Currency Values Hardly Impacts Merchandise Trade

In the eyes of the mainstream the only way to generate export growth is to devalue a currency or impose punitive tariffs on trade partners whom are deemed as 'currency manipulators'.

Yet, facts belie these misguided conventional beliefs.

Referring to the above charts, analyst Howard Simons argues, (bold highlights mine)

``First, three-quarters of the import weights and two-thirds of the export weights derive from five sources: China, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and the eurozone; the others will be aggregated for visual clarity. Let’s take a look at the imports first.

``The most prominent development over time has been the seizing of market share by China from Japan and Canada. Mexico’s share expanded after the passage of NAFTA, but it has stagnated in recent years as maquiladora plants have become uncompetitive with Asian exports. In economic terms, Mexico now is exporting labor, a factor in production, as it has lost a competitive advantage in the production itself.

``On the export side, China is displacing Japan as a customer of the US. Exports to both Mexico and Canada expanded after the passage of NAFTA, as have exports to “all-others;” this category includes important growing customers such as Brazil, India, the Middle East, and the Asian periphery.

``What is or should be striking in the pictures above are the rather constant weights for the eurozone. Given the euro’s prominence for financial flows and for traders, and given its outsized 57.6% weight in the dollar index, you might think all of the changes over the years in the rates between the dollar, the euro, and its predecessors would lead to substantial changes in trade weights.

``The US and the eurozone have structurally similar economies and factors of production. As a result, we trade in similar goods where differences in customer tastes and small quality differentials mean more than price. Moreover, much of the trade between the two zones is inter-subsidiary and represents a transfer."

True enough, (chart courtesy of netdania) despite the Euro's 5 year uptrend, this has hardly affected the trade weightings of the Eurozone vis-a-vis the US.

In addition, many other factors also seem to impact trade more than currency values, such as Free Trade Agreements, differentiation of goods, transfer pricing from inter-subsidiaries, and etc...

In other words, currency values hardly is the major factor that influences trade balances.

I'd like to interpose another perspective--how did the Euro become an export giant, in spite of the currency's elevated valuation levels?

Analyst Martin Spring enumerates the strength of Germany as the Eurozone's driver: (all bold emphasis mine)

-Germany is a hugely powerful exporting power, only recently overtaken by China, and still a far bigger exporter than the US or Japan. This year it is forecast to have a foreign trade surplus of $187 billion, not far behind China’s $219 billion.

-Despite some of the highest labour costs in the world, it has high productivity to match them.

-Due to the cohesion that comes from good employer-employee relationships, manufacturing industry has the flexibility to meet adverse circumstances. In the global recession it has kept growth in unemployment to just half a percentage point through measures such as pay cuts and state-subsidized short-time working.

-Instead of looking to currency depreciation to ease its problems, it survived the period of a strong euro by meeting competition head on. The OECD, in its latest economic survey, says the nation used the adversity to spur innovation, make allocation of resources more efficient, and invest strongly in advanced production techniques.

-Its companies have diversified internationally and outsourced to low-cost countries – about half the added value of exports is now produced abroad.

-Although Germany does, like so many countries, have a problem of high and growing public debt, it is at last addressing that problem decisively. Over the 2008-2012 period, despite the biggest stimulus programme in Europe, its debt is forecast to grow by only 17 percentage points, compared to 22 per cent in France, 33 per cent in Greece and the US, 34 per cent in the UK and 39 per cent in Japan.

-The Economist says Germany “no longer suffers from an arthritic labour market, an obese state or a suffocating tax burden.”

-At the core of the engineering sector that is the cornerstone of the nation’s industrial economy are thousands of dynamic Middelstand enterprises (small and midsized firms, often family-owned) that export almost 80 per cent of their production, selling not only highest-quality machines, but also the panoply of expert support services that go with them.

-Germany is a world leader in fields such as automotive technology and renewable energy. It can sell machinery in China at four times the cost of Chinese competitors’.

All these can be summed up into competition, division of labor, competitive advantage and high level of entrepreneurship. In short, Germany's export powerhouse came about from fundamentally embracing free market principles and not from devaluation and closed door isolationist policies.

This bring us to the surprise announcement by China to gradually allow her currency to rise. Will these alleviate the so called global imbalances?

In 2005 the yuan appreciated by 9.8%, yet there has hardly been any improvements in the trade balance (deficit) standing of the US vis-a-vis China, as shown in the above chart.

And the narrowing of the trade gap in 2008 can't be attributed to the rising Yuan, because the world suffered from convulsions of the 2008 financial crisis, which had been a far larger factor.

Besides, China then repegged her yuan to the US dollar at the onset of the crisis (also shown above-chart courtesy of Northern Trust).

So the answer is a NO--the appreciation of the yuan is unlikely to make a significant dent to the US deficits. Moreover, for as long as the US dollar is the de facto medium of account "currency standard" for global trade, the US is likely to maintain huge deficits.

However for China it could be a different story.

China's surpluses could narrow, not because of the appreciating yuan, but because of policies aimed at shifting internal dynamics.

According to Northern Trust's Paul Kasriel,

``Now, I do believe that the rate of increase in China's trade surplus will be slowing in the coming years, but not primarily because of an appreciating renminbi. But rather because rising incomes among Chinese households will lead to increased discretionary spending by them. Also, in order to keep the population relatively happy, Chinese politicians will re-allocate government spending more toward services and infrastructure spending to benefit households rather than export industries."

Bottom line: currency values signify only as one variable out of the many that influence trade activities. Therefore tunneling on the "currency" valve as means to rebalance trade by indirect (inflationism) or direct protectionism is not only fallacious and deceptive but also unwarranted.

Borrowing Howard Simons conclusion, ``the world’s protectionists are better at making noise than making sense".

Banking System And Global Imbalances

This is an interesting observation from the Economist,


``The finances of banks are a mirror of the economies where they are based. In emerging markets, the surplus of customer deposits over loans (ie, excess savings) at listed banks was about $1.6 trillion in 2008, compared with a deficit of about $1.9 trillion at rich-world banks. Banks in emerging markets, which have vast branch networks to suck in deposits from thrifty families and companies, park their surplus with the state, by buying government bonds or keeping it in central banks. The state in turn acts as the international recycling agent for those excess savings: it lends them to Western countries through its foreign reserves or through a sovereign-wealth fund. Meanwhile, overextended Western banks do the exact opposite: they borrow from capital markets to plug the hole created by having more loans than deposits. In 2009, the funding gap was smaller, reflecting the slow rebalancing of Western banks' finances." (all bold highlights mine)

My comment:

The above shows the following:

-trade imbalances are offset by capital account transfers [see US-China Trade Imbalance? Where?]

-governments are shown here to be very inefficient intermediaries in the allocation of resources (finance or real). Allocations are fundamentally politically motivated, e.g. in the US, the homeownership bias in the 1990s to 2007 (ergo the bubble bust of 2008); today, the focus is on deficit spending.

-moral hazard from sustained subsidies to government (as recycling mechanism) has partly caused bubbles and will likely continue to do so.

-the overall problem basically seems due to the architecture of our monetary system, which have been premised on a cartelized banking system that revolves around central banking.

How Inflationism Leads To “Inequality”

When speaking of morality, we shouldn’t be limited to the financial markets only, but we should also parse on the political economy.

In the US, the moralists in governments, academe and media complain alot about “inequality” or the seeming dearth of redistributive policies, thinking that talking nice and romanticizing about how a true-to-life Robin Hood could become a feasible elixir to perpetual prosperity.

For these people, the nightmare of USSR’s Lenin and Stalin, Cuba’s Castro, Mao, Cambodia’s Pol Pot and North Korea’s Kim has hardly sunk in.

In addition, it seems always ok to place the burden on somebody else except oneself. Their idea for redistribution has always been anchored on “take on somebody else’s property but not mine” syndrome.

Inequality And Inflationism

Yet what is NOT being discussed is how “inequality” has ever evolved.

How inflationism has been affecting the uneven redistribution of income through the politicization of the economic process from which the political “picking of winners” through bailouts, subsidies, behest loans, guarantees, market manipulations, deficit spending, war spending, and etc., has been influencing on such disparities.

And importantly, how inflationism, channelled through the bubble cycles, has dragged the rest of the society into a quagmire as a consequence of the bust, when only a privileged few benefits during a boom.

Doug Noland accurately describes today’s dynamics[1],

``The “inflationism” intellectual and policy doctrine was instrumental in forging a historic market distortion: the perception of mortgage Credit “moneyness.” Inflationism is the root cause of the recent crisis – and a rather lengthy list of debacles throughout history. Today, the same dangerous incongruity exits that throughout history has propped up inflationism when apparent failings should have led to this dogma’s collapse: Instead of inflationism being recognized as the problem – the force behind the boom and unavoidable bust - it is instead viewed as the solution. There is today virtually universal support for policies that would incite a rapid increase in stock market and real estate prices; rising employment, incomes and spending; and a brisk economic recovery. The common view today is that the greatest risk is to fail to inflate sufficiently.” (bold highlights mine)

And it is why looking for scapegoats- such as China to hold responsibility for the “industrial wreckages” and “lost jobs/high unemployment” due to “currency manipulation”, even if the US incurred trade deficits with more than 90 countries or a “multilateral trade deficit” to quote Morgan Stanley’s Stephen Roach[2], or blaming domestic profiteers-seems very appealing and a favourite past time for moralists.

The important point is that their preferred policy approach is to “blame somebody else and take away what they have”. Yet the same moralists forget that whether World War II or French Religious War, the “us against them mentality” has been a historical recipe for disaster.

The simple truth that can’t seemingly be absorbed is that what can’t be done through trade the alternative is likely to be worst- war. As Frederic Bastiat once wrote, ``When goods don't cross borders, armies will.”

Yet the belief that the United States is impervious as a military power is likely an issue of overconfidence. As we previously noted, the US has never been so dependent on foreign or imported oil which accounts for 2/3 of US oil consumption[3]. This should also reflect on her war machines. So energy will be an X factor in case of a full blown war.

Besides, wars have also continually evolved to reflect on societal changes that the wars of the 20^th century may not be the kind of war in the future. Today’s war has evolved to “terrorism” or urban guerrilla warfare. And most likely, given the energy constrains, the nuclear option looks likely more of a realistic risk.

The Rude Awakening

The seductive tale of inflationism is mainly due to the lack of direct connection between government action and its effects to the economy.

As Thomas DiLorenzo writes[4], The so-called inflation tax is pernicious not only because it is a hidden tax on privately-held wealth, but also because it leads to false perceptions of the cause of the inflation. Political demagoguery adds to the confusion, as politicians are naturally inclined to lie to the public and blame the inflation on greedy capitalists, farmers, mortgage bankers, and others in the private sector. The proposed solution is typically to place even more power in the hands of the inflation-generating governmental authorities.”

In short it takes quite some technical sophistication to understand the linkages which can’t be easily grasped by the masses.

Yet even sophisticated people seem to fall for the illusion of prosperity from inflationism or protectionism.

Figure 3: Heritage Foundation: The 2009 Index of Dependence on Government

Recent news from the US shows how nearly half of the people don’t pay taxes (see figure 6).

According to yahoo news[5], ``About 47 percent will pay no federal income taxes at all for 2009. Either their incomes were too low, or they qualified for enough credits, deductions and exemptions to eliminate their liability. That's according to projections by the Tax Policy Center, a Washington research organization.”

This means:

One, more people are getting something for nothing. If the culture of dependency gets well entrenched, then taking away such privileges would redound to a political upheaval (secession, coup, civil war/revolution?). Overtime, the US seems more likely on path to a Greece drama.

Two, the burden of taxation will heftily increase for those paying for the privileges of the non-productive sector or for those getting something for nothing.

Three, this would only translate to further losses in productivity and possibly a shift away of capital to other countries with lesser tax burden.

Fourth, this only implies of the accelerating growth prospects in government spending.

Such degree of welfarism is simply unsustainable. If social security is deemed as unsustainable where the worker to beneficiary ratio is now 3.3 to 1, then how much more the burden of taxation where nearly are half of the population are beneficiaries?

As Milton Friedman[6] once wrote, ``Raise taxes by enough to eliminate the existing deficit and spending will go up to restore the tolerable deficit.” In short, the root of the problem is unsustainable government spending.

Fifth, given the prospects of the lack of savings and taxes to bridge finance the humongous growth of welfarism, inflationism is the most likely option.

Sixth this isn’t a problem confined to the US but to developing countries (figure 4).

Figure 4: Bank Of International Settlements: The future of public debt: prospects and implications

The BIS notes[7] that fiscal problems faced by developed nations “are bigger than suggested by official debt figures” with “public debt increasing to more than 100% of GDP, an even greater danger arises from a rapidly ageing population”.

It also sees sovereign debts are likely to suffer from higher spreads as markets face up to the risks of greater deficits and higher burden from interest payments, which will likely “drive down capital accumulation, productivity growth and long-term potential growth”.

Importantly, the “looming long-term fiscal imbalances pose significant risk to the prospects for future monetary stability. We describe two channels through which unstable debt dynamics could lead to higher inflation: direct debt monetisation, and the temptation to reduce the real value of government debt through higher inflation. Given the current institutional setting of monetary policy, both risks are clearly limited, at least for now.” (emphasis added)

Let me make a guess, developed countries will run out of ammunition or magic (Philosopher’s stone of turning lead to gold) once the next crisis resurfaces.

This means likely a back-to-back crisis which entails a bubble bust plus sovereign defaults as Harvard’s Carmen Reinhart[8] and Ken Rogoff has observed from previous experiences, ``historically, following a wave of financial crises especially in financial centers, you get a wave of defaults. You go from financial crises to sovereign debt crises. I think we’re in for a period where that kind of scenario is very likely. I don’t think a repeat of the fall of 2008 is at stake here, where it looks like the world is going to end”.

Or an even worst outcome would be a hyperinflation crisis-our Mises moment.

At the end of the day, the moralists will face a rude awakening from the laws of nature.

---

[1] Noland, Doug, Money Good; PrudentBear.com

[2] Roach, Stephen, Blaming China will not solve America’s problem, Financial Times

[3] See The Delusion Of The Mercantilist Miracle

[4] DiLorenzo, Thomas; The Subjectivist Roots of James Buchanan's Economics, Mises.org

[5] Yahoo.news, Nearly half of US households escape fed income tax

[6] Friedman, Milton, What Every American Wants, Wall Street Journal

[7] S. Cecchetti M S Mohanty and F Zampolli, The future of public debt: prospects and implications, Bank of International Settlements

[8] see Does Rising US Treasury Yields Today Suggest Sovereign Debt Concerns Or Remergent Inflation?

US-China Trade Imbalance? Where?

Mercantilists claim that the huge trade imbalance between China and the US serves as justification for enabling protectionist measures.

Well not so fast.

Even based on accounting, where financial securities are added to the equation, such claims are shown to be unfounded.

Professor Mark Perry elaborates,

``1. In 2009, the U.S. imported more from China ($354 billion) than it exported ($93 billion), resulting in a "trade deficit" of -$263 billion on our "current account" (data here).

``But that is only part of the international trade story, since there are also financial transactions that have to be accounted for, and that deficit on the current account has to be offset somehow, since all international trade has to balance (it's based on double-entry bookkeeping).

``2. The offsetting balance came from the $263 billion capital account surplus in 2009, as a result of $263 billion of net capital inflow to the U.S. from China to buy our Treasury bonds and other financial assets.

``3. The $263 billion capital account surplus exactly offsets the current account deficit.

Bottom line:

Professor Perry: ``There really is NO trade imbalance, when we account for: a) exports and imports of goods and services, AND b) capital inflows/outflows. Stated differently, the balance of payments is always ZERO. We buy more of China's goods than they buy of ours, but then China buys more of our financial assets (bonds and stocks) than we buy of theirs. So in the end, international trade with China, is balanced, not imbalanced." (emphasis original)

My comment: Experts twist facts to provide intellectual cover to populist politics. It's called political hysteria.

Big Mac Index And The Furor Over China's Yuan

Here is an update of the Economist's Big Mac Index which shows how McDonald's Big Mac are priced around the world.

In other words, the relative purchasing power of a currency measured in terms of Big Mac prices.
According to the Economist, (bold highlights mine)

``RECENT renewed American calls for China to revalue its currency have so far fallen on deaf ears. China has rejected accusations that America's huge trade deficit with it is caused largely by an artificially weak yuan, which has been pegged to the dollar since July 2008. Economists point out that a depreciation of the yen did little to help reduce America's trade deficit with Japan in the 1980s. But the yuan is unquestionably undervalued. Our Big Mac index, based on the theory of purchasing-power parity, in which exchange rates should equalise the price of a basket of goods across countries, suggests that the yuan is 49% below its fair-value benchmark with the dollar. "

While it may be true that the Chinese yuan may be "artificially weak", it is inaccurate to entirely blame the yuan for the America's deficits.

Chart from Google

As you can see, US trade deficit is largely a world phenomenon, except that China takes up most of the load (see below)

From US Census Bureau

In addition, outside of the oil exporters and China, the US has substantial deficits with Canada, Ireland and Japan even when the currencies of the 'developing economy' group are mostly "dearer" [or 'at par' with the US as with Japan].

Several additional observations:

-It is a fallacy to assume that weak currencies automatically extrapolate to strong exports or increased jobs.

As the Economist rightly points out, the strength of the Japanese Yen over the past decades didn't automatically transform Japan into a "consuming" class. To this day Japan is known as an "exporter".

-All furor over the Yuan, ignores the role played by the US dollar as the world's de facto currency reserve.

In short, the US has to produce dollars, required not only at home, but to fund global transactions and thus contributing to deficits. [see the Triffin Dilemma as previously discussed in The Nonsense About Current Account Imbalances And Super-Sovereign Reserve Currency]

-If the Chinese have indeed been subsidizing their export sector, it does so to keep Americans buying their product.

In a subsidy one group is favored over another, which means redistribution of resources from other sectors to the favored sector.

chart from Google

China's exports account for 35% of the GDP, alternatively this means the rest of her economy is shouldering the burden of the subsidies.

In addition, if China is subsidizing her exports then it also means that by keeping the yuan "artificially cheap", her subsidies extend to the American consumers. So how bad can it be for Americans?

And such dynamic is seemingly being reflected on the growing clout of US discount behemoth Walmart to influence the production methods of her Chinese suppliers,

This from the Washington Post,

``Wal-Mart has more than 10,000 suppliers in China. In addition, about a million farmers supply produce to the company's 281 stores in China. If Wal-Mart were a sovereign nation, it would be China's fifth- or sixth-largest export market. So the company hopes that small measures taken by all suppliers start to add up. Its 200 biggest suppliers in China have already trimmed 5 percent of their energy use.

``In the past, environmental concerns have taken a back seat to growth in China and to costs for Wal-Mart. And China and Wal-Mart have come under sharp criticism for conditions in factories. Yet pollution now threatens China's growth; as a result, awareness of climate change and energy security has spread in China. Likewise, as consumers grow more environmentally aware, Wal-Mart's executives have responded. On Thursday, the company pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 2015."

In short, politicos when caviling over currencies are looking only looking at superficial and not on structural issues.

-The problem of US joblessness isn't an issue of China stealing jobs but instead of domestic bubble policies as earlier explained in Why Americans Are Jobless

-Lastly, it is simply foolish and highly pretentious to believe that foreign policies based on antagonism or belligerency will alleviate US economic woes.

Even if we assume that China yields to Americans, as shown above, this won't solve their problems. So failure to do so would only prompt blood lusting politicians to ask for more interventionism that may lead not only to a trade war but to a risks of military confrontation.

Importantly, it would seem that egotism has overwhelmed rationality such that by threats to slap protectionism aggravates and not helps the US predicament. Remember the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act?

It is such hypocrisy for these dunces to proclaim that they are working for the common good when they are, in fact, agitating for a great depression.

As the UNCTAD recently wrote, (all bold highlights mine)

``Amidst continued financial crisis, the question of the global trade imbalances is back high on the international agenda. A procession of prominent economists, editorialists and politicians have taken it upon themselves to “remind” the surplus countries, and in particular the country with the biggest surplus, China, of their responsibility for a sound and balanced global recovery. The generally shared view is that this means permitting the value of the renminbi to be set freely by the “markets”, so that the country will export less and import and consume more, hence allowing the rest of the world to do the opposite. But is it reasonable to put the burden of rebalancing the global economy on a single country and its currency? This policy brief contends that the decision to leave currencies to the vagaries of the market will not help rebalance the global economy....

``It is time to break with a sterile polemic that ignores the increasing evidence from a range of experiences showing that both absolutely fixed/pegged and fully flexible/floating exchange rate systems are suboptimal. These so-called “corner solutions” have added to volatility and uncertainty and aggravated the global imbalances . With this as a starting point, the debate can move forward to explore new common formulas for exchange rate management that increase consistency between trade and financial flows in a globalized economy.

``In order to address global imbalances coherently, governments need to act in the same spirit of multilateralism that characterized the international fiscal response to the crisis at its most critical moments in 2008. A coherent approach to restoring balanced trade calls for policies that address and prevent currency speculation at the global level. Even those who criticize governments for stabilizing exchange rates and intervening in financial markets generally recognize that a viable long-term solution to the problem of massive trade distortions and global imbalances cannot be expected from individual central banks trying to find a unilateral solution to a multilateral problem like the exchange rate."

Quote Of The Day: Renminbi Ad Absurdum

Professor Donald Boudreaux of Cafe Hayek strikes at the heart of the US government and mainstream's arguments for China to revalue...

``If this argument is correct, why doesn’t Beijing arrange for the yuan’s value to be even lower – say, $0? If the Chinese were simply to give yuan to Americans, Americans’ demands for Chinese exports would soar even higher. China’s export industries would boom even more magnificently. And presumably (according the logic of Uncle Sam’s argument) the Chinese would prosper even more splendidly, if more unfairly, at the expense of Americans.

``Because the Chinese don’t give the yuan away for free on foreign-exchange markets, do they reveal themselves to be really not so clever and financially savvy after all?!"

Mercantilism: Misunderstanding Trade And The Distrust Of Foreigners

One of goal is to expose on false doctrines peddled by mainstream media.

Here is another example of the fixation of the currency "magic wand" solution to global ills.

In a recent article by the Economist, the woes of Japan's diminishing share of world trade has unfairly been pinned to its firming currency.

From the Economist, ``Its 10% slice this year will equal that achieved by Japan at its peak in 1986, but Japan’s share has since fallen back to less than 5%. Its exporters were badly hurt by the sharp rise in the yen—by more than 100% against the dollar between 1985 and 1988—and many moved their factories abroad, some of them to China. The combined export-market share of the four Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) also peaked at 10% before slipping back."

While it may be true that Japan's share of world exports have fallen, blaming the strong yen is far from accurate. There may have been some companies or industries that may be affected, but this can't be applied in the general or macro sense.

What this implies is that the article has engaged in selective perception of its presentation of facts or has engaged in fact twisting in of support of a preconceived bias, i.e. inflationism via anti-market bias currency interventions.


As you will note from the chart above by Google's public data, exports as % of GDP has been rising for the world.

This means that for most of the world's major economies, exports have been improving. This includes the BRIC's or particularly China or even the 'burdened' strong yen of Japan.

Yet, to give a better perspective, the world's GDP has been in an uptrend going into the 2008 crisis, with most of the world's economies reflecting such improvement.

In other words, the impression that China has been stealing export market share, by manipulating her currency, at the expense of Japan who 'suffers' from a strong currency is far from the reality.

Instead, what has been happening is that as globalization gets entrenched, the pie of world output has been increasing with an increasing share of contributions from more nations nations participating in global trade, particularly, from emerging markets as China.

In short, the major fallacy of the mercantilist view is the perspective that trade is a zero sum game. It isn't. In fact globalization has generally benefited the world.

And currencies, the favorite snake oil nostrum, have hardly been the determinant of the share of exports or competitiveness or economic growth. [see previous discussion: Big Mac Index: The Fallacy of Blessed And Burdened Currencies]

In fairness to the Economist, they mentioned other factors that may have helped China's expanding exports amidst a falling share of her major trading partners during the recent recession.

``Lower incomes encouraged consumers to trade down to cheaper goods, and the elimination of global textile quotas in January 2009 allowed China to increase its slice of that market."

Nevertheless, article's underlying theme seems slanted towards 'Sino phobia' -which unnecessarily portrays her as arbitrarily benefiting from the recession.

Again the Economist, ``Strong growth in China’s spending and imports is unlikely to dampen protectionist pressures, however. China’s rising share of world exports will command much more attention. Foreign demands to revalue the yuan will intensify. A new year looks sure to entrench old resentments".

Well perhaps it is more than just a misperception of the role of trade but from an anti-foreign bias endemic in the public's mind.

According to Professor Bryan Caplan, ``The root error behind 18th-century mercantilism was an unreasonable distrust of foreigners. Otherwise, why would people focus on money draining out of “the nation” but not “the region,” “the city,” “the village,” or “the family”? Anyone who consistently equated money with wealth would fear all outflows of precious metals. In practice, human beings then and now commit the balance of trade fallacy only when other countries enter the picture. No one loses sleep about the trade balance between California and Nevada, or me and iTunes. The fallacy is not treating all purchases as a cost but treating foreign purchases as a cost." (emphasis added)

Bottomline: Mercantilist solution deals with symptoms and not the cause. This means that policymakers who follow mainstream prescriptions is likely to suffer from the law of unintended consequences.

Big Mac Index: The Fallacy of Blessed And Burdened Currencies

The Economist recently published its updated Big Mac Index aimed at demonstrating whether a currency is cheap or expensive relative to the US dollar, as benchmarked to the price of the a McDonald's Big Mac Burger in the US.


According to the Economist, (bold highlights mine)

``THE Big Mac index is based on the theory of purchasing-power parity (PPP)—exchange rates should equalise the price of a basket of goods in different countries. The exchange rate that leaves a Big Mac costing the same in dollars everywhere is our fair-value benchmark. So our light-hearted index shows which countries the foreign-exchange market has blessed with a cheap currency, and which has it burdened with a dear one. The most overvalued currency against the dollar is the Norwegian kroner, which is 96% above its PPP rate. In Oslo you can expect to pay around $7 for a Big Mac. At the other end of the scale is the Chinese yuan, which is undervalued by 49%. The euro comes in at 35% over its PPP rate, a little higher than half a year ago.

Looking at the chart above, 'expensive' nations hail mostly from the Euro zone except for Australia, Canada and Turkey.

On the other hand, emerging markets, especially our ASEAN neighbors Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia have been classified along with China as "cheap".

So by virtue of association we assume that the Philippine Peso is likely to be in the 'cheap' category.

Yet reading through the article we observe that 'cheap' currencies have been reckoned as "blessed" whereas 'dear' currencies have been deemed as "burdened".

This is just an example of the perverted mainstream view [as recently discussed in Dueling Keynesians Translates To Protectionism?] which gives prominence to mercantilist ideology that the advocates "inflationism" and varied form of regulatory protectionism.

The oversimplistic idea is that 'cheapness' equals export strength and competitiveness which translates to economic growth.

Yet such preposterous prejudice is unfounded.


Based on the list of world's export giants from wikipedia.org estimates (left window), 8 nations from Europe plus Canada comprise the top 15 biggest international exporters belong to the "expensive" category. In short, a majority.

Meanwhile, only 3 of the ultra blessed 'cheapest' currency nations (Mexico, Russia and China) and marginally cheaper (South Korea and Japan) are part of the roster of elite exporters.

Moreover, in terms of competitiveness, except for Singapore, Japan and the US, 7 out of the 10 most competitive nations, according to the World Economic Forum, come from the 'burdened' expensive currency group.

In other words, the rationalization of 'cheap' as blessed and 'dear' as burdened greatly misleads because, as evidence reveals, cheapness doesn't guarantee competitiveness or export strength.

Why the mainstream's predisposition on such a view? Because of the fixation to parse on economic disequibrium predicated current account asymmetries.

Zachary Karabell writes in the Wall Street Journal that global imbalance is a myth because in no time in history has there been a global economic equilibrium.

From Mr. Karabell (bold highlights mine), ``The blunt fact is that at no point in the past century has there been anything resembling a global economic equilibrium.

``Consider the heyday of the "American century" after World War II, when Western European nations were ravaged by war, and the Soviet Union and its new satellites slowly rebuilding. In 1945, the U.S. accounted for more than 40% of global GDP and the preponderance of global manufacturing. The country was so dominant it was able to spend the equivalent of hundreds of billions of dollars to regenerate the economies of Western Europe via the Marshall Plan, and also of Japan during a seven year military occupation. By the late 1950s, 43 of the world's 50 largest companies were American.

``The 1970s were hardly balanced—not with the end of the gold standard, the oil shocks and the 1973 Arab oil embargo, inflation and stagflation, which spread from the U.S. through Latin America and into Europe.

``The 1990s were equally unbalanced. The U.S. consumed and absorbed much of the available global capital in its red-hot equity market. And with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic doldrums of Germany and Japan, the American consumer assumed an ever-more central position in the world. The innovations of the New Economy also gave rise to a stock-market mania and overshadowed the debt crises of South America and the currency implosion of South Asia—all of which were aggravated by the concentration of capital in the U.S. and the paucity of it in the developing world. When the tech bubble burst in 2000, it had little to do with these global dynamics and everything to do with a glut of telecommunication equipment in the U.S., and stock-market exuberance gone wild."

In looking at the US current account chart from globalpolicy.org one would note that deficits began to explode during the 80s.

This probably implies that, aside from the above assertion by Mr. Karabell, as the China and emerging markets got into the globalization game, the US deficits soared. This bolsters the Triffin Dilemma theory as vastly contributing to such phenomenon.

Moreover, mainstream experts seem mixed up on the participating identities of those involved in current account and trade deficits with that of budget deficits.

With budget or fiscal balancing it is the government that accrues the surpluses or deficits. In contrast with trade balances, individuals through enterprises and not nations engage in commerce.

Professor Mark Perry makes a lucid explanation, (all bold underscore mine)

``It might be a subtle point, but it's important to realize that countries don't trade with each other as countries - rather it's individual consumers and individual companies that are doing the buying and selling. The confusion gets reinforced when we constantly hear about the "U.S. trade deficit with Japan" or China, which might again imply that the "unit of analysis" for international trade is the country, when in fact the unit of analysis is the individual U.S. company that engages in trade with other individual companies on the other side of an imaginary line called a national border.

``It's possible that some of the confusion about international trade can be traced to confusion about the "trade deficit" and the "budget deficit." The relevant unit of analysis for the budget deficit is indeed the country, since it's the entire country via elected officials that is responsible for the "budget deficit." By conflating these two distinctly different deficits, it's then easy to assume that the relevant unit of analysis for both is the "country" when in fact that only applies to the "budget deficit" and not the "trade deficit."

``Once one understands that it's individual companies, not countries, that are doing the trading, then it's not so easy to get fooled by statements or headlines like "Punitive tariffs are being imposed on China," or "Obama to hit China with tough tariff on tires." Since China doesn't actually trade with the United States at the national level, tariffs cannot be imposed on the country of China - it's not like the United States government sends a tax bill to the Chinese government.

``Rather, since it is companies that are trading, it's companies that have to pay the taxes (tariffs) TO their OWN government. In the case of U.S. tariffs on Chinese tires or steel, the tariffs (taxes) are being imposed not on the Chinese government or even the Chinese steel-producers, but on American companies who now are taxed for buying tires or steel from China, and then those taxes are ultimately passed along to the individual Americans who purchase the tires and purchase the consumer products like automobiles that contain Chinese steel."

In addition, it would seem similarly incoherent and ironic to think that manipulating currencies to subsidize "exporters" would generally benefit the country engaged in such policies.

That's because as a general rule for every subsidy someone has to pay for the "subsidized" cost. In short, subsidies redistribute rather than generate wealth.

Professor Donald Boudreaux debunks the favorite fixation of the mainstream: the US-China imbalances,

``The real costs of the resources and outputs exported by the Chinese people are not lowered simply because Beijing keeps the price of the yuan artificially low. And the resources spent to supply the extra American demand that results from an artificially low price of yuan—even though they are unseen by the untrained eye—represent a huge cost that harms the Chinese economy."(emphasis added)

So not only have mercantilists been barking up at the wrong tree, they have been brazenly promoting policies that focuses on short term fixes, which favors a select political group, and importantly, raise the risks of provoking a mutuality destructive trade war.

In closing this apt quote from John Chamberlain, ``when nations begin worrying about the "balance of trade," they are saying, in effect, that the price of a currency expressed in an exchange rate is more important than bananas, or automobiles, or whatever. This is a perversion that sacrifices the consumer to an abstraction; better let the currency seek its own level in the world's money markets."

Dueling Keynesians Translates To Protectionism?

Finger pointing seems to be the favorite but fatalistic past time for self-righteous mainstream experts and their gullible followers.

Not content with assigning blame on the marketplace for last year's crisis, a further step is to engage and rebuke foreign central planners on their elected policies.

For instance, the mainstream tends to focus on global imbalances as a source of the present tensions, where savers mainly from China have been blamed for the troubles in the US, primarily by manipulating the former's currency.

Hence, the prescription from the mercantilist camp is simplistically to demand China to conform to the interests of Americans by revaluing its currency, in order to rebalance the world by regenerating the lost "aggregate demand".

And on the other end, for the Americans to devalue their currency.

In short, a waving of the magical wand in view of currency adjustments will automatically resolve today's problems in the eyes of the politically correct mainstream.

Mainstream seem to see the problem like a shower faucet that can simply be turned hot or cold. It's that simple.

Never mind, if a "manipulated" Chinese currency translates to overall cheaper goods for US and global consumers.

Yet, if we go by the words of Adam Smith consumers and not producers should be the chief concern, ``Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system the interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce."

The mercantilist policy of forcing currencies to adjust benefits a politically privileged select "producers" more than the consumers or society in general.

Never mind too, that even when some currencies had been repriced, evidence doesn't automatically extrapolate to support expected benefits.

For instance the Japanese yen, which firmed from 350 (in the 70s) to about 100 (today) remains as one of the world's major exporters, and is ranked 8th among the world's most competitive nations in 2009 according to the World Economic Forum is said to be still deficient in domestic demand after all these years of currency strength.

On the other hand, following the recent hyperinflation episode, Zimbabwe has yet to transform into a major exporting powerhouse, while the Philippines, following over 4 decade of devaluation from Php 2 to Php 55 to a US dollar, remains an underdog in terms of goods and services exports.

And if one were to argue in the context of low net wages then the Philippines, India and Indonesia should be powering ahead based on a study by UBS.

As previously argued, currencies aren't everything. Capital and economic structures, political framework and its underlying institutions aside from cultural influences essentially varies from country to country.

Besides mainstream's dogmatism on the currency panacea presumes that all products have similar price sensitivity and is sold to one class of consumers, which isn't anywhere true.

Never mind too that when the mainstream argue about oversimplified nostrums, which is for China to revalue and for the US to devalue, exports as % of the GDP for the US translates to only 11%.

This means that devaluation isn't truly directed at boosting exports at the expense of the society, but instead tacitly aimed at reducing outstanding liabilities (about 350% of the GDP) to the benefit of select industries as the banking system and Wall Street.

Never mind too that the world operates on the US dollar standard system where according to the Triffin Dilemma, expanding global trade requires US dollar financing via expanded deficits. It would appear that the mainstream sees no distinction in the economic and trade categorization of China and the US.

Never mind too that the Chinese didn't force Americans to engage in a euphoric mania to buy houses, or for US institutions to engage in excessive risk taking or for the lapses of American regulators who had been caught asleep at the wheel.

Never mind too that Americans had responded to an ad hoc cocktail mix of domestic policies that promoted a bubble:

An extended ultra low interest rate regime, administrative housing policies that encouraged speculation and subsidized mortgage indebtedness, tax policies that tilted the public's incentives towards assuming debt than equity and capital regulations that prompted for regulatory arbitrage via financial innovation.

Yet the mainstreamism parses their perception of 'macro' problems on their perceived one dimensional framework than considering the mutual or bilateral aspects.

NYU's Professior Mario Rizzo asserts that the conflicting interests of international policymakers operating on the Keynesian framework leads to a negation of their system.

From Professor Rizzo,(emphasis added)

``But, as some economists freely admit, the problem is that this pits one country’s interest against another. Either China could gain or the US could gain by manipulating exchange rates.

``Yet I cannot help imagining that a Beneficent World Planner with Keynesian views might think it equitable to permit unemployment to stay high in the US but not in China. Not only is the US safety net better, many of our poor or lower middle class are better off than Chinese workers.

``However, the ideal Keynesian solution, we are told, is to have an internationally coordinated policy of low interest rates. Of course, China has been following a low interest-rate monetary policy; credit is abundantly available. But Chinese bankers and economists have become increasingly worried about bubbles. Should they not be?

``The Keynesian world-view is skeptical of the classical liberal idea of the international harmony of interests under free trade, when the economy is operating at less than full-employment. In this world, there are definite conflicts of interest among nations. A Chinese Keynesian would not have the same views as Krugman. This is not because they differ about theory but because the theory sets up conflict. Such conflict is naturally settled by the partiality of their perspectives.

``If the Keynesians are right, this is another example of traditional microeconomic theories being annulled in their system. I suggest that the formal limitation to conditions of less than full employment is not as stringent as it sounds. Much, perhaps most, of the time the economy will arguably be in either a state of less than full employment or be threatened with some change in the news that will knock it out of full-employment equilibrium."

I would add to Prof Rizzo's position that not only would the result be a nullification but 'settled by the partiality of their perspective' via a non-zero sum game theory called the Prisoner's dilemma or a game theory which "demonstrates why two people might not cooperate even if it is in both their best interests to do so".(wikipedia.org)

This involves policymakers to either cooperate or adversely outdo or undertake policies that clashes with each other, even to the extent that they could be mutually destructive, possibly in the form of protectionism.

And indications of the partiality of political policies in the direction of an internecine trade war between two camps of opposing Keynesian practitioners seems to have emerged.

As observed by John Stossel,

``The administration continues their relentless march towards a Trade War with China:

``Trade disputes between Beijing and Washington over exports of tires, chickens, steel, nylon, autos, paper and salt are multiplying and further damaging the already tense relationship between the two economic powers.

``The Obama administration says it only aims to protect the country's rights, but the Chinese counter that the United States started the whole thing by launching an unprovoked attack".

So while China has been opening up to its neighbors, a gamut of "beggar thy neighbor" or tit-for-tat policies appears to be engaged by Keynesian adherents of both US and China at risks of another world recession or even depression.

Again John Stossel, (bold highlights mine)

``This is madness. Even if China is subsidizing their exports, the US consumer benefits at China's expense. A Trade War will simply make everyone worse off (except maybe unions), leaving consumers with fewer choices and higher prices. The Administration needs to swallow its pride and drop the tarriffs, because if the US doesn't lead on free trade, no one will. A recent study by Global Trade Alert, a trade policy think tank based in Europe, shows that global protectionism is on the rise, with the wealthiest nations imposing more than 180 protectionist measures in the last year. Congress, meanwhile, won't even bring the Colombia Free Trade Agreement to a vote".

In the past free market devotees had been deceptively labeled as ruthless 'liquidationists'. We turn the tables and ask, what should we call policymakers and their adherents who espouse on belligerent or hostile short term oriented policies predicated on ideological zealotry that places society at extreme risks?