Sunday, January 26, 2020

Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat? The Pig-Rat’s Nasty Tandem



Well, to tell you the truth, in all this excitement, I've kinda lost track myself. But being this is a .44 Magnum, the most powerful handgun in the world, and would blow your head clean off, you've got to ask yourself one question: 'Do I feel lucky?' Well, do you, punk?—Dirty Harry (Callahan), played by Clint Eastwood

In this issue

Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat? The Pig-Rat’s Nasty Tandem
-Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat?
-Shocks from The Pig-Rat Tandem: Symptoms of the Credit Cycle
-The Metal Rat May Be Inclined Towards the USD and Less Eager on Stocks
-The Pig-Rat Tandem’s Contribution to Economic Shocks and Underperformance

Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat? The Pig-Rat’s Nasty Tandem

Is China’s Coronavirus Portentous of the Year of the Metal Rat?

How should we take the following events as a precursor to the fortunes of the Chinese zodiac year of the Metal rat?
Figure 1

Due in part to the outbreak of the deadly coronavirus, which originated in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, China’s major equity benchmark, the Shanghai Composite Index, plunged 2.75% on Thursday, January 23rd, posting its worst loss for the end of the lunar year in three decades. (Figure 1 topmost pane)

And as the Chinese government aims to contain the virus from morphing into an epidemic or pandemic, social activities are being stringently controlled, which included the lockdown of some cities affecting as many as 56 million people, for now.


China's government imposed travel restrictions, as well as ordered shut the nation’s 70,000 movie theaters. Disney closed its Shanghai Disneyland in response to the outbreak, and had later been joined by several branches of Starbucks and McDonald's.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s government announced a citywide coronavirus emergency, which suspended classes until February 17, aside from the cancellation of all official travel to the mainland.

That’s aside from the Chinese government’s latest measure of suspending all inter-provincial road passenger transport from and to Beijing. Likewise, twenty-five provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in covering more than 1.2 billion people have activated the Level-I alert of public health incident, according to the China Daily.

The US and French governments also announced plans to evacuate citizens and diplomats from Wuhan.

Last night, China’s President Xi Jinping warned of the “spread of a deadly new virus is accelerating”, and thus declared that following the first 1000 room hospital, a second 1,300 room, will be built in a month or less.

And exacerbating this, major East Asian benchmarks have suffered deficits from the start of the year. The worst year-to-date performers have been national bellwethers of Laos (-5.17%), the Philippines (-2.45%), and China (-2.41%). (Figure 1, lowest pane)

With New Year’s celebration virtually aborted and turned upside down, would these signify as good Feng Shui for the metal rat?

Shocks from The Pig-Rat Tandem: Symptoms of the Credit Cycle

The Chinese zodiac sign of the year of the Pig has a history of being been chain-linked to either financial or economic turmoil, as I warned last year. Superstitions have little to do it with, except as coincidence. Instead, the credit cycle embodies the occurrence of such turbulence.

To recap on the 12-year cycle of the year of the pig:

1947-1949: Precursor to the Foreign Exchange crisis
1958-1960: Economic Slump (1959- year of the pig)
1969-1971: Balance of Payment crisis
1983-1985: Debt Moratorium/ Economic recession
1995-1997: Antecedent to Asian Financial Crisis
2007-2009: Forerunner to the Great Recession

Since the Philippine independence from the US, economic turmoil has shockingly encumbered the year of the pig. Its relations per year differ though.  The year of the pig heralded the crises of 1949, 1997 and 2008. The emergence of a crisis (1983) or its culmination (1971) has also shrouded the year of the pig.

The year of the PIG hasn’t been responsible for such gamut of economic dislocations. Or it hasn’t been superstitions that have plagued the Philippine financial and economic sphere since 1946.

These episodes shared some common denominators: credit expansion. Its ramifications were price inflation, economic slump, recession or a financial crisis or a combination thereof.

Some had external influences. Domestic origins were responsible for the others. 


There had been no let down from the year of the Earth Pig. Credit strains intensified in the banking system.
Figure 2

Exhibiting signs of tightening financial conditions, the Philippine yield curve INVERTED for the FIRST time since at least 2000!  (Figure 2, upper pane)

Such historic and seismic activities, but had largely been unnoticed by the public, had been reflected in the banking system’s liquidity conditions as manifested by the BSP’s KPI of cash-to-deposits, as well as, the liquid assets to deposits ratio. (Figure 2, lower window)

Tighter financial conditions likewise spiked Net NPLs to multi-year highs! (Figure 3 upper window)

Figure 3

The BSP response has likewise been monumental!

Aside from the massive downside adjustments of 400 bps in the banking system's Reserve Requirements Ratio, resonating its response to the 1997 Asian Crisis, not only did it join the global central banks in paring down its policy interest rates, but most importantly, it rekindled its nuclear option of monetizing public spending to unprecedented levels!

As ramifications to an economic downturn, global central banks eased in a panic to lower rates at levels last seen during the Great Recession that sparked a massive risk-on on financial assets in 2019!

And that’s not all.

Not only has the BSP engaged in stealthy rescue measures, but they even transcribed it in a report!

In its 2018 Financial Stability Report, the BSP acknowledged the massive buildup of such imbalances. (p. 19) [bold and underline added]

If there are risk issues to raise, it will have to be the prospects of managing liquidity. Aside from simply having more loans versus deposits, using liquid assets as a source for funding more earning assets needs our attention. However, the bigger issue will be that continuing on the path of being a bank-based financial market means that the provision of credit will require taking on mismatches in tenor and in liquidity. As more credit is dispensed, such mismatches will only increase.

Sadly, mainstream institutions have either dismissed or repressed this.

And in the face of increasing leverage, the BSP also raised concerns about the capability of its platform to handle payments and settlements of the Financial System. (p. 29 to 30)

Developments in the clearing and settlement space are unfolding at two distinct levels. At the most basic, the amounts processed for payments are significant, of the order of 15 times that of the resources of the banking system or of the economy (Figure 3.13). This highlights the substantial amount of (gross) liquidity needed to support financial market activity. This point is not trivial because it means that the magnitude of settlement/pre-settlement risk may be a much bigger concern than credit risk.

It also suggests why unwinding failed transactions can have broad system-level implications. Despite institutionalizing the delivery-versus payment protocol, the system remains vulnerable because a single bilateral failed trade may require a network of unwinding. Unfortunately, such data is not easily accessible and the extent to which these “settlement fails” represent a possible systemic risknot just in size but more so in terms of interlinkages that can spillover to the rest of the economy—is not readily determinable, at least at this time. In general, payments system data remain largely untapped and not having even a cursory view of the dynamics of the payments network leaves financial authorities blind to their possible consequences. This is a major concern

Unfortunately, with its complete dependence on such platforms and the absence of causal factors, the BSP provides no concrete solution to these substantial risks!

So the risk baton will be passed over by the Earth Pig to the Metal Rat.

The Metal Rat May Be Inclined Towards the USD and Less Eager on Stocks

Philippine risk assets likewise generated positive returns in 2019, the year of the Pig.

Saved by massive end session pumps, the main equity benchmark eked a meager 4.68% returns in 2019, the second positive return in six outings for the year of the pig since 1959.

Aside from Philippine Treasuries, the peso surged 3.7%.

Will such positive returns continue in the year of the Metal Rat?
Figure 4

In looking at patterns, positive returns might be the result of the alternating performances of the equity benchmark of the year of the rat since 1960. But such gains were accrued following negative returns from the year of the Pig.

But what if this year’s outcome will come in the shade of 2007-2008’s two-year boom-bust cycle? Or, this year’s positive may lead to negative returns in 2020.

Compared to the year of the Pig, the average USD peso has generated strong returns in the year of the Rat. The average USD peso has been up in four of the five years, with an average gain of 17.8%.

Or how about the last appearance of the metal rat, which was in 1960? 

The Pig-Rat Tandem’s Contribution to Economic Shocks and Underperformance

The big jump of the USD-peso and the crash of the equities in 1960 and 1984 had mainly been a consequence of economic shocks.

As noted last year, 1983 was the year the Philippine Government declared a debt moratorium (debt default)!

Figure 5

From Wikipedia: The country was hit hard by the second global oil crisis of the decade, in 1979. And when the US Federal Reserve raised interest rates in the early 80s, the Philippines’ debt ballooned rapidly, pushing the Philippine economy towards an economic nosedive by 1983 (bold italics added)

In the meantime, 2020’s predecessor, the year of the metal rat in 1960, almost shared a similar economic fate.

Aside from the former Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia’s January 26, 1959 SONA, which indicated pressures arising from credit-fueled inflation and a growth slowdown or stagflation, I excerpted Messrs Dohner and Intal from an NBR paper (p.180): “Philippine trade and industrial performance have been determined by a system of protection initiated in 1950. To deal with external imbalance, the Philippine government began licensing imports, in amounts determined by essentiality of the product. The incentives created for domestic production of these goods led to rapid industrialization and growth during much of the decade, but the growth rate had slowed appreciably by 1959.” (bold added)

The Philippines used to be ahead of its neighbors. However, the cumulative effect of such shocks or dislocations resulted in the reversing their relative financial and economic status.

According to the ADB: (bold added)

The Philippines has frequently suffered from periodic macroeconomic instabilities (Figure 3.21). The instabilities often resulted from persistent fiscal and current account deficits, over-borrowing and over-lending activities in the banking sector, and excessive exposure to short-term external debt. These often depressed investor confidence and led to capital flight, sharp currency depreciation, and economic recessions. Sharp monetary contraction and high interest rates to stave off currency depreciation and inflationary pressures during these crisis periods aggravated the economic downturn. The 1984–1985 economic collapse cost the Philippines a decade of potential economic growth and development. Major recession or low growth episodes occurred in 1960, 1970, 1982–1985, 1991– 1993, 1998, and 2001, and were associated with the macroeconomic instabilities in the last five decades. Indeed, these periodic and frequent downturns largely explain why the Philippines lagged behind many of its regional neighbors.

Asian Development Bank Philippines: Critical Development Constraints 2007, ADB.org

And yet the pig rat tandem played critical roles or have been associated with most of these shocks, as indicated in the underline texts.

And let us not forget, a cauldron of miasmic events for 2020: the Taal eruption in the Philippines, which may still be ongoing, the bushfires of Australia, the flare-up of the US-Iran conflict, a Trump impeachment trial and now the outbreak of the coronavirus of China…for January alone!

What a close for the year of Earth Pig! What an inaugural for the year of the Metal Rat!

As SFPD Inspector Harry Calligan in the 1971 film Dirty Harry asked, “Do I feel lucky? Well, do you?”
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Monday, January 20, 2020

Record GIRs Amidst Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits, Booming Crossborder Credit Transactions and Derivatives!



There’s always someone who is more willing to play the short-term game than you are. Someone who is willing to cut more corners, send a more urgent text, borrow against the future, ignore the side effects, abuse trust and corrupt the system–somehow justifying that short-term hustle with a rationalization (usually a selfish one) about how urgent it is. On the other hand… There’s plenty of room to win as someone who takes a longer view than the others—Seth Godin

Record GIRs Amidst Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits, Booming Crossborder Credit Transactions and Derivatives!
-Record GIRs? Why the Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits?
-US Dollar Standard: Despite Record GIR, BSP’s Bank Reserve Deposits and Currency Issuance Decouple!
-Trade Deficit and Manufacturing Recession Hardly US Dollar Flow Positive, Tourism Has Been Dollar Flow Positive!
-USD Flow Positive? October FDI Substantially Down, Portfolio Investments Reported Outflows in 2019
-Record GIR Equals Short USD: Financial Derivatives and Crossborder Credit Transaction Booms!

Record GIRs Amidst Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits, Booming Crossborder Credit Transactions and Derivatives!

Is the Philippines truly awash with US dollar and other FX deposits?

From the BSP’s media entitled “End-December 2019 GIR Level Reaches an All-time High of US$88 Billion”: Preliminary data shows that the country’s gross international reserves (GIR) rose by US$1.63 billion to US$87.86 billion as of end-December 2019 from US$86.23 billion as of end-November 2019.1 The month-on-month increase in the GIR level reflects the inflows arising from the BSP’s foreign exchange operations and income from its investments abroad, and the National Government’s (NG) net foreign currency deposits. These inflows were offset partly, however, by outflows representing payments made by the NG on its foreign exchange obligations during the month in review.

Record GIRs? Why the Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits?
 
Figure 1

In the first place, why has the GIRs parted ways with the FX deposits of the banking system?

FX deposits submerged by .19% in November, its first deflation since May 2013.

Here’s the backstory.

During the US Fed-induced taper tantrum days of 2013, when the GIR growth rate cascaded, FX deposits swelled. That’s because GIRs may have been disseminated by the BSP to the public then, which have found their way to the banking system and transformed into peso loans. The 10 straight months of seething 30% growth in money supply in 2013-2014, thusly, exhibited the ventilation of this “distribution effect”!

However, since peaking in 2014, the growth rate of the banking system’s FX deposits has steadily headed south.

Opposite to 2012-2014, the massive buildup of the BSP’s GIRs since September 2018 has emerged in the face of an accelerated plunge in FX deposits, which again posted its first deflation in 6.7 years. M3’s plunge in 2018 may have highlighted the “concentration effect”!

Have FX deposits of the banking system been diverted to bolster the NG’s foreign currency reserves?

In nominal terms, after hitting a low of USD 76.722 billion in July 2018, December GIR posted an all-time high of USD 87.9 billion last December, to surpass its previous record etched in September 2016 at USD 86.14 billion. In contrast to FX deposits, since hitting an apogee of Php 2.179 trillion in August, November deposits totaled Php 2.127, down 2.4% from its peak.

Have FX deposits plateaued or emitted signs of an inflection point? Will the BSP be eventually prompted to redistribute its reserves back to the banks?

The topmost chart in Figure 1 shows the relationship between FX deposits and GIRs. While the middle is the same, it incorporates M3, demonstrating the possible distribution effect of GIRs in 2013-2014, and its concentration effect from 2018 to 2019. The lowest chart illustrated the nominal values of both the GIR and FX deposits that exhibit a potential plateau on FX deposits.

US Dollar Standard: Despite Record GIR, BSP’s Bank Reserve Deposits and Currency Issuance Decouple!

Figure 2

Secondly, considering the de facto US dollar standard, whereby changes in the domestic money supply mainly from bank credit expansion has been implicitly anchored on US dollar reserves held by the BSP, since the nadir in the 3Q of 2018, growth of international reserves have spiked to decouple with bank reserves as the latter’s growth rate continues to fumble.

The BSP’s international reserves jumped 10.34% in November 2019, the highest rate since September 2016. Meanwhile, Reserve Deposits of Other Depository Corporations (ODC) deflated by 6.99% over the same period, marking a six consecutive month of decline. (Figure 2, topmost)

The BSP’s currency issue has likewise mirrored the ongoing divergence with international reserves. For the second straight month, currency issuance grew by over 9% (9.7% in November), the lowest since December 2015. (Figure 2, middle pane)

International Reserves constituted 87% of the BSP’s total assets, as of November. Such reserves have maintained a narrow range from 84% to 88% of the BSP’s assets since 2012, which has served as the implied anchor relative to the domestic currency. (Figure 2, lowest pane)

On the liability side, the ODC and currency issued appear to be on the path to trade places. While the ODC’s share continues to erode, gains of currency issued have replaced the former's losses.  The ODC’s share of liabilities slid to 34.15% in November down from 34.6% a month back. The share of currency issued to total liabilities surged to 30.3%, its second-highest since December 2018’s 31.47%.

With the ample supply of USD reserves, theoretically, the banking system should be issuing more credit and domestic currency. But the diametric directions of these factors tell us that something has been amiss.

Trade Deficit and Manufacturing Recession Hardly US Dollar Flow Positive, Tourism Has Been Dollar Flow Positive!
Figure 3

Furthermore, economic performance provides subdued support to a USD positive flow.

Merchandise trade continues to register substantial trade deficits even with the contracting rate of change of imports, which stagnating exports have barely improved. (Figure 3, upmost pane)

With imports posting a negative rate of change for eight straight months through November, hearing claims that the statistical economy has outperformed in the 4Q is just incredible.

Not just imports, but industrial production has registered another substantial 5.8% decrease in November. Industrial production has posted 12-consecutive months of declines through November. The raw data shows that a recession had already engulfed the manufacturing sector. (Figure 3, middle pane)

But because we are supposed to be a service-oriented economy, the negative showing of manufacturing and imports are to be ignored, according to establishment wisdom.

Are physical goods not sold on consumer retail outlets, such as department stores, groceries, and others? How about the barbershops and salons? Don’t they consume powders, lotion, shampoo, nail polish, and more? How about the much-ballyhooed real estate sector? Are cement, steel, nails, marbles, veneer wood, paints, and more not used in construction and on the finishing of real estate projects?

All these have to be imported or manufactured, yes?

And with BPO’s downscaling on growth projections, should these be taken as signs of either growth or dollar positive?

Tourism may be one of few the bright spots for the USD reserves. In the ten months of 2019, arrivals growth nearly doubled in 2019 to 15.04%, bolstered by October arrivals up by 21.93%. (Figure 3, lowest pane)

USD Flow Positive? October FDI Substantially Down, Portfolio Investments Reported Outflows in 2019

Figure 4

Foreign direct investments have likewise pointed to a USD negative for the Balance of Payments. The BSP’s 10-month FDI have been down 32.8% in 2019 to USD 5.8 billion from USD 8.6 billion a year ago. (Figure 4, upper pane)

Also, foreign portfolio investments have registered a net outflow worth USD 1.89 billion for the entire 2019. (Figure 4, lowest pane)

As enumerated above, there hardly has been any USD positive flows from the real economy that would justify the recent record GIRs.

Record GIR Equals Short USD: Financial Derivatives and Crossborder Credit Transaction Booms!

Perhaps, internal operations by the BSP and the banking system may have magnified the statistical reserves.

 
Figure 5

Following the sharp decline of the Peso in 2018, the BSP has modestly careened away from using FX instruments in managing its international reserves.

As of December, the GIR’s FX component registered USD 2.8 billion in December 2019, down by over half or 52.05% from its zenith at USD 6.86 billion in October 2018 or 14 months ago. Still, such FX tools are at unmatched levels. (Figure 5, upmost pane)

As of November, in the BSP’s International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity report, other reserve assets, constituting financial derivatives and loans to nonbank residents and others accounted for USD 6,982.78 million or about 8.0% of December GIR or 53% of the nominal gains from the October 2018 trough.

Nevertheless, the BSP’s Balance of Payment 3Q report showed us some clues on the other likely drivers: “Net inflows in the other investment account expanded by more than four times to reach US$935 million in Q3 2019, from US$228 million in the same period of the previous year. This was on the back of residents’ withdrawal of their currency and deposits abroad amounting to US$747 million (from net placements of US$633 million) and lower net availments of short-term loans of US$381 million (from US$720 million) extended by local banks to non-residents. In addition, local banks’ net availments of short-term loans from non-residents increased to US$1.2 billion from US$95 million in Q3 2018. Net inflows during the period were partly tempered by outflows stemming from resident corporates’ net repayment of trade credits and advances amounting to US$222 million (from net availments of US$1.1 billion) and net withdrawal of nonresidents’ currency and deposits in local banks amounting to US$116 million during the quarter from net placements of US$96 million in the same quarter last year” (bold mine)

Stunning, isn’t it? Despite the massive foreign exchange denominated short-term borrowing by local banks, their deposits continue to deplete! Where’d the money go?

And there’s more.

The record GIR must have also been a product of BSP and the financial system’s increasing leverage with the US banks.

US Banks Total liabilities payable to the Philippines have rocketed to multi-year highs in 2019, alongside the spike of the BSP’s GIR, which hit a record late 2019. Though not a record, vigorous activities have also been noted on the US bank's Total Claims on the Philippines.(Figure 5, middle and lowest window)

According to the US Treasury International Capital (TIC), “U.S. Banking Liabilities to Foreigners” comprise “Foreign holdings of most types of dollar-denominated short-term U.S. securities”.  On the other hand, “Data on U.S. holdings of short-term foreign securities including securities held for banks' domestic customers”, adds the TIC, “are included with other claims in the monthly data on "U.S. Banking Claims on Foreigners”.

Needless to say, a substantial portion of gains of the record GIR, from its recent troughs have stemmed from cross-border credit transactions with US banks.

That said, financial derivatives, such as FX swaps, and massive cross-border credit transactions only increases the implicit USD short-positions of the domestic financial system, magnifying its vulnerability to sharp volatility in the financial markets.

Oh, add FDIs to such leveraging. Intercompany debt or debt to domestic affiliates comprised 73.75% of the 2019 10-month FDI, which doesn’t mechanically entail investments on productive capacity.

Record GIRs don’t seem to exhibit the abundance of foreign exchange holdings, instead like stocks, internal operations appear to have been designed to embellish or facelift superficially the nation's macroeconomic picture.

Brought about by the big bond boom, and the rallying ASEAN currency, that 2019 luck on the Peso seems bound to reverse in 2020. The 3.7% annual gains of the peso in 2019 came in the light of its neighbors, the Indonesia rupiah 3.64%, the Thailand baht 8.15% and the Malaysian ringgit 1.03%.

Buy the USD Php!