Sunday, December 02, 2018

Philippine Treasury Markets Exhibits More Symptoms of “Dislocations of Crisis Proportions”


Philippine Treasury Markets Exhibits More Symptoms of “Dislocations of Crisis Proportions”

It pays to emphasize this conclusion from the BSP-led Financial Stability Coordinating Council (FSCC)’s Financial Stability Report(FSR) 2017:

While there is no definitive evidence of a looming crisis, it is also clear that shocks that have caused dislocations of crisis proportions have come as a surprise. What is not debatable is that repricing, refinancing and repayment risks (3Rs) are escalated versus last year and this could result in systemic risk if not properly addressed in a timely manner

Since the BSP has been enlisted as a Bank for International Settlement (BIS) reporting country, the annual Financial Stability Report becomes part of its requirement. That said, though the primary audience for the FSR seems to be central bankers, it has been made available to the public.

Fundamentally, the National Government produces reports that cater to different audiences.

When in front of the BIS, they talk “Black Swans” and Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis”. When in front of domestic audiences, it is all about La La Land!

The risks it writes about in the FSR virtually vanished on its 1H report on the Financial System. Both reports cover almost the same timeframe but published with a 2-month differential, the FSR on August and the Financial System on October.

And here’s the thing.

The in-your-face rally in the stock market, led by the top 6 issues which now account for whopping 51.30% of the market capitalization of PSYEi 30, the second highest ever, attempts to show a hunky dory scenario of the financial system!

But that scenario has hardly been supported elsewhere.

The ferocity in the rally of the four banking majors has barely resonated with the performance of the broader banking system.  [See Charts: Why the Janus-Faced Banking Stocks? PSEi Banks Versus The Rest November 26, 2018].

Not limited to the banks, such divergent performance has been evident even against the broader universe of listed issues. But this won't be tackled here. 

More importantly, the “managed” treasury market seemingly opposes or rejects this roseate scenario.

In other words, the current trends in the Philippine Treasury’s yield curve herald MORE and not less problem ahead.

Let us dive into them.
Figure 1

PDS data provided by investing.com have been used above because the new BVAL metric lacks breadth in data.

The plunge in the yields of the bonds (10-, 20-, and 25-year maturities) highlights the market’s perception of a material slowdown in inflation. (figure 1)

In contrast, while the 3-month bills retraced slightly, generally the short-end of the curve continues to rise. The short-end continues to exhibit strains in monetary liquidity.

The divergence of yield actions has brought about a stunning narrowing or flattening of the yield curve!

Remember rising yields of T-bills have been an ongoing trend since 2016 that has only accelerated in the 2H of 2018. (figure 1 lower window)
Figure 2

The 10-year 6-month spread closed to its lowest level since late 2015 and 2016. The 10-year 1-year spread has narrowed past the 2015 lows! (figure 2)
Figure 3

ADB’s favorite benchmark, the 10-year 2-year spread, has dropped to 2015-16 lows. The spread with the belly (mid-curve) bounced from negative but has dropped to near to zero this week.

As repeatedly been stated here, the narrowing curve will hurt bank margins and profits. And inversions have typically been signs of either economic slowdown or recession.

So despite the BSP’s “yield management”, the treasury curve continues to reveal unpleasant developments within the financial industry.

If credit is the blood of the Philippine economy, the banking system is its heart
Figure 4

From the BSP: “Preliminary data show that domestic liquidity (M3) grew by 8.2 percent year-on-year to about ₱11.1 trillion in October 2018. This was slower than the 9.8-percent (revised) expansion in the previous month. On a month-on-monthseasonally-adjusted basis, M3 decreased by 0.1 percent.”

On a month on month basis, M3 dropped by a staggering 153 bps, that’s huge!

The October M3 rate of 8.23% hit a January and February 2015 low of 7.82% and 8.63%. (figure 3, lowest window)

Former BSP chief Amando Tetangco Jr. ranted about “deflation” or “disinflation” risks in his speeches during these days.

Having been stripped of transfers from the inflation tax, such had been the prime reason the BSP chief griped about positive real rates. (figure 4 topmost chart)

An even more important and related reason: with a system heavily dependent on credit, a meaningful slowdown in credit expansion would not only lead to an economic downturn but would also reinforce fragility embedded into the system.

Positive real rates had been the outcome of the M3 plunge in 2014-2015 of which penalized the banking system with initial losses and a slow recovery. (figure 4, middle chart) The banking system has never recovered its profit rate from 2009 to 2013.

It was because of such losses in the banking system that prompted the BSP to launch its version of Quantitative Easing in 2015.

Back then, crashing M3 was still accompanied by INCREASING peso deposit growth and cash and due banks in the banking system. Though money supply shrank, banking liquidity hasn’t been as much a concern.

And the current environment has been peeled off such cushions. (figure 4, lower chart)

The surge in 1-year yield has narrowed its gap with the CPI to only 40 bps at the end of the October. The interest subsidy favoring the NG has gone thin. The diminishing subsidy tells us that the BSP will soon stop tightening. (BUY the USD-Php!)

And if the CPI falls below the 1-year yield, then statistically speaking, we would have moved on or segued to a positive real rates regime. And neither the banking system nor the economy would thrive without facing significant risks and volatility under such environment.

There had been a lot less debt and more liquidity in 2015 than in the present. Yet, the BSP had to bail the system out with a QE in 2015 and the lowest interest rate in June 2016 (under the cover of instituting the corridor system). At the end of October 2018, Banking loan portfolio was at Php 7.78 trillion 55.5% above the Php 5 trillion at the close of 2015.

The flattening curve, aggravated by the plummeting M3, not only exposes liquidity issues but also credit strains within the banking system. It also brings forth funding issues for the NG’s very ambitious deficit spending.

When the FSR admitted that “shocks that have caused dislocations of crisis proportions have come as a surprise”, they weretalking about constraints on the system that had been a lot less than today.

Or, none of the present market developments has alleviated such “shocks”. To the contrary, ‘shocks’ have gotten much worse.
And this tells us why the Insurance Commission had to bailout preneed firms by easing regulatory reporting standards. [SeeInsurance Commission Launches Regulatory Bailout of Pre-Need Firms, The Twin of Unbridled Fiscal Spending is High Inflation, The Coming Stagflation November 18, 2018]

And this shows to us why banks have been aggressively soliciting funds from the public.

From last week’s disclosures:

The maiden bond issue of UnionBank of the Philippines [PSE: UBP] has received overwhelming investor demand. With this, the bank has now more than doubled its issue size from the originally announced PHP5.0 billion to PHP10.5 billion. The 2-year fixed rate bonds, which have a coupon rate of 7.061% per annum to be paid quarterly, were priced at 30 basis points over the 2 year BVAL government benchmark rate on November 21, 2018. This is at the lowest end of UnionBank’s indicative pricing guidance of 30 to 50 basis points that the Bank communicated during a multi-city roadshow in Manila, Cebu and Davao last November 13-15, 2018. With the issue size already over twice covered, UnionBank also opted to shorten the public offer period almost a week earlier than expected.

Yield to Maturity at which Additional Bonds under Metrobank’s [PSE: MBT] 2-year 7.15% Coupon Fixed Rate Bonds Due 2020 (“Bonds”) will be issued.  (Reissuance out of the Php 100 Billion Bond and Commercial Paper Program)In consultation with Standard Chartered Bank as the Sole Arranger, Metrobank will issue the Additional Bonds at a Yield to Maturity of 7%. The Additional Bonds will be offered to the public from November 28 to December 7, 2018. Issue Date will be on December 17, 2018. Metrobank is targeting to add at least Php5 Billion to the existing Bonds.

Lastly, again from the FSR: “What is not debatable is that repricing, refinancing and repayment risks (3Rs) are escalated versus last year and this could result in systemic risk if not properly addressed in a timely manner”

Will the present path of tightening suffocate the economy that “results in systemic risk”? Or will the BSP set loose its grip on the financial system to unleash inflationism once again? Will the coming declines in the CPI serve as its trigger?
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Will Lower International Prices of Oil Benefit the Philippine Economy?

Will Lower International Prices of Oil Benefit the Philippine Economy?

The international prices of oil have been plunging. As a net importer, the mainstream sees, lower prices of oil should benefit the Philippines.

But has it?
Superimposing GDP data with the US Energy Information Administration’s end-of-the-period data on US WTI crude oil prices, the correlation between the GDP and WTI has been different than popular perception.

Since 1999, Philippine GDP has risen concomitant with higher oil prices and vice versa. Or, in three occasions when oil prices slid or plummeted, GDP followed.

The Philippines imports about ninety percent of its oil supply from the Middle East, specifically, Saudi Arabia has a 37.7% share, Kuwait 24.6%, UAE 18.6%, Qatar 6.2% and Oman 2.6% (Department of Energy 2017).

The US WTI crude prices used here is for comparison purposes only.

Though there may be many factors influencing the price of oil and GDP I cite three rudiments.

Forex exchange movements. Example, a strong domestic currency may offset rising oil prices, while a weak currency may amplify it.

External factors. The crash of oil prices in 2008 was in reaction to the seizure in the US financial industry which eventually morphed into the Great Recession. Instead of helping the GDP, the plunge in international oil prices reflected on the transmission mechanism of global economic weakness to the Philippines. GDP nose-dived to near recession in 2009.  GDP nose-dived to near recession in 2009. But the fiscal stimulus package, the Economic Resiliency Plan of 2009 shielded the economy from it. Aside, with relatively clean balance sheets, the Philippines wasn’t as vulnerable then as today.

A similar dynamic occurred in 2014-2015, where oil prices crashed tagging along with the Philippine GDP. China’s stock market crash occurred in 2015. The global oil crash prompted several global central banks to launch negative interest rates in 2016. In defense of the banking system, the BSP launched its QE.

Domestic Forces. I previously used the analogy of Vibranium which powers Marvel Comic’s Black Panther’s Wakanda empire.

Let us assume that the local scientists have discovered the conversion of water into energy to substitute for oil and other natural sources of energy. Because facilities for the use of this energy has been mass produced, it became the ONLY source of the nation’s power. However, like in Marvel hero Black Panther’s dominion Wakanda, this energy has been classified and exclusively used in the Philippines.

So what would be the price of oil and its byproducts here?

Because demand for oil is zero (value is zero), therefore, the price of oil is zero. So the fluctuations of oil prices in the international markets will neither have an impact nor influence on the prices in the economy.

The point of this exercise is to demonstrate that the influence of international oil prices on the local economy depends on the extent of the value of oil and its byproducts to domestic demand.  


So what would be the impact of lower oil prices abroad here? It depends.

If international prices of oil and energy drop significantly to the spur an offsetting spike in domestic demand for these, then the volume of imports will be least affected. Ceteris paribus, consumers benefit from lower energy prices. However, there will be little change from the imports perspective.

If the plunge in the international prices of oil has been a manifestation of an intensifying fragility in the global economy, then such frailty should be expected to reflect on the domestic GDP eventually.

Seen from the CPI perspective…
At its recent peak, international oil prices have remained distant (31% off) from its 2013 high, yet the October CPI at 6.7% have surged 60% past the July 2014 high at 4.19%. Such gap exhibits the loosening statistical relationship between oil prices and the CPI, or oil’s diminished impact on the CPI. The Core CPI (ex-food and energy) corroborates such relationship.

Nevertheless, a decrease in a relationship is not the same as no relationship. Thus, the plunge in November’s oil prices will still have some effects on the CPI. Pump prices, reports say, will be rolled back significantly.

More importantly, the continuing incredible dive in money supply growth in October reinforces the perspective that demand from some sectors (consumers?) has slowed dramatically. And such escalating economic infirmities should exhibit its presence in the CPI and the GDP eventually.  

The current state of domestic liquidity doesn’t seem to support a vibrant demand for energy products. Of course, this may change.

The BSP hedged its CPI forecast with a wide range of 5.8 to 6.6% for November. Did they not get any tip from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)? The PSA will report on November’s CPI next week.

And because of falling international oil prices, the National Government proposes to recall the suspension of fuel excise tax hikes. The President said that he would study it.

The hike in excise tax will have more of an impact on the domestic economy than the drop in international prices of oil.

And the bait and switch used in the international oil prices to justify fuel excise tax hikes is a useful example of example of Professor Thomas Sowell’s first lesson of economics and politics (Is Reality Optional?)

The first lesson of economics is scarcity: there is never enough of anything to fully satisfy all those who want it. The first lesson of politics is to disregard the first lesson of economics.

As been repeatedly noted here, the inflation tax constitutes an integral part of the financing of the NG’s aggressive public spending.

High CPI will indeed slow, but only to the point that it becomes less of a hindrance to the goals of the political system.