Monday, February 25, 2013

Even in the Short Term, Abenomics Fumbles

Cheerleaders of Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe’s aggressive economic policies known as “Abenomics” say that devaluing the yen would produce the “solution” required to revive her economy. I say that this represent no more than wishful thinking that relies on tooth fairy.

After the yen’s 7% loss against the US dollar since the end of 2012 (as of Friday’s close), “Abenomics” hardly seems to have delivered on its vaunted promises of increasing “competitiveness”.

From Bloomberg,
Exports climbed 6.4 percent in January from a year earlier, the first rise in eight months, exceeding the median 5.6 percent estimate in a Bloomberg News survey of 24 economists. Imports increased 7.3 percent, the Finance Ministry said in Tokyo today.

Weakness in the yen that aids exporters such as Sharp Corp. and Sony Corp. also means the country pays more to import fossil fuels needed as nuclear reactors stand idle after the Fukushima crisis in 2011. That burden may encourage the government to limit the currency’s slide, with Deputy Economy Minister Yasutoshi Nishimura signaling in a Jan. 24 interview that the government may prefer a yen stronger than 110 per dollar.

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"Abenomics" has, so far, only worsened the trade and current account balance of Japan (charts from tradingeconomics.com) which amplifies the risks of her overleveraged government. To cover such deficits, Japan's economy would now require more foreign capital. Japan seems on path to a banana republic.

More from Dr. Ed Yardeni at his blog,
The immediate consequence of his browbeating the central bank was a 16.9% plunge in the yen since September 27. The catch is that 18% of Japan’s exports go to China, where components made in Japan are assembled into final products. That could lower the input costs to Chinese manufacturers and increase their competitiveness. Higher import prices in Japan could depress consumers' spending by lowering their purchasing power. By far the biggest catch is that Japan’s numerous governments have tried massively stimulative fiscal and monetary policies for over two decades that all obviously failed to work. 
While the benefits of inflationism are usually on felt on the short term, in Japan’s case, it hasn’t.

Yet, whatever supposed boon accrued from the loss of the yen’s purchasing power has largely been offset or neutralized by other factors such as higher import costs and reduced capacity by consumers to spend.

As the great Ludwig von Mises warned,
The much-talked-about advantages which devaluation secures in foreign trade and tourism are entirely due to the fact that the adjustment of domestic prices and wage rates to the state of affairs created by devaluation requires some time. As long as this adjustment process is not yet completed, exporting is encouraged and importing is discouraged. However, this merely means that in this interval the citizens of the devaluating country are getting less for what they are selling abroad and paying more for what they are buying abroad; concomitantly they must restrict their consumption.

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So far what the crumbling yen has generated has been an artificial money inflation fueled boom in her stock markets. 

The Nikkei has been up 9.53% as of Friday’s close. However a foreign investor invested in Japan would see his returns at only 2.53%, net of the losses from the yen, while taking on greater risks from the potential setbacks from the political desire to combust price inflation.

The Economist Buttonwood columnist Philipp Coogan rightly noted of the growing risks from Abenomics…
Abenomics is targeting higher inflation. But does the government really know what will happen if inflation hits 3-4%? Hard to believe that the Japanese public will want to own 20-year government bonds yielding 1.75%. At current interest rates, Japan spends 25-30% of its tax revenues on debt payments; what would happen if yields double or treble? The effect would dwarf any improvement in tax revenues that would flow from a revived economy.
Again in politics, common sense has hardly been common.

At the end of the day, the real intent of the yen’s devaluation has been to provide subsidies or transfers of wealth to the banking, insurance and finance industry that will come at a great cost to Japan’s citizenry via a credit event or a currency run.


Quote of the Day: The Folly of All for One

And is not this the point that we have now reached? What is the cry going up everywhere, from all ranks and classes? All for one! When we say the word one, we think of ourselves, and what we demand is to receive an unearned share in the fruits of the labor of all. In other words, we are creating an organized system of plunder. 

Unquestionably, simple out-and-out plunder is so clearly unjust as to be repugnant to us; but, thanks to the motto, all for one, we can allay our qualms of conscience. We impose on others the duty of working for us. Then, we arrogate to ourselves the right to enjoy the fruits of other men's labor. We call upon the state, the law, to enforce our so-called duty, to protect our so-called right, and we end in the fantastic situation of robbing one another in the name of brotherhood. We live at other men's expense, and then call ourselves heroically self-sacrificing for so doing.
(italics original)

This is stirring quote, posted by CafĂ© Hayek’s Prof Don Boudreaux, is from Frederic Bastiat‘s 1850 treatise, Economic Harmonies  based on 1964 W. Hayden Boyers translation. Chapter 12, paragraph 21

Has the Phisix has Gone Ballistic?!

14.66% in 8 straight weeks of unwavering ascent has truly been spectacular!!

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Whether parabolic or vertical, the Phisix seems to have gone ballistic.

February has already racked up 6.8% with this week’s 2.2% gains. Yet there are still four trading days to go.

As I said last week, should 7% return per month persist, then the Phisix 10,000 will be reached within the second semester of this year.

Again I am NOT saying it will, but we cannot discount the likelihood of such event, considering what appears to be the deepening of the manic phase in the Philippine Stock Exchange. 

Signs of Mania: Friday’s Marking the Close

I highlighted this week’s actions (via red ellipse) because of what appears to be a botched attempt by the Phisix to correct.

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In what appears to be a sympathy move with US markets which closed lower Thursday, on Friday, the Phisix has been down through most of the session, by about 1.5% (chart from technistock). That’s until the last few minutes before the closing bell window, where the losses had precipitately been wiped out to close the day almost unchanged (or a fraction lower)

Whether what seems as “marking the close” has been another attempt “manipulate” the Phisix for whatever ends (I would suggest political), or that bulls have taken the opportunity to conduct a massive counterstrike against the bears, such refusal to allow for a normal profit taking mode simply has been an expression of the intensifying du jour bullish frenzy.

Net foreign activity posted marginal selling last Friday (Php 36 million). Index heavyweights exhibited mixed performance in terms of foreign activity, which may suggest that local buying could have been mostly responsible for the last minute rebound.

To boost the Phisix means to bid up major blue chip issues. This requires heavy Peso firepower that can emanate mostly from institutions rather than from retail participants, regardless of nationality, whether foreign or local.

The scale of actions from Friday reflects on either hugely expanded risk appetite or the increasing symptoms of desperation to chase momentum from so-called professional money managers, or that parties responsible for Friday’s action could have been conducted by largely price insensitive taxpayer financed institutions.

Yet given the current election season and perhaps the desire to generate upgrades in the nation’s credit rating in order to justify political spending binges, one cannot discount on the potential influences played by public institutions in the stoking of today’s frenetic markets.

To elaborate, marking the close is the practice of buying a security at the very end of the trading day at a significantly higher price[1] is considered illegal by Philippine statutes[2]. Although personally speaking, I consider insider trading[3] and related rules and regulations as arbitrary, repressive, unequal and immoral form of laws.

For instance, the legality or illegality of what appears as “marking the close” could depend on the identity or of the class of executor/s. If public institutions may have been involved, then I doubt if such regulations will apply or will be enforced. Such rules get activated only when there has been a public outcry or when authorities want to be seen as doing something or when used for assorted political goals.

Either way, yield chasing or politically motivated actions to artificially prop markets arrive at a similar conclusion: a policy induced mania.

Mounting Publicity Hysteria

Of course, the manic phases are essentially reinforced through public’s psychology. The public has been made to believe that prices represent reality which tells of the perpetual extension of such boom. Such resonates on the mentality that “this time is different”: the four most dangerous words of investing, according to the late legendary investor John Templeton
Hysteria about the boom phase has been building up.

Proof?

This Bloomberg article entitled “Philippines Trounces Global Stocks in Aquino-Led Rally[4]”, even sees the current rally as “structural”.

I wonder how valid will the “structural” foundations of this bull market be when faced with significantly higher interest rates.

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Nevertheless it is a fact that the Philippines have “trounced” the world in terms of returns.

In my radar screen of the equity benchmarks of 83 nations, on a year-to-date basis Venezuela’s Caracas Index has been on the top of the list, with an astronomical 31% nominal currency gains which essentially compounds on 2012’s stratospheric 302%.

Yet as I have repeatedly been pointing out[5], what seem as rip-roaring stock market gains are in fact an illusion.

Venezuela has most likely been suffering from seminal stages of hyperinflation, where the stock market becomes a shock absorber or a lightning rod of a massively devalued or inflated currency. Venezuela’s recent official devaluation by 32% has only triggered a steeper fall in the unofficial rate of her currency, the bolivar.

The official rate has been recently readjusted to 6.3 bolivar per US dollar, but the black market for the bolivar trading has been trading at around 22 per US dollar[6] from 19 less than two weeks back[7]. As typical symptom of hyperinflationary episodes, Venezuela has been suffering from widespread shortages of goods.

Venezuela’s skyrocketing stock market from hyperinflation has been reminiscent of Zimbabwe in 2008. In 2008, as the world plumbed to the nadir as consequence to the contagion effects from the US housing bubble bust, Zimbabwe became the top performer, nominally speaking.

Yet Kyle Bass, a prominent hedge manager, captures the zeitgeist of such a boom[8] (italics added)
One of the best performing equity markets in the last decade has been Zimbabwe. But now your entire equity portfolio only buys you three eggs.
Yes, thousands of percent in returns buys you three eggs.

This shows how stock markets, as surrogate or as representative of real assets, serve as refuge to monetary inflation. This has been especially elaborate at the extremes—hyperinflation.

This also implies that monetary inflation, which has been neglected by the mainstream, plays a very important role in establishing price levels of the equity markets.

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Outside Venezuela, the rest of the top ranked equity bellwethers have been far beyond their respective nominal record highs. This makes the local equity bellwether, the Phisix, the likely global crown holder or the current world champion. The Manny Pacquiao of international stock markets. The $64 trillion question is its sustainability.

From Friday’s close, the Phisix has been up 256% since the last trading day of 2008. This translates to around 35% CAGR.

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Even among the top ASEAN peers, from a 5-year perspective or from a starting point in mid-2008 from the Bloomberg chart, the Phisix [PCOMP: red orange] has outclassed by a widening margin, Thailand [SET: Green], Indonesia [JCI: orange] and Malaysia [FBMKLCI: red].

So the feedback loop between prices and media cheerleading entrenches the public’s belief and conviction of the flawed views of realty. Such perceptions translate to actions: more debt.

Bubble Mentality Leads to Bubble Actions

As I have pointed out last week, manias signify as the stage of the bubble cycle where the yield chasing phenomenon has become the prevailing bias. Manias are essentially underpinned by voguish themes unquestioningly embraced by the public and most importantly enabled, facilitated and financed by credit expansion.

I pointed out how the booming stock markets have reflected on the growing imbalances in the real economy of the Philippines

The stock market boom has similarly been reinforced by the expansion of credit at exactly where such imbalances have been progressing: property-finance-trade, or simply, the property-shopping mall-stock market bubble.

Such extraordinary growth in credit may have already percolated into the domestic money supply 

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The monetary aggregate, M3 or as per BSP definition[9], constitutes currency in circulation, peso demand deposits, peso savings and time deposits plus peso deposit substitutes, such as promissory notes and commercial papers, has jumped by 16.22% in 2012. From 2008 CAGR for M3 has been at 11.51%.

On the other hand, M0 or narrow money or as per tradingeconomics.com[10], the most liquid measure of the money supply including coins and notes in circulation and other assets that are easily convertible into cash, spiked by 24% in 2012, which on a 5 year basis grew by 13.2% CAGR.

Although there have been many intermittent instances of peculiar outgrowth, such outsized move appears to be the largest.

Moreover, it remains to be seen if this has been an anomaly.

If this has indeed been an aberration, then this implies that the coming figures should show a decline which should revert M3 and M0 back to the trend line. If not, recent breakout may establish an acceleration Philippine monetary aggregate trend line: an affirmation of the classic bubble.

Considering that both the private sector, lubricated by expansionary credit, and the domestic government, whom will undertaking $17 billion of public works spending, will be competing for the use of resources, we should expect that pressures to build on either relative input prices (wages, rents, and producers prices), particularly on resources used by capital intensive industries experiencing a boom, and or, but not necessarily price inflation.

Such dynamics would exert an upside pressure on interest rates that would eventually put marginal projects, including margin debts on financial assets operating on leverage, on financial strains which lay seeds to the upcoming bust.

Yet the idea that price inflation is a necessary outcome of an inflationary boom has been misplaced.

In the modern economy, many things such as productivity growth, e.g. informal economies and or technological innovation) or today’s financial quirks, e.g. as excess banking reserves held at the central banks, such as the US Federal Reserve, can serve to neutralize its effects.

As the great dean of Austrian school of economics Murray N. Rothard wrote[11],
Similarly, the designation of the 1920s as a period of inflationary boom may trouble those who think of inflation as a rise in prices. Prices generally remained stable and even fell slightly over the period. But we must realize that two great forces were at work on prices during the 1920s—the monetary inflation which propelled prices upward and the increase in productivity which lowered costs and prices. In a purely free-market society, increasing productivity will increase the supply of goods and lower costs and prices, spreading the fruits of a higher standard of living to all consumers. But this tendency was offset by the monetary inflation which served to stabilize prices. Such stabilization was and is a goal desired by many, but it (a) prevented the fruits of a higher standard of living from being diffused as widely as it would have been in a free market; and (b) generated the boom and depression of the business cycle. For a hallmark of the inflationary boom is that prices are higher than they would have been in a free and unhampered market. Once again, statistics cannot discover the causal process at work.
Nonetheless, while price inflation may not be the necessary and sufficient factor for upending a boom, the lack of its presence does not prevent business cycles from occurring.

Moreover, the yield chasing boom will likely spur greater demand for credit that will similarly put pressure on interest rates.

In addition, competition for resources by both the government and the private sector will likely increase demand for imports that subsequently leads to wider trade deficits. Eventually bigger trade deficits may impact the current account that could put pressure on foreign exchange reserves.

And as noted last December[12],
And since the prolonging of the domestic boom requires foreign capital or that trade deficits would need to be offset by capital accounts or increasing foreign claims on local assets, either the BSP loosens up or keeps an eye closed on foreign money flows. Most of which will likely come from hot money inflows seeking refuge from inflationism and financial repression.
By then the Philippines could be vulnerable to “sudden stops” which may arise from a domestic or regional if not from a global event risks.

And as pointed out last week, today’s global pandemic of bubbles will most likely alter the character of the next crisis.

Instead of many nations offsetting bursting bubbles of some nations, the coming crisis would translate to a domino effect.

Wherever the source or origins of the crisis, the leash effect means cascading bubble implosions over many parts of the world. The escalation of bubble busts would prompt domestic political authorities to intuitively embark on domestic bailouts and fiscal expansions (or the so-called automatic stabilizers), and for central bankers to aggressively engage in monetary easing for domestic reasons—or a genuine “currency war”.

In contrast to what seems as phony “currency wars”, real currency wars have had broad based carryover effects from expansionist political controls. This usually includes price and wage controls, capital and currency controls, social mobility and border controls, trade controls or protectionism and other financial repression measures[13] (e.g. taxes, regulations on banks, nationalizations, caps on interest rates, deposits and etc…).

How inflationism leads to forex controls and the spate of other political controls, the great Ludwig von Mises explained[14]
But the government is resolved not to tolerate any rise in foreign exchange rates (in terms of the inflated domestic currency). Relying upon its magistrates and constables, it prohibits any dealings in foreign exchange on terms different from the ordained maximum price.

As the government and its satellites see it, the rise in foreign exchange rates was caused by an unfavorable balance of payments and by the purchases of speculators. In order to remove the evil, the government resorts to measures restricting the demand for foreign exchange. Only those people should henceforth have the right to buy foreign exchange who need it for transactions of which the government approves. Commodities the importation of which is superfluous in the opinion of the government should no longer be imported. Payment of interest and principal on debts due to foreigners is prohibited. Citizens must no longer travel abroad. The government does not realize that such measures can never "improve" the balance of payments. If imports drop, exports drop concomitantly. The citizens who are prevented from buying foreign goods, from paying back foreign debts, and from traveling abroad, will not keep the amount of domestic money thus left to them in their cash holdings. They will increase their buying either of consumers' or of producers' goods and thus bring about a further tendency for domestic prices to rise. But the more prices rise, the more will exports be checked.
In short, one form of interventionism breeds other forms interventionism.

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For now, the domestic yield chasing mania means an increasing pile up on winning trades.

And instead of the rotation to the mining sector as has been for the past years, the latter of which has been smacked by a double black eye from the Semirara landslide and from the recent blowup in metal prices, dampened appetite for the mines has shifted the public’s attention back to the last year’s biggest winners.

The trio: property, financial and banking and property weighted holding firms has reclaimed their leadership positions.

Thus the checklist for the manic phase of stock market bubble:

Deepening price or yield chasing dynamics √
Popular themes √
This time is Different mentality √
Expansionary credit √

Every Bubble is a Thumbprint

And it’s not just me.

One analyst from the S&P credit rating agency recently raised his concern over Asia’s growing appetite for debt where he says many Asia-Pacific countries have raised debt “well above the levels in the mid-2000s”, importantly, credit to GDP ratios of few nations has been “high relative to peers at similar income levels”
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S&P KimEng Tan at an interview with Finance Asia further adds[15],
Real estate downturns may be less of a threat to financial institutions in the key economies than they were in the worst-hit developed economies. Nevertheless, credit losses can still increase rapidly if general economic conditions weaken materially. The top concern is that China’s growth could slow sharply before the developed economies recover sufficiently to contribute to maintaining moderate growth. The slowdown is likely to have a material negative effect on economic activities across the Asia-Pacific.
Although the seemingly disinclined Mr. Tan downplays the imminence of the risks of a crisis by making apple-to-orange comparison with debt levels in Europe.

Let me improve by saying that each nation have their own unique characteristics or idiosyncrasies, therefore it may not be helpful to make comparisons with other nations or region. Moreover, while many crises may seem similar, each has their individual distinctions.

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For instance, one Bloomberg article I came about highlights the portentous troubles that lie ahead for Asia. The article[16] relates on the symptoms: South Korea’s household debt “rose to a record 959.4 trillion won last quarter”, and equally such debt has “reached 164 percent of disposable income in 2011, compared with 138 percent in the U.S. at the start of the housing crisis”.

South Korea’s domestic credit provided by the banking sector[17] (shown above), as well as, domestic credit to the private sector[18] as % of has reached over 100% GDP, although slightly below the recent peak.

China’s mounting debt problem and property bubble has also been daunting. Recent easing and government intervention via stealth spending programs[19] has prompted a recovery in housing prices. According to a Bloomberg report[20] (italics mine)
Average per-square-meter prices in 100 cities tracked by SouFun are five times average monthly disposable incomes.
In addition,
Home sales in China’s 10 biggest cities almost quadrupled to 8.5 million square meters in the first five weeks from last year, property data and consulting firm China Real Estate Information Corp. said in an e-mailed statement Feb. 19.
Either China and South Korea’s productivity growth has to catch up with the lofty levels of debt or that untenable debt dynamics will eventually lead to self-destruction whether triggered by an upsurge in interest rates or by weakening of the economic conditions or from a global contagion or simply unsustainable debt.

Interventions can only delay the day of reckoning but worsen the longer term entropic impact.

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These are debt levels when “credit events” occurred via the Asian Crisis (left window) and of the other emerging market debt crisis (right window). Data from Harvard’s Carmen Reinhart as presented by Ricardo Cabral at the Voxeu.org[21]

First, there has been no definitive line in the sand for credit events. South Korea has for instance very low external debt when the crisis struck, although Argentina’s debt crises shared the same debt levels during 2 crises within 10 years.

Second, external debt may or may not function as an accurate gauge today. Many economies have resorted to amassing debts based on internal local currency units and from local currency bond markets which has been unorthodox relative to the past.

In addition, financial innovation may mean risks have spread to other potential channels as securitization and derivatives.

Nonetheless, external debts have indeed been swelling in Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and even in South Korea with the exception of Malaysia.

The implication is that there are many potential sources of black swan events.

The Wile E Coyote Moment

Yet the current booming environment has been prompting policymakers of several economies to pull back on current easing programs. 

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The Chinese government has recently withdrawn funds from the financial system. In addition, the Chinese government has recently ordered more property curbs[22]. Such perception of tightening has prompted for a 4.86% plunge in the Shanghai Index (SSEC) over the week, which reverberated throughout the commodity markets (see CRB line behind SSEC).

Prior to February, Chinese authorities were loosening up on the monetary spigot, then all of a sudden the change of sentiment. As one would note, this is an example of how markets has been held hostage to the actions of authorities.

Of course it is also important to point out that the European Central Bank (ECB) has been draining funds from the system since October of 2012 which has coincided with the peak in gold prices. February’s dramatic shrivelling to March lows of the ECB’s balance sheet has mirrored the collapse in gold prices[23].

And it’s not only the ECB.

Swiss banks have been required only this month to up their capital reserves by 1%.

And in the face of credit fueled property boom in Europe’s richer nations as Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, Sweden’s regulators have warned that they are ready to tighten more given the recognition of a brewing debt bubble. “Swedish households today are among the most indebted in Europe” the Bloomberg quotes a Swede official[24].

Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s government has doubled sales tax[25] on high end real estate worth HK$2 million and above, as well as, commercial properties in her attempt to suppress bubbles that has spread from apartments to parking spaces, shops and hotels

As one would note, wherever one looks there have been blowing bubbles: a global pandemic of bubbles

So contradicting policy directions can became a headwind and increased volatility for financial markets, including the Phisix. Although domestic dynamics are likely to dictate on momentum.

Nonetheless bubbles eventually peak out regardless of interventions.

Again in Hong Kong, prior to the sales tax hike, bankruptcy petitions has risen to 2 year highs[26]

Things operate or evolve on the margins. And so with puffing bubbles. Deflating bubbles always commences from the periphery that eventually moves into the core.

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The US housing bubble cycle should serve as a noteworthy paradigm.

US home prices represented by the National Composite Home Price Index peaked (lower window blue line) at the close of 2005, as interest rates increased (red line). The Fed controlled Fed fund rate topped in 2007.

Notice that the mild descent of home prices in 2006 steepened or accelerated in 2007. The housing bear market fell into a trough only in 2011 and began showing signs of recovery in 2012.

Yet the US stock market (S&P 500 blue line top window) continued to ignore the developments in the housing markets in 2006-2007, as well as, the interest rate hikes. In fact, gains of the S&P seem to have accelerated when interest rates peaked. 

The stock market came to realize only of the flawed perception of reality when home prices affected the core, or when the banking and financial system began to implode. It was like cartoon character wile e coyote running off a cliff.

From hindsight, the divergence between housing and the stock market, the massive debt buildup on the housing, mortgage, banking and financial sectors, the denial by authorities of the existing problem, the transition of deflating bubbles from the periphery to the core and the public’s persistent yield or momentum chasing dynamics, all meets the criteria of a manic phase in motion.

But as I said last week, the next crisis may not be similar to the US housing crisis of 2008.

Then policymakers have been mostly reactive, today policymakers are pro-active, pre-emptive and considered as activists. The outcome isn’t likely to be the same.

Importantly, given that almost every nations have been serially blowing bubbles, a domino effect from a bubble bust would either mean the path to genuine reform (bankruptcies and liberalization) or more of the same troubles but in different templates (stagflation, protectionism, controls of varying strains and etc…). I am leaning onto the latter outcome, although I am hoping for the former.

Everything now depends on the Ping Pong feedback loop between markets and international policymakers.

Although from the lessons of US bubble, I believe that the Phisix in spite of several increases in interest rates may go higher.

Momentum will initially mask the traps that have been set, until of course, economic reality prevails; eventually. Or going back to wile e coyote analogy, wile e coyote will continue to chase after Road Runner to the cliff until he realizes that there is no more ground underneath.

Again bubbles signify a market process.





[2] Republic of the Philippines Security Exchange Commission Chapter VII Prohibitions on Fraud, Manipulation and Insider Trading




[6] Wall Street Journal Ailing Chávez Returns to Caracas February 18, 2013


[8] Kyle Bass Why Inflation Could Eat Into Stock Gains: Kyle Bass Klye Bass Blog February 1, 2013


[10] Tradingeconomics.com PHILIPPINES MONEY SUPPLY M0

[11] Murray N. Rotbhard Part II The Inflationary Boom: 1921-1929 America’s Great Depression


[13] Wikipedia.org Financial repression

[14] Ludwig von Mises 6. Foreign Exchange Control and Bilateral Exchange Agreements XXXI. CURRENCY AND CREDIT MANIPULATION, Human Action Mises.org







[21] Ricardo Cabral The PIGS’ external debt problem, voxeu.org May 8, 2010





Saturday, February 23, 2013

Tanzania: A Case of Democracy Destroying Itself?

The great Austrian Economist Friedrich von Hayek once warned about the perils of democratic government,
And if a democratic people comes under the sway of an anti-capitalistic creed, this means that democracy will inevitably destroy itself.
Could this be the evolving case in Tanzania? 

Writes Lauren Bishop at the NYU Development Research
Tanzania looks an awful lot like a democracy. The East African nation has been holding multi-party elections since 1995, which international observers have deemed free and competitive. In Tanzania, votes are not miscounted, opposition parties compete actively, and the ruling party—the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which has controlled the government since independence—seems to play by the rules.

But according to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, NYU politics professor and DRI affiliated faculty member, Tanzania is in fact sliding down a slippery slope to autocracy, even as it maintains the trappings of a “transitioning” democracy. A working paper with Alastair Smith describes how Tanzania’s completely legal and institutionalized electoral laws are placing power in the hands of a small and increasingly entrenched elite.
Read the rest here.

Democracy has ushered in various despots like Adolf Hitler, the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos, or even modern day contemporaries as Hugo Chavez of Venezuela as well as Argentina’s Cristina Elisabet Fernández de Kirchner.

The populist idea that the "majority knows best" has simply been a fraud.

Quote of the Day: A War over Insignificant Scrubby Rocks?

Here is a link to the Google Maps Satellite view of the Senkaku Islands. Take a moment to contemplate how insignificant these scrubby rocks really are. 

Some observations after zooming in and out and panning around. First, there are no visible houses, bases, airstrips, factories, or really anything of value other than some timber and potential (note - potential, not proven) oil reserves. Second, the total size of the islands is 1700 acres - slightly bigger than most modern swim tennis communities in the US. Third, given that Japan, Taiwan, and Mainland China are all well within surface to surface missile distance from each other, these islands offer no military or strategic advantage. Fourth, if there are oil reserves of any significant amount they undoubtedly extend beyond the immediate confines of these tiny islands into the waters of Japan and China. Next time someone tells you we need government to resolve international disputes peacefully, send them this.
(bold mine)

From John Keller at the Lew Rockwell Blog.

In the world of politics, common sense has hardly been common.

Are Expanding Deals in Currency Swaps Signs of Currency Wars?

Lately I questioned the popular wisdom promoted by politicians and by media as “currency wars”

Reports say that the Bank of England (BoE) may seal a deal with the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) for currency swap lines.

From Reuters
Britain said on Friday it hopes to set up a currency swap line with China soon to help finance trade, a move that will enhance London's drive to become a leading offshore centre for yuan trade.

China, in an effort to internationalize the yuan and eventually make it a world reserve currency, has already agreed swap lines with more than 15 other countries, mostly emerging markets.

The Bank of England said on Friday it would work with China's central bank to sign a final agreement shortly on a reciprocal three-year yuan-sterling swap, building on its statement last month that it was ready "in principle" to adopt the swap line.
Last December global central banks went on to renew arrangements for forex swap lines

From Reuters
The U.S. Federal Reserve said it had extended for another year the dollar swaps with the European Central Bank, Bank of Canada, Bank of England and Swiss National Bank. The announcement was released at the same time by the other central banks.

These provisions were an important part of the powerful response launched by monetary authorities during the crisis to keep global financial markets open, curbing lofty dollar funding costs which had spiraled due to fear over counter-party risk.

Swap arrangements were revised and extended in November, 2011 as the euro zone debt crisis intensified, to ease the dollar funding pressure being experienced by some European banks.
China has said to have closed 18 swap arrangements worth a total of 1.6 trillion yuan involving different nations since 2009 (China Daily).

So essentially as these governments embark on their respective domestic money expansion programs, what they do to “hedge” against potential “shocks” (implicitly caused by such programs) has been to accommodate each other currencies through swap line deals.

Some currency war eh?

US Fed Ben Bernanke: No Asset Bubbles

Ben Bernanke denies that there has been an inflation of asset bubbles.

From the Bloomberg,
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke minimized concerns that the central bank’s easy monetary policy has spawned economically-risky asset bubbles in comments at a meeting with dealers and investors this month, according to three people with knowledge of the discussions.

The people, who asked not to be identified because the talks were private, said Bernanke made the remarks at a meeting in early February with the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee. Fed spokeswoman Michelle Smith declined to comment.

The Fed chairman brushed off the risks of asset bubbles in response to a presentation on the subject from the group, one person said. Among the concerns raised, according to this person, were rising farmland prices and the growth of mortgage real estate investment trusts. Falling yields on speculative- grade bonds also were mentioned as a potential concern, two people said…

Speculation about scaled-back asset purchases by the Fed was fanned by the Feb. 20 release of minutes of the central bank’s last policy making meeting in January.
Of course, it would be natural to expect  Mr. Bernanke to dismiss the idea of bubbles. For an acknowledgement would mean that he would be forced to reverse current policies. And this would undermine his theory of how the world operates, or of the interests (political, economic or financial) whom they have been implicitly protecting. 

Importantly, an admission would translate to self-indictment of the policies he and his team has implemented.
As I have pointed out, whether former Fed chair Alan Greenspan or incumbent Ben Bernanke (via the Bernanke doctrine), these guys project to the public of their belief that the conditions of asset prices determines economic growth via the “wealth effect” transmission.

Their concept of the economy hasn’t been about making and producing things for people to consume, but for assets to drive people’s consumption habits. Thus, all these global central banking balance sheet expansions. I say global, because evidently much of the world central banks has espoused, imbued and or mimicked the Greenspan-Bernanke paradigm.

The reality is that such ideology camouflages the real intent:  the desire to prop up the highly fragile and insolvent privileged banking cartel whom have been tightly linked to the equally bankrupt welfare-warfare state as financiers, and whose intertwined relationships have been underwritten by central banking PUT. 

Of course another perspective is to preserve the “Deficit without Tears” framework, where the US gets a free lunch arrangement with the world by exchanging green pieces of paper with goods produced by the rest of the world, via the US dollar standard. Arguing that no asset bubbles exists implies that the US must continue to rely on the growth of "financialization".

Like in 2007, eventually the laws of economics will expose on such a sham that will be ventilated on the markets.

Mr. Bernanke, like most the mainstream experts, got it all so horribly wrong in 2007

Here is a video of comparing the predictions of Peter Schiff and of Ben Bernanke during the ballooning housing bubble in 2005-2006.


In the world of politics, the laws of demand and supply just doesn’t apply.