Phisix: Braving The Global Storm So Far

``Most financial professionals have strongly concluded that recent market action has completely disproved the decoupling theory that I have espoused. This is premature. It will take some time for the rest of the world to realize that what has been decoupled from the economic train is the caboose, not the engine”-Peter Schiff, The Price of Popularity

For the fourth consecutive week, the US equity markets have suffered its second episode of meltdown throes, where major US bellwethers have lost over 20%. True, many parts of the world have tracked the developments in the US, especially among industrialized economies. But unlike the first episode during the last quarter of 2008, where collapsing markets were ‘synchronized’, this time pockets of divergences have apparently emerged.

The Philippine Phisix, for instance, seems to have been shrugging off the turbulence, as the major bellwether accrued a 2.56% weekly advance amidst a raging four week squall to tally a marginal 2.53% year-to- date gain.

We have asserted that last year’s rout in the global market and the Phisix had been principally tied to the global debt deflation phenomenon called as the “forcible selling” or forced liquidations as described earlier than merely domestic “economy” related.

Nonetheless even as the world has been facing relentless pressure on the besieged US banking sector, which is further exacerbated by the banking crisis in developed Europe, locked in by the economic crisis in Emerging Europe, the appearance of diminishing degree of deleveraging based NET foreign liquidations seem to be partially gaining momentum in the Philippine Stock Exchange, see figure 2.

Figure 2: PSE: % Share of NET Foreign Trade

The red ellipse shows of the sharp drop in the share of foreign trade to total trade.

For the past four weeks, most of the sudden reduction of foreign trade is largely due to the expanded speculations over Meralco , a Manila based utility firm which maintains a legal stranglehold on electricity distribution over the National Capital Region (NCR).

Moreover, based on several market internal indicators as the advance-decline spread, see figure 3, we can take note of the improving breadth of the trading activities in the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) despite the violent gyrations in the overseas equity market.

Figure 3: PSE: Improving Advance-Decline Spread

In contrast to most of 2008, where the advance-decline spread hardly saw any material improvement, the collapse in late October of last year until the recent days have manifested a sizeable progress in the advance-decline spread as displayed by the red arrow.

Combined with the narrowing of foreign trade even before the Meralco sizzle, the improvement in the market breadth plus the 5 months of sideways trading makes it appear that the Phisix (see figure 4) has been drifting along a Bottoming phase of the market cycle.

Figure 4: Three Divergences: S&P 500, Phisix, Meralco

The Phisix, in green, is on a 5 month consolidation while the US S&P, light orange, has been on a steep plunge!!

But our guarded optimism has been partially substituted with alarm; the fantastic price actions in Meralco (black candle), where on the positive side has been providing the PSE with a semblance of “market leadership”, and risks being negated by a negative side, a formative bubble that risks overturning the recent improvements!

Phisix: Throwing The Baby Out of the Water

``An optimist sees an opportunity in every calamity; a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity.”-Winston Churchill

The recent selloff in most of the global equity markets has led some doomsday proponents to pronounce the toxicity of the emerging asset class as evidence by a drop in global forex reserves. They believe that a paucity of liquidity compounded by a US recession would lead to collapsing asset classes or some form of a crisis in emerging markets.

Unfortunately we can’t be convinced by such deflationary recoupling scenario promoted by perma bears simply because such argument has been predicated on the “fallacy of composition” or the generalization of the whole when it is only true for some its parts.

For instance, in the case of Russia which had been used as an example, which we recently also posted in An Epitome of A Full Scale Bear Market:: Russia, the country’s problem has been mostly from the political imbroglio where it got into a military engagement with neighboring Georgia. A compounding factor had been the liquidity crunch and falling commodity prices.

We aren’t seeing the same dynamics here in the Philippines.

Emerging Markets Are Not The Same

As we have repeatedly been arguing, for the Philippines it has not been about the question of risks from a recession, overleverage, oversupply, overvaluation, excessive speculation, stifling new government regulations or taxes, war, or even insolvency as seen in the case of the US or other developed economies.

Nor is it in Brazil whose housing or property industry remains sizzling hot according to the Business.view of the Economist.

For the Philippines despite the announcement of several banks with exposures to the Lehman bankruptcy, we had been right to say that the potential loses from these ‘toxic’ US instruments had been inconsequential relative to the banking industry’s capitalization or assets.

This from the inquirer.net (highlight mine),

``Seven banks in the Philippines have a total of $386 million in exposure to bankrupt US investment banking giant Lehman Brothers, according to the central bank’s estimates, but the banking system is widely believed to be in a good position to withstand the world’s worst financial shake-out.

``Even assuming zero recovery of their exposure to Lehman, the fallout for the seven banks is not expected to exceed one percent of their total assets.

``According to estimates by the central bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), obtained by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the retail tycoon Henry Sy’s Banco de Oro Unibank has the biggest exposure to Lehman at $134 million, followed by state-owned Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) at $90 million.

``The BSP data show Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank) has an exposure of $71 million, Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. (RCBC) $40 million, Standard Chartered Bank’s Manila branch $26 million, Bank of Commerce $15 million, and United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) $10 million.

``As a percentage of total assets of the individual banks, the exposures are as low as 0.5 percent and as high as 1.7 percent, according to the estimates, which were discussed at a meeting of the BSP policymaking body, the Monetary Board, on Thursday.”

As we have pointed out the main risk from the external link would come from the extent of foreign selling of domestic assets on the account of today’s mostly US based ‘deleveraging’ process. While there could still be some exposures to ‘tainted’ US financial instruments that may implode in the future, our idea is that this is likely to be material to impact normal business operations of the local banking industry.

Moreover, if some of the estimates are correct that over 50% of portfolio flows to Asia has been redeemed (as pointed out last week) then we are most likely to have seen the worst of the depressed foreign sentiment which leaves us with sympathy selling.

Figure 5: PSE Net Foreign Selling

The Phisix suffered its second worst week of the year which lost 6.93% compared to the week that ended January 18^th which accounted for a 9.57% loss. But relative to the degree of foreign selling, (see figure 5 orange arrows) the amount has been less intense compared to the similar circumstances when the Phisix had been subjected to the same fate.

In fact, last Thursday, which likewise accounted for a 4% drop following a similar decline in the US markets, the Phisix saw significant reduction of foreign selling to the tune of only Php 256 million compared to the daily range of Php 500-950 million a day during the past 2 weeks. This leaves us to hypothesize that mostly momentum driven domestic retail investors “threw out the baby with the bath water” in panic!

Of course, we are not saying the Phisix is riskfree or immune. Any risk from the Phisix would likely come from the political spectrum, if not from inflation or higher food prices, which so far have begun to decline. Of course, the recent concerted central bank pumping of liquidity into the global markets may reverse this decline. But if the global equity asset classes manage to absorb these injections, then the increase in consumer inflation could likely be gradual.

Debating Keynesian Concepts

Besides, we don’t buy into the Keynesian connection that consumer spending drives the economy which leads to the myth that the wilting US consumers will automatically lead to a bust in the emerging markets. As Gerard Jackson of Brookesnews explains, ``consumer demand springs from production, meaning you cannot consume what has not been produced. Therefore when consumers demand goods they are in effect exchanging what they produced for the products of other consumers. This is why the classical school considered money to be a veil that concealed the process of production and exchange from the public eye.”

The notion of a consumer driven economy actually stems from monetary inflation which has a detrimental effect in shaping an economy’s capital structure, to quote Gerard Jackson anew, ``Monetary manipulation not only severely distorts a country’s capital structure by misdirecting production it can also lead to the currency being overvalued which in turn could induce some manufacturers to shift operations offshore when undistorted marketed conditions would have persuaded them to remain in the US”.

And if trade or current account balances signified of the symptom of inflationary monetary policies, then the Phisix hasn’t been in the same shape or conditions as the US enough to unjustly merit a “toxic” grade. Moreover, based on the account of real savings or savings from the actual stuff we produce, the Philippines with its large informal economy equates to a cash based society with minuscule leverage applied, meaning much of our economy has been based real output than from the influences of distortive monetary policies.

Besides, much of the angst from the past Asian financial crisis still lingers, as evidenced by the minimal exposure of the banking system to rubbish US papers and conservative lending schemes by the banking system.

Moreover, valuations in Asia ex-Japan have nearly fallen to its multi-year “floor levels” which may translate to a looming bottom, see figure 6.

Figure 6: Matthews Asia: Asia’s Valuations Near Extreme Lows

To quote Robert J. Horrocks, PhD of Matthews Asia, ``the “decoupling” term has done a disservice to the entire economic debate. It has given the impression that economies must sever their links, and has denied the possibility that countries might simply transform their relationships whilst remaining close. The failure then of the world to decouple has lead to an overemphasis on the short-term decline in earnings and the worry that Asia will follow the U.S. into recession. Valuations in Asia have collapsed from the overexcited levels of late last year to far more sober levels that capture little of the exciting prospects for Asian growth. As such, they provide a long-term investor with a decent margin of safety. Framing the argument properly, I believe, helps to see the opportunities more clearly.” (highlight mine)

Like Mr Robert J. Horrocks, we have often stated that the decoupling recoupling debate is nothing but an invalid abstraction detached from the reality of the globalization process. And that from a valuations viewpoint, Asia has reached extreme lows and apparently has become detached from the real economy.

So while there might be additional sympathy selling pressures arising from the impact of the US financial crisis, this could be seen as opportunities from the facets of margin of safety to accumulate than to join the bandwagon of running for cover. Because markets are emotionally driven over the short term, they can always overshoot to the upside or the downside.

Recommendation: A Tradeable Rally Ahead?

Finally, some indicators suggest that we could have likewise bottomed out over the interim and a tradeable rally could be in the offing.

One, the restrictions on short selling of 799 financial stocks in the US and also adopted in the UK has moved the equity markets in seismic proportions last Friday. This should translate to a strong open in the PSE at the start of the week. However the effects from restriction curbs tend to be short term.

Two, as pointed out in my recent blog, Fear Index Pointing To Tradeable Rally Ahead?, each time the VIX or Fear Index peaks at above 30 it is usually followed by a bearmarket rally. The VIX or fear index hit a record high last week signifying outsized fear.

Three, the Phisix is coming from an oversold level, which means there could be more room for more upside traction.

So far, the recent lows have held its ground, giving us a clue of the possible strength of the aforementioned support level. The longer the Phisix maintains such support level the stronger it becomes.

Fourth, massive injections of bridge financing by global central banks tend to induce a period of lull following the recent turbulence. In addition, the proposed resurrection of the Resolution Trust Company RTC type of rescue package will entail a huge cost to US taxpayers. Over the longer perspective, this could lead to some capital reallocation of Asian capital to within the region and,

Lastly, any forthcoming rally, which would probably coincide with the closing of the seasonally weak September, may strengthen our case for a yearend rally.

Sequel To Asian Financial Crisis?, Costly Bailouts and Bernanke Buys Time

``So the lesson we can take away from all this is to respect what the market tells us, listen to it and ignore the nonsense in the news. More recent incongruous market action should be respected because it may be indicating something important.”-George Kleinman, Commodity Trends, What I Learned This Year Trading Commodities

 

Since I read voluminous reports, articles and research papers daily, I get the privilege of having to access a diversity of opinions and insights of which ranges from the extreme ends of optimism and pessimism. Thus, I realized that my personal biases have been frequently challenged or tempered by the influences of contrasting outlooks. Instead of having extreme convictions which are usually swayed by emotions my views have been redirected to the moderation.

 

Over the years we have pointed on the perils of systemic overleveraging via the US housing bubble and how it poses as a challenge to the global market and the economies. Now that it has become a reality and whose dynamics has been providing us with a suspense thriller, I have been arguing today that the “US is not the Philippines and vice versa” such that while there are transmission linkages that could impact the local economy via trade, labor and financing, there are domestic factors to reckon with that could help cushion on the negative effects from the present systemic deleveraging seen in developed economies.

 

Besides, if I had to take the view of the extreme pessimist, I would have to move to the countryside, stockpile upon years of food (aside from raising them by ourselves) and medicine, accumulate precious metals, and load up on ammunition, energize our homes with solar panels and erect my “mini” fortress in anticipation of the holocaust. Think medieval times applied to present circumstances. That is what the extremes see. Great Depression, a world at war, grand anarchy, massive famine and hunger, breakdown of the financial and monetary system and the society’s division of labor and etc.-arising out of the sudden arrival of “peak oil” or from the ravages of a global economic depression.

 

However, I learned from the Austrian School of Economics that people are rational beings which when confronted with even similar circumstances react distinctly as we discussed last week in Global Recession: Reading From Individual Actions Than From The Collective. Because of such divergence in the actions of individuals there is the tendency that the perceived outcome could be different from what many analysts expect.

 

If it were as simple for people to react in a “common” manner, as seen via the lens of “omniscient” experts, perhaps in the model of the “Gaussian curve”, then our problems would be easily solved. Governments through these experts can simply legislate away on how we should act. But the reality is that we are not robots, our rationalities cannot legislated, and governments only react to circumstances brought upon by the compounded actions of the marketplace. Why do you think we have this “deleveraging” problem in the first place?

 

Not wanting to stop the boom which the US authorities fostered (negative real rates, current account deficits, Fannie and Freddie Mac’s privileged status-which impelled them to take upon greater risk in their portfolios and prompted for a model from which was assimilated by private label mortgages, former Federal Reserve Chair Greenspan’s promotion of ARM, tight regulation in the banking system which led to creation of the “shadow banking system”, etc.) in the first place, now the same authorities have been applying cushion to the impact of an unwinding market dynamic emanating from a grand malinvestment edifice. Yet, if circumstances have been as predictable and politicians react accordingly, we wouldn’t be in these shoes today.

 

Sequel To Asian Financial Crisis? Not So Fast!

 

Even from the Philippine perspective we see the same unpredictability. Because of the interconnectedness brought upon by globalization trends, we have been saying that perhaps the Philippine economy will probably experience slower growth because of the adverse development abroad which are likely to negatively impact our “external linkages”. None of this has happened yet. Export growth trends (up 8.3% in June) and (remittances up 30% in June) have remained vigorous. Maybe it will be a matter of lagged effects.

 

It has been the same with our bullishness of the Peso relative to the US dollar. Where fundamentals favor many ex-US dollar currencies, especially relative to Asia, the sheer vigor in the momentum of the US dollar’s ACROSS THE BOARD advances have spawned many “rationalizations” from “high inflation” to “relative economic growth” to “shrinking liquidity due to current account improvement” and now to Fannie and Freddie Mac inspired risk of a currency crisis. Much of them I believe as unfounded.

 

Look at the following horrid news items:

 

This from the Bloomberg (emphasis mine),

 

Asia Currencies to Fall 12% on Capital Flight, ABN Amro Says

 

``There is more downside to Asian currencies from a reflow of capital out of Asia,'' Irene Cheung, a Singapore-based strategist at ABN Amro Bank, said in a phone interview. ``The decline could accelerate in the next two months because banks in the U.S. and Europe are pulling out. They are short of cash and need to recapitalize toward year-end.''….

 

``As much as $1 trillion flowed into Asia since 2001, of which two-fifths went to China, slightly more than a third to Korea and the rest went mostly to India and Taiwan, according to ABN's estimate.

 

Or this Korea’s Chosun.com (highlight mine)

 

``The main reason behind Monday’s panic was the September crisis rumor, which refused to go away despite government efforts to calm jitters.Stoking them was a scenario where W8 trillion (US$1=W1,118) worth of foreign investment in bonds maturing in September would exit the Korean market at once, further undermining the won and leading to a string of bankruptcies in financial institutions.”

 

Or this from UK Timesonline.co.uk

``Heavy investment by the Korean Government in Fannie, Freddie and other US-related agency bonds has left a potentially huge liquidity problem - perhaps $50 billion (£27.4 billion) - in the foreign reserve portfolio. Some believe that Seoul might have no ammunition left to prevent a significant flight from the won. Fruitless currency intervention by South Korea - increasingly desperate-looking verbal and financial measures to fight the market trend - cost about $20 billion in July alone.”

 

I don’t know why the seeming emphasis on the South Korean won’s 3.3% decline (see figure 1) when the Australian dollar and the New Zealand dollar even took heavier blows, down 5.08% and 4.46% respectively. Although I suspect that the latter two can be easily attributed to sharp decline in commodity prices.

Figure 1: yahoo.com: The Skyrocketing US dollar-Korean Won

 

Except for the Chinese remimbi (down .04%) and the Japanese yen (up 1.14%), based on Bloomberg’s data, ALL Asian currencies took it to the chin with the biggest casualties including the once mighty Singapore Dollar (down 1.43%). The Peso was down nearly 2% to 46.82 to a US dollar. Such dramatic cascading actions in the currency markets have led to creepy claims of market disaster.

 

Patching up all these we understand that stuffed with outsized holdings of US Fannie and Freddie Mac papers have basically rendered South Korea’s central bank as illiquid. Faced with maturing bonds in the face of a central bank liquidity crunch aggravated by current account deficit and portfolio liquidations from the deleveraging US and European institutions translates to a currency run. Thus, the currency crisis of South Korea and the rest of Asia!

 

Run for your lives…Its Asian crisis all over again! Or is it?

 

Of course we understand too that the global credit crunch has adversely impacted many companies that rely on global trade like Daewoo Shipping, some of whose international customers have withdrawn due to the lack of access to credit, aside from the anticipation of slowing business due to economic growth deceleration. And state owned Korean institutions, the Korea Development Bank and Korea Asset Management Corp, which controls 50.4% (Bloomberg, Hat Tip Craig McCarty) have reportedly been selling their stake in the company, possibly reinforcing the view of the state’s liquidity predicament.

 

But wait, what seems grossly inconsistent is that if South Korea’s central banks are truly in liquidity crunch, the same institutions cited above have played separate roles in NEGOTIATING TO ACQUIRE stakes at the beleaguered US financial institutions of the LEHMAN Brothers and Merrill Lynch!

 

So what could also be seen as selling by state owned Korean financial institutions of Daewoo shipping could also be interpreted not as raising liquidity for financing obligations but as an arbitrage, buying US assets! If the latter view is correct then, where’s the currency crisis?

 

Horror Stories Deserve A Second Look

 

Of course we can’t deny that with heightened incidences of liquidations from hedge funds on every asset class would “hurt” somewhat ex-US currencies due to a gush of outflows.

 

But to assume that MOST of the money which had flowed into Asia WILL EQUALLY stampede out seems one dimensional if not downrightridiculous or absurd. Such assumption ignores the fact that Asia has also been a source of liquidity growth and not just in the US.

 

Proof?  This from India’s Daily News Analysis (emphasis mine), ``Wealth is growing at much faster rates among the rest of the world.Households in Asia, the Pacific Rim excluding Japan and Latin America saw the greatest growth, with wealth rising 14%. That growth was fuelled by manufacturing in Asia and commodities in Latin America and the Middle East, as well as more currency and political stability.”

 

Besides, such analysis ignores that the fact that Asia has been impacted by trade and financial linkages and have NOT been the source of the financial disaster. In short there is a stark difference between structural and cyclical factors.

 

Another proof?

 

While, many OECD economies have been undergoing the paroxysm of deleveraging which essentially raises the cost of capital aside from the paucity of access to capital seen via contracting bank lending, figure 2 shows how the Philippine Banking system continues to experience robust growth!

Figure 2: ATR Kim Eng: Philippine Banking System Continues to Expand!

 

This from ATR Kim Eng (Hat Tip: Ton Garriz), ``The growth in outstanding loans of commercial banks accelerated to 18.1% Y/Y in June from 15.8% in May. The trend is consistent with the numbers reported separately by banks in their Q2 financial results. Credit expansion was driven by wholesale and retail trade (+38.5%), electricity, gas and water (+43.8%), and transportation, storage and communications (+57%). The growth in loans to the manufacturing sector grew at a slower pace of 7% although an improvement from 5.2% in the previous month. Manufacturing accounts for the 22% of total loans, the largest among categories. Auto loans also reversed course, growing 15.3% in June from a 6.9% contraction in the previous month.”

 

So aside from growth seen in the general industry we are seeing also credit growth in the consumer segment as seen in Auto Loans. This also suggests that sales of cars despite “high” oil prices can be expected to remain firm.

 

Additional information from the Inquirer.net,

 

``Consumer-related loans, which made up of about 8.0 percent of total bank lending, climbed 22 percent in June against a revised 19.9 percent in May, the central bank data showed. Consumption loan growth came mostly from credit card receivables which grew 27.3 percent in June, the central bank said.”

 

So the credit contraction or a liquidity crunch hasn’t infringed (yet. Though I don’t expect it to impact us materially) on the premises of the Philippine economy. Also all these suggest that the Philippine economy remains vibrant.

 

And the financial markets except the Peso have been bearing us out.

 

While Korean bonds have fallen (rising yields) reflecting the anxiety of deficit-global deleveraging process, Philippine bonds continue to rallymarkedly (falling yields).

 

This implies two possible developments, one, “lower” expectations of future consumer price inflation and two, diminished symptoms of “liquidity” crunch or contagion from the world’s develeraging process.

 

As we have written in many times during the past, market internals of the Phisix have shown decreasing depth of foreign selling. This has recently supported the Phisix’s “divergence” from most of the global markets, see figure 3.

Figure 3: PSE: Once Again, Diminishing Foreign outflows

 

As you can see, the foreign selling since the credit crunch unraveled last year has been the dominant theme in the Phisix. But once again the scale of selling activities (exhibited by the red arrow) seems to be diminishing and NOT increasing in contrast to the gloom and doom citations by freaked out analysts!

 

And yes, while the markets may not agree with me yet on the Peso which I believe reflects mainly a function of the unwinding short US dollar Carry trade, the deleveraging process, government intervention and momentum, this perhaps could last longer than my expectations.

 

Besides as we pointed in our July 20 issue Philippine Peso: Technical Pattern, BSP Actions and Diminished Inflation Points To A Rally, previous patterns have shown the Peso to correct by 45-50% before resuming its upward path which means the Peso could go over 47 before appreciating.

 

And if falling Asian currencies have been associated with the illiquidity from Asian central bank portfolio holdings of Fannie and Freddie Mac securities then the latest proposed emergency actions by the US Treasury (which is set to be announced before Asian markets open on Monday) suggest that “implicit guarantees will become explicit” as the US nationalizes the two behemoth widely owned mortgage institutions.

 

This from Bloomberg, ``The Treasury plans to put Fannie and Freddie into a so- called conservatorship and pump capital into the companies, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank said in an interview yesterday. The government would make periodic capital injections by buying convertible preferred shares or warrants, according to a person briefed on the plan. Paulson is seeking to end a crisis of confidence in the companies sparked by concern the companies didn't have enough capital to weather the biggest housing slump since the Great Depression.”

 

US Dollar Weighed By Heavy Cost of Bailout, Bernanke Buying Time

 

It’s simply amazing how we can be bullish the US dollar when the US government will be throwing so much money to salvage its financial system from a complete meltdown at a heavy cost to its taxpayers.

 

Don A. Rich in Mises.org wrote about the estimated full cost to taxpayers in rescuing Fannie and Freddie Mac alone, ``the real cost of the bailouts will easily exceed $1.3 trillion. In fact, the real cost is likely to range between $1.3 trillion to $1.6 trillion, and is not unlikely to reach $2.5 trillion.”

 

In perspective, US $1.3 trillion is almost equivalent to 10% of the US GDP! That’s for the GSEs alone, how about the others (FDIC and the rising bank foreclosures)?

 

Furthermore, just look at these comments from the news wires:

 

The Bloomberg quotes PIMCOs top honcho and bond market wizard Bill Gross (highlight mine),

 

``Unchecked, it can turn a campfire into a forest fire, a mild asset bear market into a destructive financial tsunami,'' Gross said. ``If we are to prevent a continuing asset and debt liquidation of near historic proportions, we will require policies that open up the balance sheet of the U.S. Treasury.''

 

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker says of the same thing (Bloomberg)

 

``This bright new system, this practice in the United States, this practice in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, has broken down,'' Volcker said today at a banking conference in Calgary. ``Growth in the economy in this decade will be the slowest of any decade since the Great Depression, right in the middle of all this financial innovation.''

 

No, the US dollar’s rally can’t be about economic growth or earlier recovery relative to its peers. The remaining pillar that keeps the US economy afloat has been exports, if the actions in the international financial markets are any indications, as seen in collapsing commodity prices and falling equity values in the BRIC zone (except India!), these suggest that US exports will likewise founder perhaps ushering its economy to a full blown recession perhaps from here going forward.

 

It can’t be about compression of liquidity out of the improvement in the US current account deficits too, if US exports fall in tandem with imports then the deficit standings will remain the same. Besides, the strength of the US exports implies the strength of the global economy; meaning in order for the US economy to keep from falling into a recession it needs a stronger global economy. So relativity-wise, the US can’t outgrow the world economy, especially against emerging markets which has supplied most of its financing requirements.

 

Yet any supposed improvement in the current account deficits will likely be offset by a sharp widening of fiscal deficits where government spending can’t be curbed at the same rate as the slowdown in tax revenues. And these deficits entail the need for foreign capital to plug or fill such yawning gap.

 

It can’t be about the rush to secure US dollars to pay off debt as deflation proponents argue. The liquidity crunch has been mainly a US and partly a Europe phenomenon. Besides, liquidity hasn’t been a monopoly of the US dollar and its financial system.

Figure 4: PIMCO: World Real Policy Rates Remain Negative!

 

Figure 4 from Pimco demonstrates that the world remains essentially “accommodative”.

 

My interpretation is that by keeping the US Fed policy rates down, Chairman Bernanke aims to transmit its inflationary policies via dollar links and currency pegs to Emerging Economies in order for latter to recover earlier-if not to remain vibrant-in order to buoy (via exports) and finance (plug deficits) the US economy, aside from inflating away the relative values of foreign owned US financial liabilities. (Korea’s plan to buy into Lehman and or Merrill Lynch exhibits such patterns).

 

You see the probable strategy employed by the global central banks led by Chairman Bernanke’s US Federal reserve seems to be to buy enough time for the world to recover and eventually write off all the losses in the affected financial sectors (once enough capital has been raised and when markets stabilize) similar to what the US Federal Reserve did in the early 1980s when every major American bank was technically bankrupt.

 

This apropos excerpt from one of our favorite analyst John Maudlin (underscore mine),

 

``They had made massive loans all over Latin America because the loans were so profitable. And everyone knows that governments pay their loans. Where was the risk? This stuff was rated AAA. Except that the borrowers decided they could not afford to make the payments and defaulted on the loans. Argentina, Brazil and all the rest put the US banking system in jeopardy of grinding to a halt. The amount of the loans exceeded the required capitalization of the US banks.

 

``Not all that different from today, expect the problem is defaulting US homeowners. So what did they do then? The Fed allowed the banks to carry the Latin American loans at face value rather than at market value. Over the course of the next six years, the banks increased their capital ratios by a combination of earnings and selling stock. Then when they were adequately capitalized, one by one they wrote off their Latin American loans, beginning with Citibank in 1986.”

 

Conclusion

 

The important thing to differentiate from our standpoint to that of horror stories is that the world is much integrated, more sophisticated and collaborative or more flexible as to diffuse these shocks to perhaps minimize stress levels. That’s why I try to always keep my mind open than simply fall for emotionally stirred hypes.

 

Applied to the investing world, such scenario translates to the same theme: gradual accumulation of EM and Asian assets and/or currencies as the opportunities arise, because the world likely to grow or recover in support of the US economy and not the other way around.

Phisix: Domestic Participants Panic! Bottom Ahoy?!

``Time is what matters most. Just as time is the friend of the great business and the enemy of the not-so great business, so to time, like volatility, makes friends with the long-term investor and antagonizes the short-term one.” –Josh Wolfe Timeless Space & the Mismeasure of Risk

Post Holy week of 2008, we noted of an article by a high profile domestic analyst in a business broadsheet satirically provoking local stock market participants to “panic” so as to “end” the anguish of the present bear market.

The article appeared to be a “reverse psychology”, as we wrote in In A Crisis, Be Aware Of The Danger But Recognize The Opportunity, ``which was meant to do otherwise, it signifies pretty much of a deeply entrenched state of denial-the inability to accept the persistence of the present conditions. This seems to reflect signs of impatience and deepening frustration from a supposed market expert. As German-Swiss author poet Hermann Hesse in his novel Steppenwolf wrote, ``All interpretation, all psychology, all attempts to make things comprehensible, require the medium of theories, mythologies and lies."

Instead we suggested that prudent investors ought to understand the global credit-equity cycle, which appears to be of more impact to our equity market more than simply reading too much of sentiment as a potential indicator of the direction of our market.

Let us see why…

Figure 1: stockcharts.com: World Equity Markets Have Basically Tracked US Financials

Figure 1 courtesy of stockcharts.com depicts of the Dow Jones World Index (main window), whose peak seems to resemble the local Phisix (not shown), has been winding down since the US General Financial Services (lowest pane) has broken down in July of 2007. In short, global equity markets have been heavily correlated with the performance of US financial stocks and apparently have signified as a drag.

However, in contrast to the Dow Jones World index, which remains above its recent low, the local benchmark the Phisix has severely underperformed by successively carving out new lows despite this week’s technical rally.

Will Global Financial Markets Survive High Oil Prices?

In addition, we hear many of today’s pains pinned on oil prices. However, such causality seems specious. The same chart shows oil prices (pane below main window-$WTIC) and global equities have not been strongly associated. On the contrary, the recent rally of oil prices coincided with the rebound of global equity markets.

When oil prices pinnacled at nearly $140, global equity markets were already rolling over concomitantly alongside with the US financials. Thus, the pain from high oil prices is clearly a subordinate source of concern relative to the headwinds from the US financials.

On a positive note, $135 oil today also translates to strong demand from emerging countries, which is a peculiarity or an unprecedented characteristic given today's environment see Figure 2.

Figure 2: British Petroleum: World Oil Consumption: Signs of Decoupling?

British Petroleum notes that ``world consumption rose by about 1 million barrels in 2007, just below the 10 year average. OECD consumption declined nearly 400,000 barrels per day. China accounted fro the largest increment to consumption even though growth rate was below average. Consumption in oil exporting regions was robust.” (BP)

Essentially with oil at $135, the outperformance of emerging markets relative to advanced economies in terms of oil consumption could also be seen as another sign of "decoupling".

Yes, China surprisingly raised energy prices this week-18% diesel, 16% gasoline (NYT) and electricity prices nearly 5%-which means easing of subsidies to alleviate the growing incidences of crippling shortages arising from losses of petrol refineries, whom have been curbing production, aside from the prospects of power failure (as the Olympic season nears), as power companies have become reluctant to operate oil fired power stations for the lack of revenues to cover oil costs. Anyway, despite such increases, refined crude oil prices are still about 30% BELOW world market prices!

Of course while we may expect price increases to somewhat dampen demand for energy usage (it is expected to hurt mostly countries that don’t use subsidies), this won’t be enough to curtail overall demand as evidenced by some countries who recently undertook measures to lift subsidies as Indonesia-recently hiked oil prices last May (Reuters), saw vehicle sales 24.4% year on year but 1.8% down from April (automotive world).

Besides, the market have learned how to adjust to the recent high oil price landscape by introducing fuel efficient yet affordable motor vehicles, as shown in Figure3.

Figure 3: Economist: Where low-cost car sales are set to grow

From the Economist, ``WITH one eye on emerging markets and another on fuel restrictions more carmakers are entering the low-cost car market. Renault, which already manufactures the €7,600 ($12,000) Logan, recently announced a venture with Nissan and an Indian carmaker, Bajaj Auto, to develop a car that will compete with Tata's Nano, which goes on sale in India in October for a tiny $2,400. Sales of basic and small low-cost cars are predicted to leap by nearly 4m cars a year to 17.7m by 2012, according to Roland Berger, a consultancy. Growth is set to be highest in the emerging economies of Asia and Eastern Europe, but sales in America, home of the big gas-guzzler, will also grow by an average of 8.7% a year.”

Figure 4: Economist: Falling US Light Truck Sales

So yes, while SUVs and Hummers (figure 4) are on the decline in the US, we don’t see the same with China which has a black market for Hummers and some growing variants-Beijing Auto’s Trojan and Dongfeng Auto’s HanMa (Financial Times).

The world has survived high oil prices. And is likely to get over high oil prices provided the world can adapt to the changes brought forth in time.

In fact, as seen in above, it is not high oil prices per se that has been contributing to the angst of the financial markets and the real economy, but the rate of change of oil prices, given that oil has doubled year on year. But then again the world markets seem to be finding ways and means to adjust to a given environment.

The point is that high oil prices reflect the reality of distortive government policies on one hand, and the seismic shift in the sphere of global economic progress on the other.

Short Credit-Short Equity In The Face of Global Monetary Inflation

Next, as we further commented, the pang of the recent bear market here and abroad looks likely one which tracks the cyclical credit-equity cycle. As we earlier quoted Citibank’s Mark King’s credit-equity cycle, it looks likely that we have segued into the fourth phase, where…

``Phase 4: Short credit, Short equity

``This is the classic bear market, when equity and credit prices re-couple and fall together. It is usually associated with falling profits and worsening balance sheets. Concerns about insolvency plague the credit market, while broad profit concerns plague the equity market. A defensive strategy is most appropriate - cash and government bonds are the best performing asset classes.”

Going back to figure 1 shows that LIBOR rates have remained high signifying continuing stress in the credit markets.

The London Interbank Offered Rate (wikipedia.org) is a daily reference rate based on the interest rates at which banks offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the London wholesale money market (or interbank market). To quote David Kotok of Cumberland Advisors, ``LIBOR is perhaps the most important interest rate in the world, in US dollar terms. It’s the pricing reference for probably $150 trillion. Trillion with a T. That number includes lots of derivatives.”

While falling credit and falling equities seem to be the classic bear market which we envisage today, we are faced with an environment where rising goods and services inflation makes the classic defensive strategy (cash and bonds) as an unlikely viable option.

Why? Because the inflation phenomenon has been transformed into a global affair. To aptly quote Doug Noland, in his Credit Bubble Bulletin (emphasis mine),

``First, there is the massive flow of dollar liquidity inundating the world. Despite huge dollar devaluation, a major Credit crisis, and economic downturn, our system is on track for yet another year of $700bn plus Current Account Deficits (and this doesn’t include the massive speculative outflows to participate in the global inflation). Global economies, especially booming Asia, are awash in dollar liquidity to use to bid up the prices of oil and other strategic resources.

``Second, today’s massive dollar flows have increasingly gravitating to speculative endeavors (hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, commodities speculation, etc.) – each year ballooning the “global pool of speculative finance” that by its very nature chases rising prices (“liquidity loves inflation”).

``Third, the confluence of the flood of global liquidity and unfettered domestic Credit systems has exerted its greatest stimulatory effect upon the highly populated countries of China, India, and Asia generally. This, then, has created a historic inflationary bias throughout the energy, food and commodities complexes.-Doug Noland Good Inflation?

Figure 5: Brad Setser: US Exports More Financial Assets

Proof? Figure 5 courtesy of the Brad Setser of the Council of Foreign Relations shows that the US exports TWICE more Financial Assets than its exports of goods and services.

To quote the meticulous Brad Setser, ``No one has argued that the main benefit of globalization is that it allows America’s bankers to sell US debt – and increasingly shares of American companies – to governments in the emerging world. But that is a fairly accurate description of current trade and financial flows.”

This is the epitome of the US dollar standard- the US sells promises to pay (sovereign debt or treasuries/agencies) in exchange for goods and services, aside from selling equity ownership in the US to foreigners (mostly emerging markets).

Thus, the ongoing wealth transfer and inflationary pass through from the US to world which has begun to boomerang back to the US.

Local Investors Gripped By Panic! Bottom Ahoy?

Well going back to the local analyst who called for the domestic participants to panic, the Philippine stock market appears to be accommodating his wishes.

Market internals suggests, despite the rally in the Phisix last week, of panic stricken activities led by local mostly retail investors.

Let us look at some of the evidences:

Figure 6: PSE: Net Foreign Trade

Figure 6 accounts for the year to date representation of net foreign trade. The chart shows that despite the most recent burst of foreign selling largely brought upon by the intense politicking amidst a drab global equity market sentiment, the intensity of foreign selling seems to have been thawing (red arrow) compared to the earlier bouts of liquidation.

In fact, for this week, foreign trade accounted for a marginal net buying of Php 152 million. But, this came amidst a negative net foreign trade breadth or the number of companies with positive foreign trade minus number of companies with negative foreign trade.

For the Phisix to bottom, foreign trade needs to revert to both a positive net Peso value and positive market breadth. We anticipate improvements on the said variables as the BSP raises interest rates in the face of high goods and services inflation, provided the politicking will abate.

However, market breadth persisted to decline despite the modest rally posted by the Phisix this week.

Figure 7: PSE data: Deteriorating Advance-Decline Spread

As can be seen in Figure 7, market breadth has turned deeply negative, but this has been smaller compared again to the earlier bouts of selling seen last January or March.

A bottoming phase would likely show lesser degree (smaller incidences of declining companies) and intensity (smaller number of declining companies during down days) of negative market breadth coupled with stability or improvement in the technical picture.

Figure 8: PSE: Collapsing Average Peso Trade Amidst Rising No. of Trades

And the kicker, as shown in Figure 8, is the surging number of trades (violet) amidst a materially diminishing Peso volume per trade (maroon).

During the earlier bouts of selling (since the second round of credit driven fears emerged in October 2007), the number of trades had been declining as the Phisix headed lower. This basically reflected a retreat of buyers.

However during the past two months we can see a reversal of this pattern, the Phisix persisted towards its downdraft but the number of trades amplified. This apparently reflects FEAR.

In addition, the latest episode of selling shows that the average Peso volume per trade has dramatically weakened. Again the lower volume plus heightened trading activity could possibly indicate fear among small accounts or retail investors!

Usually, the inflection point of any cycle is marked by a shift in ownership. In a bullmarket cycle, the strong hands give way to the weak hands who pushes the market to its maturity or until the pivotal turning point. On the other hand, we should expect the same but an antipodal ownership shift in a bearmarket, where weak hands are expected to give way to the strong hands.

So for our analyst whose wishes appear to have come in full circle, perhaps this could be indicative of the nearing culmination of the bearmarket.