Monday, February 24, 2014

Phisix: Scrutinizing the Property Inspired Rally

We believe investors often confuse waves of capital inflows into emerging markets-when global monetary conditions are permissive and the consequent asset inflation and credit booms -with some fundamentally-driven intrinsic “growth” theme in emerging markets. There are many ebullient investment ideas we have hear d over the past 25 years: the massive infrastructure theme, the growing middle class, the nutrition/water idea, the urbanization meme, the emergence of this sub-region or the other. We remain skeptical and cynical. Eventually, these glossy investment views have run into tighter global monetary conditions, the inevitable crises, large capital losses and vows of “never again”. Until, of course, the next global monetary easing, when all is forgiven, and a fresh wave of investors wades in again. Ajay Singh Kapur, Ritesh Samadhiya,and Umesha de Silva

Bullish hopes had been rejuvenated this week as the Philippine equity benchmark, the Phisix, went into a melt up mode.

Powered by foreign buying, the Phisix leapt by 3.18%. Year to date gains suddenly tallied to 7.11% after last week’s 1.71% rally. The bulk of the annual gains had been built on from the late January surge. The advances during the last two weeks piggybacked on this despite the sporadic accounts of downside volatilities from late January.

Market Breadth Highlights Fragility of Recent Run Up

Stock market bulls have latched their hopes on a sustained “high” statistical economic growth, ignoring recent developments or facts (Aldous Huxley syndrome) that unemployment data has surged in late 2013 and of the deterioration of sentiment by recent surveys on the quality of life. They would most likely see the recent rally backed by foreign flows as signs of a return to “rational” assessment by foreigners of Philippine assets.

The technically speaking, the recent rally which broke beyond the January highs will be seen as “falsification” of the “descending” triangle that has haunted and encumbered the Phisix. Yet the fact is that the late January inspired rally represents the third major attempt to push the Phisix back into bullish territory where the previous two failed.

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The health of the recent rally can be measured by relative market breadth developments which are indicative of sentimental changes. 

While it has been true that foreign buying may have returned to their “senses” (putting on the hat of the bulls), previous patterns of foreign flows tell us, in 2013, a different story. In the past, spikes in foreign flows (in both directions) have been accompanied by major volatile periods marked by interim peaks and bottoms (left window/ blue circles). While the recent rally has not reached levels as those with May, July and September, yet if the recent rate of foreign inflows will continue in the coming week or so, this may portent of another major interim retracement. That’s in the condition where the past will rhyme.

In addition, it would be a mistake to read foreign flows as a static or linear based dynamic. In 2013, foreign flows have mostly been mercurial characterized by drastic and substantial reversals of sentiment, particularly from June onwards. I don’t think this dynamic would stabilize anytime soon for reasons I have long stated, and for reasons I will elaborate below.

Moreover, despite the very impressive 4.89% two week swing supported by a sudden turnaround in foreign sentiment, peso volume (weekly averaged or total peso volume for the week divided by the number of trading days) has materially lagged the earlier denial rallies of July and September (right window).

In other words, in the face of the nice numerical gains, it would seem that the bulls have hardly maintained a wholehearted conviction of a sustainable upside move, or that the bulls have remained reluctant. This seems in contrast to the bears whom has used the buy-up as opportunities to exit.

We then move from flows to trades.

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This week’s massive rally has been accompanied by a spike in the number of daily trades (averaged weekly or total weekly daily trades divided by number of trading days) as shown on the left diagram.

A sustained upsurge in daily trades has coincided once again with major interim tops (Feb 2013, May 2013 and July 2013). Sudden and dramatic increases in daily trades have been indicative of increases in trade churning. This implies more participation from retail participants who has bought into bullish “growth” story/spin.

Yet in every peak of stock market cycles, retail investors, who are usually the last movers into maturing runs, have usually been the last left holding the proverbial empty bag[1]. So if there should be another significant gush of churning activities in the coming week or so, then we should expect another major downside move soon. That’s again if the past will rhyme.

Such sentiment metric has hardly been any different with advance decline spread. The current run has been broad based. Weekly averaged advance decline spreads have reached levels where previous rallies has been abbreviated or accompanied by a big downside swing.

And such scale of climaxing bullish sentiment has translated into interim peaks which has been apparent in February 2013, May 2013, July 2013, October 2013 and the late January 2014 rally. So again if the past will rhyme, any sustained bullish breadth this coming week or so, would translate into a selling opportunity.

Despite the impressive gains during the past two weeks, four market breadth indicators (flow) peso volume and foreign money flux and (trade) daily trades and advance-decline spread have shown how fragile the current rally has been.

This means that while technically the declining triangle may have been invalidated (this depends really on reference points), bullish sentiment based on the above facts reveal of a largely uncommitted stance.

Excess Volatility, Market Tops and History Rhymes

Since we are into Mark Twain’s history doesn’t repeat but history rhymes, let me exhibit why I believe patterns reinforce their existence.

As a student of the business cycle and of economic history, I am convinced that this time will not be any different. Inflationism as evidenced by the symptoms—rising markets (expressive of overconfidence) driven by excessive speculation founded on rampant debt accumulation—is fundamentally unsustainable. This has been proven all throughout history and has even been documented by Harvard professors Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff[2]. And rising rates in the face of such untenable conditions serve as the proverbial pin that eventually that leads to what I call as the Wile E. Coyote moment (a bubble bust).

I am not a fan of simplistic pattern based analysis for one simple reason: people’s social interactions and reaction with the environment will hardly ever be constant.

But there are reasons why patterns, which can be expressed as cycles, exist.

Despite technological advances and the permeation of education, people incur the same errors. And such errors have been induced by social policies. Unfortunately a majority of people, including the so-called intellectuals, can’t seem to comprehend that the impact of regulations or of social policies has never been neutral. Social policies affect people’s incentives and behavior to such extent that people have been lead to commit the same mistakes; thus such become cycles. So for instance, when central bankers dabble with money inflation, almost similar to the way Roman emperors debased their coins[3], eventually crises occurs and society degenerates.

I have noted that bubble cycles operate on a “periphery to the core” dynamic where the zenith of bubble cycles applied to the stock market can be seen via extreme volatility or what I say as volatility in both directions with a downside bias. 

I have previously demonstrated how “volatility in both directions with a downside bias” applies to the Philippine Phisix, based on the 20 years of history[4]

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Applied to the US we see the same volatility dynamic at work.

In hindsight all topping process in the S&P 500 has been accompanied by “volatility in both directions with a downside bias” whether in 2007-8, 2000 dotcom bust, 1973-1975 US recession and 1929 stock market crash that ushered in the Great Depression.

Like me, the source of the charts above except 2007, fund manager John Hussman who hasn’t been a fan of patterns too but notes on why patterns may become a self-fulfilling reality[5] “We would dismiss historical analogs like this if the recent market peak did not feature the “full catastrophe” of textbook speculative features – particularly the same syndrome of extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yield conditions observed (prior to the past year) only at major market peaks in 2007, 2000, 1987, 1972, and 1929.” 

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This brings us back to the Phisix in the context of a 1994-1997 top and today’s perhaps more truncated cycle. The numbers are not Elliott Wave counts, instead they are occasions when the Phisix suffered from bear market seizures.

So far, there seems to be a pattern or a resemblance between 1994-95 topping process and today’s cycles. The common denominator three bear market strikes (June, August, December 2013) and three bear market convulsions (1994-1995).

Yes I know the difference: today 5,800 has been the support, while in 1994-5 the decline has been a downside channel.

If the past should repeat then we should see a final blowoff phase rally prior to the capitulation.

Troubling Signs from Property Bubbles

One of the troubling indicators underscoring the “this time is different mentality” is from an article touting “Who’s afraid of interest spike?”[6] noting of the largest property developer thrust to finance a major expansion program by going into the debt markets.

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Last week’s rally has been inspired by the property sector largely premised on the supposed jump in the profits of Ayala Land in 2013. Company officials announced that past is the future so they will sustain a massive expansion program to be financed mostly by debt

I had wondered if truly the officials of the largest property developer expected an interest spike as the title of the article suggested.

Well it turned out to be a disappointment. The quoted official of developer said that “We have debt capacity we can utilize” and when asked how interest rates developments affected their plans the reply was “already built in to the plan”

Would a company acquire massive debts if faced with “spiking” interest rates that would jeopardize their profit position? From a rational economic position the answer would be NO. Instead the company will take on more debt because they foresee that profits will eclipse the cost of debt servicing.

So it is obvious that “built in to the plan” extrapolates to expectations for a negligible rise in interest rates. Obviously too that a “spike” in interest rates has hardly been a factor into the expectations of company’s officials in the context of demand for the company’s property products. Company officials seem to see that the finances of their customers are without limits.

The article even quotes the BSP governor who reportedly said “high liquidity in the banking system will help mitigate any increases at all.” When does “mitigate any increases” equal to “interest rate spike”?

So contra the headline of the article whose author may be impliedly sneering at cynics, the headlines represents an inaccurate and inconsistent depiction of the official stand of the property company. There hardly has been any trace of expected “spike” in interest rates.

Two reasons why these are troubling signs. The inaccurate representation of the company official’s position is a sign of media’s undiscerning promotion of bubbles. It is also a sign of illusion of superiority based on what seems as false knowledge or the Dunning–Kruger effect[7].

Two, the stock market players bidded up on property stocks based on past performance (last year’s profits) and based on the company’s optimism via a massive debt financed expansion. This means that stock market players practically threw “risk” under the bus and virtually agreed that “debt is growth”. Such signifies nauseating signs of overconfidence or reckless yield chasing speculation or both.

Where will Domestic Demand for Properties come from?

If the recent surge in unemployment rates have anywhere been accurate, and if this has been supported by deteriorating sentiment on the public’s perception in terms of quality of life standards (due to spreading price inflation), then demand for middle and lower class housing will begin to taper.

The adverse impact from inflation will also impact demand from remittance based finances or OFW dependent markets, a sector that previously contributed to an estimated one fourth of demand of the housing industry[8]. While it is true that devaluing peso means more pesos for every unit of foreign currency, such advantage will be offset by increases in domestic prices of other goods and services. As pointed before, Philippine households are mostly sensitive to changes in food, energy and housing as part of their consumption distribution basket. So a switch in spending to food and energy or even to rental would mean less money available for housing acquisition.

And if inflation intensifies and will get reflected on interest rates, there will be reduced demand for housing even to people with access to the banking system, since debt servicing will eat up a larger share of a shrinking income base, due to reduced purchasing power from an inflated peso.

This also means that any sustained boom in demand for property will largely depend now on a narrowing spectrum of markets, particularly the elite (perhaps funded via debt financed purchases) most likely for speculation (flipping) purposes, from foreigners (mostly for speculation), and from some property owners who benefited from the expansion undertaken by property developers by selling to the latter.

While it is true that high end properties may not even be price sensitive as they can perceived as “status symbol” products or Veblen Goods[9], demand for such goods will depend on the prestige behind the scarcity, and the available financing to acquire such products.

But the race to develop properties has been an industry wide phenomenon, not limited to the prime developers, so inventories have been rising faster relative to demand in almost all categories.

And rising rates from increasing signs of inflation will mean lesser availability of capital.

One demand for property boom comes from previous property owners who sold to the developers. Some may have bought into developer’s project while others may have joined the race in the snapping up of properties in the hope of flipping them again to developers. Both have contributed to higher property prices. Some have used the windfall for consumption.

Nonetheless, for such segment consumption and property speculation extrapolates to capital consumption. When developers see the light of a slowing demand, such beneficiaries will also feel the heat from financial losses once the excess from the supply side becomes apparent.

The Singapore Model for Foreign Demand of Philippine Properties?

The last dynamic driving housing demand comes from foreigners.

Experts from the housing industry said last year that new regulations and taxes in Hong Kong and Singapore in order “to curb speculation in their property markets”, drove demand for domestic properties since the Philippines have become a “more foreign-investor friendly destination”[10]

As a side note, I’d say that liberalization that led to a “foreign-investor friendly destination” has been mostly in the construction sector[11], and hardly the general economy. Like almost every government elsewhere today, the incumbent have used bubbles to spruce up statistical economic growth.

In short, what the report should have said was that speculative demand merely transferred from Hong Kong and Singapore to the Philippines.

Here is more of what they didn’t say.

Singapore’s property bubble fuelled by the Singaporean central bank’s easy money policies has essentially driven a stake into the hearts of the Singapore’s free market model[12].

The politically divisive easy money policies by Singapore’s monetary authority have made foreigners a lightning rod for politically correct populist inequality sloganeering that has raised nationalist sentiment[13]. As such, Singapore’s politics has ushered in statists leaders who has imposed welfarist programs[14], and has recently even imposed labor protectionism[15] by putting a law to prioritize on locals over foreigners. 

A few days ago we see Singapore’s descent deeper into a welfare state by the imposition of sin taxes[16]. Those low tax days appear to be numbered.

Would you believe that riots afflicted a developed economy like Singapore in late December[17]?

So what the report didn’t say was that the untoward political repercussions from Singapore and Hong Kong’s property bubbles would have been inherited by the Philippines. But that’s if the housing boom transmission persists.

The good news is that rising bond yields of 10 year treasuries of both in Singapore and Hong Kong will most likely stymie any foreign demand for Philippine properties for speculative purposes. So this should temper any political ramifications from massive inflow of foreign money on domestic properties. But this will be bad news for developers and for stock market investors who bought into the “debt is prosperity” spin.

And as I previously noted the property bubble will induce a change in the composition of ownership[18]
…the ongoing leveraging by players in the property sector whom has access to the banking system may be acquiring properties from the 68% of households and selling these projects to the same high end sector whom have been speculating both in stocks and in properties
As events in Singapore reveal, property bubbles has nasty political consequences.






[2] Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff This Time is Different Princeton Press



[5] John P. Hussman Topping Patterns and the Proper Cause for Optimism, Hussman Funds, February 17, 2014




[9] Wikipedia.org Veblen Goods







[16] Wall Street Journal Singapore Ups Sin Taxes Amid Higher Social Spending February 22, 2014


Explaining the Recent Sharp Volatility in the Peso

Last week’s rally came amidst a very volatile peso. While the Peso closed the week significantly higher to 44.565 per US dollar, Friday’s closing doesn’t tell of the bigger picture. That’s because the peso had a very wild rollercoaster ride. Monday, the peso almost covered the year’s loses by firming to 44.43. The peso ended 2013 at 44.4.

On Thursday, all gains seem to have been erased as the peso drastically fell to 44.78 per USD. 

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But Friday, the peso saw a last minute surge as seen in the above chart from Bloomberg. Has the BSP been responsible for pushing the Peso higher?

Yet such exchange rate volatility would signify a nightmare for domestic companies engaged in external trade, particularly for smaller companies with little or no access to currency hedging (mostly forward derivatives contract). Who cares about the small invisible guy/gal who pay the taxes which the VIP rely on?

Yet it would seem ironic if not absurd to see analysts predict a strong peso when the BSP has been inflating the money supply at ridiculous rates. Well it is natural for officials to say things positive, that’s because saying negative will mean self-incrimination. Moreover, their job is to also sell interests of the political leaders, their employers or they lose their privileges

Most analysts see effects of money printing on the prices as neutral. This means that they see the distribution from bank credit creation or from direct monetization by government of deficits as having proportional effects. In short, money printing and credit creation has little bearing or influence on the economy. If it does it is just a one-time event.

So for them, bubbles from credit expansion exist in a vacuum. And if there should be any bubbles they are an offshoot to psychological aberrations rather than from political interferences. 

So if one notices the mainstream’s or officialdom’s defense, say that the Philippines has been overheating from soaring Philippine money aggregates, they deflect on the idea by selectively picking on irrelevant statistics to dismiss such a risk, or bringing up a stawman to beat them up. They hardly deal with the issue of debt as if they are non-existent or have no effects.

Now if there are signs of price inflation they glibly turn to supply side factors such as citing disruptions from Typhoon Yolanda. Funny how one economically depressed region can spark a national contagion via price increase of goods which can easily be solved by trade liberalization.

These people hardly realize that money has relative effects depending on the entry points and on people who first receive them (Cantillon Effects[1]). And because they have relative effects, the impact on the economy’s production and capital structure comes in relative time intervals. Some sectors, the first beneficiaries of money benefit from lower prices compared to later recipients of money. As the money circulates and spreads economy wide, prices go higher relatively. Earlier beneficiaries see this as profits. Later recipients suffer from reduced purchasing power.

Price changes from money inflation come in condition where the relative production rate remains lower than the growth of money. This is why some areas are more sensitive to price increases. And throw into the cauldron of myriad regulatory restrictions on specific segments of economy we thus have market prices driven by demand and supply operating on such politicized environment. Distorted prices mean embedded imbalances.

This also means monetary inflation undergoes stages. And such stages will be reflected on what the convention interprets as corporate fundamentals whether earnings or cash flows or other financial metrics, or even micro economics, where negative real rates induce a change in people’s preference to hold money, particularly to indulge in speculative activities that would have eventual horrible consequences. 

These are things which the mainstream can’t see or won’t even give an effort to see. So they are surprised when volatility emerges in the face of their “stable” projections.

For instance, the outflow from BSP’s Special Deposit Accounts (SDA) to the banking system—as the central bank has reduced the banking system’s access (due to BSP losses) to what was intended as a liquidity mopping up program—will likely extrapolate to even more the incentives for banks to lend[2]. So all these credit creation will mean higher inflation and higher interest rates, especially to the underdeveloped economy (pretending to be a developed economy), whose limited exposure by the general household to banking and financial sector, would extrapolate higher degree of vulnerability to price inflation due to low productivity. 

So unless the BSP tightens significantly, which will come at a big cost to the statistical economy and the subsidized privileged sectors, given the already present stagflationary environment, the peso will weaken.

Thus the BSP’s interventions, which if true and if sustained, will likely be seen via lower Gross International Reserves (GIR) data in February.

Importantly despite the interventions, the economic forces will upend any artificially based prices.




Why Strong Economic Growth Hardly Equals Outsized Equity Returns

Bulls have been sold to the idea that economic growth equals hefty stock market returns.

A recent report from Credit Suisse argues against such popular thinking for three reasons[1]

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First because everybody already knows and has priced in growth, “To use public information to try to predict the market is to bet against the consensus view set by a multitude of other smart and informed global investors.”

Second, in the context of risk reward tradeoff, lesser risks means lower returns, “the strategy of buying companies that are on average becoming less risky, and hence offer a lower expected return. It is more risky to invest in companies in distressed economies”

Lastly popular issues and markets deliver lower returns not only because of risk reward balance but because growth assets have been overvalued relative to undervalued distressed assets. “There is extensive evidence that investors bid up the prices of growth assets, to the point that their long-run return is below the performance of distressed assets (sometimes referred to as ‘value’ investments).

What do they recommend as a strategy? BUY DISTRESS-SELL GROWTH; “The strategy would be to buy equities in distressed markets and to short-sell securities in fast-growing markets”

So even in the assumption of the absence of a potential Black Swan, from the conventional perspective, growth assets may not be conducive to deliver ALPHA returns.

I have no idea if the authors or Credit Suisse practice on what they preach, but from their analysis, one would understand why foreign selling on growth markets, e.g. Philippines stocks, has NOT been irrational.

Yet I offer a fourth reason. Strong economic growth may come from credit bubbles and therefore represents artificial statistical growth. Naturally since credit bubbles are not sustainable, when the inflation chicken comes home to roost, “growth” may segue into “recession” and for stocks, “boom” segue into “bust”.

So yes I second the motion: Buy distress (bust/fear) Sell growth (boom/greed).




[1] Credit Suisse Research Institute Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2014 February 2014 p.29

Emerging Market $2 trillion Carry Trade: The Pig in the Python

Last week, I reasoned that changes in US monetary policies and changes in the interest rate signals in the US will naturally force adjustments based on “yield spreads” which eventually will be transmitted (whether you like it or not) as emerging market monetary policies. I stated that such alterations will expose (bold original) “on the distinct vulnerabilities of these economies thereby leading to massive outflows.”[1]

I did not go further. However, one mainstream report seems to have picked up where I left off. And they came with a gala performance

As a side note, signs are that the mainstream has increasingly been recognizing that the problem of emerging markets has not been due to demons or bogeymen of current accounts, exchange rate mechanism or Non Performing loans but rather on debt, debt and debt.

The following quote is from Kermal Dervis former Minister of Economic Affairs of Turkey and Vice President of the Brookings Institution[2] (bold mine)
Unfortunately, the real vulnerability of some countries is rooted in private-sector balance sheets, with high leverage accumulating in both the household sector and among non-financial firms. Moreover, in many cases, the corporate sector, having grown accustomed to taking advantage of cheap funds from abroad to finance domestic activities, has significant foreign-currency exposure.

Where that is the case, steep currency depreciation would bring with it serious balance-sheet problems, which, if large enough, would undermine the banking sector, despite strong capital cushions. Banking-sector problems would, in turn, require state intervention, causing the public-debt burden to rise.
Mr. Dervis’ observation “taking advantage of cheap funds” and my theory “ expose on the distinct vulnerabilities that leads to massive outflows” brings into light the missing factor: the US$ 2 trillion EMERGING MARKET CARRY TRADE

In a report by Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BofAML), the troika of authors Ajay Singh Kapur, Ritesh Samadhiya,and Umesha de Silva wrote that the Fed motivated an Emerging market credit bubble and called this “the Pig in the Python”[3]
The QE channel worked through Emerging Markets too. By lowering the US government bond yields to a bare minimum, and zero—ish at the short end, a search for yield ensued globally. Emerging market banks and corporates have gone on an international leverage binge, yet another carry trade, the third in 20 years. The first one was driven by European banks, financing East Asian capex –that ended in 1997. The second one was global banks and equity-FDI supporting mainly capex in the BRICs. That ended in 2008. This time, it is increasingly non-equity flows: commercial banks and, more importantly, the bond market –undercounted in the BoP and external debt statistics that conventional analysis looks at.
Like me, the authors question on the accuracy of statistics where they delve deeper only to discover many unreported debt. They write of the difference between resident borrowing from a foreign bank branch in a country as loans issued by residence that is counted in the Balance of Payment (BoP) and from borrowing by the same resident in the offshore bond and inter-bank markets which they consider as loans by nationality, which appear to be unaccounted for in the BoP calculations. The difference according to them have been substantial. 
For externally-issued bonds, USD1042bn has been raised by the nationality of the EM borrower since 2009, USD724bn by residence of the borrower – a gap of USD318bn, or 44%. This undercount is USD165bn in China, USD100bn in Brazil, and USD62bn in Russia. There is evidence that this bond borrowing overseas by EM non-financial corporates is part of a carry trade, with these corporates acting like financial intermediaries. EM banks have also been busy issuing bonds overseas, a part of this carry trade. We do not have the breakdown for international bank loans by residence and nationality
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Oh I noted that contra cheerleaders who think that by shouting “forex reserve!” “forex reserve!” “forex reserve!” they can drive away EM demons[4], the authors like me also note how forex reserves have been manifestations of the ‘sins’ of the credit inflation binge rather than as signs of strength.
Since 3Q2008, the US Federal Reserve QE has unleashed a massive USD2tn debt-driven carry trade into emerging markets, disproportionately increasing their forex reserves (by USD2. 7tn from end-3Q2008), their monetary bases (by USD3.2tn), their credit and monetary aggregates (M2 up by USD14.9tn), consequently boosting economic growth and asset prices (mainly property and bonds). As the Fed continues to taper its heterodox policy, we believe these large carry trades are likely to diminish, or be unwound
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And here is where it gets more interesting. 

In Asia, the authors worry about the explosive external debt growth from time period of 2008 and 2013 (blue rectangles), mainly from China and Thailand in terms of bank lending and bonds. The red rectangles are the other ASEAN debt position acquired from the FED sponsored EM carry trade.

While the Philippines have the least exposure in nominal US dollar based loans, at 4.34x (!) the Philippines has the 2nd biggest growth rate after Thailand.

This report seems consistent with the Deutsche Bank report I earlier noted which showed how the companies from the Philippines ramped up on US dollar loans in the global corporate bond markets in 2013.

And it would be natural to see a limited but concentrated bond market growth in the Philippines for one simple reason as I noted[5]
The small size of bond markets fit exactly with the low penetration level of households in the banking and financial system. This means that the dearth of savings being intermediated into investments via the banking sector or via the capital markets have hardly been signs of real growth.

Importantly, because of the small size of the corporate bond market, the top 10 share in terms of % to the total is at 90.8%. Said differently, the benefits and risks of Philippine corporate bonds have been concentrated to these top 10 issuers.
So should the BofAML’s fear of the risks from the unwinding of the massive EM carry trade materialize, it would seem unfortunate that based on the data from both Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Deutsche Bank, the Philippines or ASEAN major hardly be immune from a contagion.

Don’t forget we seem to be seeing accelerating signs of bank runs in emerging markets. Over the past one and a half weeks, Kazakhstan following the massive devaluation endured three bank runs[6], Ukraine suffered a bank run[7] and our neighbor Thailand just had a bank run on a state-owned bank[8]!

And while China hasn’t had a bank run yet, they seem to have undertaken a series of bailouts of delinquent financial institutions.

Sharp volatility in EM financial markets, stock markets fighting off bear markets, rising rates amidst spiraling debt loads, risk of unwinding of carry trades and bank runs, great moment for stocks right?

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A final comment on the pig in the python EM carry trade, the above charts seem to suggest that there has been some correlation between US stocks as measured by the S&P 500 (yellow), the USDollar Yen (orange) and Emerging Markets stocks (EEM green) where all three seem to be moving in a synchronous fashion.

While correlation isn’t causation, could such synchronicity be a function of the carry trade in motion? Are performances of stocks based on ‘fundamentals’ or based on the carry trade anchored on US Federal Reserve policies?

Interesting.



[2] Kermal Dervis Tailspin or Turbulence? Project Syndicate February 17, 2014

[3] Ajay Singh Kapur, Ritesh Samadhiya,and Umesha de Silva Pig in the Python –the EM carry trade unwind Bank of America Merrill Lynch February 18, 2014




[7] See Behind Ukraine’s Bank Run February 22, 2014

Japan’s Ticking Black Swan

And speaking of carry trade. There seems no other fantastic example than the Nikkei 225-Japanese Yen.

The Nikkei Yen trade is a Bet on the Direction of Stimulus

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Since Abenomics, the Nikkei’s (Nikk) movements have practically been a mirror image of the Japanese Yen (XJY) where each time the yen troughs, the Nikkei peaks (green ellipses). It is a stunning picture which shows that Japan’s stocks have become a proxy for a punt on the yen and vice versa, and where stock market investors have been trading shoes with currency traders.

And you think stocks are about fundamentals? The Nikkei Yen correlation has basically been a bet on the direction of stimulus from Abenomics.

Early during the year, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) reportedly bought beyond its quota thus the central bank expected to slow their monthly purchases[1]. The result has been devastating, the Nikkei plunged while the yen rallied.

This week has been “bad news is good news” for the Nikkei.

Two bad news: one the GDP numbers had been reported below mainstream expectations, and two, Japanese consumers showed reluctance to spend. The frontloading effect in the face of the coming increase in sales taxes from 5-8% this April has failed to inspire a surge in consumer spending. Hence the mainstream urged for more stimulus, the good news, the BoJ relented.

The BoJ without adding to the QE programs, announced an expansion in two key lending programmes. Upon the announcement last Tuesday the Yen fell, the Nikkei skyrocketed 3.3%[2]!

The Nikkei ended the week 3.86% up which means the Tuesday’s gains has been more than preserved, as rumors of more stimulus[3] seem to have whetted on the appetite for stock market bulls.

In the face of very strong evidence I don’t why the mainstream stubbornly insist that the Nikkei actions has been about fundamentals when it has been a bet on the direction of stimulus.

What’s Really Wrong with Japan?

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This graph serves as a startling evidence of the kernel of the problems facing the Japanese economy. The graph represents prices of corporate goods by stage of demand and use[4]. In other words, this should reflect on the price levels of various stages of production. I don’t know to what degree of representativeness this applies to Japanese corporations.

But the message above is that price of raw materials and intermediate goods have been rising faster than final goods.

In short, corporations appear to be very hesitant to raise prices perhaps in fear of demand slowdown. Thereby this means a squeeze in corporate profits. Abenomics has only worsened such existing conditions.

What’s has been the repercussions?

One, Japanese corporations have been hesitant to expand. Growth in machinery orders remain sluggish as December data reported a sharp drop following an increase in November[5].

Two, Japanese firms seem unwilling to raise wages, as base pay slip to “levels around those during the global recession of 2009”[6]. While unemployment rates have reportedly improved[7], statistics hardly identifies which industry has been hiring. My suspicion is that most of the hiring will come from sectors benefiting the boom, financials and real estate[8].

Like the Philippines Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to stoke another property bubble from QE and zero bound rates helped by the easing of construction, building and land zoning regulations[9]

And a lower yen has hardly been beneficial to Japan’s stagnating exports which has also been hampered by high energy costs.

Third Japanese companies continue to invest abroad[10].

And the lower than expected performance by Japanese enterprises has been reflected on the consumption patterns by households in the face of Abenomics.

This report gives us a clue how Japanese consumers have seen a reduction in disposable income[11] from Abenomics
Price increases are prompting Japanese shoppers to buy less mayonnaise, showing the fragility of any economic rebound unless wages keep up with living costs
The article like most mainstream articles sees a simple solution: higher wages.

But higher wages can only happen if there are more investors. To have more investors mean that profit opportunities should abound. And that is what has been missing.

Governments can temporarily provide jobs, but such jobs have to come from taxpayer money. This means again shifting capital from productive ventures to unproductive bureaucratic tenures. At the end of the day everything boils down to productive risk taking from private investors.

Since every politician and economic expert seem to have a magical elixir in influencing Japan’s policies, they end up creating more problems than less.

Japan’s problems can’t be solved by opening or closing the monetary gap or by government providing jobs or by more government spending, the issue is to create profit opportunities for investors to invest. And that’s something the Japanese government has been doing in the opposite direction. Given the aging population, liberalizing immigration could be a good start.

Also Japan’s stock market bubble has hardly been providing consumers resources to spend, the subsidy from Abenomics only supports a small number of Japanese stock punters. Japanese households only own 8.5% of assets in stocks. Rising stocks has only been supportive of financial institutions and non financial private institutions whose shares have been listed in the markets[12].

And it has been ironic that even with deep capital markets, Japanese households own about a record “ more than $6,000” in cash per person compared to the US at $2,029 where much of such cash has been “ socked away at home in dressing cabinets and shoe boxes” Cash accounts for 38% of retail transactions[13]. This is a sign of distrust on the banking system.

Japan’s Ticking Black Swan: the JGB

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All these remain sideshow to Japan’s real problem: the Japanese government bonds (JGB).

10 year JGB yields have been declining since the early spike in May 2013, rose at the end of 2013 as the Nikkei boom climaxed, but collapsed again this year, when the public expectations for more stimulus waned. Like stocks and the yen all seem to have focused on whether the BoJ will increase or decrease her easing programs.

The BoJ has essentially become the only major buyer of Japanese debt as banks, foreigners and households have shown a decline in JGBs ownership from June 2013 to September 2013. Aside from the BoJ only life and nonlife insurance posted a minor .1% gain.

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The odd thing is that the Japanese government in their latest budget projection has been expecting a jump in revenues. They expect tax revenues to grow by 16% in 2014 and also expect a reduction of bond issuance by 3.6% to fund government budget. Japan’s government budget has been expected to grow by 3.5%[14].

Meanwhile expected tax revenues accounts for 52% of the Japan’s government budget while JGB issuance constitutes 43%. The budget for debt service which has been expected to grow by 4.6% represents 46.5% of tax revenues. So about half of tax revenues will end up just servicing debt and that is if the optimistic target will be met.

Yet the Japanese government maintains a cognitive dissonance—holding two ideas—as part of their finance management. First they are optimistic that they can raise the targeted budget so they even expect a reduction in bond issuance.

Yet in December, they raised a bogeyman to secure more stimulus. They argued that the slated national sales-tax hike in April may jeopardize growth, thus appealed and got approval for a fiscal stimulus worth 18.6 trillion yen ($182 billion). Most of the loans have been said will emanate from existing spending by local governments and loans from government backed lenders[15].

Two months after, the government seems deeper in straits as the economy has hardly performed as expected and thereby markets expect an increase in BoJ support

Japan’s dilemma is that if Abenomics successfully ignites “inflation” then this should bolster JGB yields and put burden on her trillion yen debt load. The Japanese government has a debt to gdp ratio of 244%[16]. And higher yields will likely force the BoJ to bring down yields by increasingly frantic money printing that may not only lead to a debt crisis but to a currency crisis.

On the other hand if Japan’s thrust to inflate a bubble fails, then a bust would mean greater dependence on debt to finance her budget. With debt servicing accounting for 46% of tax revenues a severe shrinkage in tax revenues may force the government into a debt crisis.

Japan’s current tenuous “kick the can” measures operates midway between these two extreme conditions.

As noted at the start of the year[17], Japan is a closet Black Swan in the making.






[4] Bank of Japan Monthly Report on the Corporate Goods Price Index, February 13, 2014


[6] Wall Street Journal Real Times Economic Blog Real Japanese Wages Slip, Posing Challenge to ‘Abenomics’ February 5, 2014







[13] Wall Street Journal Japanese Keep Holding Cash January 9, 2014

[14] Ministry of Finance Japan's Fiscal Condition December 2013