24]. The ECB sent out ambiguous communications like “wait until next quarter before assessing if additional stimulus measures are needed” which sent stocks reeling. In a few hours, the ECB reported more specific targets particularly in January where the central bank would consider “a package of broad-based asset purchases including sovereign debt”.
ECB President Super Mario Draghi followed this up stating that since policy makers “won’t tolerate” a prolonged period of low inflation, officials discussed buying “all assets but gold”.
It turns out the reason for the initial dawdling may have been due to a broadening internal ECB rift. German media published that Super Mario has ‘lost majority of the Executive Board’.
The ECB chief in no time countered in a press release that “he would not allow opposition from Germany or anyone else to stop it”. The Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann in a quid pro quo rebutted to warn against copying the money printing used in the United States and Japan[25]
Mr Wedsmann was joined by fellow German ECB policymaker Sabin Lautenschlaeger in opposing Super Mario
Meanwhile the European Court of Justice has also been slated to deliver a non-binding ruling on Jan. 14 about the legality of the ECB’s OMT program.
The bottom line there is no free lunch for money printing. Natural barriers will emerge to eventually prevent debt overload or from a full-scale destruction of the monetary system. So risks have been mounting fast even if European stocks are at 7 year highs.
The higher stocks are, the greater the risks.
Malaysian Ringgit Crashed; Malaysian Stocks Smashed!
Things are really getting to be interesting.
For one, booming stocks in major markets have hardly been shared by the rest of the world.
Second, global markets appear to exhibit developing signs of extreme divergences. While developed economy stocks have been on a melt-UP mode, commodity-casino related stocks have been melting DOWN.
What seem even more interesting has been milestone highs of the US dollar against some Asian currencies.
The US dollar-Indonesian rupiah (USD-IDR) just surpassed 2009 levels (12,275) and seems fast approaching 12,600! [left window]
But contrary to 2008-9 where Indonesian stocks (JCI) had been at the bottom from a selling frenzy, Indonesia’s JCI have now been drifting at fresh record highs.
The rupiah has been down by .77% this week.
It’s been vastly a different story for the Malaysian currency, the ringgit, which has been brutally pummeled this week. This week, the USD-ringgit soared 2.6% to a NEW four year high! Alternatively said, the ringgit CRASHED! [right window]
But instead of record highs as the JCI, the Malaysian stock exchange as measured by the FTSE Bursa Malaysia experienced a meltdown this week. The KLSE cratered 3.93% for the week!
The FTSE KLSE chart illustrates of a massive breakdown from portentous head and shoulder pattern.
The Malaysian index which was largely unscathed by the 2013 taper tantrum and has been the first to break to new highs among her ASEAN peers and has been down by 7.5% from the peak. Now it seems as the first to weaken.
Media blames Malaysia’s recent stock market woes on crashing oil prices and the attendant fiscal concerns from its fallout.
Malaysia’s commodity exports consist of Petroleum products with a 9.5% share of total exports, LNG 8.3%, Palm oil 6.2%, crude petroleum 4.5% and rubber products 2.3% for a total of 30.8% of total exports[26]. Manufacturing consist of most of the other non-mining non petroleum exports.
In addition, falling commodity prices have raised concerns over Malaysia’s chronic budget deficits. The Nikkei Asia reports that “Resource-related companies account for slightly more than 30% of the government's income”, which implies that falling commodity prices will translate to bigger deficits. Also in anticipation of this, the Malaysian government reportedly scrapped subsidies for gasoline and diesel[27] this December. Like the Philippines, Malaysia’s 3Q economic growth output sizeably dropped to 5.6% from 6.5% in 2Q
While falling commodity prices may have material impact on the real economy, unless Malaysia’s other industries have strong ties with them, they should hardly be reflected on Malaysia’s major benchmark because the share of oil & gas consist of only 6.7% of the KLSE basket.
The biggest weighting has been in Banks 23.85%, Telco 13.04%, Industrial 9.5%, Food & Beverage 8.12% and Travel and Leisure 7%. These 6 industries constitute 68.21% of the KLSE according to FTSE[28]. (left)
Meanwhile in terms of corporate representation, banks have also the largest share among the biggest market caps, followed by telcos and electricity travel and leisure and oil. Petronas has only a 3.48% share.
A glimpse of the charts suggests that Malaysia’s banks have hardly been in good shape. Even prior to the oil collapse Public Bank BHD the Malayan Bank and the CIMB group have been floundering since the July highs. The latter has been in a bear market.
A month ago I projected[29] that pressures on Asian currencies are likely to weigh on the region’s risk assets. Here I noted of a potential weakness of Malaysian financial assets due to her onerous debt burden, I wrote: Malaysia has a credit bubble. Malaysian overall debt comprises about 200% of her GDP with the largest share being household debt. Household debt has soared to 86% in 2013 from 80% in 2012. This should be larger today given the acceleration of loans to the private sector.
Mainstream media has even openly talked about Malaysia’s Savings Retirement Crisis referring to property bubbles and high debt burdens as taking a toll on the average Malaysians[30].
So it seems a question whether these sinking bank stocks could be a symptom of a systemic problem or just another blip. By systemic problem I am denoting of either a deflating property bubble being exacerbated by oil-commodity weakness or the other way around—crashing oil prices serving as the proverbial pin to prick on Malaysia’s property bubble.
Meanwhile gaming and hotel giant Genting Malaysia, like her regional casino peers have been struggling (but to a lesser extent relative to her contemporaries). Petronas, Malaysia’s largest oil company has been on a decline also since July.
Last week’s stock market carnage seems like a broad based phenomenon. Even telecoms and electricity companies which previously diverged from the rest got smoked. This marks a sudden shift in sentiment. And if Malaysia’s currency and stocks should continue to remain under pressure, then actions in the financial markets may eventually spillover to or reflect on the real economy.
The biggest winner this week (+.75%), aside from the Indian rupee, to defy the region’s trends has been no less than the USD Philippine peso. The peso has almost been unchanged for the year. The Philippines must either be doing something so well, or someone must be spending a huge sum of money to prevent the peso from falling.
I’d bet on the latter. Philippine Gross International Reserves (GIR) last November has fallen to its lowest level since 2012. The peso closed unchanged month on month last November.
Why the need by the BSP to defend the peso? Could it be because of the huge foreign debt exposure/s by some private entities? If so what justifies the implicit subsidies? Financial stability?
I told you, it was a very interesting week.
Cracks in the Philippine Casino Bubble: Philippine Casino Stocks Crushed!
I was under impression that the Phisix would hit 7,400 during the week as stock market operators seem to have plotted a methodical way to reach such level via sustained implementation of marking the close.
That’s because Macau’s autonomous government’s Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau reported a 19.6% slump in revenues for November, which marks the 6th successive monthly hemorrhage. The bad news reportedly has been compounded by a downgrade by certain financial institutions on Macau’s casino stocks.
The following day domestic casino stocks had been slammed.
Yet this has not been limited to Macau. Singapore’s Genting (G13.SI) has likewise been pounded and so as with Marina Bay Sands Resort as seen through stocks of operator Las Vegas Sands.
And this has not just been Malaysia, Singapore and Macau, the US Dow Jones Gambling Index has seen a wicked bear market in spite of record stocks!
Yet domestic consensus see local casino stocks as ‘this time is different’ or that these have been perceived as immune to external developments.
Well they were given a taste of bitter reality. Bloomberry [PSE: BLOOM] operator of Solaire has been drubbed by 8.6% over the week from heavy foreign selling—52% of total traded volume during the two day selloff. Melco Crown Philippines [PSE:MCP] whose City of Dreams has been reportedly slated for a soft opening this December has been equally whacked 3.87% from foreign selling which accounted for 47% of the two day carnage. Premiere Leisure Group [PSE: PLC] a partner of Melco Philippines and a part owner of Pacific Online System, operator of the software that runs the government run lottery has similarly been clobbered -8.1%.
Casino stocks and PLDT combined to bring the Phisix back again below 7,300.
The casino industry’s falling earnings and stock prices in Asia and in the US reflects on dwindling demand in the face of surging supplies.
Yet like local projects, most of these will be bankrolled by debt.
As I warned back in my original piece in April 2013[31],
The mainstream ignores the fact that these casinos will be competing with the regional counterparts for essentially the same (regional) market…
And worst, such cumulative bullishness comes in the backdrop of artificially lowered rates, which industry operators and the unwitting public presume will be everlasting.
If foreign demand (mostly the Chinese high rollers which every single Asian nation has been targeting) fails to materialize, then local casinos will be duke it out over a limited domestic market.
Unlike Macau’s casinos which have been there for awhile, local casinos will be faced with huge liabilities.
The question here is how debt will be repaid? Bloomberry according to 4-traders has Php 20.693 billion of debt. Melco Crown has 12.5 billion as of December 2013 based on Financial Times data. The next question is to whom have these monies been owed? How much to the banks and how much via bonds? Who are the bond holders? In the case of bonds, given that Philippine capital markets have been shallow, outside foreigners, bond holders are likely to be a limited number of financial institutions or elite clients of banks or financial institutions. In short, the circulation of debt instruments will be held by a concentrated group of entities or individuals.
Limited market combined with huge liabilities will serve as a lethal combination for grand projects borne out of debt financed zero bound
rates.
Has this week’s domestic casino stock market crash opened the Pandora’s Box of debt deflation?
[10] Charles Kindleberger, The Emergence of Swindles Manias, Crashes and Panics, Third Edition, p.66
[17] Kindleberger, op cit p. 92