Sunday, February 15, 2015

Clash of the Titans: Phisix 7,700 in the Face of a Steep Flattening of the Bond Yield Curve!

There are numerous virtues and vices that account for the rise and fall of societies. Near the top of the list are the two opposites, humility and pride. . . . Pride sprouts and grows from ignorance and self-blindness. Those with a haughty spirit foolishly believe they know the most, whereas they know the least-Leonard E. Read

In this issue:

Clash of the Titans: Phisix 7,700 in the Face of a Steep Flattening of the Bond Yield Curve!

-Philippine Bonds: The Flattening Dynamic Intensifies!
-What a Continuing Steep Yield Curve Flattening Means: Clue—Not A Boom!
-Phisix 7,700: Casino Stocks CRASH Anew!
-Phisix 7,700: Surging Store Vacancies at Many Shopping Malls!
-Record Stock Market and the Smoking Risk Debate Analogy
-How to Lose $ Billions in 2 Years

Clash of the Titans: Phisix 7,700 in the Face of a Steep Flattening of the Bond Yield Curve!

Record upon record.

Philippine equity markets carved a fresh record on the same routine: manic bidding of overpriced securities punctuated by serial marking the close or index management.

Yet it is the foundation or the health of the stock markets that determines the sustainability of its actions and accompanying the tradeoff between risk and returns for investors.

And it is not just the Philippines but record or milestone high stocks have been occurring worldwide, mostly in US, Europe, Asia despite mounting uncertainties in the economic, financial and even the geopolitical sphere.

Yet the 2008 bear market provided me several insights;

-Bear markets can happen even with little or minor fundamental impairments. This has been the case for Philippine equities where corporate and from statistical economy has hardly been affected by the Lehman episode. Yet the Philippine stocks endured a crash predicated on a contagion from a global liquidity crunch. 

-Bear markets happen when fundamentals deteriorate as with the US and Europe’s experience.

-If bear markets have precipitated by global factors, there will be no decoupling.

So risk factors should be identified from external and domestic origins.

And this week’s record Phisix comes with deepening domestic fundamental divergences.

In this issue I highlight three: Intensifying flattening of the domestic yield curve, crashing casino stocks and ballooning incidences of store vacancies at shopping malls.

Philippine Bonds: The Flattening Dynamic Intensifies! 

One of the common rationalizations of today’s record stocks has been that negative real rates have eviscerated risks on stocks and debt. The idea is that rising stocks and ballooning debt are free lunches for as long as rates remain zero bound or at negative in real terms.

I have already explained here using elementary logic why even at zero bound, debt financed spending is no free lunch[1].

Yet the present developments in the domestic bond markets reinforce the dismantling of the myth that negative rates are a free lunch to debt.

The significance of the yield curve as explained by a professor at the University of Rhode Island in a presentation (bold mine): “(1) Related to inflation and growth expectations (2) Affected by monetary policy (3) A real-time economic forecast by the bond market.”[2]

The presentation further deals with the different slopes of the yield curve.

On the one hand, “an upward-sloping Yield Curve is a forecast of economic growth to occur (or continue) in the future - the steeper is an upward-sloping curve, the more growth and/or inflation is expected in the future.”

On the other hand, the opposite, “It should be fairly obvious that when the Yield Curve flattens, banks become less profitable, as NIM falls, and if the Yield Curve becomes inverted (longer-term rates below short-term rates), bank profits disappear and financial stocks begin to underperform”. NIMs are the bank’s net interest margins.

The reason I used a presentation from a school lecture is to demonstrate on the importance of the signals from the yield curve from a basic level.

Now the flattening dynamic as seen from the financial mainstream.

From About.com[3]: (bold mine) However, economic slowdowns generally have a dampening effect on inflation. This tends to reduce the risk, and therefore interest rates, on long-term debt. The net effect is a flattening, or actual inversion, of the yield curve, with short-term loans growing more expensive and long-term loans growing cheaper, driven largely by investor expectations of a rocky road in the near future.

The above applies to the US where bonds (long term government debt) are seen as “risk free”. In emerging markets, flattening of the yield curve have usually been about short term yields rising faster than the long term equivalent.

The flattening of the yield curve thus represents a transition towards an inversion.


Last December, I wrote about the Philippine bond selloff. A die hard zealot of this phony boom countered that this has merely been an aberration. Such sentiment, which has been representative of the consensus, shows that nothing wrong can ever happen today. 

Well, two months after the Moody’s upgrade, a month since the Philippine $ 2 billion of international bond issuance, the recent string of record breaking stocks, and the alleged 4Q 6.9% GDP, the flattening of the domestic yield spread have only deepened!

Flattening spreads has now pulled farther away from December levels (see right)!

Given that Philippine local currency bonds have been a tightly held market by both the banking sector and by the government, I have been expecting the cabal to massage the market as they may have done to the Phisix.

Last week there seem to have been an attempt. What resulted has been a deviation: some spreads appear to have widened (spiked) while others continued narrow. In short, a botched effort to manipulate the curve.

This week, activities in domestic bonds negated all the deviances from last week’s activities.

Now all spreads based on 10 and 20 year minus 6 months, 1 year and 2 year seem in unison. Flattening yields have been accelerating! And this has been led by rising yields of 3 and 6 months and the 1 year which have all returned to near December highs! Yields of 2 year treasury hardly budged during the soothing period from the Philippine government’s bond issuance.

As a side note, the international bond issuance gave a breathing spell to the country’s forex reserves as seen via the GIRs which marginally rebounded last January, and to the domestic currency the peso which thus far has been up .9% against the US dollar year to date. My guess is that this about to reverse. 

Additionally the inversion of the yields of 4 relative to the 5 year have become wider (violet square shows the start of the inversion)!

The seeming intensifying flattening dynamic shows not only that “short-term loans growing more expensive”, but importantly a market induced tightening of the system’s liquidity! 

Ironically, the current flattening dynamic has been one “anomaly” that has been continuing!

The flattening dynamic should also be an eye-opener, since there are only a few (concentrated) holders of Philippine treasuries, the implication is that recent developments has hardly been a revelation of dandy conditions, instead they signify as progressing entropy that has been camouflaged by record stocks and by statistical blandishments.

What a Continuing Steep Yield Curve Flattening Means: Clue—Not A Boom!

Some possible implications from a continuing yield flattening dynamic.

With spreads tumbling fast, the incentives to lend diminish.

This means domestic credit activities will decline. And because real formal economic growth has been financed by credit growth or real formal economic growth have become dependent on credit, what has been seen as “aggregate demand” by the mainstream will head south or growth in the real formal economy will stagger. 

[Oh yes government statistics may continue to exhibit cosmetic strong G-R-O-W-T-H, but all these will reverse once real micro problems surface!]

Loan portfolios constitute about half or 50% of the banking system’s assets Php 11.159 trillion as of December based on BSP data. This implies that much of the earnings growth from the banking system has been derived from loans. Thus a slowdown in loan activities will eventually hurt bank earnings mostly through the loan channel. 

Additionally, financial assets comprise about 20% of the banking system’s balance sheets. Since values of financial assets have mostly been a product of surging credit growth, reduced credit activities postulates to eventual pressures on the values of financial assets. Once financial assets reveal signs of strains, ancillary activities related to financial assets such as commissions or fees will also backtrack. Thus a slowdown in loan activities will also eventually hurt bank earnings through the financial assets channel.

And because of the previous torrid pace of the rate of growth of credit activities mostly from the banking system, “short-term loans growing more expensive” should imply a tightening of credit.

And such tightening extrapolates to likely increases in the incidences of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) or expose on the deterioration of credit conditions in the banking system’s portfolio. The rise in NPLs will impact banking and financial system’s balance sheets. And this comes as loan conditions stagnate. Aggravating such conditions will be a downturn in other banking and finance activities anchored on sustained inflation of financial assets.

For banks, the flattening dynamic should eventually filter into general earnings conditions.

And for stocks, a concise way to say this is that a continuing yield flattening dynamic means that the fuel to the present record stocks has been draining fast.

So a slowdown in credit activities as consequence from a continuing flattening dynamic will be transmitted to economic, financial market and credit risk conditions.


BSP data on December’s bank credit activities has already been manifesting signs of this. Except for the hotel, the major sectors have posted a sharp slump in credit loan growth rates.

This explains the school lecture which I quoted above that “It should be fairly obvious that when the Yield Curve flattens, banks become less profitable, as NIM falls, and if the Yield Curve becomes inverted (longer-term rates below short-term rates), bank profits disappear and financial stocks begin to underperform”.

There are policy implications too.

The current flattening dynamic comes as the BSP has maintained its rates this week. 

Lately in his spiel over the risk from global deflation, the BSP chief, Amando Tetangco Jr., has signaled the BSP’s willingness to respond to changes in conditions (exact words: We do not pre-commit to a set course of action) since they are “data-dependent” as noted last week. This has been a euphemism or a signal by which the BSP has opened the doors to ease or cut rates.

But the BSP seems hesitant to make this outright because of the potential perception from the public to project rate cuts with economic weakness ahead. Infringing on the G-R-O-W-T-H image is a taboo. It’s showbiz everywhere, from business to the economy to the BSP’s monetary policies, to politics and even to the government statistics.

So the BSP chief issued instead a trial balloon to see how the market responds. I bet that there will be more accounts of the deflation spin story coming as part of the conditioning of the marketplace.

Yet hasn’t it been a coincidence that intensifying flattening activities came in the light of BSP’s recent announcement to keep rates at present level? The domestic bond markets seem to be pressing on the BSP to ease! 

Yet the current flattening dynamic only reveals that the time window of efficacy from BSP’s monetary actions and the government’s action has been thinning. Should the BSP accommodate the bond holders, like the January $2 billion international bond issuance, the easing’s anodyne effect will likely be a short term one.

Said differently, domestic balance sheets problems, as revealed by the flattening dynamic, have been growing fast enough that may be rendering BSP actions impotent. This phenomenon is known in the mainstream as “pushing on a string”. 

The bottom line: Philippine bond markets have been signaling a vastly different story than record stocks.

The growing divergence between stocks and bonds is simply not sustainable. One of them will be proven wrong.

Also actions in the bond markets also shows that even at zero bound or negative real rates, debt is NO free lunch.

Oh by the way, on a very much related note, yields across the curve of Japanese government Bonds (JGB) have been on a rip! Could these signify as the bond market’s ongoing (one month) strike against the Bank of Japan (BoJ)? Will the BoJ accommodate the desire for more easing? Or will this herald an inflection point for BoJ’s subsidy to the Japanese government and their private sector allies? 

Record or milestone high stocks in the face of imbalances at the edge!

Phisix 7,700: Casino Stocks CRASH Anew!

Actions in the bond markets reflect not only inflation and growth expectations, monetary policy, the term premium but also credit developments.

Before this some numbers on the Phisix.

This week’s record Phisix 7,700 comes with a weekly market breadth in favor of decliners whom dominated 3 days of trading days. Peso volume has been dwindling even when this has been padded by special block sales. Special block sales, mainly due to Metro Pacific’s Php 8.9 billion offering last Tuesday February 10, have accounted for 20% of total peso volume for the week. Even the wild trade churning has been moderating.

Market internals have been suggesting for a pause from the blistering run, but index managers would have none of this. As noted above, record stocks have been a result of last minute pumps on select popular heavy weights in two trading sessions last week.

Obviously the next attempt is 7,800. Since stocks can only rise, so the hysteric pumping and pushing.

But of course, since record Phisix has been about popular biggest market cap issues, there appear to be parts of the markets that have been meaningfully diverging.

Yes this week’s record Phisix has masked a crash. Monday, February 9th, the big three major casino stocks tailspinned!


Traveller’s International Hotel [PSE:RWM], operator of Resorts World, got smoked by 4.22%! Bloombery Resorts [PSE: BLOOM] operator of Solaire Casino tanked 11.64%! Melco Crown (Philippines) [PSE: MCP] operator of newly opened City of Dreams cratered 10.18%!

At the close of the week, Bloom was able to recover half of the day’s loss down by 4.97%, MCP hardly came back and closed deep in red or 9.44% while RWM closed the week down 4.37% reflecting a slight additional loss (see right window).

Year to date the losses has been massive: MCP has dived 27.98%, RWM bled 17.7% while Bloom shed 10.48%. The scale of losses runs opposite to the degree of gains by the popular issues. This can be seen by the ordeal of casino stocks during the last four months (see left).

One irony is that previous meltdown has been spearheaded by heavy foreign selling, but last Monday’s crash was basically about local investors. Have locals become aware of the growing risks from casinos or have they just been influenced by the momentum and movements in Macau or Singapore?

Yet unlike crashing Macau stocks which most likely will be an issue of earnings, losses from domestic casinos will not just be about earnings but about DEBT or credit risks. I have to admit, I haven’t looked at financial statements of Macau casinos so my presumption over the quandary upsetting Macau’s casinos may be inaccurate. 

Yet if RWM’s 3Q 2014 financial statement should give us a clue, then the casino business haven’t been revealing the promises that have been meant to be. 

On a quarterly basis, RWM’s gaming and non-gaming revenues grew by only 2.9%. On a year to date the same top line data has skidded by 14.2%. This means that 1H 2014 was a drag to RWM. Has RWM high rollers shifted to the competitors only to return in 3Q?

The admirable thing RWM did was to slash debt by a huge Php 4.2 billion! But despite this, the company still has an enormous pile of Php 13.5 billion in liabilities to reckon with.

RWM’s debt payment has been the biggest since Resorts World opened in 2009. The debt chart can be seen here. Why so? Have recent actions abroad prompted operator and owner to see things more conservatively? Or could they be sensing trouble ahead?


It’s a different story for RWM’s competitor Bloomberry which raised Php 11.4 billion in private placement deals via corporate notes reportedly for expansion. (news) (3Q 2014) Raising debt via corporate bonds effectively padded Bloom’s debt by 74%.

In late 2014, media gushed over the company’s Php 3.3 billion of net profit in 3Q which they most likely projected into the future. They forgot all about the Php 11.4 billion in debt.

Yet the recent casino selloff hasn’t been as dramatic with Bloom as compared to her peers. Why? Because grandiose plans and recent sales will shield her from the woes afflicting the competitors?

Meanwhile, MCP which operates on the recently opened City of Dreams has a debt of Php 14.690 billion based on 3Q 2014 FS.

As of the 3Q 2014, 3 major casinos have among them Php 57.22 billion of debt. This is a smidgen compared to San Miguel’s Php 461 billion!

Those high rollers from China should start streaming in soon. Otherwise there will be a small segment of domestic bettors from which the 3 majors will be competing intensely to serve.

This has been the current dilemma that has plagued Singapore’s two glitzy casinos; Las Vegas Sands’ Marina Bay Sands Resorts and Genting’s Resorts World Sentosa. The decline of Chinese gamblers has led Singapore’s two casinos to undercut each other to gain market share from a limited population of domestic gamblers. The result of which has been sizably prune profits which has been reflected on their respective share prices. Such fierce competition has even turned into acrimonious conflict waged over at media.

And the huge non-gaming capacity expansion by these companies will add to the inventories of the numerous malls and hotels sprouting all over the metropolis. Has the recent sellers of casino stocks realize that the plight of the casinos have been indirectly connected to the other sectors? Considering that the Philippine financial economy has been very shallow in terms of penetration level or participation by the population, how tightly linked are financiers and investors of casinos with that of the other property segments?

Going back to the flattening of the yield curve, has demand for short term debt by casino operators intended to fund operational financing gaps been contributing to influence “short-term loans growing more expensive”?

Phisix 7,700: Surging Store Vacancies at Many Shopping Malls!

It’s not a propensity of mine to make a claim without providing evidence.


Last week I gave a clue that one of the malls has shown vacancy rates that may have likely exceeded 10% of total retail space for lease.

A panoramic glimpse of the upscale Edsa Shangri-la mall from the elevator reveals immediately 13 vacancies. (left photo taken February 5, 2015, this may be subject to change).

If we add the former Tokyo Tokyo, this makes 14. But I heard that the prime Tokyo Tokyo space has been under negotiation.

The above photo accounts for just one of the many blocks of shop vacancies that seem to have suddenly emerged during the last quarter at the said mall.

Since the original mall has about 300 stores, the new mall, the East Wing, has about 160 stores, a 10% vacancy rate would imply 46. If my estimates are correct that number has been exceeded. But most of the vacancies can be found at the original mall.

Nota Bene: Life is dynamic so changes can happen as I write this. But I do not expect any sharp improvement.

Over the past two weeks I have been shopping mall hopping. And I discovered that this has not been a phenomenon exclusive to EDSA Shang. Many other malls have shown significant increases in vacancies, but not as much as the EDSA Shang. Even the most popular malls—where I didn’t expect to see one—surprised me. 

Interestingly some vacancies have even occurred in high traffic areas! This defies the common perception that malls operates like public parks.

In the dotcom bubble, the misperception was that “eyeballs” (site traffic) can be monetized. This led to massive overvaluations. In today’s shopping mall equivalent, some believe that traffic equals sales. Yet current vacancies prove that this hasn’t been so. There are many factors that affecting sales, like competition, economic conditions, price, regulations, and more…

Based on my observation, the vacancy rates from the various malls I visited has ranged somewhere from 1.0% to over 3%. In absolute terms, these figures are small. But remember, coming from a base rate of almost full occupancy, the surge in vacancies appear to be significant. They are signs of trouble.

Of course it is more than just vacancies, the other consideration is the turnover rate. Many of the vacancies I saw have indicated new tenants and some have just opened.

As I wrote back in April 2013[4] (bold mine)
For shopping malls, the “periphery to the core” would start from the mall areas with the least traffic and from marginal malls or arcades.

Surpluses amidst a boom which implies high rents, high cost of operations such as wages, electricity and other inputs prices, would place pressure on profits of retail tenants competing for consumers with limited purchasing capacity.

Periphery to the core would mean initially fast turnover from retail tenants on stalls of lesser traffic areas and of marginal malls. Then the length of vacancy extends and the number of vacancy spreads. 

Leveraged malls and arcades thus will suffer from the same vicious cycle of cash flow problems and eventual insolvencies that will impair creditors and will spread to many sectors of the economy.
Remember changes always happen at the margins.

What has been truly stunning has been the near simultaneous closures by many stores over a very short window, particularly during December to January. There are even some February closings.

It can be easily deduced that stores sales have plummeted prior to and through the holiday season for many stores to have shut down!

Hasn’t 4Q GDP supposedly been a boom, given the headline numbers of 6.9%? Yet statistics seem to have departed from street activities.

Too give the government some credit, the 4Q 6.9% GDP report revealed of a collapse in retail GDP. 

As I recently wrote, But surprise, the retail growth rates in 4Q 2014 plummeted from 6.1% in 3Q to 4.1% 4Q or by 2%! In percentage terms that would be tantamount to a 33% decline—a crash!

Such astounding collapse in retail GDP seem to have been manifested in the surge of shop vacancies at the various shopping malls. Yet you got to wonder how the government came up with the HFCE numbers (in the expenditure segment of the GDP) which doesn’t seem to square with retail activities (industry segment of the GDP). Or how can a collapse in retail GDP translate to a “growth” in HFCE or household final spending?

Yet the collapse in 4Q retail GDP shares the same period where CPI posted negative month on month in November and December (yes m-o-m CPI has become positive January), the substantial drop in growth rates of OFW personal remittances last November, contracting month on month liquidity during November and December and a slowdown in BSP credit activities as shown above.

Of course the surge in store vacancies at many shopping malls backed by a slump in 4Q retail GDP has been a symptom of a disease. The underlying disease of which has been the malinvestments caused by financial repression (negative real rates or zero bound) policies

Based on the chart I have shown last week. Let me reiterate the numbers

Based on current prices, the statistical GDP grew by 70.2% over the past 6 years. Annualized this would be about 9.3% (again this is current prices, the 6.9% 4Q GDP are 2000 prices). Household final demand or consumer spending represents about 70% of the expenditure side GDP. For the same period, consumer spending grew by 73.43% or by 9.61% yearly.

Now look at the growth rate of the trade industry. For the same period, trade GDP grew by 105.1% or by 12.77% a year.

So what does the above numbers say? Household spending growth has been at 9.61% annualized, while trade GDP grew at 12.77%. The numbers tell us that the supply side has been growing 33% (12.77%/9.61%) more or faster than consumer spending!

This data doesn’t show income growth which is the ultimate source of growth.

So what happens when the supply grows faster than consumers? Well common sense or economics 101 tell us that the Philippine economy will have more supply or EXCESS CAPACITY.

That’s the secret of the Philippine boom all captured in a single chart.

But here is more: If you add the BSP component, it shows how the overbuilding has been financed by leverage or 177% loan growth to the retail industry or 18.5% a year.

In terms of credit intensity or growth rate of GDP/Bank loan, every 1% growth by the retail industry has been financed by 1.68% growth in banking loans (177/105).

So we have not just been seeing excess capacity we are looking at excess capacity financed by debt!

Now excess capacity financed by an inundation of leverage has been manifesting itself on the yield spreads of local currency sovereign bonds.

The flattening yield dynamics now has served as a natural barrier to aggregate demand based policies founded on credit expansion.

Yet underneath the flattening curve dynamics I greatly suspect developing balance sheet problems.

And those constrained balance sheets will slow capex that leads to lower income growth. And lower income growth will filter into consumer demand that will get reflected on higher turnover rates and store vacancies at the shopping mall.

This is an example of the asymmetric linkages in a complex economy.

Of course, no trend goes in a straight line. There will be bounces.

Nevertheless, unless income growth grows faster than supply side growth, expect that vacancies to become a new trend.

Realize that overcapacity in shopping malls has brought about a “dead mall” spiral in the US or ghost shopping malls in China.

Are you aware that the world’s largest mall (based on gross leasable area), China’s New South Mall has a vacancy rate of NINETY NINE percent since it opened in 2005???!!! From Wikipedia.org: Total spaces: 2350, Unoccupied: 2303.

Meanwhile, one of the largest ghost city of China in Ordos, Inner Mongolia includes “a series of doom-struck towers, grey office buildings, flats and shopping malls – and most of them are completely empty”, according to Gizmodo.

What does the consensus think the Philippines is: Immune to the laws of economics?

Record Stock Market and the Smoking Risk Debate Analogy

Stocks at record levels—pillared by sheer pump and by index manipulation in the face of severe mispricing via overvaluation, total disregard of valuations and risks, harassed consumers from previous episode of inflation, the sustained and even acceleration in the flattening of the domestic yield curve, ballooning debt levels, emerging signs of overcapacity in several parts of the real economy, as well as developing external risks all over the world (which even the BSP chief recognizes)—doesn’t seem like a sustainable dynamic.

In the hat of an investor, while the markets may rise, the balance in the tradeoff between risk and returns seem to have been greatly tilted in favor of risks.

Thus positioning on popular or mainstream stocks in the face of great risks looks very much like a vice rather an investment.

So here is a fictional anecdote characterizing the outlook of the majority of the stock market participants as analogized in the context of “smoking risk” debate.
In an informal occasion, I stumble at an old friend who divulges that he consistently smokes two packs of cigarettes a day. So I mention to him that since studies reveal that smoking has an 86% chance of leading to lung cancer, he bears enormous risk of acquiring the disease if he continues to smoke at the current rate. My friend smiles and bids adieu.

Two years after, at a gathering, the same friend and I share a roundtable with many other guests.

And the following discussion ensues:

My friend rationalizes: “Do you recall two years ago, you warned me of smoking? Look I’m alive and kickin’. I have NO lung cancer. And I feel absolutely great! So you are wrong. Because, I feel great, I have even DOUBLED DOWN. I now smoke four packs a day!!! Believe me, nothing bad will happen or will ever happen from smoking alone! But thanks for your concern.”

The person seated beside my friend conforms and addresses me: “Like your friend, my friends and I have been smoking about two packs or even more a day for the past few years. And like him, nothing has happened. So those risk studies are a quack. Smoking does no harm. It’s all in the mind. The going gets good, so why then should we stop?...”

Across the table, another person, who also acquiesces, argues from a different standpoint. In a stentorian tone he interjects: “…Besides everybody has been doing it. When everybody does it, this means that those opposed have only been a minority. And because they are a minority they are wrong, Vox populi, vox Dei! It’s not about studies or risks. It’s about what the majority thinks and believes! Since the majority has been having fun, then this can’t ever be wrong! But who cares about risks? As Tyler Durden at the Fight Club would say “Let the chips fall where they may”. There is no stopping the majority from having fun! Only fools will attempt to do so, but they do so in vain…”

The persons seated next to the majoritarian jibes: “…and all opposition to the smoking should be censored!”

An industry representative lubricates on the no smoking risk hysteria and provides ‘expert’ confirmation to the biases of the crowd: “You see smoking is fun. The more you smoke, the more the fun. Our company has studies that show health risks from smoking have been greatly overstated. For instance, the adrenalin rush from “surge” smoking reduces stress. This diminishes, if not offsets, the physical risk aspects from smoking. This means that health risks have all been an illusion peddled by alarmists to stop you from having fun. Media support us. Here, I show you the statistics...”

The man from the industry also resorts to the appeal to the majority: “…And as testament, just look around.” Pointing to the early speakers…“These guys here…are all having fun!” Then looking at me he cavils, “But the non-smokers, I repeat, the non-smokers have been missing out!” Then he looks at the rest to punctuate his point, “Would you like to be a loser and miss out on the party of winners?”

But he whispers to himself: “BUT if all of you should stop smoking, the greasing of my employer’s pocket stops, this means I’d lose my job!”

Another person, a media personality, with proclivities toward a home bias adds a new dimension in support of the consensus: “The risk all comes down to the genetic makeup of the race. Our genes have stronger resistance to the hazards of intense smoking than the rest of the world. The error of those anti-smoking studies has been because they have lumped people as one or they have ignored the inherent structural ramparts built into our genes! Because of this, I smoke as much too! Since I began my intense smoking just a few years back, like them, I am also staying alive with no lung cancer! We are more immune but the others are at risk! So smoke on!”

[As a side note: you can replace genetic/genes with territorial boundaries/borders to highlight the nationalist theme. For instance, “The risk all comes with the territorial borders.” —Benson]

In response to the last comment, a former smoker turns recidivist along with a non-smoker, who suddenly transforms into a convert. They jointly profess: “Damned, look at the years I have missed from the fun of smoking! I have had it listening to these negative pronouncements. Because it did not happen to them, then nothing bad will also ever happen to me! So will anyone please give me a cigarette now?”

Turning to the industry man, the proselytes ask, “And where do I buy reams of your cigarettes?”

Also at the table, another guest who stopped smoking a few years back, dithers and mumbles to himself: “Oh how could I have been so dumb enough to have missed partying with them! I must have missed a world! But still, I sense something terribly wrong with way these people smoke. Or perhaps I have not been entirely persuaded by both camps. So I will just watch. But, if nothing happens to these smokers, then this will keep haunting me for staying on the fence!”

Hearing the discussion, the serving waiter, a bystander, who turns out to be a straddler, adds to the discussion: “Ah, I’m mostly with the smokers. But…but, I fear that the risks hazards could also pack some truth. Anyway, to ensure that I get the best of both worlds, I smoke only one pack a day…sometimes…but rarely…two. Hopefully this may not qualify as risk! You see, doing so means that I possess a Monopoly ‘get out of jail free card’!
At the end of the day, all actions have time inconsistent consequences. Or said differently, the consequences will be different in the short term as against the long term. As with smoking, this is what record stocks will be all about. Yet the consensus has been seduced to popular talking points while ignoring the negative long term ramifications of their present actions.

How to Lose $ Billions in 2 Years

Finally since stocks are at record after record highs, I’m quite sure you’d hear at parties people raving and blustering, “I made blah & blah % in yada yada yada stocks”. That’s nice. This would be true if the returns have been realized and pocketed away. But if the holdings remain open then they are only paper profits. And if sold, where stocks have been plowed back to prices at current levels, and if a reversal occurs and current position be left hanging, paper profits will vanish.

It’s like winning in horse racing. After the excitement and self-gratification, the tendency is to plunk down the prize money back to the races over the coming days. At the end of a period, all the gains have been returned to the horse racing facility with additional losses or total losses exceeding gains by miles.

How do I know? I was once a jai-alai and horse racing aficionado until I learned of Austrian economics.

Yet if the stocks of companies positioned at by the market speculators go bankrupt, they become wallpapers. How do I know? My beloved Dad left me a legacy of mining stocks, which was the fad of their stock market glory days. They transformed into wallpapers. Unfortunately so had been my Dad’s dreams

If stock positions have been financed by leveraged, and the market reverses, not only will paper wealth vanish, losses will likely be amplified due to leverage.

How do you think Brazil’s former tycoon Eike Bastista’s $25-35 billion of paper wealth in 2012 became NEGATIVE $1.2 billion in 2015? Or what is the secret to lose $26.2 or $36.2 billion in a little over 2 years?

The answer: (speculative) G-R-O-W-T-H driven by G-R-E-E-D financed by D-E-B-T!




[2] University of Rhode Island The Yield Curve, Stocks, and Interest Rates (Leonard Lardaro)

[3] About.com The Yield Curve

Saturday, February 14, 2015

JGB Watch: Cracks in the JGB Bubble? Yields Spike Across the Curve!

Very interesting turn of events in Japan’s sovereign debt markets last week…

From Nikkei Asia: (bold mine)
The yield on newly issued 10-year JGBs touched a two-month high Friday, driving the yen higher against the dollar on the one hand and putting a damper on stocks on the other.

The benchmark yield has been climbing since Jan. 20, when it hit a record low of 0.195%. Growing market skepticism over the Bank of Japan's quantitative easing policy is cited as a major reason.

A Ministry of Finance auction of five-year JGBs proved lackluster Friday, with the bid amount dropping to the lowest level since April 2013. JGB sell-offs ensued after the auction, and the long rate surged 3.5 basis points at one point to 0.435%.

Bond uncertainty is rippling through other financial markets. The Japanese currency swung around 0.5 yen higher against the greenback at one point in Friday trading, while the Nikkei Stock Average's slide picked up speed.

An interest rate spike calls for skepticism over the effectiveness of the BOJ's monetary policy," said Minoru Uchida of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ. "With no additional easing on the radar, the weak-yen scenario backed by easy money is losing ground."
First of all, we can do away with the negative spin that recent actions by the JGB has been a “damper on stocks”.

For the week, the Nikkei has been up 1.5% and the Topix 2.27%. Year to date, as of Friday’s close, both equity bellwethers have been up 2.65% and 2.97% respectively

image

Also we can do away the claim that “Bond uncertainty is rippling through other financial markets”. That’s because Europe and US stock markets are at record levels while as much 16% of global bond markets have been negative yielding according to the Wall Street Journal Money Beat Blog

As for negative bond yields, we have come point where savers and lenders even pay borrowers to lend money!

With credit risk priced out of existence, it’s a sign of a massive breakdown of incentives undergirding the current global financial markets. It’s now about borrow, borrow, borrow and spend spend spend!

With savings and production sidelined, all the rest of growth statistics have transformed into smoke and mirrors!

But there is another potential reaction from negative yields, which has not been in the radar screens of policymakers…cash hoarding! Some dynamic we are likely to see in the future.

Back to the uncertainty effect of JGBs. The yen was up this week against the US dollar by about .3% this week. Where destruction of the currency has been seen as a benefit, then a rising yen may have been perceived as part of “uncertainty”


image

10 year JGB yields have been on the upside since a month ago as shown in the chart from Investing.com. So this has little to do about a rippling effect…so far.

And rising yield has been across the yield curve 1, 2 and 3 year (they had been at the negative zone last month but has now moved into the positive), the  5 year 7 year, 9 year, 15 year, 20 year, 30 year and 40 year have all resembled the 10 year (as seen from a 1 year perspective). So milestone high stocks comes in the face of a bond market selloff!

But aren’t JGBs supposedly an example of “we owe it to ourselves”? 

The unstated purpose of Abenomics  has been to vanquish interest rates, which should lower debt servicing cost thereby buying time for the Japanese government to manage her increasingly untenable debt levels. Another undeclared purpose has been to inflate away her debts.

Unfortunately, what seems may not turn out as reality.

The lackluster demand for the 5 year JGBs auction which added to the surge in yields last week, and where rising yields again has been a one month dynamic, exposes on the myth that government debt is a free lunch. JGBs are sensitive to the markets after all!

image

The share of JGBs held by the Bank of Japan via Abenomics has now risen to 25%.

According to Japan Macro Advisors: In terms of the BoJ's market share in the JGB market, it renewed its new peak. In January 2015, the BoJ owned 25.6% of the JGB market, measured in value, and 20.9% measured in aggregate duration risk. We expect BoJ's market share will exceed 30% by the end of 2015, and approach 40% by the end of 2016.

So by siphoning liquidity out of the JGB markets, the ramifications of BoJ’s actions has been to increase volatility. Such volatility has emerged in the form of reduced demand for JGBs that has spiked yields. Current events may signify as the unintended long term consequences from the BoJs inflationary policies.

As far back during November 2013, I quoted a market participant who called the end of the JGB market: “The JGB market is dead with only the BOJ driving bond prices...These low yields are responsible for the lack of fiscal reform in the face of Japan’s worsening finances. Policy makers think they can keep borrowing without problems.”

I have also warned in the past that not only has the BoJ sucked liquidity out of the system, and not only has QE broken the price discovery mechanism of the JGBs by skewering the incentives of the marketplace, importantly there will be other implicit effects via the banking and financial system: “Such massive misalignment in the JGB markets entails magnified unseen risks in Japan’s banking and financial system who owns a bigger share of JGBs. And the possible channels for these could cover collateral, capital adequacy and more…

Thus JGBs have been a ticking time bomb (which I previously called this a potential Black Swan).

Finally the article above has a a striking quote from a market participant: “An interest rate spike calls for skepticism over the effectiveness of the BOJ's monetary policy”

Has the BOJ been losing credibility? Have markets been embolden to fight or defy them? Has rising yields represented a “short” on the BoJ? Are these signs of a possible inflection point? If so, will this spillover to the other major financial markets?

Hmmmm. We will see.

Friday, February 13, 2015

My Son’s Art Blog: The Harmony of Painting

My youngest son has a penchant for art, so he has recently opened a blog to publish his portfolio.

image

His latest the “Red Petals” has been intended for Valentine’s Day.

If you are interested with paintings, pls do drop by my son’s blog: The Harmony of Painting

Thanks.

yours in liberty

Benson

China’s Xiconomics: The Comeback of State (and Crony) Capitalism

I haven’t been actively posting lately as I have been shopping mall hopping and writing private my observations to my clients.

Anyway, in the past, I have been a skeptic on the trumpeted liberalization reforms by the Chinese government. For instance, I wrote then, “However, implementation will mark the difference from rhetoric”

Also I have been saying that the so-called anti-corruption campaign has been nothing more than consolidation of power by the incumbent government by jettisoning the old political order: “anti corruption campaings have usually been euphemism for or disguise on political persecution”

The Chinese government has been exhibiting a multitude of actions that have been  anti-market; as I recently noted:  “The Chinese government has launched “targeted easing” last June, has resorted to selective bailouts of firms which almost defaulted last July, imposed price controls on stock market IPOs last August, injected $125 billion over the last two months and announced the schedule of the Hong Kong-Shanghai stock market link on November 17, 2014”

I also noted then that current statistical growth targets have been channeled through state owned enterprises: “And part of the Chinese government’s selective bailout on the economy has been to use State Owned Enterprises to take on the slack abandoned by private developers, take for instance current developments in Guangzhou, where “China's state-backed developers are making unprecedented investments in Guangzhou, as the private firms that have dominated the wealthy southern city for decades grapple with tight liquidity and Beijing's corruption crackdown. The waning fortunes of the "Guangzhou Five Tigers" - the city's big private developers - are giving state-owned enterprises the chance to muscle in on one of China's most prestigious property markets for the first time.

I guess all these have become so obvious that the mainstream has seen it too.

From Nikkei Asia (bold mine)
As Beijing's deeper involvement in economic affairs suggests, pundits were wrong to assume that Chinese leadership would let market forces transform the country's economy. On the contrary, China seems eager to leverage the scale of its government-owned enterprises to snag lucrative orders overseas.

China CNR's ascent is a case in point. The company said on Jan. 26 that it signed a 4.11 billion yuan ($660 million) contract to supply railway cars to Boston's subway system. Japan's Kawasaki Heavy Industries also bid for the U.S. contract, but could not compete against the low price offered by the Chinese rival.

Under Beijing's approval, state-controlled China CNR struck a deal to merge with another state-owned rival, CSR. The merged entity, which will effectively control the domestic market, will dwarf its global competitors in sales. Armed with its massive scale, the new company is expected to bid for a high-speed railway project in California.
The comeback of state and crony capitalism
At a meeting held in January, Premier Li Keqiang made clear the government's intent to help infrastructure-related companies land order overseas. In fact, Li has been jetting around the world promoting China's high-speed rail systems, nuclear power plants and other infrastructure.

Li was a leading advocate of economic reform based on market principles. Overseas news media dubbed his vision of market-led economic growth "Liconomics." Judging by the premier's recent comments and actions, however, the policy to unleash more market forces has been wound back.

During the third plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, in autumn 2013, leaders agreed on a plan to tap the power of the private sector to reform an economic system centering the government and state-run enterprises. The centerpiece of this reform was to bring private competition into areas dominated by state-owned companies.

But in reality, Beijing has been allowing the birth of bloated state-owned enterprises through mergers.
What seems isn’t what has been. 
It was initially believed that Xi shared the same reform-minded vision as Li. The president's crusade against corruption had been interpreted as part of reform efforts. By getting rid of vested interests within state-owned enterprises, especially in the oil, electricity and coal industries, Xi has also weakened political rivals who draw power from those businesses. This gives the president more power to dismantle state-owned monopolies and pave the way for reforms, or so the thinking went.

That Beijing has been allowing large state-owned corporations to combine and become even bigger, however, suggests that was not his intention at all. It seems Xi's economic policy is more aligned with his oft-stated vision of realizing the great revival of the Chinese people, rather than introducing more market forces.

Instead of privatizing state enterprises and pursuing higher productivity, Xi appears to be aiming to expand China's influence in the world. If this in fact is his vision, "Xiconomics," in essence, is about using state capitalism to cultivate overseas markets and make up for slowing domestic growth. Such a policy puts China on a crash course with developed countries not only in the political and military realms, but in economics as well.
Market based reforms, where?

Xiconomics has all been about political power. In the context of economics, it is the equivalent of jumping the frying pan and into the fire.

Sunday, February 08, 2015

Rationalizing the Record Phisix 7,700

If you look at the typical stock on the New York Stock Exchange, its high will be, perhaps, for the last 12 months will be 150 percent of its low so they’re bobbing all over the place. All you have to do is sit there and wait until something is really attractive that you understand. And you can forget about everything else. That is a wonderful game to play in. There’s almost nothing where the game is stacked in your favor like the stock market. What happens is people start listening to everybody talk on television or whatever it may be or read the paper, and they take what is a fundamental advantage and turn it into a disadvantage. There’s no easier game than stocks. You have to be sure you don’t play it too often. You need the discipline to say no. –Warren Buffett

In this issue:

Rationalizing the Record Phisix 7,700
-False Investment Flows and Blind Confidence
-Marking the Close as Confidence Booster?
-Record Phisix 7,700 Equals Overtrading!
-Phisix 7,700: BSP Chief Express Concerns Over External Forces
-China’s PBOC and Danish Central Bank Panics!

Rationalizing the Record Phisix 7,700

This week Phisix broke through the 7,700 levels. Record after record.

False Investment Flows and Blind Confidence?

The PSE’s press release on the ninth record streak (bold mine): Year-to-date, the PSEi has broken through new record highs 9 times. It has also posted a 6.9 percent gain since the start of the year. "We are pleased with the market's movement in the last five weeks. The record numbers registered by the index highlights the level of investor confidence in our market. We hope that our initiatives to raise awareness about investing at the PSE to fund managers here and abroad will see more investment inflows into our market," PSE President and CEO Hans B. Sicat said.

First of all, the fact is that there is NO such thing as investment flows. For every buyer of a security there is a matching seller, the matching is expressed via peso (buy) per peso (sell) trades. What changes is the composition of the stock market ownership. For instance if foreign funds are buying, then the sellers would be local entities and vice versa.

This is not meant to nitpick on the PSE but to show how real exchanges work.

What record prices have been indicating instead has been the degree of aggressiveness of buyers to bid up prices relative to sellers.

It’s not about flows.


Over the past 5 weeks, there has been an “improvement” in foreign participation, but this has mostly been from special block sales of FGEN (January 21), JGS (January 22) and GTCAP (February 3)

Yet the PSE has not clearly stated why record after record stock levels should highlight as foreign investment attraction. 


The year to date performance accompanied by the PER ratio of the entire Phisix basket demonstrates how the Phisix has reached the current levels. The arrangement in the chart has been ranked according to market weightings as of February 6 close.

The green rounded rectangle on the left reveals of the quality and quantitative aspects of 7,700

There have been 12 stocks (with 6% and above) that have buoyed the Phisix while the rest has been underperforming the bellwether. Remember the Phisix has posted 6.9% returns year to date.

The above implies that the pump and push has not only been in the most popular trades but on the biggest market caps! In short, these stocks have been mostly responsible for Phisix 7,700. The concentration of pump on the biggest market caps, which has been a continuation of the trend from 2014, has led to nose bleed PERs (see right boxes).

Basically the top 15 issues have PERs at celestial levels, ranging from 18 to 50!

Let me cite an example. Consumer stock URC declared that for 2014, profit growth came at 15.2%. In 2014, URC’s stock price generated 73.3%. This means that markets paid a shocking premium of 4.82% for every 1% earnings growth. Such pump has led to URC’s PER to 40+ (45.87 as of February 5 based on PSE data)!

As a side note, the reason I chose URC is because I just came across their first quarter performance (last quarter 2014) 12.6% performance.

Let us do some back of the envelop calculations and grant the past will project into the future where 2014 will repeat in toto this year.

At the end of year, URC’s stock price will be at 340 (196 * 73.3%) while EPS will jump from (Thursday’s close 204/ PER 45.87) 4.45 to 5.13 or 15.2% earnings growth. This implies PE at 66.28!

Such level of valuations will become an attraction for foreign investors? Perhaps for Wall Street high rollers or momentum traders financed by carry trades, but not serious fund managers.

As shown in the above, all these have nothing to do G-R-O-W-T-H, but about speculative orgies founded on the catchphrase of G-R-O-W-T-H. Domestic punters have become like Pavlov’s dogs, conditioned to pump and push at every citation of G-R-O-W-T-H. But instead of dogs drooling in the sound of ringing of the bells, when media, politicians and experts utter G-R-O-W-T-H, punters go into a blind hysteric bidding spree! Risk and valuations have been thrown under the bus!

Yet how much of these bidding orgies have been financed by debt?

Marking the Close as Confidence Booster?

Third, it doesn’t seem that 7,700 Phisix has been all about the “level of investor confidence”.

Record 7,700 Phisix as noted above has been about concentration of pumps on popular and biggest market cap stocks. The Phisix year to date performance can be squared with the “marking the close” activities or attempts at managing the index. 

“Marking the close” is supposed to be a violation of the Philippine Securities Code but yet such practice has become rampant.

Record 7,700 Phisix has now been seen as a ONE way street. Corrections are simply not tolerated. Last week’s major marking the close has been used during corrections.

Last Monday February 2 (see left pane), the Phisix fell by as much 99 points or by 1.3% but the index managers ensured that losses will have to be mitigated. So the last minute pump resulted to the Phisix down by only 59.2 point or by .77% or .53% of the losses evaporated from a manic buying spree at the last minute. (charts above from technistock and colfinancial)

The same has been applied to the session on February 5, where marking the close reduced losses to just .54% (see middle). A minor “marking the close” became part of 7,700.

The serial “Marking the closes” has created a false perception of level of confidence. What it has really done has been to contribute to the ludicrous mangling of the pricing discovery system that has spawned outrageous mispricing of domestic securities.

As I have been saying the higher the Phisix, the greater the risks. This means that instead of sound market dynamics, Phisix 7,700 signifies a symptom of progressing financial instability.

Yet I am not sure that foreigners will see attractiveness in markets that have been gamed.

Record Phisix 7,700 Equals Overtrading!


The “I belong to the mainstream” crowd claims that the peso volume has been “heavy”. The claim is meant to justify the pump by appealing to the majority. Yet “heavy” really depends on data or reference points of comparison.

On an absolute level this has hardly been true or PSE data suggests the contrary. While peso volume (averaged on a daily basis) has been rising, peso volume remains off from the May 2013 levels. So far, current levels have reached the taper tantrum selloff volumes. And a significant chunk of current volume has been helped by huge special block sales.

What has really been a standout has been the number of daily trades. Trade churning has bloated by an astounding 50% from 2013 highs. The swelling of trade churning perhaps has likely been less about the growth of retail trades but more about, as I suspect, the managing of the index.

Historically, overtrading has been symptoms of a market top or market inflection points. Historian Charles Kindleberger sees overtrading as a symptom of a progressing “mania” where he noted[1],
The result of the continuation of the process is what Adam Smith and his contemporaries called ‘overtrading.’ This term is less than precise and includes speculation about increases in the prices of assets or commodities, an overestimate of prospective returns, or ‘excessive leverage.’ Speculation involves buying commodities for the capital gain from anticipated increases in their prices rather than for their use. Similarly speculation involves buying securities for resale rather than for investment income attached to these commodities. The euphoria leads to an increase in the optimism about the rate of economic growth and about the rate of increase in corporate profits and affects firms engaged in production and distribution
And how asset inflation tends to camouflage imbalances…
Even though bank loans are increasing, the leverage—the ratio of debt to capital or to equity—of many of their borrowers may decline because the increase in the prices of the real estate or securities means that the net worth of the borrowers may be increasing at a rapid rate.
And how asset inflation incites a bandwagon effect applied to social status and the credit system…
A follow-the-leader process develops as firms and households see that others are profiting from speculative purchases. ‘There is nothing as disturbing to one’s well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich.’ Unless it is to see a nonfriend get rich. Similarly banks may increase their loans to various groups of borrowers because they are reluctant to lose market share to other lenders which are increasing their loans at a more rapid rate. More and more firms and households that previously had been aloof from these speculative ventures begin to participate in the scramble for high rates of return. Making money never seemed easier. Speculation for capital gains leads away from normal, rational behavior to what has been described as a ‘mania’ or a ‘bubble.’
Phisix 7,700: BSP Chief Express Concerns Over External Forces

And yet while officials of the PSE have been patting their backs on the record after record levels, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas honcho, Amando Tetangco Jr., continues to raise the prospects of risks from the external environment.

In a recent speech he said[2]: (bold mine)
The steep decline in oil prices has complicated the market appreciation of the outlook for monetary policy in 2015.  Some analysts say, the Fed would be hard-pressed to hike rates by any significant measure (as in June this year) if oil prices continue to drop because inflation in the US will be soft.

In addition, low oil prices increase the risk of deflation in the EU and Japan, raising the likelihood that more easing measures would be put in place.

In other words, ladies and gentlemen, whereas markets used to have the confidence in the trend of monetary policies, this new uncertainty from oil price movements is now seen to heighten volatility in financial markets by unsettling investor risk appetite and unseating inflation expectations.

Further, a continued decline in oil price could also change the balance of global growth prospects. There will be winners and losers if low oil prices persist.  While the decline in oil is a dampener to inflation and could raise purchasing power for oil importers, it could also result in a loss of revenues for oil producers and lead to weak aggregate demand. With overall global growth still fragile, the significant drop and the weak prospects in oil prices have gotten more analysts discussing the risk of deflation in recent weeks.
Nonetheless while the BSP chief sanitizes and downplays the risks to the Philippine economy due to the alleged “strong environment”, he sees a potential reemergence of market volatility. 

Also the BSP chief seems to signal the possibility for them to lower interest rates.
Our initial projections using lower oil prices show that inflation would still be within the target range for 2015, which is now lower at 2-4 percent compared to the previous year’s target of 3-5 percent. Indications of easing inflationary pressures owing in part to the decline in international oil prices as well as signs of robust domestic economic growth allow the BSP some room to maintain its current monetary policy stance. Even so, we do not pre-commit to a set course of action. As I have always said, the stance of monetary policy will remain data-dependent.

One thing we keep in the back of our minds is that prices can reverse and often very quickly. If you have been in this market long enough – as I believe some in the audience have – you know that markets tend to get ahead of themselves.  So, we continue to watch developments in the oil market carefully and how these affect inflation and growth dynamics, to see if there is any need to make adjustments in the stance of policy.

Remember what I wrote last week on the 4Q 6.9% GDP[3]?
if the BSP, suddenly cuts rate for one reason or another, say below inflation target, or external based alibis, then this proves that 4Q 6.9% GDP 2014 has all been a Potemkin Village.

In the same speech, the BSP chief denies the risks of deflation, supposedly due to the “ramping up of government spending”, yet this outlook overlooks Japan’s experience.

Following the bursting of the stock market and property bubble, in the 90s Japan’s government engaged into a spending spree but failed to create meaningful growth. Reason? Japan’s economy had been shackled by a mountain of non-performing loans and by a refusal to let the markets clear. Japan’s economy stagnated for decades (continuing until today, hence Abenomics) with CPI prices fluctuating between marginal increases and slight decreases. Such ‘lost decade(s)’ have been misinterpreted by the mainstream as ‘deflation’ when this has been about stagnation.

As a side note, record Phisix 7,700 came as Bank of Japan’s governor Haruhiko Kuroda rang the opening bell for the PSE last Friday. The BoJ’s chief has been the architect of Japan’s incredible divergence, milestone stock market performance in the face of an economic recession! The BoJ’s visit to the Philippines has reportedly been about arranging for peso credit facilities for Japanese companies backed by yen as collateral. With the BoJ so far intent on destroying the yen, the BoJ wants the BSP to accept Japanese collateral with vastly diminishing value. The peso has been climbing against the yen since January of 2012 and has gained 57% as of Friday’s close from the same period. [I understand that currencies may be hedged, what this does is to spread the risks but not to diminish it]. Yet local punters seem to project to BoJ’s Kuroda: if you can do it we can do it! Be careful of what you wish for.

Going back to the BSP, statistics isn’t economics. 

Debt represents the intertemporal distribution of spending activities. Borrowing money to spend simply means the frontloading of spending. The cost of debt financed spending today is spending in the future. Debt will have to be repaid at the expense of future spending. Of course there are productive and non-productive debts. But policies of financial repression via zero bound rates tend to promote non-productive ‘speculative’ and consumption debts.

The BSP fails to understand that having too much debt, which constrains balance sheets, will undermine real economic growth. The transmission mechanism from balance sheet problems will affect prices and subsequently the economic coordination process. The mainstream sees this as lack of aggregate demand when they are in fact balance sheet imbalances. Debt is not a free lunch, not even government debt. McKinsey Quarterly estimates that global debt grew by $57 trillion since 2007 where debt to GDP has reached 286%! Why do you think the negative interest rate policies adapted by many central banks? 


And one only needs to look at the growth conditions of loan and statistical GDP to see how disproportionalities have been mounting in the Philippines.

From end of the year 2008 to end of the year 2014, or in 6 years, production or supply side banking loans has inflated 125% (CAGR 14.51%) whereas gdp (at current prices) has only amassed 70.2% (CAGR 9.3%). The bigger buildup of debt relative to gdp means slower real economic growth ahead. This is regardless whether debt based spending has been due to government or private sector. The government can pump statistical economy but not the real economy.

And since consumer spending accounts for about 70% of the expenditure GDP, HFCE has grown by about a similar rate to statistical gdp of 73.43% (CAGR 9.61%) over the same period.

Yet from the same timeframe, supply side GDP has swelled by outlandish rates as follows: construction 135.1%, trade 105.71%, finance 142.94% and real estate 273.38%. This has been financed mostly by bank credit growth with incredulous growth rates for the said industries at 200.85%, 176.92%, 194.68% and 178.77% respectively. 

So even if Real Estate GDP has ballooned more than the rate of credit growth, the huge disparity between consumer growth and industry growth means severe accumulation of excess capacity in motion. And this will become evident when credit growth slows.

Oh by the way, as possible symptom of excess capacity combined with a slump in retail 4Q GDP—have you seen the dramatic surge in store vacancies in many of the major malls at the metropolis? The vacancy rates of a high end mall have recently soared and appear to have already exceeded 10% of their total retail space! 6.9% 4Q GDP in the face of soaring vacancies in shopping malls! Duh!

And I’m not sure if the BSP chief has merely been just parroting what the central bank of central banks, the Bank for International Settlement has been saying, or if he is just underwriting an escape clause to exonerate (him and the BSP) when risks transforms into reality, nevertheless, the concerns of the BSP chief (or by the BSP) seem at material odds with the heady outlook of PSE officials.

Statistics isn’t economics. What seems as may not be what’s real. Notice how “strong” statistics have often been masked by an inflation boom as indicated by historian Charles Kindleberger? Warren Buffett’s alternative axiom has been: Only when the tide goes out do you discover whose swimming naked.

Two recent examples of “swimming naked” exposed.

Remember Brazilian tycoon Eike Batista whose worth was once quoted as anywhere from $25 to $35 billion in 2012 and was named as the 8th richest man in the world by Forbes Magazine in 2011? Well he is now a “negative” billionaire. Now, Mr. Batista reportedly owes $1.2 billion. Thus authorities have been seizing his assets, which includes white Lamborghini and $32,490 in cash, computers, and watches — as well as any real estate, six other cars, his boat and his airplanes, according to the Businessinsider.com

Worst, compounding his financial woes, the erstwhile mining and oil tycoon has now been faced with charges of insider trading and stock market manipulation.

Mr. Batista’s financial crash took only less than two years to happen. Who would have thought that billions worth of wealth (paper) can vaporize so fast? And yet when revulsion and discredit sets in, the blaming part begins.

At the turn of the business cycle, I believe that there will many miniature Eike Batistas, here and abroad.

For the domestic setting, I predict that “when the tide goes out”, the serial “marking the closes” will likely become a future legal issue.

Next, another account of what seems as, may not really be: Brazil’s state firm Petrobas

From Bloomberg: (bold mine) When Brazil emerged from the global financial crisis as one of the world’s great rising powers, Petrobras was the symbol of that growing economic might. The state-run oil giant was embarking on a $220 billion investment plan to develop the largest offshore crude discovery in the Western hemisphere since 1976 and was, in the words of then-President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the face of “the new Brazil.” Today the company epitomizes everything that is wrong with a Brazilian economy that has been sputtering for the better part of four years: It’s mired in a corruption scandal that cost the CEO her job this week; it has failed to meet growth targets year after year; and it’s saddling investors with spectacular losses. Once worth $310 billion at its peak in 2008, a valuation that made it the world’s fifth-largest company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA is today worth just $48 billion.

The face of “New Brazil”—another slogan highlighting euphoric “this time is different” demolished!

Rings a bell?

China’s PBOC and Danish Central Bank Panics!

Two central banks seem as in a panic mode. 

In Denmark, the Danish Central Bank cut interest rates by another 25 basis points which brings Danish interest rates deeply into negative territory -.75. This marks the fourth cut in less than 3 weeks intended to defend the Danish krone-euro peg which has reportedly been under heavy assault from speculators. Will the krone-euro peg break soon? Will there be a huge demand for cash too…reinforcing deflation?

China’s PBoC seems to have panicked too. The PBoC suddenly cut reserve requirements in the wake of a slower than expected bank lending, an unexpected contraction of factory activities and a slowdown in the service industry.

Government economists as quoted by media say that the cut, which injects $96 billion to the economy, has been aimed at curtailing the yuan’s slide as a result of accelerating capital outflows. Capital flight hit a record $91.2 billion in the fourth quarter according to a report from Bloomberg. The said report also noted that PBoC injected $31 billion over the past three weeks. 

If cutting reserves had been intended to defend the yuan then this will hardly work.

First some data. Chinese credit to GDP has been reported by McKinsey Quarterly at 282% as of 2Q 2014. Corporate debt has been estimated by McKinsey at 125% of GDP the highest level in the world! In addition, Chinese debt has been concentrated to the real estate sector, along with a massive growth in Shadow Banking and in local government debt.

Given the sustained downturn in housing prices, which continues to put pressure on the economy and on credit conditions, capital flight would be a natural response for investors and currency holders anticipating a far worse outcome.

Cutting reserve requirements would free up resources for banks to lend but this will hardly attract credit activities if the balance sheets of Chinese residents and companies have been hocked to the eyeballs with debt.

Given the above statistics, what happens instead will be more access to credit in order to pay off existing loans (debt rollover) rather than for investment. The end result of the ‘extend and pretend’ strategy will be to increase debt levels as GDP cascades.

The Chinese government seems in a bind to desperately defer the inevitable distressing adjustments.

Interestingly, Hong Kong’s tourism seems as suffering from a facelift. Chinese tourists have become dominated by ‘Day Trippers’ which now accounts for a record 60%of Chinese tourists. According to a report from Bloomberg, Day-trippers spent an average of around HK$2,700 ($350) per capita in Hong Kong in 2013, compared with about HK$8,800 by overnight tourists, according to government data.

Wow, that’s a 69% collapse in spending budget by tourists! And this has resulted to a slump in luxury brand sales but a surge in medicine and cosmetic sales! What the report suggests has been that China’s economic slowdown and the government’s anti-corruption drive (political persecution) have changed the character of Hong Kong based Chinese tourists.

Well if the trend continues, then this will radically shake up the Hong Kong economy!

Now the report also says that the wealthy have been shifting visits to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, but they didn’t give the numbers.

Anyway, Hong Kong’s dilemma seems to have been shared by the miseries of Macau as expressed by the crashing share prices and earnings of casinos. 

And applied to the Philippines, if those wealthy Chinese high rollers don’t come streaming into the Philippine casinos soon, excess capacity will lead to losses and subsequently credit troubles.

The effects of the looming shortage of Chinese gamblers will not be isolated to casinos but will extend to creditors, suppliers and workers of the industry. The chain reaction will spread to the economy. If you add other risks areas like shopping mall or other property related industries the direct and indirect effects will be magnified.

In addition, a radical makeover of the Hong Kong’s economy may jeopardize domestic OFWs working there.

But then, according to the record Phisix 7,700 risks and valuations have all been expunged out of existence! Stocks and economic conditions are a one way street! So for the mainstream, we should not only buy, buy, buy!...but also borrow borrow borrow to buy, buy, buy! Money’s free!



[1] Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes A History of Financial Crises Fifth Edition, Now and Futures

[2] Amando M. Tetangco Jr. Working Together towards a Stronger Economy January 30, 2014 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

Saturday, February 07, 2015

The Agency Problem: The Difference between an Investment Firm and a Marketing Firm

Wall Street Journal's business columnist Jason Zweig frames the agency problem in a remarkably different light: the fiduciary duty of finance managers.

Excerpted from Mr. Zweig’s excellent speech entitled “Putting Investors First”, as published at his website (hat tip Tim Price) [bold mine]
How do a marketing firm and an investment firm differ?  Let us count the ways:

-The marketing firm has a mad scientists’ lab to “incubate” new funds and kill them if they don’t work.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm charges a flat management fee, no matter how large its funds grow, and it keeps its expenses unacceptably high.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm refuses to close its funds to new investors no matter how large and unwieldy they get.  The investment firm does not. 

-The marketing firm hypes the track records of its tiniest funds, even though it knows their returns will shrink as the funds grow.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm creates new funds because they will sell, rather than because they are good investments.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm promotes its bond funds on their yield, it flashes “NUMBER ONE” for some time period in all its stock fund ads, and it uses mountain charts as steep as the Alps in all its promotional material.  The investment firm does none of those things.

-The marketing firm pays its portfolio managers on the basis not just of their investment performance but also the assets and cash flow of the funds.  The investment firm does not.

-The marketing firm is eager for its existing customers to pay any price, and bear any burden, so that an infinite number of new customers can be rounded up through the so-called mutual fund supermarkets.  The investment firm sets limits.

-The marketing firm does little or nothing to warn its clients that markets do not always go up, that past performance is almost meaningless, and that the markets are riskiest precisely when they seem to be the safest.  The investment firm tells its customers these things over and over and over again.

-The marketing firm simply wants to git while the gittin’ is good.  The investment firm asks, “What would happen to every aspect of our operations if the markets fell by 67% tomorrow, and what would we do about it?  What plans do we need in place to survive it?”

Thus you must choose.  You can be mostly a marketing firm, or you can be mostly an investment firm.  But you cannot serve both masters at the same time.  Whatever you give to the one priority, you must take away from the other.

The fund industry is a fiduciary business; I recognize that that’s a two-part term.  Yes, you are fiduciaries; and yes, you also are businesses that seek to make and maximize profits.  And that’s as it should be.  In the long run, however, you cannot  survive as a business unless you are a fiduciary emphatically first.

In the short term, it pays off to be primarily a marketing firm, not an investment firm.  But in the long term, that’s no way to build a great business.  Today, tomorrow, and forever, the right question to ask yourselves is not “Will this sell?” but rather “Should we be selling this?”  I will praise every fund company that makes that choice based on what is right for its investors, because I believe that standard of judgment is the right standard.
Amen.

But don’t expect the fiduciary role to be adapted by the sellside industry who predominantly embraces the "marketing" aspect as their core function. That's because most of them seem as adherents to JM Keynes' sound banker principle:
A sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional way along with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him.