Monday, January 20, 2020

Record GIRs Amidst Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits, Booming Crossborder Credit Transactions and Derivatives!



There’s always someone who is more willing to play the short-term game than you are. Someone who is willing to cut more corners, send a more urgent text, borrow against the future, ignore the side effects, abuse trust and corrupt the system–somehow justifying that short-term hustle with a rationalization (usually a selfish one) about how urgent it is. On the other hand… There’s plenty of room to win as someone who takes a longer view than the others—Seth Godin

Record GIRs Amidst Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits, Booming Crossborder Credit Transactions and Derivatives!
-Record GIRs? Why the Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits?
-US Dollar Standard: Despite Record GIR, BSP’s Bank Reserve Deposits and Currency Issuance Decouple!
-Trade Deficit and Manufacturing Recession Hardly US Dollar Flow Positive, Tourism Has Been Dollar Flow Positive!
-USD Flow Positive? October FDI Substantially Down, Portfolio Investments Reported Outflows in 2019
-Record GIR Equals Short USD: Financial Derivatives and Crossborder Credit Transaction Booms!

Record GIRs Amidst Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits, Booming Crossborder Credit Transactions and Derivatives!

Is the Philippines truly awash with US dollar and other FX deposits?

From the BSP’s media entitled “End-December 2019 GIR Level Reaches an All-time High of US$88 Billion”: Preliminary data shows that the country’s gross international reserves (GIR) rose by US$1.63 billion to US$87.86 billion as of end-December 2019 from US$86.23 billion as of end-November 2019.1 The month-on-month increase in the GIR level reflects the inflows arising from the BSP’s foreign exchange operations and income from its investments abroad, and the National Government’s (NG) net foreign currency deposits. These inflows were offset partly, however, by outflows representing payments made by the NG on its foreign exchange obligations during the month in review.

Record GIRs? Why the Deflation in the Banking System FX Deposits?
 
Figure 1

In the first place, why has the GIRs parted ways with the FX deposits of the banking system?

FX deposits submerged by .19% in November, its first deflation since May 2013.

Here’s the backstory.

During the US Fed-induced taper tantrum days of 2013, when the GIR growth rate cascaded, FX deposits swelled. That’s because GIRs may have been disseminated by the BSP to the public then, which have found their way to the banking system and transformed into peso loans. The 10 straight months of seething 30% growth in money supply in 2013-2014, thusly, exhibited the ventilation of this “distribution effect”!

However, since peaking in 2014, the growth rate of the banking system’s FX deposits has steadily headed south.

Opposite to 2012-2014, the massive buildup of the BSP’s GIRs since September 2018 has emerged in the face of an accelerated plunge in FX deposits, which again posted its first deflation in 6.7 years. M3’s plunge in 2018 may have highlighted the “concentration effect”!

Have FX deposits of the banking system been diverted to bolster the NG’s foreign currency reserves?

In nominal terms, after hitting a low of USD 76.722 billion in July 2018, December GIR posted an all-time high of USD 87.9 billion last December, to surpass its previous record etched in September 2016 at USD 86.14 billion. In contrast to FX deposits, since hitting an apogee of Php 2.179 trillion in August, November deposits totaled Php 2.127, down 2.4% from its peak.

Have FX deposits plateaued or emitted signs of an inflection point? Will the BSP be eventually prompted to redistribute its reserves back to the banks?

The topmost chart in Figure 1 shows the relationship between FX deposits and GIRs. While the middle is the same, it incorporates M3, demonstrating the possible distribution effect of GIRs in 2013-2014, and its concentration effect from 2018 to 2019. The lowest chart illustrated the nominal values of both the GIR and FX deposits that exhibit a potential plateau on FX deposits.

US Dollar Standard: Despite Record GIR, BSP’s Bank Reserve Deposits and Currency Issuance Decouple!

Figure 2

Secondly, considering the de facto US dollar standard, whereby changes in the domestic money supply mainly from bank credit expansion has been implicitly anchored on US dollar reserves held by the BSP, since the nadir in the 3Q of 2018, growth of international reserves have spiked to decouple with bank reserves as the latter’s growth rate continues to fumble.

The BSP’s international reserves jumped 10.34% in November 2019, the highest rate since September 2016. Meanwhile, Reserve Deposits of Other Depository Corporations (ODC) deflated by 6.99% over the same period, marking a six consecutive month of decline. (Figure 2, topmost)

The BSP’s currency issue has likewise mirrored the ongoing divergence with international reserves. For the second straight month, currency issuance grew by over 9% (9.7% in November), the lowest since December 2015. (Figure 2, middle pane)

International Reserves constituted 87% of the BSP’s total assets, as of November. Such reserves have maintained a narrow range from 84% to 88% of the BSP’s assets since 2012, which has served as the implied anchor relative to the domestic currency. (Figure 2, lowest pane)

On the liability side, the ODC and currency issued appear to be on the path to trade places. While the ODC’s share continues to erode, gains of currency issued have replaced the former's losses.  The ODC’s share of liabilities slid to 34.15% in November down from 34.6% a month back. The share of currency issued to total liabilities surged to 30.3%, its second-highest since December 2018’s 31.47%.

With the ample supply of USD reserves, theoretically, the banking system should be issuing more credit and domestic currency. But the diametric directions of these factors tell us that something has been amiss.

Trade Deficit and Manufacturing Recession Hardly US Dollar Flow Positive, Tourism Has Been Dollar Flow Positive!
Figure 3

Furthermore, economic performance provides subdued support to a USD positive flow.

Merchandise trade continues to register substantial trade deficits even with the contracting rate of change of imports, which stagnating exports have barely improved. (Figure 3, upmost pane)

With imports posting a negative rate of change for eight straight months through November, hearing claims that the statistical economy has outperformed in the 4Q is just incredible.

Not just imports, but industrial production has registered another substantial 5.8% decrease in November. Industrial production has posted 12-consecutive months of declines through November. The raw data shows that a recession had already engulfed the manufacturing sector. (Figure 3, middle pane)

But because we are supposed to be a service-oriented economy, the negative showing of manufacturing and imports are to be ignored, according to establishment wisdom.

Are physical goods not sold on consumer retail outlets, such as department stores, groceries, and others? How about the barbershops and salons? Don’t they consume powders, lotion, shampoo, nail polish, and more? How about the much-ballyhooed real estate sector? Are cement, steel, nails, marbles, veneer wood, paints, and more not used in construction and on the finishing of real estate projects?

All these have to be imported or manufactured, yes?

And with BPO’s downscaling on growth projections, should these be taken as signs of either growth or dollar positive?

Tourism may be one of few the bright spots for the USD reserves. In the ten months of 2019, arrivals growth nearly doubled in 2019 to 15.04%, bolstered by October arrivals up by 21.93%. (Figure 3, lowest pane)

USD Flow Positive? October FDI Substantially Down, Portfolio Investments Reported Outflows in 2019

Figure 4

Foreign direct investments have likewise pointed to a USD negative for the Balance of Payments. The BSP’s 10-month FDI have been down 32.8% in 2019 to USD 5.8 billion from USD 8.6 billion a year ago. (Figure 4, upper pane)

Also, foreign portfolio investments have registered a net outflow worth USD 1.89 billion for the entire 2019. (Figure 4, lowest pane)

As enumerated above, there hardly has been any USD positive flows from the real economy that would justify the recent record GIRs.

Record GIR Equals Short USD: Financial Derivatives and Crossborder Credit Transaction Booms!

Perhaps, internal operations by the BSP and the banking system may have magnified the statistical reserves.

 
Figure 5

Following the sharp decline of the Peso in 2018, the BSP has modestly careened away from using FX instruments in managing its international reserves.

As of December, the GIR’s FX component registered USD 2.8 billion in December 2019, down by over half or 52.05% from its zenith at USD 6.86 billion in October 2018 or 14 months ago. Still, such FX tools are at unmatched levels. (Figure 5, upmost pane)

As of November, in the BSP’s International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity report, other reserve assets, constituting financial derivatives and loans to nonbank residents and others accounted for USD 6,982.78 million or about 8.0% of December GIR or 53% of the nominal gains from the October 2018 trough.

Nevertheless, the BSP’s Balance of Payment 3Q report showed us some clues on the other likely drivers: “Net inflows in the other investment account expanded by more than four times to reach US$935 million in Q3 2019, from US$228 million in the same period of the previous year. This was on the back of residents’ withdrawal of their currency and deposits abroad amounting to US$747 million (from net placements of US$633 million) and lower net availments of short-term loans of US$381 million (from US$720 million) extended by local banks to non-residents. In addition, local banks’ net availments of short-term loans from non-residents increased to US$1.2 billion from US$95 million in Q3 2018. Net inflows during the period were partly tempered by outflows stemming from resident corporates’ net repayment of trade credits and advances amounting to US$222 million (from net availments of US$1.1 billion) and net withdrawal of nonresidents’ currency and deposits in local banks amounting to US$116 million during the quarter from net placements of US$96 million in the same quarter last year” (bold mine)

Stunning, isn’t it? Despite the massive foreign exchange denominated short-term borrowing by local banks, their deposits continue to deplete! Where’d the money go?

And there’s more.

The record GIR must have also been a product of BSP and the financial system’s increasing leverage with the US banks.

US Banks Total liabilities payable to the Philippines have rocketed to multi-year highs in 2019, alongside the spike of the BSP’s GIR, which hit a record late 2019. Though not a record, vigorous activities have also been noted on the US bank's Total Claims on the Philippines.(Figure 5, middle and lowest window)

According to the US Treasury International Capital (TIC), “U.S. Banking Liabilities to Foreigners” comprise “Foreign holdings of most types of dollar-denominated short-term U.S. securities”.  On the other hand, “Data on U.S. holdings of short-term foreign securities including securities held for banks' domestic customers”, adds the TIC, “are included with other claims in the monthly data on "U.S. Banking Claims on Foreigners”.

Needless to say, a substantial portion of gains of the record GIR, from its recent troughs have stemmed from cross-border credit transactions with US banks.

That said, financial derivatives, such as FX swaps, and massive cross-border credit transactions only increases the implicit USD short-positions of the domestic financial system, magnifying its vulnerability to sharp volatility in the financial markets.

Oh, add FDIs to such leveraging. Intercompany debt or debt to domestic affiliates comprised 73.75% of the 2019 10-month FDI, which doesn’t mechanically entail investments on productive capacity.

Record GIRs don’t seem to exhibit the abundance of foreign exchange holdings, instead like stocks, internal operations appear to have been designed to embellish or facelift superficially the nation's macroeconomic picture.

Brought about by the big bond boom, and the rallying ASEAN currency, that 2019 luck on the Peso seems bound to reverse in 2020. The 3.7% annual gains of the peso in 2019 came in the light of its neighbors, the Indonesia rupiah 3.64%, the Thailand baht 8.15% and the Malaysian ringgit 1.03%.

Buy the USD Php!

Sunday, January 19, 2020

Bank’s November Cash Reserves Soar on BSP’s QE and RRR Cuts! The Taal Volcano Eruption Scapegoat for Higher Inflation!



A permanent lowering of the interest rate can only be the outcome of increased capital formation, never the result of any technical banking measures. Attempts to achieve a long-term lowering of interest rates by expanding the circulation credit of the banks ineluctably result in a temporary boom that leads to a crisis and to a depression—Ludwig von Mises

In this issue
Bank’s November Cash Reserves Soar on BSP’s QE and RRR Cuts! The Taal Volcano Eruption Scapegoat for Higher Inflation!
-BSP’s QE, November’s Php 100 Billion RRR Cuts and Bank Borrowing Spiked Bank’s Cash Holdings Last November!
-The Perils of Debt Monetization (Money Printing)
-FX Deposits Engulfed by Deflation as Peso Savings Deposit Conditions Remain Lethargic!
-Banking Loans Stagnate in the Face of Massive QE, RRR and Policy Rate Cuts as Investments and Profits Decelerate!
-In spite of BSP’s “Shock and Awe” Measures, NPLs at Multi-Year High, Treasury Yields Rise Across the Board!
-Mt. Pinatubo Eruption Experience: Sorry, but Taal Volcano Eruption Won’t Spur or Magnify Inflation!

Bank’s November Cash Reserves Soar on BSP’s QE and RRR Cuts! The Taal Volcano Eruption Scapegoat for Higher Inflation!

“If there are risk issues to raise, it will have to be the prospects of managing liquidity. Aside from simply having more loans versus deposits, using liquid assets as a source for funding more earning assets needs our attention. However, the bigger issue will be that continuing on the path of being a bank-based financial market means that the provision of credit will require taking on mismatches in tenor and in liquidity. As more credit is dispensed, such mismatches will only increase—BSP led FSCC’s 2018 Financial Stability Report

BSP’s QE, November’s Php 100 Billion RRR Cuts and Bank Borrowing Spiked Bank’s Cash Holdings Last November!

Last week, our discussion* centered on the doubling of the CPI last December, which had been powered by the BSP’s second leg of the domestic version of QE, and its connection with government finances.


This week, aside from the updates of the balance sheet, the impact of the BSP’s massive QE to the banking system will be shown.
Figure 1
 Along with a 100 bps cut in the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) last November, which freed up an estimated Php 100 billion, the BSP intensified its rescue of the banking system, by unleashing a tsunami of liquidity through debt monetization, that is net claims on the central government expanded vigorously month-on-month by 7.7% (Php 150.6 billion) or year-on-year by 13.9% Php 258.2 billion.

Such deluge of liquidity swelled the banking system’s cash reserves by 8.8% (Php 216.146 billion) m-o-m or by 9.03% (Php 219.087 billion) y-o-y to Php 2.65 trillion, a 23-month high! (Figure 1 and 2 upmost window)

BSP data on the banking system’s balance sheet and domestic liquidity can be found here and here, respectively.

The U-turn of net claims on the central government, which started in May 2019, played a crucial role in the turnaround of cash and due banks from deficit to growth.

Figure 2

The banking system’s investment assets consisting of Available for Sale (AFS) and Held for Trading (HFT), which registered declines last November, must have been part of the BSP’s liquidity operations. On a month on month basis, AFS declined Php 41.97 billion, its largest since September 2018 while Held for Trading assets decreased by Php 13.02 billion. (Figure 2, middle pane)

The BSP’s QE and RRR cuts were not the only factors. Banks were busy raising funds from the capital markets. Bills payable rose Php 22.08 billion while Bonds increased Php 19.77 billion for a total of Php 41.85 billion, month-on-month. Year-on-year, Bills increased by 7.8% (Php 58.63 billion) to Php 811.7 billion, while Bonds rocketed 152.71% (Php 329.53 billion) to Php 545.33 billion for a combined growth of Php 388.166 billion or 40.07% YoY to Php 1.356 trillion. (Figure 2, lowest window)

BSP’s debt monetization supercharged the RRR cuts, which seemed to have been inadequate in flooding the system with liquidity, and the bond raising by the banks on the capital markets.

Such liquidity injecting measures will continue, another RRR cut took effect last December. There would be more in 2020.

Despite all these, banks continue to aggressively borrow from the public this 2020 as in the case of Union Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands and Philippine Savings Bank. It never seems to end.

The Perils of Debt Monetization (Money Printing)

The BSP expects that the sheer “shock and awe” intensity of RRR cuts combined with such massive scale of debt monetization would not only normalize liquidity conditions that had been strangling the industry, but likewise spur banks to breathe new life on credit growth, which ramifications would be the attainment of CPI, GDP and revenue targets.

If everything has been so rosy, why all these?

Yet, even if the task of shoring up liquidity for the financial industry succeeds, this should be a precarious experiment.

Money printing from debt monetization AND bank credit expansion will function as a lethal smoldering cauldron that would combust real economy prices to the stratosphere!

Such an inflation outbreak would not only wreak havoc on the peso but likewise, impair the nation's division of labor, impel a discoordination of the economic process, spike interest rates and break open to the public, the banking system’s skeletons in the closet, which would likely spur a domino effect from a credit crunch!

Or have the BSP embraced the monetary sect called the Modern Monetary Theory, which sees free lunch from money printing?

FX Deposits Engulfed by Deflation as Peso Savings Deposit Conditions Remain Lethargic!
Figure 3

While the tidal wave of liquidity injected into the financial system last November did spur a surge in cash levels, the BSP’s Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for liquidity hardly reflected substantial improvements due to the sluggish conditions of deposit liabilities!

Liquid assets to deposits ratio barely increased, it grew from 47.58% in October to 47.99% in November, still lower than the September’s 48.28%. Cash and due banks to Deposits ratio jumped from 18.54% in October to 19.91% in November, reaching an 11-month high. (Figure 3, upmost pane)

That said, total deposit liabilities registered an unimpressive 6.51% last November, a 7-month high.

Growth of total deposits emanated mostly from peso deposits, which expanded by an unimpressive 7.98%, an 11-month high, coming in the face of the BSP’s widening of the QE valve PLUS the RRR cuts.

Peso demand deposits, which advanced by a hefty 13.82%, carried the weight of the segment’s gains, and most likely, absorbed part of the BSP’s QE.

Savings deposits crept out of the deflationary zone last October and had been up by a meager 2.66% in November. Growth of time deposits, meanwhile, slowed to 12.6% in November from 16.1% a month ago.

Nevertheless, November’s performance hardly pushed the banking system’s savings deposits, which had been reflected in the M2, from its 6-year downtrend! (Figure 3, middle window)

Might RRR cuts and a possible continuation of the money printing last December do the trick? Or will it require more of the same in 2020?

Didn’t some sages call doing the same things over and over again, but expecting different results as insanity?

Strikingly, while the massive injections kept peso savings afloat, Foreign Currency deposits tumbled to the deflationary domain! (Figure 3, lowest window)

Because demand and time deposits contracted in November, total fx deposits shrunk by .19%! The scanty 3.32% growth of FX’s savings deposit was insufficient to push FX deposits to growth.

So while banks have been starved out of FX, the BSP’s GIRs have reached a record high! What gives? Did the BSP use the FX deposits of the banking system to augment its statistical reserves?

Banking Loans Stagnate in the Face of Massive QE, RRR and Policy Rate Cuts as Investments and Profits Decelerate! 

Figure 4

And it should be apparent that the banking system’s Total Loan Portfolio (TLP) has shadowed the trend of savings, the fundamental source of bank lending.

TLP inclusive of Interbank and Reverse Repo transactions bounced marginally from 7.35% in October to 8.13% in November, a growth rate which remains below September’s 8.91%. It is important to remember that both factors have been southbound since 2013. (Figure 4, upmost window)

And to arrest forces of deflation from engulfing a credit-dependent economy, the BSP’s massive liquidity tsunami program has implicitly been engineered to rekindle credit expansion, again, to meet its money supply, therefore the CPI, GDP, and revenue targets. That’s what inflation targeting has been all about, which is the BSP’s primary objective.

Interestingly, the BSP’s grand liquidity tsunami program has yet to reinvigorate the bank credit expansion and money supply conditions substantially.

And with the BSP acquiring National Government’s debt from the banking system, investment growth slowed considerably last November.

Total Net Investments (financial assets and equity investments in subsidiaries) decelerated to 11.31% in November from 15.19% a month ago. Because of the big bond boom, the growth of total investments zoomed to its pinnacle in April 2019 at 20%. (Figure 4, middle pane)

Curiously, even with the BSP’s direct subsidies to the banking system, registered market gains appears to be fading.  Accumulated gains recorded a 228% increase in November to Php 19.29 billion, which was higher in percentage than October’s 212%, but lower in nominal terms the month’s gains Php 22.06 billion.

It appears that the beneficial impact from the subsidies from the big bond boom has been eroding too. Hence, the BSP’s rescue would seem not just aimed to provide liquidity, but likewise, maintain the bank’s profitability—another indirect means to enhance liquidity.  

In spite of BSP’s “Shock and Awe” Measures, NPLs at Multi-Year High, Treasury Yields Rise Across the Board!

Figure 5

Fascinatingly, despite the avalanche of liquidity injections, part of which has filtered into M3, mostly via M2’s demand deposits, Net Non-Performing Loans (NPL) remains adrift at multi-year highs! And these represent the only banking system’s declared and published NPLs.

By reflating the system through the revving up of credit expansion, the BSP believes that higher GDP would contain the outbreak of delinquent debt, thereby bolstering financial liquidity. Unfortunately, in spite of the flooding of liquidity, Net NPLs had been steady at 1.15% in November, again slightly off the multi-year high carved last August at 1.18%. And NPLs have clung tenaciously at such levels even as Money Supply conditions have modestly improved. (Figure 5 upmost window)

More pointedly, the aggressive injection of liquidity by the BSP barely been improved the economic and financial conditions, thus the elevated published NPLs.

To emphasize, money supply expansion is mostly a product of bank credit expansion.  From the BSP on November’s liquidity conditions: “Demand for credit remained the principal driver of money supply growth.”

Since bank credit conditions represent the essential causal factor to changes in money supply, its declining growth rate, thereby, leads to the diminishment of the latter. More importantly, when bank credit contracts or is defaulted upon, the money supply shrinks.

Thus, under the current environment, a combination of the declining rate of bank credit expansion AND rising debt delinquencies in the banking system fundamentally erode the money supply conditions or financial liquidity.

So with banks drudging to revitalize liquidity conditions, the BSP has thus, assumed command and control by printing money through monetization of debt, which usually has been used to finance deficits.

Since all actions have consequences, sadly, the immediate impact from this "shock and awe" policy has been to raise rates materially across the Treasury yield curve (PDS) this week and in the first 11 trading days of January.  T-Bill (BVAL) rates continue to climb! (Figure 5, mid-pane)

With the draining of excess liquidity previously held by the National Government, with the massive infusion of money from the BSP, with the crowding-out effect in financing, as banks and the NG compete for public savings, and with higher street inflation due to such money printing measures, rates can be expected to rise significantly over time.

Stagflation is upon us in no time.

The late BSP Governor Nestor Espenilla Jr.’s published this concern at the 2017 Financial Stability Report, which should reverberate…

While there is no definitive evidence of a looming crisis, it is also clear that shocks that have caused dislocations of crisis proportions have come as a surprise. What is not debatable is that repricing, refinancing and repayment risks (3Rs) are escalated versus last year and this could result in systemic risk if not properly addressed in a timely manner.

Mt. Pinatubo Eruption Experience: Sorry, but Taal Volcano Eruption Won’t Spur or Magnify Inflation!

Finally, the search for a convenient scapegoat as the culprit for inflation has emerged.

For possibly fanning the flames of inflation, media has pointed the finger at last week’s Taal volcano eruption.

Yet, if Mount Pinatubo’s episode on June 15, 1991, should serve as a paradigm, the second-largest eruption in the twentieth century, surging CPI didn’t happen. In fact, in the aftermath of the eruption, the CPI plunged! Plummeting money supply growth preceded or caused the crash of the CPI back then. (Figure 5, lowest pane)   


The CPI drifted at 18.7% to 21.1% in the first five months of 1991. In June or during the month of Mt. Pinatubo’s unrest, the CPI registered 20.6%. The CPI descended below 20%, beginning October. In 1992, except for January’s 10.9%, the CPI was below 10%.

On the other hand, after culminating in 1990 at 28.6% in October, M3’s growth trend descended sharply lower, falling below 14% by September 1991. With money supply growth tempered, the CPI followed suit.

Because imports can remedy supply shocks caused by natural disasters, such dislocations are unlikely to pressure prices upwards for long or if at all.  That’s in the condition that markets are allowed to function.

The lightning rod for a higher CPI, which will be cited by media, will emerge from many irrelevant events.

But no one will point at the BSP’s money printing as the primary culprit.