Showing posts with label labor regulations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label labor regulations. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

ADB’s Imprudent Investments in the Philippines

From the ADB

The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Board of Directors today approved a $350-million Increasing Competitiveness for Inclusive Growth Program loan to help the Philippines improve its business climate through a mix of policy reforms and programs to promote competitiveness and develop labor skills among out-of-school youth.

“There has been marked improvement in the Philippines’ global competitiveness, but regulation, lack of domestic competition in key sectors, underinvestment in infrastructure and a mismatch of skills in the labor market are keeping the country from realizing its full potential,” said Kunio Senga, Director General of Southeast Asia Department.

To help young people better integrate into the labor market and develop workplace skills, ADB is working closely with the Department of Labor and Employment to design a youth job search program, called MyFirstJob, which will be piloted in 2013. The initial pilot will provide up to 1,600 youth with career counseling services, grants for vocational training, and internships with employers.

MyFirstJob is one of several initiatives that will be used to make the labor market more inclusive. Others include the tourism industry-led skills development program and a new tourism quality assurance and accreditation system that will improve skills and competitiveness in the tourism industry.

(bold highlights mine)

Well ADB seems to be throwing away taxpayers money on some wishful thinking measures that, in reality, treats the symptoms than the disease. These will represent taxpayers (ADB’s contributors) money down the drain, as well as more burden to Philippine taxpayers because of the spendthrift loan program.

First of all, the ADB admits that the problem has been one of "regulation and lack of domestic competition in key sectors". So the answer here is to substantially reduce regulatory and legal impediments as well as taxes and all of other barriers and costs to businesses. But ADB has been silent on the details of their proposed reforms.

Second, ADB sees another problem of “a mismatch of skills” in the domestic labor market.

Plagued by a poor investing climate, this only means that domestic markets has been heavily distorted by political interventions.

This is why many Filipinos would rather seek employment overseas and why commerce have largely been done underground or through the informal or shadow economy.

So how on earth does ADB know of a “skills mismatch”? By mere comparison with other economies?

In a free market environment or in market economies, economic systems emerge out of specialization (law of comparative advantage), so what may be advantageous for country X may not be advantageous for country Y. But specialization through the markets has not been sufficiently addressed, again out of political obstacles.

In essence, matching of skills and jobs is hardly the cause the problem but rather a symptom. Yet without a salutary marketplace, there hardly seems a way establish the domestic comparative advantage from which local labor market should cater to. ADB then seems to be presuming the possession of the right knowledge which it doesn't have.

ADB should instead address reforms based on the liberalization not only of labor markets but of the entire economy.

So what good does the MyFirstJob project do?

With the lack of investments, job searches won’t have any material impact. The answer, instead, is to CREATE JOBS through a business friendly environment. Job searches will become a natural dynamic once the business environment expands. Also, job searches can be accomplished by many private sector internet based platforms.

To add, tourism industry-led skills development program can also be handled by the private sector. Tourist enterprises would want to have employees with the right skills to meet the demand of their consumers for them to profit from.

So the demand of the industry will be reflected on supply as local citizens will conform with changes in the industry and of the economy. If the tourism industry continues to boom, so will the number of people who would want to join the sector by acquiring the skills required. And this will be most likely provided by schools or by enterprises themselves through in housing training or education outsourcing. This does NOT need the government.

However “new tourism quality assurance and accreditation system” only means more bureaucracy, red tape and regulations which ADB sees as a problem. So the ADB the loan proposes to do more of the same thing and expecting different results. Hasn't this been called insanity?

At the end of the day, the money that ADB lends money to the Philippine government accounts for as nothing more than political symbolism, wasted taxpayer resources (which means more tax burden for us) and a wonderful ($350 million) business opportunities for domestic cronies and for the pockets of political officials.

A side comment: Could this be the money used to recently pump up the local stock market?

Saturday, June 02, 2012

Austerity in Spain?

Juan Carlos Hidalgo at the Cato Institute investigates claims that Spain has been suffering from “austerity”

Writes Mr. Hidalgo, (bold emphasis mine)

There is a wide consensus that Spain’s economic troubles are the result of an enormous housing bubble—even bigger than the one that hit the U.S.—that burst in 2008. Just the year before, Spain boasted healthy fiscal indicators: a general government budget surplus of 1.9% of GDP and a gross consolidated debt of just 36.2% of GDP. However, once the bubble burst, government revenues collapsed and stimulus spending was injected into the economy, resulting in a fiscal deficit of 11.2% in 2009 and a gross debt that has increased over 30 percentage points of GDP in just 4 years.

Paul Krugman and The Economist argue that this evidence shows that, unlike Greece, Spain wasn’t fiscally profligate. However, the devil is in the details. Spain did run budget surpluses prior to the crash, but those surpluses weren’t caused by restrained government spending, but by ballooning tax revenues (thanks to a growing housing bubble). If we look at total government spending in the last decade, we can see a steady and significant rise until 2009:

image
* Using GDP deflator.
Source: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs.

Government spending in nominal terms increased at an annual rate of 7.6% from 2000 to 2009. Ryan Avent at The Economist says that “the push for austerity began in 2010,” and thus we have to look at nominal spending after that year, when according to Avent, it fell “substantially” due to austerity measures. In reality, it went down by just 1% in 2010 and a further 3.6% in 2011. If these cuts seem “substantial” to Avent, then a yearly average increase of 7.6% for almost a decade must be staggering.

Moreover, if we look at spending in real terms, using constant euros from 2000, there hasn’t been any decrease in the level of government spending.

If we look at government spending as a share of the economy, Spain appears as fiscally prudent: Spending was 39.2% of GDP in 2000 and exactly the same figure in 2007. However, as has been noted by Juan Ramón Rallo, Ángel Martín Oro and Adrià Pérez Martí of the Juan de Mariana Institute in a recent Cato study, “the data should be interpreted with caution, given that the GDP was growing at an artificially high rate.” The point is proven by the fact that when the economy came to a halt in 2008 (it grew by just 0.9%), government spending as a share of GDP leapt 2.3 percentage points to 41.5% in just one year. Government spending as a share of the economy remained constant during much of the 2000’s not because the government was spending too little but because GDP was growing too fast.

Moreover, once the crisis kicked in, government spending as a share of GDP reached a peak at 46.3% in 2009 (due to a combination of still more stimulus spending and a contracting economy). It later fell to 43% in 2011, still a higher share than in 2008. Government spending in Spain has indeed come down in the last two years, but not in a dramatic fashion as some people would have us to believe.

What about taxes? As has been the case in Britain, France, Italy and Greece, in the last two years the Spanish government increased taxes to tackle the soaring deficit: personal income tax rates went up in 2010 and two new brackets of 44% and 45% were introduced for higher incomes. Tax credits to self-employed workers were revoked. The VAT rate went up from 16% to 18% and excise duties on tobacco and gasoline were also raised. All these tax increases took place before the large tax hike introduced this year by the conservative government of Mariano Rajoy, which turned Spain into one of the highest taxed countries in Europe (and explained at length in this Economic Development Bulletin).

In short, austerity in Spain, described by Paul Krugman as “insane,” consists mostly of significant tax increases and timid spending cuts.

So Spain’s economy has been enduring economic strains hardly from spending cuts but mainly from HEFTY TAX INCREASES, rigid labor regulations and the welfare state.

On asphyxiating labor environment the Economist noted last February,

Spain’s labour laws, which date back to the Franco era, have condemned half the workforce to unemployment or to temporary jobs while the rest enjoy ironclad contracts and huge redundancy pay-offs. The new law blurs this insider/outsider divide and may thus get more people into stable employment. The decree comes on top of a January agreement by unions and employers to limit pay rises over the next three years. Mr de Guindos thinks most Spaniards see the need for labour reform. But its success in terms of growth may depend on unions’ choice between protecting jobs and keeping up their members’ pay.

The same statist FALSEHOODs have been thrown to Greece, where supposed “devaluation” from an “EU exit” would have posed as “elixir” to Greek economic woes.

Yet the ramifications from such absurd mainstream propaganda has been to SPUR a stampede out of the Greek banking system or systemic “bank run” or “capital flight” into safe havens as Germany and the US, as Greeks feared the loss of savings from forcible conversion of their euros to “drachmas”.

And the same tax hike prescriptions from statists has led Greeks to drastically avoid paying taxes.

In short, statist medicines have been blowing up right smack on their faces.

Yes, polls have it that 80% of Greeks want to stay in the Euro!!!

Statist imbeciles engage in deceptive phraseology to promote their political religion. As George Orwell once wrote,

In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible... Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness… Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them…The inflated style itself is a kind of euphemism.

The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish spurting out ink. In our age there is no such thing as ‘keeping out of politics’. All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred, and schizophrenia. When the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer.

False prophets, these statists, are.

Friday, May 25, 2012

Germany’s Competitive Advantage over Spain: Freer Labor Markets

When politics is involved, common sense is eschewed.

The vicious propaganda against “austerity” aims to paint the government as the only solution to the crisis, where the so-called “growth” can only be attained through additional government spending funded by more debt. Unfortunately, these politically confused people have forgotten that today’s crisis has been caused by the same factors which they have been prescribing: debt. In short, their answer to the problem of debt is to acquire more debt.

The same with clamors for crisis plagued nations to “exit” the Eurozone in order to devalue the currency. Inflating away standards of living, it is held, will miraculously solve the social problems caused by too much government interventionism that has led to inordinate debt loads.

Professor John Cochrane of the Chicago School nicely chaffs at statist overtures,

The supposed benefit of euro exit and swift devaluation is the belief that people will be fooled that the 10 Drachmas are not a "cut" like the 5 euros would be. Good luck with that.

Little has been given thought to what’s happening on the ground, particularly achieving genuine competitiveness by allowing entrepreneurs to prosper.

At the Mises Institute, Ms Carolina Carmenes and Professor Howden lucidly explains why Germany has been far more competitive than Spain, specifically in the labor markets .

Spain’s labor costs have been cheaper than Germany, yet the Germans get the jobs. Writes Ms. Carmenes and Prof Howden (bold emphasis added)

Spanish employment is now hovering around 23 percent, with over 50 percent of youths jobless. Only around 6 percent of Germans are without work, almost the lowest level in the country since reunification. This divide solidifies Spain's position among the worst-performing economies of the continent, and Germany's vaunted position as among the best.

Yet such a situation might seem paradoxical. One could, for example, look at the wage rates of the respective workers and find that low-cost Spaniards are much more affordable. Profit-maximizing businesses should be expanding their facilities to take advantage of the opportunity the Spanish crisis has provided and eschew higher-cost German labor.

While fixating on nominal labor costs might provide a compelling case for a bright Spanish future, delving into the details provides some darker figures.

Once again the German-Spain comparison shows of the myth of cheap labor

Little thought has also been given to the impact of minimum wage and excessive labor regulations which stifles investment and therefore adds to the pressures of unemployment

Again Ms. Carmenes and Prof Howden (bold emphasis added)

One of the main differences between Germany's and Spain's labor markets is their minimum-wage rates. A Spanish minimum-wage worker can expect to earn about €633 per month. Germany on the other hand enforces no across-the-board minimum wage except in isolated professions — construction workers, roofers, and electricians, as examples.

German employees are free to negotiate their salaries with their employers, without any price-fixing intervention by the government in the form of wage control. (This is not to imply that the German labor market is completely unhampered — jobs are cartelized by industry each with its own wage controls. While this cartelization is not perfect, it does at least recognize that a one-size-fits-all minimum-wage policy is not optimal for the whole country.)

As an example of the German approach to wages, consider the case of a construction worker. In eastern Germany this worker would make a minimum wage of around €9 per hour. His counterpart in western Germany would earn considerably more — almost €11 an hour. This difference allows for productivity differences to be priced separately or local supply-and-demand conditions to influence wages. Working for five days at eight hours a day would yield this German worker anywhere from €360 to €440.

It is obvious that the German weekly wage is almost as high as the monthly Spanish one. What is less obvious is why Germans do not move their facilities to lower-cost Spain.

As the old saying goes, "the more expensive you are to fire, the more expensive you are to hire." If a Spanish company decides to lay off an employee, the severance payment for most labor contracts (a finiquito in Spanish) will amount to 32 days for each year the employee has worked with the company. Although this process is not simple in Germany either, there is no legal severance requirement that companies must pay to redundant workers. The sole requirement is for ample notice to be given, sometimes up to six months in advance. If a Spanish company hires a worker who does not work out as intended, a substantial cost will be incurred in the future to offload the employee. Employers know this, and when hiring workers they exercise caution accordingly, lest this unfortunate and unplanned-for future materialize.

These factors make the perceived or expected cost of labor at times higher in Spain than in Germany, despite the actual monetary cost being lower in euro terms. This effect has been especially pronounced since the adoption of the common currency over a decade ago. As we can see below, the average cost of German labor is largely unmoved since 2000, while Spanish labor has increased about 25 percent over the same period.

clip_image001

When hiring a worker, the nominal wage is only half the story. The employer also needs to know how productive that worker will be. Even after we factor for the extra costs on Spanish labor, a German worker could be more costly. A firm would still choose to hire that worker if his or her productivity was greater.

As we can see in the two figures below, over the last decade a large divergence has emerged between the two countries. While German productivity has more or less kept pace with its small increases in wage rates, the Spanish story is remarkably different. Productivity has lagged, meaning that on a real basis Spanish laborers are much more costly today than they were just 10 years ago.

clip_image002

Of course, boom bust policies have also contributed to such imbalances. The EU integration which had the ECB inflating the system essentially pushed Spanish wages levels up substantially, thereby overvaluing Spanish labor relative to productivity and relative to the Germans and to other European nations…

In his book The Tragedy of the Euro, Philipp Bagus mentions a similar phenomenon. Bagus points to the combination of (1) the rising labor costs that result from eurozone inflation and (2) divergent productivity rates between the countries as a source of imbalance. Indeed, inflation has been one driver of rising (and destabilizing) wages in the periphery of Europe, and especially in Spain. Others include, as we have noted here, minimum wages, regulatory burdens, and severance packages that increase the potential cost of labor.

In either case the effect is the same: wage rates do not necessarily reflect the labor itself, but rather the regulation surrounding it. In Spain, this translates to noncompetitive wages. It is important to remember, though, that this does not imply that the labor itself is necessarily uncompetitive — it is price dependent after all.

Every good has its price, even labor. When prices are hindered from fluctuating to clear markets, imbalances occur. In labor markets those imbalances are unemployed people. Policies such as a one-size-fits-all minimum wage and high mandated severance packages keep the price of Spanish labor above what it needs to be to clear the market.

Until something is done to ease these policies, Spanish labor will remain uncompetitively priced. Until Spanish labor costs can be repriced competitively, Spain's masses will need to endure stifling levels of unemployment.

The only solution to the current crisis is to allow economic freedom to prevail. Of course, this means less power for the politicians and their allies which is why they won't resort to this. Their remedies will naturally be worst than the disease.