Sand Castles From US Regulatory Reforms

“Any fool can make a rule. And any fool will mind it.” - Henry David Thoreau

Among the popular misconceptions about resolving today’s social and institutional problems is the issue of regulation.

For many (particularly for the left), the recent Financial Crisis had been a product of “free markets” or “market fundamentalism”. This notion is totally absurd.(there can be no pure free market in a world of central banking)

For instance many hold that the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act via the Gramm-Leach Bliley as responsible for today’s crisis.

Economist and Professor Luigi Zingales argues otherwise[1], ``In 1984, the top five U.S. banks controlled only 9% of the total deposits in the banking sector. By 2001, this percentage had increased to 21%, and by the end of 2008, close to 40%. The apex of this process was the 1999 passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed the restrictions imposed by Glass-Steagall. Gramm-Leach-Bliley has been wrongly accused of playing a major role in the current financial crisis; in fact, it had little to nothing to do with it. The major institutions that failed or were bailed out in the last two years were pure investment banks — such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch — that did not take advantage of the repeal of Glass-Steagall; or they were pure commercial banks, like Wachovia and Washington Mutual. The only exception is Citigroup, which had merged its commercial and investment operations even before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, thanks to a special exemption.” (bold emphasis)

On the other hand, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), whose regulations forced financial institutions to accept risky borrowers have also been held responsible.

According to Peter J. Wallison of the American Enterprise Institute[2], ``In 1995, the regulators created new rules that sought to establish objective criteria for determining whether a bank was meeting CRA standards. Examiners no longer had the discretion they once had. For banks, simply proving that they were looking for qualified buyers wasn’t enough. Banks now had to show that they had actually made a requisite number of loans to low- and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers. The new regulations also required the use of “innovative or flexible” lending practices to address credit needs of LMI borrowers and neighborhoods. Thus, a law that was originally intended to encourage banks to use safe and sound practices in lending now required them to be “innovative” and “flexible.” In other words, it called for the relaxation of lending standards, and it was the bank regulators who were expected to enforce these relaxed standards.”

Meanwhile, the Cleveland Fed downplays the role of the CRA in this crisis[3].

There has been “no consensus” as to which of the two laws had truly an adverse impact on the markets. Since there has been no perfect correlation, the ensuing tit-for-tat in the media had been reduced into a debate based on ideological slant.

In addition, we also said that the impact of laws tend to be divergent and ‘time sensitive’, where some laws could have positive interim term effects but with negative long term impact, and vice versa.

As caveat, while correlations may not appear to be outright linear, as the debate above holds; it would be misguided to attribute the lack of correlation to a single variable or to one law considering that there are many other laws or variables that also combine and or compete to expand or diminish the effects of a particular law.

Here the underlying general principles or theory will be more dependable than simply relying on statistics or math. Murray Rothard notes of the observation of John Say in distinguishing these[4],

``Interestingly enough, Say at that early date saw the rise of the statistical and mathematical methods, and rebutted them from what can be described as a praxeological point of view. The difference between political economy and statistics is precisely the difference between political economy (or economic theory) and history. The former is based with certainty on universally observed and acknowledged general principles; therefore, “a perfect knowledge of the principles of political economy may be obtained, inasmuch as all the general facts which compose this science may be discovered.” Upon these “undeniable general facts,” “rigorous deductions” are built, and to that extent political economy “rests upon an immovable foundation.” Statistics, on the other hand, only records the ever changing pattern of particular facts, statistics “like history, being a recital of facts, more or less uncertain and necessarily incomplete.” (underscore mine)

In short, trying to pinpoint the effects of one law based on oversimplified statistics to the political economy can be tricky. And this is where the left has used statistics or math to obfuscate evidences.

More of John Say from Murray Rothbard, ``The study of statistics may gratify curiosity, but it can never be productive of advantage when it does not indicate the origin and consequences of the facts it has collected; and by indicating their origin and consequences, it at once becomes the science of political economy.” (underscore mine)

Regulatory Arbitrage And Fighting The Last War

And as we earlier pointed out to the contrary, where laws are lengthy, ambiguous, partisan and subject to political discretion, they tend to be distortive and create imbalances in the system. And the impact of some of these laws indubitably accentuated the crisis.

Nevertheless there had been some policies or regulations that had relatively more material impact among the others (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Bank of International Settlements: Ingredients of the Crisis

The apodictic evidence from last crisis had been the surfacing of the “shadow banking system” (see right window).

As pointed out earlier above, one of the unintended consequences of bad laws or overregulation is to have regulatory arbitrages, where markets look for regulatory loopholes from which it exploits. These are parallel to the emergence or existence of black markets over economies that operate heavily under price controls[5].

So even the multilateral government agency as the UN via its subsidiary the UNCTAD had to admit this[6], ``Recent United States banking regulations, for example, were designed to control risk through the measured capital ratio used by commercial banks, the report says. This attempt backfired because bank managers circumvented the rules either by hiding risk or by moving some leverage outside the banks. This shift in leverage created a "shadow banking system" which replicated the maturity transformation role of banks while escaping normal bank regulation. At its peak, the US shadow banking system held assets of approximately $16 trillion, about $4 trillion more than regulated deposit-taking banks. While the regulation focused on banks, it was the collapse of the shadow banking system which kick-started the crisis.”

The lesson of which clearly is that politics, no matter how heavy handed, can hardly control the fundamental laws of economics.

Another problem with regulation is that it fights the last war.

For instance during the last bubble, the issue of prominence had been the accounting fraud from Enron, Tyco International, Worldcom, Adelphia and others that gave rise to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act[7].

Obviously, from a hindsight bias the regulation failed to make any headway to stop the recent crisis. Again that’s because markets are dynamic and seizes the next loopholes as opportunity to expand.

Nonetheless some has argued that the Sarbox law itself has been a drag to the recovery of the US. An example is this commentary from Wall Street Journal’s James Freeman[8],

``Is Sarbox to blame? Many financial pundits say no, but the SEC survey results point in the other direction. When public companies are asked whether Section 404 has motivated them to consider going private, a full 70% of smaller firms say yes, and 44% of all public companies also say yes.

``Has Sarbox driven businesses out of the country? Among foreign companies, a majority in the survey say that Section 404 has motivated them to consider de-listing from U.S. exchanges, and a staggering 77% of smaller foreign firms say that the law has motivated them to consider abandoning their American listings.”

In short, another unintended consequence of having more regulation is to raise the cost of compliance.

In a globalized market, investors can arbitrage away regulatory burden or the cost of compliance by simply transferring to where there is less onus or costs.

Figure 4 IMF: Sovereign Debt to GDP in the G-7

Yet fighting the last war means attacking past problems which may not be the source of the next crisis.

Another factor that is seemingly ignored is that the leverage, which is now a “prominent” factor, acknowledged by the mainstream seems to be building not in the previous sectors, which suffered from a bust, but instead in government debt.

As in the earlier chart (figure 3 left window) from the speech of Hervé Hannoun[9] Deputy General Manager of the BIS, low interest rates which has allowed for the chasing of yields, low volatility and high risk appetite, were outstanding features of the last crisis. However, practically the same ingredients in the past we are seeing today.

And governments are in a tight fix because, as we have been saying[10], “ governments will opt to sustain low interest rates (even if it means manipulating them-e.g. quantitative easing) as a policy because ``governments through central banks always find low interest rates as an attractive way to finance their spending through borrowing instead of taxation, thereby favor (or would be biased for) extended period of low interest rates”

So governments are operating in a policy paradox.

They pretend to know the main sources of the crisis yet are addicted to it for political reasons. An addict can hardly refuse what’s keeping them going. It’s simply path dependency from what we call as policy “triumphalism”. According to the G-20, ``The global recovery has progressed better than previously anticipated largely due to the G20’s unprecedented and concerted policy effort.”[11]

Again we are being validated.

Agency Problem And Socializing Losses While Privatizing Profits

There is another problematic aspect in regulation; it’s called the agency problem or the principal agent problem.

It’s a problem which emanates from different incentives or goals by those operating within the industry.

For instance during the last crisis, risk monitoring was fundamentally outsourced by risk buyers to the ratings agencies (yes in spite of the army of professionals). On the other hand, originators of risk securities or risk sellers tied fees due the credit ratings agencies on the credit ratings they issued which were then sold to “sophisticated” financial institutions.

Said differently, the job of credit appraisals were delegated to the ratings agencies which incidentally derived its income from the issuers of securities, and not from the buyers. Whereas buyers of securities fully delegated the role of due diligence to the ratings agencies.

So credit risks had been ignored in the assumption that someone else would do it for them. As Charles Calomiris Columbia University recently said in an interview[12], “Agency problem...Ratings agencies were a coordination device for plausible deniability."

Figure 5: The Economist: Reforming Banking

Perhaps the ultimate source of ‘plausible deniability’ comes with attendant with the current structure of the banking system-it’s basically called the fractional reserve based banking platform (see figure 5).

Bank equity as % of assets is now nearly at the lowest level since the introduction of central banking and deposit insurance.

In a BIS paper from Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England[13] writes, ``Over the course of the past 800 years, the terms of trade between the state and the banks have first swung decisively one way and then the other. For the majority of this period, the state was reliant on the deep pockets of the banks to finance periodic fiscal crises. But for at least the past century the pendulum has swung back, with the state often needing to dig deep to keep crisis-prone banks afloat. Events of the past two years have tested even the deep pockets of many states. In so doing, they have added momentum to the century-long pendulum swing.”

This means that the banking system’s ability to take more risks comes under the broadening premise of “privatizing profits and socializing losses” as the guiding policy.

This means that aside from central banking, deposit insurance is another means to “privatizing profits and socializing losses” which allows the banking system to absorb more risks, while on the hand tolerates the expansion of regulatory powers by the central bank.

As Murray N. Rothbard wrote[14], `Under a fiat money standard, governments (or their central banks) may obligate themselves to bail out, with increased issues of standard money, any bank or any major bank in distress. In the late nineteenth century, the principle became accepted that the central bank must act as the “lender of last resort,” which will lend money freely to banks threatened with failure.

``Another recent American device to abolish the confidence limitation on bank credit is “deposit insurance,” whereby the government guarantees to furnish paper money to redeem the banks’ demand liabilities. These and similar devices remove the market brakes on rampant credit expansion.”

So moral hazard and the agency problem seem to be significant factors that had been transforming the developed world banking system.

Of course there are other potential sources of regulatory problems, such as economics and behavioural aspects of enforcement, conflicting laws, a multitude of arcane laws which the public can’t comprehend, Arnold Kling’s legamoron (laws that could not stand up under widespread enforcement) and others, but due to time constraints we will be limited to the above.

At the end of the day, those building up the expectations for more regulations as elixir to the current problem would likely fail them. Why? Because there will be a new crisis down the road and hardly any of the current reforms will stop it.

Until they deal with roots of the problem, bubbles like the game called whack-a-mole will keep reappearing. Yet history says that all paper money is bound to go back to its intrinsic value-zero.

---

[1] Zingales, Luigi Capitalism After the Crisis, National Affairs

[2] Wallison, Peter J. The True Origins of This Financial Crisis, American Spectator

[3] Nelson, Lisa Little Evidence that CRA Caused the Financial Crisis, Cleveland Fed

[4] Rothbard, Murray N. Praxeology as the Method of the Social Sciences

[5] An example of this is North Korea, which recently massively devalued her currency to fight the black markets. But unlike before where policies where met with passive resistance, riots broke out from which tempered Kim’s political approach. See Will North Korea's Version Of The 'Berlin Wall' Fall In 2010?

[6] UNCTAD, Shadow banking system that escaped regulation, faith in ´wisdom´ of markets led to meltdown, study says

[7] Wikipedia.org, Sarbanes-Oxley

[8] Freeman, James The Supreme Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley, Wall Street Journal

[9] Hannoun, Hervé Financial deepening without financial excesses, Bank of International Settlements, 43rd SEACEN Governors’ Conference, Jakarta

[10] See How Myths As Market Guide Can Lead To Catastrophe

[11] Wall Street Journal Blog, Text Of G-20 Finance Ministers, Central Bankers’ Statement

[12] Calomiris Charles, Econolog David Henderson: Calomiris on the Financial Crisis

[13] Haldane, Andrew Banking on the state Bank Of International Settlements

[14] Rothbard, Murray N., The Economics of Violent Intervention, Man, Economy and State

The Smoke And Mirror Game Of Politics: Pres. Obama's Proposed Bank Tax

This would seem like a good example of how politicians engage in the game of political "smoke and mirrors" to spruce up on their images.

Pres. Obama, who appears to be working to shore up his rapidly flagging approval ratings, recently took to task the banking industry and proposed that banks be levied to cover or redeem the cost of the spate of bailouts.

The New York Times quoted Pres. Obama who said that he wanted "to recover every single dime the American people are owed."

The articles continues with Pres. Obama's strident diatribe on these banks, ``“We’re already hearing a hue and cry from Wall Street suggesting that this proposed fee is not only unwelcome but unfair,” he said. “That by some twisted logic it is more appropriate for the American people to bear the cost of the bailout rather than the industry that benefited from it, even though these executives are out there giving themselves huge bonuses.”

``Mr. Obama continued, “What I say to these executives is this: Instead of sending a phalanx of lobbyists to fight this proposal or employing an army of lawyers and accountants to help evade the fee, I suggest you might want to consider simply meeting your responsibilities” — including by rolling back bonuses."

What else would seem as the most politically appealing way to pander to the uninformed public than to piggyback on the prevailing negative sentiment by taking on the lead role in bashing the sector!

However beyond the surface of the politically enticing rhetoric, there appears to be significant undertones.

Cumberland Advisors' Bob Eisenbeis scrutinized on the possible ways how such tax might be imposed and came up with this stirring conclusion.

From Mr. Eisenbeis (bold emphasis mine),

``Whether or not retribution is justified, the proposal from the Administration makes little economic sense. Moreover, the spin that the tax is intended to recoup the losses banks caused to the TARP is misleading, because the primary sources of those losses to date have been Freddie and Fannie and the automobile companies that may be exempted from the tax.

``If there is a desire to extract revenue-retribution from large institutions, it turns out that there is no easy way to do it. If one wants to punish management then the efforts should be directed towards taxing their bonuses and other compensation. But there are four problems with this. First, most of those responsible are no longer in their positions, so it will be the new management who will suffer, not those who caused the problems. Second, taxing bonuses won't prevent another crisis. Third, there are always ways around the tax, in terms of how payments can be structured. Finally, managers of foreign institutions that might be covered can escape entirely.

``If the objective is to levy the tax according to how government support was provided, there is the issue in the case of those TARP recipients that were "forced" to take the government support even though they didn't want it. It is not clear how one can rationalize imposing a penalty on those who took the funds to support the government's rescue policies, even if those policies were misguided. Furthermore, there is no justification from the taxpayers' perspective of excluding the auto companies or Freddie and Fannie from responsibilities for losses, as well."

Read the entire article here.

Aside from the above, which exposes that the said taxes will not exact the social retribution from which these have been meant for, the far more significant points emphasized by Mr. Eisenbeis is that big banks will likely skirt these taxes by employing tax avoidance schemes through the shifting of their "funding by booking liabilities off-shore" or by utilizing "off-balance-sheet mechanisms to duplicate the traditional loan-funding-by-liabilities process".

And the brunt of which will likely be borne by "institutions smaller then the top five or six, who are mainly the regional institutions whose main business is the lending and deposit taking upon which their profitability depends".

The other way to interpret this is that the interests of the big banks will likely remain unscathed or could even be protected, by having its competitive moats widen against aspiring rivals through such tax measures.

I understand this to be crony capitalism.

And those of the smaller units would likely serve as the political sacrificial lambs for Pres. Obama's approval seeking publicity stint.

Yet, the more important victim could be the customers of these smaller banking institutions or the small and mid scale enterprises which compose about half of the GDP and more than half of the employment of the US (wikipedia.org).

And what seems as a politically correct harangue may actually be of the reverse intent, another political poker bluff aimed to buttress select vested interests group/s.

Of course since the proposed taxes have NOT been finalized yet, all these would be speculation on our part.

The aim of this post is to show how these political manipulations happen even in the US which goes to show how susceptible countries like the Philippines is, given its highly fragile state of democracy (I would agree with Joe Studwell-it's more of manipulated democracy).

Agency Problem: Examples, Risks and Lessons

Here is an example of what we've been referring to as the agency problem or the conflict of interests that may result from different incentives guiding diverse economic actors or as defined by wikipedia.org "treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent, such as the problem that the two may not have the same interests, while the principal is, presumably, hiring the agent to pursue the interests of the former".



Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story of the New York Times brings to spot a possible case, (bold emphasis mine),

``Goldman was not the only firm that peddled these complex securities — known as synthetic collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s — and then made financial bets against them, called selling short in Wall Street parlance. Others that created similar securities and then bet they would fail, according to Wall Street traders, include Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley, as well as smaller firms like Tricadia Inc., an investment company whose parent firm was overseen by Lewis A. Sachs, who this year became a special counselor to Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner.

``How these disastrously performing securities were devised is now the subject of scrutiny by investigators in Congress, at the Securities and Exchange Commission and at the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Wall Street’s self-regulatory organization, according to people briefed on the investigations. Those involved with the inquiries declined to comment.

``While the investigations are in the early phases, authorities appear to be looking at whether securities laws or rules of fair dealing were violated by firms that created and sold these mortgage-linked debt instruments and then bet against the clients who purchased them, people briefed on the matter say."

Read the entire article here.

Meanwhile Professor Arnold Kling of econolib.org makes a good explanation (bold emphasis mine),

``One difference is that financial innovation often serves the purpose of regulatory arbitrage--devising an instrument to comply with the letter of regulation while evading its spirit. Another difference is that financial innovation often is used by clever Wall Street bankers to separate less sophisticated investors from their money. In that sense, it is sort of like innovation in stealing credit card information. In the case of bankers outsmarting their clients, you can blame the victims for failing to be wary or to protect themselves."

The obvious lesson is that people's actions are impelled by divergent incentives whether it be motivated by regulatory arbitrage, profits, innovation, reputation and etc...

The second lesson is that divergence could mean conflict of interests; the cost -benefits and risk-reward tradeoffs, aside from information or knowledge can be asymmetric and opposite to the interests of the other party.

Third, while the article's innuendo is one of 'market failure' via misrepresentation, the fact is that regulators themselves have different incentives from the private or non-public economic actors which could lead to myriad forms of conflicts of interest. In other words, trying to forcibly align incentives by means of added regulations will likely lead to more distortions and/or unintended consequences.

The fact that regulatory arbitrage exists, which could be construed as a cat-mouse dynamic, is a manifestation of how private economic actors work to always circumvent current regulations.

Also, the fact that regulatory capture is stereotyped mostly in industries that are heavily regulated implies that many economic actors collude with regulators (or politicians) to "game" the system (example, monopolies, special licensing, private-public partnership and etc...).

Fourth, it is also true that with the growing sophistication of markets, diversified security instruments may be used for hedging, than simply a one-direction trade, often seen in underdeveloped markets. Hence, unless governments opts to bring society, as represented by the markets, back to the medieval ages, the question of conflicts of interest could be contentious and signify as controversial gray area.

Lastly, the ultimate lesson is nailed by Professor Kling, "you can blame the victims for failing to be wary or to protect themselves."

This means that without understanding the incentives driving the source of your information or those whom you do business with, you can increase your risks.

``Risk comes from not knowing what you're doing” warns Mr. Warren Buffett, we'd further improve "risk comes from not knowing the incentives with those whom you are dealing with"

Unintended Consequences From Europe's Agricultural Subsidy

This is another example of the unintended effects from market distorting regulations.

From the New York Times

(all bold highlights mine)

``Call it the mystery of the European sugar triangle.

``It began when Belgian customs officials examined shipping records for dozens of giant tanker trucks that outlined an odd, triangular journey across Europe. The trucks, each carrying 22 tons of liquid sugar, swung through eight nations and covered a driving distance of roughly 2,500 miles from a Belgian sugar refinery to Croatia and back — instead of taking the most direct, 900-mile route.

``Along the way the trucks made a brief stop in Kaliningrad, a grim and bustling Russian border checkpoint on the Baltic Sea.

``Suddenly the sugar triangle made sense to them. Because Russia, and not Croatia, was listed as the intended destination, the shipments qualified for valuable special payments known as export rebates from the European Union’s farm subsidy program.

``Some 200 shipments roared along this route over a three-year-period, investigators say, earning 3 million euros in refunds (about $4.5 million) for the Belgian sugar maker Beneo-Orafti. In the spring, dozens of Belgian and European investigators raided the company’s offices, freezing half of its refunds and initiating an investigation that could cost the company the remaining 1.5 million euros, and possibly more. In the sprawling European subsidy program — which lavishes more than 50 billion euros ($75 billion at current exchange rates) a year in agricultural aid — no commodity is more susceptible to fraud, chicanery and rule-bending, experts say, than simple household sugar."

Regulatory arbitrage according to wikipedia.org is "where a regulated institution takes advantage of the difference between its real (or economic) risk and the regulatory position".

Simply put, where some people try to profit from regulatory loopholes. The New York Times call this "cookie jar waiting to be pilfered"

Additional notes from the article:

-impact of price control via subsidies...

``Critics have long said that Europe’s subsidy system distorts the market, skewing competition and driving up prices. That is especially true for sugar, which in Europe has traded at roughly double the world market rate for almost two decades. European sugar prices are the highest per capita of any region in the world and about 20 percent higher than in the United States.

-failed goals

``But investigators say that fraud and rule-bending also contribute significantly to higher costs, because of the millions lost in uncollected revenue and in the payment of undeserved subsidies."

-spawns illegal activities...

``In addition, there are continuing investigations in Germany, Hungary and Belgium into cartel activity aimed at fixing prices and dividing up customers and territory."

``Perhaps the most common scheme used to game the system is to mix in cheap cane sugar from abroad with European beet sugar, which lowers production costs and increases volume. Companies doing this often falsely declare the country of origin for the sugar, which is illegal.

-producers confused with the bureaucratic maze...

``Sugar companies claim their activities are misinterpreted because they are governed by a byzantine European Union system that invites confusion. “It’s very complicated” and difficult for anyone to understand, said Dominik Risser, a spokesman for the Südzucker Group, a German company that is the industry giant in Europe and owns 40 factories in 10 nations, including those of Beneo-Orafti.

-producers or traders devise schemes to evade or circumvent regulations and taxes

``The mixing schemes extend into exotic hybrids — sugar mixed with dashes of tea and cocoa. By doing this, exporters can declare their products processed foods, and thus pay lower customs fees or avoid them altogether."

All these translates to a failure of policy or regulations.

Let me add that such distortive regulations will further put a strain on the global food supply chain as monetary stimulus from global central banks gains more traction, heightening the risks of a food crisis.

It's time to abolish such subsidies.

Tomorrow’s Investing World According To The Bond King

``Get your facts straight, apply them to the current valuation of the market, take decisive action, and then hold on for dear life as the mob hopefully comes to the same conclusion a little way down the road.”-William Gross, 2+2=4

The highly reputed Bond King PIMCO’s William Gross suggests that the global investment climate have radically been transforming where ``future of the global economy will likely be dominated by delevering, deglobalization, and reregulating”, from which the investment sphere would lead ``to slow global growth, a heightened risk aversion, a distrust of conventional investment model portfolios, and a greater emphasis on surviving as opposed to thriving.” (bold highlights mine)

Protectionism From Reregulation

Seen from a general sense, the idea seems true. For instance, aside from a sharp drop in global trade and investment flows as a consequence to the near US banking collapse last year, recent signs of deglobalization include the steep decline in migration trends especially from the corridor of Mexico to the US (New York Times) or the emergence of protectionism from policies aimed at “protecting ” locals-interest groups and not the local population-and the subsequent trade frictions in reaction to these policies such as the recent escalating row between the US and Canada over pipe fittings (Washington Post).

However, the chaotic reregulation in the misguided and the convoluted premise of the market’s inability to self-regulate is likely to spawn an even deadlier backlash.

Policy measures, which piggybacks on noble sounding myopic populism, have immediate beneficial solitary effects but at the expense of long term and far larger and wider damage to the system. And in the case of the pipe fittings, the political boomerang appears to have generated a greater impact than from the immediate intended benefits for the privileged groups.

And as the Washington post aptly reports, ``With countries worldwide desperately trying to keep and create jobs in the midst of a global recession, the spat between the United States and its normally friendly northern neighbor underscores what is emerging as the biggest threat to open commerce during the economic crisis.”

``Rather than merely raising taxes on imported goods -- acts that are subject to international treaties -- nations including the United States are finding creative ways to engage in protectionism through domestic policy decisions that are largely not governed by international law. Unlike a classic trade war, there is little chance of containment through, for example, arbitration at the World Trade Organization in Geneva. Additionally, such moves are more likely to have unintended consequences or even backfire on the stated desire to create domestic jobs.” (emphasis added mine)

Yet, this may serve as a casus belli for a global trade war which requires our vigilance. So reregulation seems to be inspiring more of “risk aversion” than containing it-again another unintended consequence.

Delevering Isn’t Equal

However where we depart with Mr. Gross’ outlook is on the premise of delevering.

The notion of delevering implies of a world, including the Philippines, equally swamped by an ocean of debt.

In the Philippines, it is the public sector and NOT the private sector (household or corporate) that has significant debt exposure. But the public sector has been “delevering” since the Asian Crisis in 1997. So this observation, while true in many or most of the OECD economies, is far from being accurate yet from many of the Emerging Market’s standpoint. I say yet because present policies could drive the public to indulge in a debt spree.

Moreover, the notion of delevering puts into the prism that the world revolves around the US only. Similar to the defective idea that “decoupling is a myth”, recent events have disproved much of this misplaced conventional academic expectations as the world seems to be recovering earlier than the US, see charts in Investing "Ins" and "Outs": US led Global Economic Recovery and Decoupling a "Myth". Thereby, deglobalization and reregulation will likely accentuate the decoupling process as previously discussed in Will Deglobalization Lead To Decoupling?.

In the layman’s perspective, globalization can be interpreted as a process of world integration via the trade, investments, migration, and financial channels. A more globalized world should imply of more “recoupling”. On the other hand, deglobalization does the opposite.

Further, while many debt overstretched private sector in the OECD economies have indeed been “delevering”, governments have been substituting these losses with its own massive debt expansion binge see figure 1.

Figure 1: Economist: Pumping It Up

Savings rich and foreign currency surplus laden Asian nations have commodious room to undertake lavish fiscal stimulus.

If the policy options for Asian economies has been to choose between stashing US dollars at the cost of risking currency losses from a devaluing US dollar and spending these domestically then it would appear that Asia has opted for a “politically favorable” profligate public spending option-that’s because they can afford it!

US And China Pursues Diametric Policy Directions

Yet while many economists ascribed the recent the recent “outperformance” to these government activities, our take is much more of the “unseen”- aggregate colossal liquidity, the inherent low systemic leverage in the region, high savings, greater thrust towards regional integration in spite of the financial crisis, the aftershock of “Posttraumatic Shock Distress (PTSD)” effects and creative destruction have been the major driving force around Asia’s resurgence.

For instance, while the US seems to be antagonizing its closest and friendliest neighbor and ally Canada with “closed door” policies, China, on the other hand, has been aggressively adapting “open door” policies with erstwhile archrival, Taiwan.

Recently both key Asian countries announced more transportation linkages via new shipping routes, and the expansion of direct airway routes, aside from the easing of once prohibited investments where according to the Time magazine, ``For the first time, mainland investments would be allowed in a broad range of Taiwan manufacturing and services companies. China Mobile, the mainland's largest cellular-service provider, has already agreed to invest about $530 million in Taiwan's Far EasTone Telecommunications, although the landmark deal has not been approved by Taipei.”

Tax incentives have also been extended by China to the Taiwanese investors (Bloomberg).

Moreover, such collaboration hasn’t been confined to the economic plane but also extends to the world of politics, again from the Times Magazine, ``In perhaps the most hopeful sign of change, China recently relaxed its longstanding opposition to Taiwan's inclusion in international organizations. After being rejected since 1997, Taiwan was finally invited this year to be an observer at the World Health Assembly, the governing body of the World Health Organization — the first time it has participated in a U.N.-related forum since Taiwan lost its U.N. seat to China in 1971.”

In short, the underlying trend of policies undertaken by the US and China have been running on a diametric path. So if incentives drive human action, seen from the vastly divergent aggregate policies undertaken, then obviously the expected returns, considering the risks variables, should likewise be different. This view runs in contrast to mainstream ideology, who does not believe in incentives but on the inexplicable effervescent impulses of “animal spirits”.

So yes, the atmosphere where “heightened risk aversion”, a “distrust of conventional investment model portfolios” and “greater emphasis on surviving as opposed to thriving” most probably is applicable to the defunct US centric financial paradigm and the fast evolving politicization of the US economy which seemingly has become increasingly hostile to its business environment.

But we suspect that this path shouldn’t necessarily apply to Asia or to emerging markets unless a global trade war erupts.

Delevering In A World That Rewards Leveraging, Profiting Around Regulations

Yet delevering should be seen in the “right” context and not from a generalized point of view. We shouldn’t interpret some trees as representative of the forest. This is the Achilles’ heel of macroeconomists whose inclination is to oversimplify events.

Specifically, delevering is a market process being experienced by the private sector (mostly the housing and financial industry) in key OECD economies. This has not been valid relative to its counterparts for most of the Asian or Emerging Market economies-especially in the Philippines.

Aside from the thrust to replace private delevering with government leveraging, the collective policy thrusts by global governments has been to resurrect the status quo ante of systemic leveraging by imposing aggregate policies (Zero bound interest rates, Quantitative Easing, etc.) that encourage the “buy, speculate and spend” incentives, which effectively penalizes savers.

So systemic delevering isn’t likely to happen yet unless a global government bond bubble goes ka-boom which isn’t distant from our perspective.

Incidentally, Mr. Gross has been staunchly supportive of the same unsustainable serial bubble blowing interventionist policies. Mr. Gross expects the US Federal Reserve to buy more long term treasuries in order to keep mortgage rates down. However, we can’t say as to how long artificial rates can be maintained by the US Federal Reserve’s manipulation and distortion of the marketplace, considering the huge amount needed to “fix” the price of the treasury markets. But we understand that interest rates in the US are ultimately headed higher, and Mr. Gross thinks so too as revealed by actions-PIMCO has reportedly been selling US Treasuries.

It would appear that world’s bond king’s alpha (extra or premium returns) has been to arbitrage from regulations and maybe that’s why his strong support for interventionist policies.

Negative Chain Effects from Regulatory Arbitrage: The AIG experience

In the Freakonomics blog, Daniel Hamermesh commented on a review of Kat Long’s The Forbidden Apple where he notes of how prohibitions have triggered unintended consequences.

Mr. Hamermesh wrote, ``The review describes a number of incidents where efforts to ban or restrict transactions in one market spilled over with negative consequences into a related market.

``To eliminate drinking on Sundays, New York City restricted it to hotels. In response, bars created makeshift hotel rooms, separated by dividers, which in turn created a burgeoning prostitution business. To avoid having men buy a drink in a bar in order to use the only publicly available restroom, the city opened public restrooms. But this created places where gay sex could proliferate.

``Both of these examples illustrate the law of unintended consequences: actions that restrict quantity or price in one market will affect them in related markets. Indeed, they may even create markets that nobody had heretofore imagined. No doubt there are many other, equally prurient examples.” (bold highlight mine)

Mr. Hamermesh’s remarks reminds us of how the “restrictions” based regulatory arbitrages in the financial sector spawned “related markets” in derivatives, the shadow banking system and other “structured finance” instruments.

As Paul Farrell wrote in the marketwatch.com in 2008, `` The fact is, derivatives have become the world's biggest "black market," exceeding the illicit traffic in stuff like arms, drugs, alcohol, gambling, cigarettes, stolen art and pirated movies. Why? Because like all black markets, derivatives are a perfect way of getting rich while avoiding taxes and government regulations. And in today's slowdown, plus a volatile global market, Wall Street knows derivatives remain a lucrative business.” (bold highlight mine)

These innovative vehicles ultimately served as the principal financing conduits or the “black markets” which fueled the colossal real estate bubble that subsequently shaped today’s crisis.

Essentially the banking system which sought for higher yields took advantage of legal loopholes to assume more risks by leveraging up. Hedge instruments became speculative and Ponzi financed.

Although the actions of the "bailout cultured" banking system had been partially typical of an arbitrageur, which as Michael Mauboussin of Legg Mason says is driven by “The idea is simple and intuitive: a smart subset of investors cruise markets seeking discrepancies between price and value and make small profits closing those aberrant gaps.”

Chart from Michael Mauboussin of Legg Mason

Nonetheless Chris Whalen of Institutional Risk Analytics gives an example of how AIG morphed from an insurance and reinsurance business model to a Ponzi by virtue of “regulatory arbitrage” or “may even create markets that nobody had heretofore imagined” (Daniel Hamermesh)…

``One of the first things we learned about the insurance world is that the concept of "shifting risk" for a variety of business and regulatory reasons has been ongoing in the insurance world for decades. Finite insurance and other scams have been at least visible to the investment community for years and have been documented in the media, but what is less understood is that firms like AIG took the risk shifting shell game to a whole new level long before the firm's entry into the CDS market….

``One of the most widespread means of risk shifting is reinsurance, the act of paying an insurer to offset the risk on the books of a second insurer. This may sound pretty routine and plain vanilla, but what most people don't know is that often times when insurers would write reinsurance contracts with one another, they would enter into "side letters" whereby the parties would agree that the reinsurance contract was essentially a canard, a form of window dressing to make a company, bank or another insurer look better on paper, but where the seller of protection had no intention of ever paying out on the contract…

``It is important to understand that a side letter is a secret agreement, a document that is often hidden from internal and external auditors, regulators and even senior management of insurers and reinsurers….

``It appears to us that, seeing the heightened attention from regulators and federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI on side letters, AIG began to move its shell game to the CDS markets, where it could continue to falsify the balance sheets and income statements of non-insurers all over the world, including banks and other financial institutions.

Read the rest here