Zimbabwe’s Economic Recovery Prompted by Spontaneous Dollarization

Here are some very interesting developments in post-hyperinflation Zimbabwe.

Hyperinflation has prompted the average Zimbabweans to junk the domestic currency [the defunct 'Zimbabwe Dollar'] while simultaneously gravitating spontaneously to dollarize their economy. This has resulted to a rebound in economic growth.

Writes Professor Steve Hanke at the Cato Institute

So how did Zimbabwe go from economic ruin to an annual GDP growth rate of 9.32 percent in 2011, with estimates of relatively strong growth rates through 2013?  As I predicted in early 2008, the answer is simple: spontaneous dollarization brought an end to the horrors of hyperinflation.

The important point to emphasize is that the average Zimbabweans responded to failed and repressive regulations and edicts through their own spontaneous initiative (and exactly the OPPOSITE from government imposition) which eventually became the nation’s informal ‘standard’.

Yet the informal dollarized money standard has been reflected on the economy as the informal economy dominates Zimbabwe which accounts for nearly 84% of employment (and could be more).

Yet Zimbabwe’s government continues to force its way on a society which has already rebelled on them economically

Again Mr. Hanke (bold mine)

While these achievements are cause for celebration, there are still problems in paradise: Robert Mugabe continues to hold the reins of power; Zimbabwe’s “Ease of Doing Business” ranking is a dismal 172nd out of 185; and “change” is, in short, hard to come by. In addition, the government’s external debt is now close to $12.5 billion and lending rates between Zimbabwe’s embattled banks are as high as 25 percent. To top it off, the Zimbabwean government is attempting to force banks to buy its treasury bills at significantly discounted rates, after its debt auction flopped in early October. Talk about ruling with an iron fist.

Also the Zimbabwean government, notes Mr. Hanke, continues to manipulate statistics “Lying statistics remain the order of the day” to embellish what has been a monumental government failure.

It’s amazing that the average Zimbabweans, who seemingly remain submissive and tolerant with the incumbent abusive and oppressive government, apparently live in a paradox or in a parallel universe.

Perhaps the Zimbabwean political economy could be a seminal manifestation of Étienne de La Boétie’s nonviolent political resistance and civil disobedience through the starvation of the beast.

In Zimbabwe, Coin Shortages can mean Life or Death

The scars from the ravages of Zimbabwe’s recent episode of hyperinflation has been evident through the effects of coin shortages.

From the AFP

Shouting matches and even physical fights break out each time a mini-bus pulls up in downtown Harare as passengers battle to ensure they are not short-changed in coin-starved Zimbabwe.

Hyperinflation forced Zimbabwe to trash its worthless local currency three years ago in a move that brought much needed relief to the crippled economy but created a surprising new headache: a lack of coins.

"Change is a big problem, and at the same time passengers are impatient with us. I have been slapped a few times for not having change for them," said a bus conductor Walter Chakawata.

The US dollar and the rand from neighbouring South Africa are Zimbabwe's main adopted currencies. The dollar, however, is preferred and all prices are pegged to it.

But there is not enough US small change in circulation. The result is that prices are either rounded off -- making goods and services more expensive -- or customers brace themselves for a fight to get their change.

The average city commute costs 50 cents. But the dearth of coins means passengers -- handing over bills -- are always owed change. Some bus drivers pair the passengers, handing them a dollar bill in change and leaving the two riders to sort the rest out themselves.

Often their only alternative is to buy an item worth a dollar that they can then share -- a packet of cookies, a pie or anything they agree to.

But that has not gone down well with many, who feel obliged to make an unnecessary purchase. Others complain it forces them to spend time with a total stranger. Or what if one is in a hurry? And in a country where many live on less than $2 a day, 50 cents still remains a decent sum, not to be wasted.

The fights have at times turned deadly. Last year, independent papers reported that a state security agent pulled out a pistol and shot dead a bus conductor after he failed to give him change.

Markets don’t operate on a vacuum however. From the same article…

Not all merchants buy coins, however. Ice-cream and yoghurt vendor Locadia Chimimba conceded that "the situation is better these days because you can buy change if you want" but she herself does not and still asks customers to buy more to make up the difference.

In supermarkets, when the grocery bill does not add up neatly to a round figure shoppers are offered sweets, match boxes, chewing gum and even condoms to compensate.

So markets grope to find a substitute on such coin shortages. This should mark a transition phase.

But why the coin shortages?

Authorities considered importing US coins but the idea was dropped when shipping costs proved too expensive -- costing two dollars for a batch of coins worth one dollar, experts said.

Bottom line:

People’s psychology and behavior are materially influenced by changes in monetary conditions.

Monetary disorders spawns disruptions in the division of labor which incites violence.

Coins function as insurance against the corruption of money. This is why some of the political authorities have considered a ban on coin collection.

The Suddenness of Inflation

Bloomberg columnist, author and Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) analyst Amity Shlaes warns about the complacency of political authorities over inflation. (hat tip Professor Antony Mueller)

“Sudden” is more like it. The thing about inflation is that it comes out of nowhere and hits you. Monetary policy is like sailing. You’re gliding along, passing the peninsula, and you come about. Nothing. Then the wind fills the sail so fast it knocks you into the sea. Right now, the U.S. is a sailboat that has just made open water, and has already come about. That wind is coming. The sailor just doesn’t know it.

“Sudden” has happened to us before. In World War I, an early version of what we would call the CPI-U, the consumer price index for urban areas, went from 1 percent for 1915 to 7 percent in 1916 to 17 percent in 1917. To returning vets, that felt awful sudden.

The popular mainstream ‘begging the question’ argument on consumer price inflation goes something like this: inflation risk is minimal, because there has been little signs of inflation today.

Present and past actions have been construed as extending to the future, with little regards to the cause-and-effect relationship from implemented policies such as money printing or zero bound rates. In reality, these arguments have been pushed to justify more inflationist-interventionist policies: No inflation? Have more inflation.

Yet like natural disasters, inflation wreaks havoc at the least expected moments.

The volatile episodes of US CPI inflation coincided with wars (World War I, World War II and the Vietnam War). (chart from tradingeconomics.com)

In a relative sense, today’s US CPI inflation environment has been ‘calmer’ than the current periods. Even if the US has been engaged in numerous imperialist wars, along with the huge welfare state that substantially contributes to the ballooning record fiscal or budget deficits. (chart from the Heritage Foundation)

chart from Cleveland Federal Reserve

And this comes amidst the exploding balance sheet of the US Federal Reserve. The US Federal Reserve has topped China as the largest owner of US treasuries, which means that the US central bank has become the key source of financing for the US government.

And these banking based financing of public expenditures are inflationary. The great Murray N. Rothbard explained

Deficits mean that the federal government is spending more than it is taking in in taxes. Those deficits can be financed in two ways. If they are financed by selling Treasury bonds to the public, then the deficits are not inflationary. No new money is created; people and institutions simply draw down their bank deposits to pay for the bonds, and the Treasury spends that money. Money has simply been transferred from the public to the Treasury, and then the money is spent on other members of the public.

On the other hand, the deficit may be financed by selling bonds to the banking system. If that occurs, the banks create new money by creating new bank deposits and using them to buy the bonds. The new money, in the form of bank deposits, is then spent by the Treasury, and thereby enters permanently into the spending stream of the economy, raising prices and causing inflation. By a complex process, the Federal Reserve enables the banks to create the new money by generating bank reserves of one-tenth that amount. Thus, if banks are to buy $100 billion of new bonds to finance the deficit, the Fed buys approximately $10 billion of old Treasury bonds. This purchase increases bank reserves by $10 billion, allowing the banks to pyramid the creation of new bank deposits or money by ten times that amount. In short, the government and the banking system it controls in effect "print" new money to pay for the federal deficit.

Thus, deficits are inflationary to the extent that they are financed by the banking system; they are not inflationary to the extent they are underwritten by the public.

While we cannot exactly predict exactly when CPI inflation is bound to hit the US economy, given the recent actions by the US Federal Reserve and US Federal government, we understand though that inflation will eventually rear its ugly head.

The question is a WHEN rather than an If. And to what degree of inflation.

And worst, since the world has operated on a monetary standard based on the US dollar, the effects of US inflation will be worldwide.

The basis for such prediction is our theoretical understanding of the 3 stages of inflation

As the great Ludwig von Mises pointed out, (bold highlights mine)

In the early stages of an inflation only a few people discern what is going on, manage their business affairs in accordance with this insight, and deliberately aim at reaping inflation gains. The overwhelming majority are too dull to grasp a correct interpretation of the situation. They go on in the routine they acquired in non-inflationary periods. Filled with indignation, they attack those who are quicker to apprehend the real causes of the agitation of the market as "profiteers" and lay the blame for their own plight on them. This ignorance of the public is the indispensable basis of the inflationary policy. Inflation works as long as the housewife thinks: "I need a new frying pan badly. But prices are too high today; I shall wait until they drop again." It comes to an abrupt end when people discover that the inflation will continue, that it causes the rise in prices, and that therefore prices will skyrocket infinitely. The critical stage begins when the housewife thinks: "I don't need a new frying pan today; I may need one in a year or two. But I'll buy it today because it will be much more expensive later." Then the catastrophic end of the inflation is close. In its last stage the housewife thinks: "I don't need another table; I shall never need one. But it's wiser to buy a table than keep these scraps of paper that the government calls money, one minute longer."

A fundamental example has been the most recent bout of hyperinflation which buffeted Zimbabwe’s economy during the last decade, which I posted three years back.

When inflation strikes, it slams like a tidal wave. Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation produced a hockey stick like effect, similar to Weimar Germany’s experience.

While the risk of hyperinflation is not yet imminent, if the current path of inflationist policies is sustained, then this would enhance the probability of such a risk.

Zimbabwe’s Gideon Gono Hearts the Chinese Yuan

Below is an interesting article about the eccentric Gideon Gono of Zimbabwe.

From New Zimbabwe (bold emphasis mine)

RESERVE Bank governor Gideon Gono has warned that Zimbabwe’s nascent economic recovery is at the mercy of the United States dollar, which is facing new pressures from the Euro-zone debt crisis.

Gono says Zimbabwe should in fact be looking to the Chinese yuan as its main currency, while urgently seeking to restore its own currency which was abandoned in 2009 after a dramatic loss of its value.

Speaking in Gweru last Saturday, Gono said: “The extraordinary happenings in Europe where economic power houses in the Euro-zone have been hit by a debt crisis deserves extraordinary measures, especially here in Zimbabwe where we have adopted the U dollar as the major currency in our multi-currency regime.

"With the continuous firming of the Chinese yuan, the US dollar is fast ceasing to be the world's reserve currency and the Euro-Zone debt crisis has made things even worse.

“As a country, we still have the opportunity to avoid being caught napping by adopting the Chinese yuan as part of consolidating the country's look East policy.”

China is now Zimbabwe’s biggest trading partner, with the Asian giant absorbing most of the country’s mineral and agricultural produce.

Vice President Joice Mujuru first raised the possibility of adopting the yuan in September last year, saying it would be a “logical step” and could help solve some of the country’s liquidity constraints.

The multiple currency regime announced in January 2009 has been fraught with difficulties. Retailers are supposed to accept the Euro and the British pound but those two currencies have never caught on, with most transactions being conducted in United States dollars, the South African rand and the Botswana pula.

This serves as a noteworthy example of the pot calling the kettle black.

Mr. Gono, who ironically engineered the death of Zimbabwe’s currency, the Zimbabwe dollar, has not given up on his conceit of supposedly knowing what is best for their country, yet has the chutzpah to bash the US dollar when Ben Bernanke has simply been mimicking Mr. Gono's policies.

Zimbabweans rejected Mr. Gono’s hyperflated dollar following years of hyperinflationary depression which eventually led to its ‘abandonment’.

Yet Zimbabwe’s post hyperinflation transition exhibits a socio-economic phenomenon of spontaneous order from politically induced chaos.

One would note that following the demise of the Zimbabwe dollar, the market CHOSE or expressed preference for the US dollar, the South African rand and the Bostwana pula over the Euro and the British pound as alternative replacements for medium of exchange.

And another interesting facet is that this serves as evidence that markets are dominant over politics or that people will adjust to the conditions even outside of government’s influence.

China’s increasing trade with Zimbabwe may possibly lead to more use of the yuan, but this would depend on Zimbabweans than from Mr. Gono. The hyperinflationary episode has eroded much of the political capital of Zimbabwean government which will need to rebuilt before the marketplace will regain their trust on them.

For now, spontaneous order governs the Zimbabwean marketplace, which has impelled for a "nascent recovery" of the ravaged economy of Zimbabwe.

Mr. Gono can keep talking, but little of what he says will be taken seriously.

More Devaluation Fallacies

Celebrity guru Nouriel Roubini writes about the Euro crisis and delivers his grand prescription,

So if you cannot devalue, or grow, or deflate to a real depreciation, the only option left will end up being to give up on the euro and to go back to the lira and other national currencies. Of course that will trigger a forced conversion of euro debts into new national currency debts.

Utter nonsense.

First of all, devaluation represents a default, not against the duplicity of the central bank-bankers-welfare state but against the average Greeks or the Italians. So politicians will be saving their skins at the expense of their respective citizenry.

Thus, the currency devaluation nostrum aims to preserve the welfare state which serves as the root of the Eurozone’s problem. This does nothing to solve the problem.

Second, if devaluation causes economic growth, then why has Zimbabwe’s massive devaluation (hyperinflation) not spurred her economy into the stratosphere?

Chart from Wikipedia.org

The answer; since inflationism forcibly redistributes resources from creditors to debtors, such policies impairs an economy’s division of labor via price signal distortions (aside from regulatory obstructions, particularly the twin of inflation: price controls) which restrains competitiveness and consequently poses a significant impediment to trading activities, capital accumulation, and most importantly, a substantial reduction in the purchasing power.

Chart from Indexmundi.com

Zimbabwe’s inflationism has led to 7 years of hyperinflationary depression (where economic recession has ranged from minus 3% to minus 18% in 2001-2008).

Zimbabwe’s economy has only begun to recover after the Mugabe government abdicated on such cataclysmic hyperinflationist policies which resulted to the demise of the Zimbabwe dollar and the adaption of the US dollar and South African Rand as mediums of exchanges.

This so applies with Brazil's experience too.

Three, devaluation will be a messy and chaotic process as pointed out by Professor Steve Hanke because this will translate to massive and widespread bankruptcies of the private sector (such as in Zimbabwe).

It is true that lowered standards of living from devaluation will force those affected to work more to cover for the loss of purchasing power, but this can hardly be construed as an improvement. Effects must not be read as a cause.

What is needed is to allow markets to clear by reducing the amount of government interferences, and importantly, by allowing malinvestments to be liquidated

As Professor Philipp Bagus writes,

First, relative prices must adjust. For instances, housing prices had to fall, which made other projects look relatively more profitable. If relative housing prices do not fall, ever more houses will be built, adding to existing distortions.

Second, savings must be available to finance investments in the hitherto neglected sectors, such as the commodity sector. Additional savings hasten the process as the new processes need savings.

Lastly, factor markets must be flexible to allow the factors of production to shift from the bubble sectors to the more urgently demanded projects. Workers must stop building additional houses and instead engage in more-urgent projects, such as the production of oil.

Fourth, currency devaluation nostrum signifies as an appeal to emotion rather than a logical construction of economic reality.

Such pretentious policy prescription has been predicated upon the oversimplistic assumptions of the world as operating in the prism of aggregates (where there is a single dynamic for wages, labor, product, price sensitivity and demand).

Again the Zimbabwe example shows how much quackery currency devaluation prescriptions are.

Fifth Mr. Roubini has an inferior batting average in terms of predicting markets (such as his debate with Jim Rogers on Gold), which implies that his analytical methodology must be severely flawed. And instead his views seem to be influenced by his political connections.

I am reminded of the great Ludwig von Mises who demolished the populist fallacies of inflationism…(bold emphasis mine)

The popularity of inflationism is in great part due to deep-rooted hatred of creditors. Inflation is considered just because it favors debtors at the expense of creditors. However, the inflationist view of history which we have to deal with in this section is only loosely related to this anticreditor argument. Its assertion that "expansionism" is the driving force of economic progress and that "restrictionism" is the worst of all evils is mainly based on other arguments…

…The question is whether the fall in purchasing power was or was not an indispensable factor in the evolution which led from the poverty of ages gone by to the more satisfactory conditions of modern Western capitalism. This question must be answered without reference to the historical experience, which can be and always is interpreted in different ways, and to which supporters and adversaries of every theory and of every explanation of history refer as a proof of their mutually contradictory and incompatible statements. What is needed is a clarification of the effects of changes in purchasing power on the division of labor, the accumulation of capital, and technological improvement…

In the conduct of business, reflections concerning the secular trend of prices do not bother any role whatever. Entrepreneurs and investors do not bother about secular trends. What guides their actions is their opinion about the movement of prices in the coming weeks, months. or at most years. They do not heed the general movement of all prices. What matters for them is the existence of discrepancies between the prices of the complementary factors of production and the anticipated prices of the products. No businessman embarks upon a definite production project because he believes that the prices, i.e., the prices of all goods and services, will rise. He engages himself if he believes that he can profit from a difference between the prices of goods of various orders. In a world with a secular tendency toward falling prices, such opportunities for earning profit will appear in the same way in which they appear in a world with a secular trend toward rising prices. The expectation of a general progressive upward movement of all prices does not bring about intensified production and improvement in well-being. It results in the "flight to real values," in the crack-up boom and the complete breakdown of the monetary system.

See the difference? The analytical backing of inflationism fundamentally relies on heuristics (mental shortcuts/cognitive biases) and or aggregates (math models) against the real world, whose risk-taking operations by capitalists and entrepreneurs are principally driven by the desire to earn profits.

War on Commodities: UN Endorses Price Controls

UN endorses more price controls on commodities

Reports the Bloomberg,

Commodity markets need international oversight, more transparency and intervention to deflate bubbles because increasing speculation means prices are no longer driven by supply and demand, the United Nations said.

Increased investment in commodity markets has encouraged “herding behavior” and creates bubbles, the UN’s Conference on Trade and Development said in a report published today. Anticipation of the global economic recovery played a “disproportionate role” in higher commodity prices, it said.

“Prices can move far from levels justified by the fundamentals for extended periods, leading to an increasing risk of price bubbles,” the UN said in the report. “Due to these distortions, commodity prices do not always provide correct signals about the relative scarcity of commodities.”

By how exactly does the UN determine “prices are no longer driven by supply and demand”? Their math models?

It’s an irony because earlier they had been warning about a US dollar collapse

From the IBTimes FX

Rob Vos, a senior UN economist involved with the report, said if emerging markets "massively start selling off dollars, then you can have this risk of a slide in the dollar."

Are they assuming that “selling off dollars” and “prices are no longer driven by supply and demand” are not at all connected?

Put differently, that there is absolutely no connection between debasing one’s currency and rising prices?

Maybe Zimbabwe did not experience a socio-economic depression from hyperinflation (2004-2009).

Instead Zimbabwe could have suffered from the herding effects of speculators. Speculators cratered the Zimbabwe dollar and caused consumer prices to double every day

Such is UN's prism of economics.

In the real world, rising commodity prices in response to government’s continued debasing of a currency is a symptom known as the “Flight to Real Values”.

From Mises.org

The frantic rush to spend all monetary savings and other available cash, buying goods, whether needed or not, in order to avoid holding, even for a short time, any rapidly depreciating monetary units. This occurs at that point in the development of inflation when the public is convinced that prices will continue to rise endlessly and at an accelerated pace. The flight into goods or real values is also known as a "Crack-up boom" (q.v.) and marks the complete breakdown of a monetary system.

The UN can only pretend. But they will not succeed in controlling prices if they do not treat the root of the problem—government’s inflationism.

As Ludwig von Mises warned in Planning for Freedom

those engaged in futile and hopeless attempts to fight the inevitable consequences of inflation-the rise in prices-are masquerading their endeavors as a fight against inflation. While fighting the symptoms, they pretend to fight the root causes of the evil. And because they do not comprehend the causal relation-between the increase in money in circulation and credit expansion on the one hand and the rise in prices on the other, they practically make things worse.

Twilight Zone: Zimbabwe Considers A Gold Backed Dollar!

It’s always a reasonable advice to expect the unexpected.

Zimbabwe, whom has been the latest country to endure a stunning gut-wrenching episode of hyperinflation as shown below (previously posted here)....

….has reportedly been considering…hold your breath…a Dollar backed by GOLD!

Reports the New Zimbabwe (hat tip Bob Wenzel)

THE central bank says the country must consider adopting a gold-backed Zimbabwean dollar warning that the US greenback’s days as the world’s reserve currency are numbered.

Government ditched the Zimbabwe dollar in 2009 after it had been rendered worthless by record inflation levels and adopted multiple foreign currencies with the US dollar, the South African Rand and the Botswana being the most widely used.

Finance minister Tendai Biti says the country needs at least six months import cover and a sustainable track-record of economic growth, inflation stability and above 60 percent capacity utilisation in industry before the Zim dollar can be brought back into circulation.

However central bank chief, Dr Gideon Gono said the country should consider adopting a gold-backed currency.

“There is a need for us to begin thinking seriously and urgently about introducing a Gold-backed Zimbabwe currency which will not only stable but internationally acceptable,” he said in an interview with state media.

“We need to re-think our gold-mining strategy, our gold-liberalisation and marketing strategies as a country. The world needs to and will most certainly move to a gold standard and Zimbabwe must lead the way.”

Gono said the inflationary effects of United States’ deficit financing of its budget was likely to impact other countries to leading to a resistance of the green back as a base currency.

Has this tergiversation talk of Dr. Gono, the man responsible for Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation, imply of a genuine conversion? I doubt so.

Yet, as earlier pointed out in my previous post where Steve Forbes has predicted the return of the Gold Standard in 5 years, it usually takes a calamitous event for politicians to embrace what is seen as politically repulsive.

Could Dr. Gono be the trendsetter?

Is Hyperinflation A Bogus Theory?

Ellen Brown thinks hyperinflation is a bogus theory, she writes...(bold emphasis mine)

``So long as workers are out of work and resources are sitting idle, as they are today, money can be added to the money supply without driving prices up. Price inflation results when “demand” (money) increases faster than “supply” (goods and services).”

Let’s take her assumptions and apply it to Zimbabwe (all colored charts courtesy of indexmundi.com)

Checklist number 1: Zimbabwe has 95% unemployment rate (idle workers)

Checklist number 2: Zimbabwe has also seen a successive collapse of GDP -depression! (idle resources)

1+1=2? Or unemployment + idle resources = no inflation? Of course, not.

In fact inflation skyrocketed at an annual rate of 11,200,000% (according to Index Mundi’s data) or Hyperinflation!

Based on Professor Steve Hanke’s calculation this actually much higher...

79.6 billion % for 2008! The second worst in world history.

The reason for this is that the Mugabe-Gono government financed public debt (expenditures) with seemingly endless printing of money, because the nation’s access to credit has been severed externally (international) and internally (domestic savings).

So unless the US is immune to the universal laws of economics, whereby unfettered printing of money equals no inflation and is a recipe to prosperity, which has been falsified when applied to the experience of other countries, I wonder who embraces a theory that is bogus?

Zimbabwe In The Aftermath Of Hyperinflation: Free Markets

We have published so much about the negative aspects of Zimbabwe, such that we even made her as model for government abuses.

The quest for the preservation of political power by President Robert Mugabe eventually led to hyperinflation.

But things do change.

It would be understandable that after enduring the worst, there is no way but up.

But it is Zimbabwe's reform transition that makes it all the while striking-from tyranny to free market.

This article from Alf Field "Zimbabwe's Fresh Start" is a must read... (Thanks to Jeff Tucker of the Mises Blog)

(bold highlights mine)

``In February 2009 Zimbabwe was the only country in the world without debt. Nobody owed anyone anything. Following the abandonment of the Zimbabwe Dollar as the local currency all local debt was wiped out and the country started with a clean slate.

``It is now a country without a functioning Central Bank and without a local currency that can be produced at will at the behest of politicians. Since February 2009 there has been no lender of last resort in Zimbabwe, causing banks to be ultra cautious in their lending policies. The US Dollar is the de facto currency in use although the Euro, GB Pound and South African Rand are accepted in local transactions.

``Price controls and foreign exchange regulations have been abandoned. Zimbabwe literally joined the real world at the stroke of a pen. Money now flows in and out of the country without restriction. Super market shelves, bare in January, are now bursting with products."

Read the rest here.

Some additional important quotes:

Here are the common sins (not only in Zimbabwe but everywhere- the difference is that Zimbabwe went to the extremes) and their consequences...

``There are common denominators in all hyperinflations. Generally government finances reach a point where large budget deficits cannot be financed by taxes or borrowings. The choices come down to austerity (with the government cutting back its spending) or by funding the deficit by creating local currency through the printing press, leading to the inflation tax. This is always a political decision, but the line of least resistance is the printing press. Cutting government expenditures and laying off bureaucratic staff is anathema to most politicians.

``The worst trauma for ordinary people during the hyperinflation was lack of food. This was due mainly to the imposition of price controls. If the cost of production of an item was $10 and the price controllers instructed that the item could only be sold for $5, the business would soon go bankrupt if they sold at the controlled price. The result was that production and imports just dried up, hence the empty shelves in the supermarkets. People survived by shopping in neighboring countries and relied on assistance from South Africa and the aid agencies.

``Companies survived the hyperinflation with great difficulty and often by ignoring laws. Although companies were left without debt post February 2009, they were also left deficient in working capital and had dilapidated plant and equipment. Regular repairs and maintenance could not be afforded. Most companies now require urgent recapitalization.

``The causes were those always present in these events. A weak economy, large government budget deficits, inability to borrow funds combined with the political decision not to cut Government spending. Governments are reluctant to lay off government employees, especially those related to the armed forces. The latter might invite a military coup. The only source of funding left is the creation of new money.

As to how one hedges against hyperinflation from the Zimbabwe nightmare...

``Having seen the impact of hyperinflation at close quarters, my view is that this is the least desirable method for eliminating excessive debt. The population has been traumatized physically (starvation), mentally and financially. Most people did not have foreign assets or local tangible assets, so lost virtually everything. The companies survived using unusual skills, ignoring laws and protecting working capital by holding foreign currency or purchasing equities"

Foreign currencies, equities, unusual "survival" skills and IGNORING LAWS...

Final quote...

``It is fascinating to see how rapidly the economy is recovering. It is a great testament to what can be achieved in a free enterprise environment by the elimination of controls combined with the institution of new money that people trust. It needs to be money that their Government cannot create via the printing (or electronic) press."

Amen

A Deeply Embedded Inflation Psyche

``What deflationists always overlook is that, even in the unlikely event that banks could not stimulate further loans, they can always use their reserves to purchase securities, and thereby push money out into the economy. The key is whether or not the banks pile up excess reserves, failing to expand credit up to the limit allowed by legal reserves. The crucial point is that never have the banks done so, in 1990 or at any other time, apart from the single exception of the 1930s. (The difference was that not only were we in a severe depression in the 1930s, but that interest rates had been driven down to near zero, so that the banks were virtually losing nothing by not expanding credit up to their maximum limit.) The conclusion must be that the Fed pushes with a stick, not a string.” –Murray Rothbard, Making Economic Sense

Many have touted today’s action in the marketplace as a manifestation of success from government intervention.

Given public’s predisposition to focus on the short-term and interpret heavily on current information, especially after repeatedly being seduced from the incentives provided for by inflationary policies, today’s appearance of success equals tomorrow’s seismic crisis.

Betting The House On Too Big To Fail

In the US, the “Too Big To Fail” syndrome is becoming deeply entrenched in the heavily regulated banking industry.

An article by Peter Eavis at the Wall Street Journal entitled “Uncle Sam Bets the House on Mortgages” gives as a stirring depiction of the growing intensity of systemic concentration risks.

(bold highlights mine)

``It is a stunning change, but is it good for the housing market, and to what extent will it boost profits over the long term for this elite trio: Wells Fargo, Bank of America and J.P. Morgan Chase?”

Graph 1: Wall Street Journal: Too Big To Fail Getting Bigger

``Right now, housing remains on government life support. Treasury-backed entities are guaranteeing about 85% of new mortgages, while the Fed buys 80% of the securities into which these taxpayer-backed mortgages are packaged.”

``The optimistic take is that this support, though large, will shrink when market forces regain confidence. But there is a darker possible outcome: The emergency assistance is entrenching a system in which the taxpayer takes the default risk on most mortgages, while a small number of large banks get a larger share of the fee revenue from originating and servicing mortgages.

``That is what is happening now. While big banks are originating lots of mortgages, they are selling nearly all of them to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Indeed, combined single-family mortgages held on the balance sheets at J.P. Morgan, BofA and Wells actually fell 3.5% in the first half. Before the bust, these banks sold large amounts of loans to Fannie or Freddie, but they also held on to products like jumbo mortgages. The volumes for those large loans now have tumbled.”

What you have here is essentially the politicization of the US banking industry, where the top 3 banks have cornered the meat of the “economic rent” from mortgage servicing and issuance which it deals with the US government.

And this concurrently, becomes an issue of moral hazard, where these highly privileged banks, which operates on implied guarantees from US government that they are “too big to fail”, may indulge on more aggressive risk taking activities at the expense of US taxpayers.

Moreover, the US government stands as THE market for home mortgages.

Alternatively, this also posits that since the US government is a political entity and is less constrained by economic pressures, the pricing structure for transacting these mortgage securities have been above what the market is willing to pay for. Thus, government intervention translates to massive tax payer subsidies to cover losses meant to keep the banking system afloat.

Analyst Doug Noland in his Credit Bubble Bulletin recently dissected the Federal Reserves 2^nd Quarter Flow of Fund and construed that instead of targeting stabilization for conventional mortgages, the Fed has been propping up private label Mortgage Backed Securities.

He says (all bold emphasis mine), ``So, the Fed is amassing quite a stockpile of “conventional” GSE MBS, but often these are “private-label” mortgages recently “refinanced” into GSE securities. And as the Fed buys the new GSE MBS, newly created funds become available to flow back to reliquefy the formerly illiquid ABS marketplace (along with agencies, Treasuries, corporates, and equities). To be sure, placing essentially federal government backing upon previously “private-label” mortgages dramatically changes the market’s perception of these securities’ worth (“moneyness”) – especially with fed funds pegged for an extended period at near zero and the Fed in the midst of a $25bn weekly purchase program in order to fulfill it commitment to purchase $1.25 TN of mortgage securities….”

``Not only is the vast majority of new mortgage Credit this year government-backed, Washington guarantees are being slapped on hundreds of billions of existing “nonconventional” mortgages. This intrusion and transfer of (Credit and interest rate) risk has terrible long-term ramifications. Although in the near-term this mechanism provides a powerful stabilizing force for both the Credit system and real economy.”

Here is an example of the “privatization of profits and socialization of losses” from which would most likely exact a heavy toll on US productivity and which would likewise be reflected on the economy, as the productive segments will be penalized dearly for the subsidies or the losses incurred by the US banking system.

Nevertheless all these accounts for the priorities of the incumbent officials and their penchant to salvage a preferred industry via the inflation route, as we discussed in Governments Will Opt For The Inflation Route.

Bernanke’s Fascism Risks An Inflation Crisis

One would have to wonder whether Fed Chair Ben Bernanke is a chronic prevaricator or has been captured by the industry he regulates or operates with a tacit vested interest on the industry or has been fanatically blinded by ideology to declare that the Fed won’t monetize debt and likewise yearn for expanded powers or control over more parts of the economy including the proposed regulation of banker’s pay. Mr. Bernanke failed to predict, was in denial of the crisis and panicked in front of Congress to ask for bailout money.

To quote John H. Cochrane And Luigi Zingales who wrote on a Wall Street Op-ed on the Lehman anniversary, `` these speeches amounted to the financial system is about to collapse. We can't tell you why. We need $700 billion. We can't tell you what we're going to do with it." That's a pretty good way to start a financial crisis.”

Yet the justification to “help the agency act more decisively to reduce the chances of a recurrence” would only entrench the growing politicization, reduce the systemic efficiency and transition the US market economy into fascist state.

In the definition of Sheldon Richman, Fascism is ``where socialism nationalized property explicitly, fascism did so implicitly, by requiring owners to use their property in the “national interest”—that is, as the autocratic authority conceived it. (Nevertheless, a few industries were operated by the state.) Where socialism abolished all market relations outright, fascism left the appearance of market relations while planning all economic activities. Where socialism abolished money and prices, fascism controlled the monetary system and set all prices and wages politically. In doing all this, fascism denatured the marketplace.” (bold emphasis mine)

Yet, the diminishing role of institutional check and balances and an increasingly centralized flow of power would only amplify the systemic concentration risks that could spark a runaway inflation crisis (given Bernanke’s tendency to inflate).

One man’s error could lead to another global systemic mayhem.

The Fed didn’t monetize debt?

Again Doug Noland on the Fed Fund Flow, ``In total, Rest of World purchased $403bn SAAR of Treasuries during Q2, about a quarter of total issuance ($1.896 TN SAAR). Who were the other major purchasers? The Fed monetized $647bn SAAR, the Household Sector bought $343bn SAAR, and Broker/Dealers accumulated $404bn. And while it is positive that American households are buying Treasuries and saving more, this does not change the fact that this so called “savings” was bolstered by income effects from massive government spending increases.”

For us, the outcome of inflation or deflation is a result of a deliberate policy. It’s only the fat tails or the extreme outcomes that function as a form of unintended consequences, similar to the meltdown post Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.

Moreover we don’t believe that inflation can only occur via a revitalized US consumer.

Such view myopically underestimates the role of fiscal channels [Noland: “bolstered by income effects from massive government spending increases”] or an increasing concentration or centralization of power by central banking [Richman: “Where socialism abolished money and prices, fascism controlled the monetary system and set all prices and wages politically”].

In addition, given today’s increased globalization or deepened integration by global economies and financial system, there are transmission mechanisms or interlinkages from global governments undertaking the same inflationary tools [Noland: “Rest of World purchased $403bn SAAR of Treasuries during Q2, about a quarter of total issuance ($1.896 TN SAAR)”].

Hence while the risks of debt deflation seem a concern for some parts of the world, it does not apply to all. Yet if debt deflation is premised from a monetary phenomenon perspective, based on country specific issues, then the argument crumbles especially when applied to countries that have been least leveraged.

Not even a “ghost fleet of recession” or massive number of ships idly anchored in Asia in the absence of international trades arising from the recession would be enough to circumvent a steadfastly determined central bank to inflate a system.

A central bank can simply print a dollar per every dollar of liability, even if it means hundreds of trillions, if it deems it as beneficial.

Zimbabwe’s recent example should be a reminder that no amount of capacity utilization, unemployment rate, velocity of money [see last week’s Velocity Of Money: A Flawed Model], consumer spending or consumer debt and other traditional econometrics used by mainstream experts deterred a tyrant (operating on centralized power and a politicized economy) and an inflation obsessed central banker in Dr. Gideon Gono from fanning 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000% hyperinflation in 2008.

While the US or UK may not be the same as Zimbabwe, an increasing centralization of power and politicization of the economy could neutralize any inherent advantages thereof. As former Fed Chief Alan Greenspan quoted in Bloomberg commented, ``It’s the politics in the United States that worries me, whether the Congress will basically feel comfortable” with the Fed withdrawing its stimulus, Greenspan said in a broadcast to Tokyo clients of Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. today. He later said that “if inflation rears its head, it will swamp long-term markets,” referring to bonds.”

In short, Mr. Greenspan appears sardonically worried about the US government’s addiction to inflation, a policy which incidentally, he applied extensively throughout his tenure. One might say that he inured the world with the “Greenspan Put” or Mr. Greenspan’s repeated policy of rescuing or providing support for the markets with artificially lowered interest rates during the 1987 stock market crash, the Gulf War, the Mexican Tequila crisis, the 1997 Asian crisis, the LTCM debacle, Y2K, the burst of the internet bubble, and the 9/11 terror attack.

Not until a significant part of the world becomes as deeply indebted as those afflicted by the recent bubble, will deflation become a meaningful threat to the global banking system or perhaps not until the destruction of the present currency system.

Yet deflation is a natural and rightful antidote to the excesses of inflation.

Exploding Bond Markets, From Periphery To The Core

Moreover, while debt deflation advocates continue to tunnel onto the banking system as the key source for benchmarking credit market conditions, they seem to forget the existence of the bond market as an alternative venue for credit access.

However, the difference is that credit via the bond markets won’t trigger the fractional reserve nature of today’s banking platform that would expand monetary aggregates. Nonetheless it helps push up prices of securities.

This from the Financial Times, ``European bond issuance has hit $2,000bn so far this year, the fastest ever pace of issuance, as companies race to refinance in the bond markets and banks remain reluctant to lend.

``European sovereigns, agencies and companies have sold 38 per cent more than the $1,450bn issued in 2008 in the year to date, according to analysts at data provider Dealogic, who add that issuance has never previously stood at such a high level so early in the year.

``Non-financial companies accounted for a record $446.3bn so far this year, 55 per cent more than in all of 2008….

``Financial issuers have sold a record of $542.8bn year to date, 24 per cent more than issued in 2008.”

In Asia, a somewhat similar dynamics could be at work as bond market growth has also been robust see figure 2.

Figure 1: ADB Bond Monitor: Hefty Growth in Bond Markets

According Standard & Poors as quoted by Researchrecap ``Notwithstanding a near universal attempt by central banks to ease monetary conditions, bank lending—still the predominant source of funds in the emerging markets—has varied from country to country. China is a standout, having reportedly injected as much as $1.1 trillion in new lending during the first six months of 2009. For many other markets, however, credit growth is decelerating (and, in some cases, contracting) in comparison with a year ago. This suggests that banks, even those that were largely unscathed by the financial crisis, are remaining cautious to stave off a potential increase in nonperforming loans.” (bold highlights mine)

In short given the fresh memory of the 2008 setback, some banking system in the region has opted to remain conservative in their lending practice. Nonetheless, the other route has been through the debt markets.

According to the ADB’s Bond Monitor, (bold underscore mine)

``Emerging East Asia’s bond market grew by 12.8% year-on-year (y-o-y) on an local currency (LCY) basis to USD3.94 trillion in the first half of 2009. The market also expanded by 5.2% quarter-on-quarter (q-o-q) in 2Q09 as financial markets showed signs of stabilization and the region’s growth showed signs of recovery. This lifted the growth rate for outstanding LCY bonds for the first half of the year…

``The strongest improvements in y-o-y bond market growth rates on an LCY basis in the first half of 2009 were in Hong Kong, China (19.4%); the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (14.8%); Republic of Korea (Korea) (13.1%); Indonesia (12.3%); and the Philippines (8.2%).”

Anyway, one of the publicly listed companies in the Philippines, the SM Investments, successfully sold $500 million worth of bonds from which two-thirds of the placements had been made local investors (FinanceAsia). This is a testament of the immense liquidity of the domestic system which had been reinforced by a faster growth clip in July (BSP).

In addition, domestic bank credit growth has remained vigorous in terms of trade and production, household consumption and bank repo lending activities (BSP).

And the growth in both the banking and bond markets have been indications of inflationary policies gaining continued traction in Asia. This as we repeatedly been saying is simply due to low systemic leverage, high savings rate, unimpaired banking system, current account surpluses and an apparent trend towards a deepening regionalization, and likewise, integration with the world economic system.

And as discussed in The Growing Validity Of The Reflexivity Theory: More PTSD And Periphery, we proposed that growth dynamics would probably shift from the core (US consumers) to the periphery (emerging markets), ``money appears as being transmitted to support growth in the developing countries as part of the collaborative efforts to inflate the system.”

Morgan Stanley’s Joachim Fels, takes a parallel view in his recent outlook, ``near-zero interest rates in the US and Europe eased monetary conditions in those emerging market economies that peg to the dollar or the euro, adding to their domestic stimulus packages. Thus, it didn't come as a surprise that China was the first major economy to emerge from recession, given that it imports easy money from the US through the exchange rate link without having the US's financial sector problems.

``The point worth noting here is that we may all still be underestimating the effects of the stimulus that has already been put into place and is still playing out. If so, growth would not moderate from its current 4%+ global pace going into 2010 as in our base case, but accelerate further. The most plausible upside scenario, in our view, would be one where Asia keeps motoring ahead with domestic demand strengthening further in response to the stimulus, leading to a surprisingly strong revival of global trade.” (bold emphasis added)

Stages Of Inflation Redux

Instead of the deflation scenario, today’s sweet spot in inflation could actually signify as the initial phase of the three stages of inflation as also discussed in Warren Buffett’s Greenback Effect Weighs On Global Financial Markets.

To quote Henry Hazlitt, ``What we commonly find, in going through the histories of substantial or prolonged inflations in various countries, is that, in the early stages, prices rise by less than the increase in the quantity of money; that in the middle stages they may rise in rough proportion to the increase in the quantity of money (after making due allowance for changes that may also occur in the supply of goods); but that, when an inflation has been prolonged beyond a certain point, or has shown signs of acceleration, prices rise by more than the increase in the quantity of money. Putting the matter another way, the value of the monetary unit, at the beginning of an inflation, commonly does not fall by as much as the increase in the quantity of money, whereas, in the late stage of inflation, the value of the monetary unit falls much faster than the increase in the quantity of money. As a result, the larger supply of money actually has a smaller total purchasing power than the previous lower supply of money. There are, therefore, paradoxically, complaints of a "shortage of money." (bold emphasis mine)

What could be seen as some pockets of deflation today, could actually be the initial phases of inflation. And a continued rise in the commodities space even if it signifies as a currency “pass through” from the sagging US dollar would likely intensify the inflation expectations.

Then when the late stage of inflation have been reached, where the value of monetary unit falls faster (or consumer prices are rising faster) than the increase in the quantity of money which leads to the perception of “a shortage of money”, the central bank under the auspices of the government would either elect to print money at an ever accelerating “exponential” rate to meet such shortages-ergo the hyperinflation scenario, or opt to withhold feeding the boom (or by declaring a default) -the deflation scenario.

Again this will all be a result of policy choices.

So simply reading conventional metrics when governments have taken a lead role in the marketplace will lead to misdiagnosis and mass confusions on the disconnection between the market from economic reality. Analyzing how political trends will shape policy decision making will likely be a better alternative [see Stock Market Investing: Will Reading Political Tea Leaves Be A Better Gauge?]

Anyway, a hyperinflation episode would also lead to deflation once the hyperinflated currency have been eschewed and replaced by another currency. The recent case of Zimbabwe which has abrogated its currency, the Zimbabwean Dollar, for the US dollar and South African Rand is a prime example.

At the end of the day, global policymakers will continue to bask on the triumphalism from present day policies and will most likely continue to keep the booze flowing.

Hence even if markets don’t move in a straight line they will likely respond positively to policy sustained policy accommodations over this early phase of the inflation cycle.